Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Commissioner of Police, NSW v Taleb [2019] NSWSC 21 Hearing dates: 21 – 22 November 2018; 3 December 2018; 5 December 2018 Date of orders: 30 January 2019 Decision date: 30 January 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Hamill J Decision: (1) Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of the schedule to the first subpoena will be struck out. (2) Subject to a claim of public interest immunity, order production of the application for controlled operation authority CB CO 17/097. (3) Subject to a claim of public interest immunity, order production of the authorities, operational plans, and reports created pursuant to the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 relating to controlled operation CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2. (4) Subject to order (3) requiring production of the authorities, operational plans and reports, set aside the second subpoena insofar as it seeks the application and associated documents relating to controlled operation authorities CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – application to set aside subpoena – legitimate forensic purpose – metaphors about fishing trips – Controlled Operation Authority – whether subpoena can compel production of application and material behind authority – where NSW police investigate Commonwealth offence – where accused contends operation is unlawful – whether terms of subpoena oppressive Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 310J Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15M Criminal Code (Cth) 1995 s 119.4 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 138 Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) ss 3,5(2A)(a), 15, 20B, 20C Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) Telecommunications (Interceptions and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) Cases Cited: Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; [1984] HCA 85 Allen v Ewing and Anor [2017] NSWSC 1696 Attorney General (NSW) v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; (2008) 182 A Crim R 536 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; [1979] UKHL 4 Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 Dowe v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission & Anor; Gedeon v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission & Anor [2007] NSWCA 296; 177 A Crim R 44 Flanagan v Australian Federal Police [1996] FCA 16; 134 ALR 495 Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 Gedeon, Gilbert v R [2013] NSWCCA 257 Gould v DPP (Cth) [2018] NSWCCA 109; (2018) 333 FLR 352 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; [1995] HCA 26 Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; [1989] HCA 94 Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; [1997] HCA 49 R v Jenkin (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 697 R v Mokbel (Ruling No 1) [2005] VSC 410 R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 Regina (C'Wealth) v Baladjam & Ors [No 28] [2008] NSWSC 1449 Rinehart v Rinehart [2018] NSWSC 1102 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; [1978] HCA 43 South Pacific Hotels Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation [1984] 1 NSWLR 710 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Moudasser Taleb Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Representation: Counsel: M Ramage QC (Mr Taleb) T Glover (Commissioner of Police, NSW) Solicitors: Zali Burrows at Law (Mr Taleb) Crown Solicitors Office (Commissioner of Police, NSW) File Number(s): 2017/00179287 Publication restriction: No publication until the conclusion of the trial. Judgment 1. Moudasser Taleb, who is due to stand trial in February 2019 in relation to what I will loosely describe as a terrorism offence, issued two subpoenas directed to the Commissioner of Police, NSW ("the Commissioner") and one directed to the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police. There was significant correspondence about these subpoenas and some agitation in front of the criminal list Judge before the matter was listed for trial and allocated to me. In accordance with directions made by the list Judge, both Commissioners filed notices of motion seeking to have the subpoenas set aside and the matter was listed before me on 21 November 2018 with an estimate of two days. Affidavits were sworn or affirmed and read on the application. 2. At the conclusion of the first day of argument, the lawyers indicated a willingness to speak to one another in an attempt to resolve the issues that were crystallised in the course of submissions that day. 3. The next day, Queens Counsel for the accused indicated that Mr Taleb no longer pressed the subpoena directed to the Australian Federal Police ("AFP"). It also appeared that the arguments surrounding the subpoenas directed to the NSW Police would be resolved by agreement and, on that understanding, the matter was adjourned until Monday 3 December 2018. However, while some issues were resolved, a number of significant issues remained in dispute. There was also a potential claim for public interest immunity. 4. On 3 December 2018, I was told there had been "some progression" but, as it turned out and in terms of the fundamental issues between the parties, there wasn't really much progress at all. The argument continued but not much was achieved beyond clarifying which paragraphs of the subpoenas were still pressed, which were not, and the issues that did, and did not, need to be resolved. The matter was adjourned until 5 December 2018 when there was further explanation of what needed to be decided and Queens Counsel for Mr Taleb and counsel for the Commissioner advanced their final arguments on the outstanding items in the subpoena. 5. Annexed to this judgment is a table setting out in column 1 the items sought by each paragraph of the two subpoenas ("the table"). Column 1 adopts the exact terms of the subpoenas themselves. Column 2 of the table sets out the final position of the parties after weeks of correspondence and parts of four days arguing in court. This includes (i) whether the item is pressed or not pressed, (ii) items where there is nothing to produce, (iii) items where the scope of the subpoena has been narrowed or clarified (iv) items that have been, or will be produced, and (v) where there remains dispute between the parties, a brief explanation of the nature of the dispute or objection. Column 3 identifies the reference to the transcript where this position was clarified or expressed. 6. By simply reading the schedules to the subpoenas, by reference to the subpoenas themselves or column 1 of the table, it can be seen that a number of the paragraphs were poorly drafted. The complaints made about some of the items sought by the subpoena, in terms of their breadth, potential to operate oppressively, and the opacity of any legitimate forensic purpose, were well-founded. Some of the paragraphs (in the subpoena directed to the AFP) did not seek documents but information. There was also, in the period the matter was before the list Judge and even after the argument was listed before me, a failure on the part of Mr Taleb's solicitor to respond to various requests made by the Crown Solicitors Office ("CSO") representing the Commissioner of Police, NSW. Not unreasonably, the CSO sought clarification as to precisely what documents were sought by the subpoena and how it was contended to be on the cards that those documents would assist Mr Taleb in his defence. Until the hearing, there appeared to be an intransigent failure to respond to correspondence containing the CSO's legitimate inquiries. These inquiries were calculated to narrow the issues between the parties and to streamline the conduct of the pre-trial hearing. 7. Under force of argument, by the time the decision on the notice of motion was reserved, a number of the more obviously defective paragraphs of the schedules to the subpoena were abandoned and the parties had negotiated a resolution to the production of certain documents pursuant to some of the other paragraphs. There remained a number of outstanding issues. The most controversial issue was whether Mr Taleb had a legitimate forensic purpose in seeking access to documents that were used in the application for two controlled operations authorities issued under the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) ("LECO Act"). 8. In relation to the first subpoena, there remained a dispute in relation to paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 13 and 24. Paragraphs 8-9 of the first subpoena are covered by the items sought in the second subpoena. In relation to the second subpoena, there remained a dispute in relation to all six paragraphs except for 1(d), 4, 5(c) and the material sought in relation to CB CO 17/097 in paragraphs 2 and 6, which was provided to Mr Taleb's lawyers in the course of the pre-trial hearing. [1] The facts and issues in the trial 1. Before turning to the specific paragraphs of the subpoenas which remain in dispute, it is necessary to relay briefly the charges against Mr Taleb and the case the prosecution seeks to present against him and, insofar as it can be known at this point, the nature of the case Mr Taleb intends to present. The charges against Mr Taleb and the prosecution case 1. The accused is charged with an offence under s 119.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) 1995. This is an offence referred to in the heading of the section as "preparations for incursions into foreign countries for the purpose of engaging in hostile activities". It is an offence that carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The "Crown Case Statement" was tendered on the application. [2] The prosecution alleged that the accused intended and prepared to travel to Syria to fight for a terrorist organisation known as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS). The prosecution will rely on recorded telephone calls between Mr Taleb and an associate (Mr Ghazzaoui). These occurred between 8 and 23 February 2017. The calls recorded a number of comments that might be seen or interpreted to convey extreme views on matters religious and political. It is unnecessary to set out those comments here. In some calls, gunfire could be heard in the background. When questioned by Mr Ghazzaoui, Mr Taleb said he was practicing and that it was "nothing man compared to the real, it's just a stupid game." 2. On 24 March 2017 an "operational plan" was created by NSW Police. [3] This plan was created under the LECO Act for the purpose of establishing controlled operation CB CO 17/097. An authority to conduct a cross border operation (CB CO 17/097) was granted the same day. [4] The authority was granted by a delegate of the Commissioner. 3. A report concerning controlled operation CB CO 17/097 was signed on 21 December 2017. [5] The report refers to a previous controlled operation (CB CO 17/023) that was "issued" on 25 January 2017 and varied on 16 February 2017 and 24 February 2017. 4. On 5 April 2017, Mr Taleb met with an undercover operative ("UCO"). Reading between the lines, this meeting was arranged by police pursuant to the controlled operations authorities then in existence. There were further meetings on 7 and 13 April, 3 May and 5 June 2017. In these meetings the accused showed the UCO items he had purchased and expressed his intention to fight on the front line in Syria. He was observed walking for many hours in his new boots while carrying a backpack. On 12 April 2017, he purchased various items from a Kathmandu camping equipment store. 5. On 20 April 2017, a controlled operation authority was issued by the AFP. It nominated the same NSW Police UCO as being authorised to participate in the controlled operation. The Deputy Commissioner of the AFP who signed this Authority dated it erroneously, in handwriting, "20/7/17" but it is clear from the substance of the Authority that it was granted on 20 April 2017. 6. Between 24 April 2017 and 15 June 2017, in the company of the UCO and otherwise, the accused did a number of things said to be in preparation to travel overseas and fight with ISIS in Syria. The prosecution will submit that conversations Mr Taleb had with the UCO confirm that this was his intention. On 15 June 2017 Mr Taleb travelled to Sydney Airport and was arrested. He was in possession of a number of items consistent with the intention asserted by the prosecution, many of which had been discussed with the UCO and were purchased over the preceding months. Mr Taleb's case 1. Queens Counsel was appropriately circumspect in relation to the case that the accused intends to run at trial. He complained that the Crown Case Statement failed adequately to summarise the interaction between the UCO and Mr Taleb. I understand it to be alleged that Mr Taleb was reluctant to be involved in any overseas incursions but was importuned or placed under pressure to express the desire to fight with ISIS. No evidence was tendered to establish this, but I am prepared to give some weight to Mr Ramage's assertions from the bar table, at least for the purpose of determining the preliminary issues around the subpoena (that is, whether there is a legitimate forensic purpose in seeking the documents itemised in the subpoena). 2. Reference was made to psychiatric reports although it is unclear what is to be made of these at trial. It may be that there will be evidence concerning Mr Taleb's fitness to stand trial, or supporting a defence of mental illness, or to establish that he was susceptible to influence or importuning undertaken by the UCO. The precise use to be made of these reports, or any details of their contents, was not made clear and there was no suggestion that they were relevant to the issues to be determined on the notice of motion concerning the subpoena. 3. It seems there will be a pre-trial argument under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) as to the lawfulness of the controlled operation and the admissibility of evidence gathered during that operation. In particular, it was submitted: [F]undamentally, it seems, this was a New South Wales operation. It quite clearly shouldn't have been because it involved a Commonwealth offence, an alleged terrorist offence. For a joint operation, although the New South Wales Police obviously enthusiastically chose to ignore it, there had to be a joint authority issued under the Commonwealth Act. Leaving that aside, most of the material I will be directing your Honour to is a failure to comply with the New South Wales Act in that respect, or seeking documents pursuant to that Act insofar as persons calling themselves Federal Agents were operating as part of a New South Wales operation prior to the issuance of any Commonwealth authority. [6] 1. The accused will argue that some (or all) of the evidence obtained in the course of the police investigation was unlawfully obtained. In particular, it will be argued that the NSW controlled operation authority could not authorise either AFP Officers or NSW Police Officers to investigate a Commonwealth offence. If this argument is correct, the activities up until the grant of the Commonwealth authority may be unlawful and the evidence obtained under the NSW authorities subject to exclusion (or, to correctly state the onus under s 138, admission) under s 138 of the Evidence Act. There may also be questions around whether the arguably belated obtainment of the Commonwealth controlled operation authority legitimised the operation prospectively or retrospectively. Matters likely to arise on pre-trial argument concerning lawfulness of NSW Police action 1. The operational plan for CB CO 17/097 set out the objectives or aims of the operation as follows: [7] To gather evidence and information concerning involvement in terrorist related activities, namely Membership of a terrorist organisation contrary to Section 310J of the Crimes Act NSW 1900 and Preparations for incursions into foreign countries for purpose of engaging in hostile activities contrary to Section 119.4 Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995 by Moudasser TALEB. Identify and gather evidence or information regarding other person/s involved in the said terrorist related activities. 1. The NSW controlled operation authority related to a "cross border operation". Section 20C of the LECO Act provides: 20C Applications for authorities to conduct cross-border controlled operations (1) An application under section 5 for an authority to conduct a proposed cross-border controlled operation: (a) must be made to the chief executive officer of the law enforcement agency concerned, and (b) must state that the proposed controlled operation is a cross-border controlled operation, and (c) must specify (in place of the particulars required by section 5 (2A) (b)) the relevant offence in respect of which the proposed operation is to be conducted. 1. Section 20B defines "relevant offence" as: (a) an offence against the law of this jurisdiction that carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 3 years or more, or (b) any other offence against the law of this jurisdiction that is prescribed by the regulations. 1. Section 3 provides that "this jurisdiction" means New South Wales. 2. Counsel for the Commissioner very properly acknowledged that these provisions may suggest there is some substance to an argument that the controlled operation authority went beyond the power granted to the Commissioner's delegate by Part 3A of the LECO Act. Relevant principles relating to subpoenas 1. For the most part, the legal principles upon which the notice of motion is to be determined are well established. There is one matter of the law which, on the submissions of the parties, is controversial and another where the parties take different approaches to the application of settled principle to the facts of the case. Vagueness, particularity and oppression 1. A subpoena must identify with clarity and particularity the document or documents sought to be produced. The party compelled by the subpoena to produce the documents must be placed in a position where it is able readily to identify the material to be produced. The categories of documents that might be caught by the terms of the subpoena must not be so broad as to require the recipient to troll through many hundreds of records in order to determine what documents are actually caught by the subpoena. A subpoena must not be used as a substitute for discovery. If the terms of the subpoena are too wide or lacking in particularity, the subpoena may be set aside as oppressive on the basis that it represents an abuse of the Court's process. See generally, Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 573-574, South Pacific Hotels Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation [1984] 1 NSWLR 710 at 718 and Rinehart v Rinehart [2018] NSWSC 1102 at [50]-[51]. Identification of forensic purpose and prohibition on "fishing" 1. As noted in the last paragraph, a subpoena cannot be used as a substitute for discovery. Many of the decided cases, including cases of the highest authority, adopt metaphors about fishing and fishing trips to explain the prohibition. The issuing party must identify the legitimate forensic purpose for which the documents are sought. A failure to do so will mean that the subpoena will be set aside or relevant parts struck out. Establishing that the documents may be relevant to an issue in the case is not sufficient. Rather, it must be established that the documents may materially assist the party's case. A party is not permitted to use a subpoena in order to embark on a "fishing expedition" in the hope that documents might assist their case. The "net cast" by the subpoena must not be too wide. While a party may use the Court's subpoena power to obtain documents that will materially assist its case, it is not permissible to use that power to determine whether it has a case at all. See, for example, Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; [1984] HCA 85 at 414, R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 at 17-18, Attorney General (NSW) v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; (2008) 182 A Crim R 536 at [5], [62]-[64] and Commissioner for Railways v Small at 575. Greater latitude in criminal cases 1. While the propositions stated in the last two paragraphs apply to criminal proceedings, "a more liberal approach" is taken when a defendant in criminal proceedings seeks documents to assist or support their defence. A "lower standard" may apply. However, even in such cases, "fishing expeditions ought [not] to be encouraged". However, while "a mere 'fishing' expedition" is not to be countenanced, it may be enough that it appears to be "on the cards that the documents will materially assist the defence" in a criminal case. See, for example, Alister v The Queen at 455-456 and Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; [1978] HCA 43 at 42, 61-62. 2. In R v Mokbel (Ruling No 1) [2005] VSC 410 at [71], Gillard J made the following observations with which I have previously expressly agreed: [8] Defence lawyers are in a far better position than a judge to make an appraisal of the value of information contained. There is a fine line between fishing for information and knowing or suspecting that there is information in the documents relevant to the credibility of a witness. A more liberal approach to the question is required in a criminal proceeding. Experience shows that full examination of documents by defence counsel sometimes produces relevant material for cross-examination, material which may to others not fully conversant with all the factual matters, be not important. 1. Even allowing for the more liberal approach taken when a subpoena is pressed by a defendant in criminal proceedings, the principles articulated in cases such as Alister, Saleam and Chidgey remain central to the question of the enforceability of a subpoena. In Alister, the observations of Lord Edmund-Davies in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England were cited with approval: [9] [W]hat is no more than a "fishing expedition" ought not to be advanced by the judge's having a peep to see whether they contain an attractive catch. 1. Wilson and Dawson JJ doubted "whether a satisfactory criterion can be found which falls between the requirement that a likelihood be shown and mere hopeful anticipation." [10] Presumption of validity of warrants and attempts to obtain material used to ground the application for the warrant 1. A party cannot "go behind" a warrant (such as a search warrant, a surveillance device warrant or telephone intercept warrant) in an attempt to obtain the material that was used to procure the warrant. The validity of the warrant is determined by considering whether it is valid "on its face". An accused in a criminal trial may not mount a "collateral attack" on the validity of the warrant by seeking to examine the sufficiency of the material upon which the relevant authorised person or authority issued the warrant. This has been made clear in a number of well-known cases decided in the High Court, intermediate appellate courts and single judges of this Court: see, for example, Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; [1989] HCA 94 at 105, Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; [1995] HCA 26 at 359, Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; [1997] HCA 49 at 80 (Toohey J), 87 (Gaudron J), 130-131 (Gummow J), Gould v DPP (Cth) [2018] NSWCCA 109; (2018) 333 FLR 352 at [42], [52], [55]-[59] and Regina (C'Wealth) v Baladjam & Ors [No 28] [2008] NSWSC 1449 at [38]-[40]. 2. It seems that the prohibition on obtaining the material is not an absolute one. The observations of Basten JA in Gould v DPP (Cth) are important. His Honour noted at [57] that "the accused expressly eschewed the issue of a subpoena, counsel submitting that he might well not be able to satisfy the test of a legitimate forensic purpose." The case came before the Court on an appeal from a decision of the primary Judge refusing to order a temporary stay of criminal proceedings until the prosecution complied with its duty of disclosure. This was described at [60] as "procedurally" "unsound". Basten JA referred to my judgments in R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 at [75]-[76] and Allen v Ewing [2017] NSWSC 1696 at [30]-[47], saying at [54]-[56]: No doubt, on an appropriate factual basis, an accused person could challenge the admissibility of evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act on the basis there had been impropriety on the part of an applicant for a search warrant (for example, by relying on perjured testimony) or impropriety in the execution of the warrant. However, that is quite a different thing from challenging the validity of the warrant on conventional judicial review grounds. For example, the ground of improper purpose refers to the purpose of the decision-maker, not the purpose or conduct of the applicant. In R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) Hamill J found support for a broader form of review in a passage from Flanagan v Australian Federal Police suggesting that the trial judge had the power to exclude evidence where allegations of "bad faith and impropriety" have been made good. Hamill J noted that Flanagan was referred to with approval by McHugh J in Ousley. However, the key point in Flanagan was that "[n]ecessarily implicit in this ruling is the proposition that the trial judge in the pending County Court trial could determine the validity of warrants issued by Federal Court judges." [11] There is no doubt that an accused may seek to establish such impropriety as a basis for challenging the admissibility of evidence. That may be done through a voir dire, usually prior to the empanelling of a jury. Relevant evidence may be obtained from any source. That may require the issue of a subpoena if the evidence is thought to lie in the hands of the prosecutor, or the investigating authority. It can be entirely separate from any challenge to the validity of the warrant and on different grounds, as illustrated by a comparison of two interlocutory judgments in the Petroulias proceedings, R v Petroulias (No. 5), involving the challenge to an interception warrant, and R v Petroulias(No. 8), involving an allegation of impropriety. 1. One of the critical points made by Basten JA in Gould v DPP (Cth) was that "access to 'affidavits, statements or other documents' provided by the Australian Federal Police to the issuing authority could only rationally support a challenge to the issue of the warrants based on the insufficiency of the information supporting the applications." [12] That was not the issue in Allen v Ewing. The accused in that case did not seek to establish that there was insufficient material to justify the issuing officer's decision to issue the warrant. Rather, he attempted to establish that the police conduct was unlawful and that the unlawfulness or impropriety extended to the (belated) application for the warrant. 2. Basten JA did not suggest, at least explicitly, that Allen v Ewing was wrongly decided and counsel for the Commissioner in the present case accepted that, in the circumstances of Allen v Ewing, the decision was correct. [13] Allen v Ewing was a somewhat unusual case in that counsel then appearing for the Commissioner (not counsel who appeared in this case) submitted that the Local Court, before which it was contended that the investigating police acted unlawfully, had the power to go behind the warrant in the proceedings at first instance while counsel for the accused submitted that there was no such power and that it was necessary to bring proceedings for declaratory relief in this Court. [14] The case came before the Supreme Court on an application by the accused for declarations that a search warrant was invalid. The Commissioner contended that declaratory relief was inappropriate and should be dismissed in the exercise of discretion because the validity of the warrant, and the lawfulness of the search, could be determined in the lower court and the administrative law proceedings were calculated to fragment the criminal process. As to the decision in Ousley, counsel for the Commissioner (in Allen v Ewing) contended that there was no clear majority in the High Court for the proposition that "no collateral attack could be made on the search warrant in the absence of proceedings of the kind brought by his summons". [15] 3. The facts of Allen v Ewing were that police officers entered land without a warrant and there was a respectable argument that they conducted an illegal search. Part way through the search the officers made an application for a search warrant to the Local Court. The warrant was granted, the search continued and the accused was charged with cultivating cannabis. In those circumstances, I held that it was open to the Local Court to "go behind" the warrant in order to determine both the validity of the warrant and whether the police officers acted unlawfully. There was no suggestion that the collateral attack on the warrant was to be based on the sufficiency of the material before the issuing authority. Rather, the argument was that the police were acting unlawfully when they applied for the warrant and there was a legitimate purpose in going behind the warrant because it was applied for, and granted, part way through an (arguably) illegal search. 4. Similar considerations applied in R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3). [16] In that case, objection was taken to a conversation recorded by a surveillance device while a suspect was in a psychiatric hospital. The police obtained a warrant under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). The issuing Supreme Court Justice was not aware that the target of the warrant was in a mental health facility. The police officers were cross-examined about the contents of the affidavits sworn in support of the application for the warrant and their failure to disclose that the accused was (or might have been) mentally ill and that the warrant was to be executed inside a psychiatric hospital. Both officers denied that they knew the precise location of the accused when they applied for the warrant, let alone that he was a psychiatric patient at the time. The accused argued that the failure to disclose that fact to the Judge issuing the warrant meant that the warrant was invalid. The accused bore the onus of proof on the issue and I was not satisfied that the evidence established that the officers were aware that the accused was in the psychiatric hospital when they applied for the warrant. The fact that evidence later emerged that may have impacted on the administrative decision to issue the warrant did not invalidate the warrant, and it was valid on its face. However, in obiter remarks, I rejected the more extreme submission put by the Prosecutor that, if it were established that the police perjured themselves in applying for the warrant, the trial Judge could not determine that the evidence was improperly obtained because the warrant itself was valid on its face. [17] I relied on Flanagan v Australian Federal Police [1996] FCA 16; 134 ALR 495 at 545. 5. R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) was not a case about obtaining documents under subpoena. It seemed the affidavits used in the application for the warrant were disclosed to the accused without dispute or controversy and no objection was taken to the cross-examination of the police officers as to their state of mind, or what they disclosed to the judge who issued warrant. My observations were necessarily obiter and, as Basten JA pointed out in Gould v DPP at [55]: the key point in Flanagan was that "[n]ecessarily implicit in this ruling is the proposition that the trial judge in the pending County Court trial could determine the validity of warrants issued by Federal Court judges". 1. Again, R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) was not a case in which the accused sought to establish the insufficiency of the material upon which the surveillance device warrant was issued. Rather, an attempt was made to establish that the police acted improperly by failing to disclose important information – that the target of the electronic surveillance was in a psychiatric hospital – to the Judge who issued the warrant. 2. In the present case, and at this point in the proceedings, the question is whether Mr Taleb has established a legitimate forensic purpose to obtain (by subpoena) the material used in support of the applications for various warrants ("search warrants, listening devices warrants and telephone intercept warrants") [18] and/or the authorities to conduct a cross-border controlled operation. Subject to what appears below concerning the possible distinction between a warrant and a controlled operation authority, the starting point for that determination is that (i) ordinarily the Court will not order production of the material upon which a warrant or authority was issued and (ii) there is no power in a trial Court to consider the question of whether that material was sufficient to justify the grant of the warrant or authority. Is there a distinction between a warrant and a controlled operation authority? 1. The area of controversy to which I referred in paragraph [25] concerns whether the prohibition on the court inspecting the material founding a warrant applies equally to a controlled operation authority. Queens Counsel for Mr Taleb submitted that there were important distinctions that meant that the rules, if they were applicable at all, were at least relaxed. 2. The most critical point of distinction is that warrants are generally issued by an independent authority, usually a judicial officer, who exercises an administrative function separate from, and independent of, the investigators applying for the warrant. For example, in the case of a surveillance device warrant, the issuing authority is generally a Supreme Court judge. Telephone intercept warrants are issued by authorised officers of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and search warrants are issued by the Local Court or, in the case of covert search warrants, the Supreme Court. 3. A second point of distinction is that such warrants are issued upon the issuing authority, authorised officer or judicial officer being satisfied, usually based on affidavit evidence, of various statutory requirements or pre-conditions. By contrast, a controlled operation authority may be granted by a senior officer of the same investigating body (in this case, the NSW Police). Section 5 of the LECO Act does not require the material to be sworn or affirmed. All that is required is that the application be in writing and signed by the applicant. 4. Counsel for the Commissioner submitted that there was no relevant distinction although he acknowledged that there was no direct authority in which the point had been determined. He noted, correctly, that a judge or magistrate issuing a warrant was not undertaking a judicial function but rather an administrative one. In this regard, the documents sought by the second subpoena (and parts of the first) are indistinguishable from those that might be sought by a party seeking to go behind a warrant. 5. The most potent recent authority in the area is the decision of Basten JA in Gould v DPP (Cth) to which I have already referred. However, the present issue did not arise in that case because it involved an attempt to force disclosure of "affidavits, statements or other documents" used to support an application for a telephone intercept warrant under the Telecommunications (Interceptions and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). 6. In Chidgey, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered a matter where a subpoena was calculated to obtain documents that formed the basis of an application for a controlled operation authority under the LECO Act. The present issue does not appear to have been raised by either party. The Court did not make reference to the line of High Court authorities including Murphy, Ousley and Grollo. Rather, the Court held that the Magistrate erred in determining that the accused had a legitimate forensic purpose "so that they can check that there has been compliance with form in order for the Chief Executive Officer to be … satisfied that [a controlled operations authority should be granted]" [19] (emphasis in the original). The Court described the exercise as a fishing expedition and held that no legitimate forensic purpose was established. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that there was any relevant non-compliance with form and no evidence to suggest any impropriety or unlawfulness in the obtaining of the authority. The documents were not sought to establish a case of impropriety but, rather, to see whether there was such a case. 7. Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 was a case in which the High Court held that a controlled operation authority issued under the LECO Act was invalid. The invalidity arose as a result of the terms of s 15M of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which required the Commissioner granting the certificate to be "reasonably satisfied" that "any illicit goods involved in the operation will be under the control of an Australian law enforcement officer" [20] and the operation would not "seriously endanger the health or safety of any person" [21] . The present issue was not determined because of the course that the litigation took. The Commissioner resisted a subpoena during committal proceedings and, as a result, the applicant sought declaratory relief in the Supreme Court. As to this, the High Court made the following observations at 132-133: On 28 March 2006, at the committal proceedings in the Central Local Court, senior counsel for the Commissioner moved to have set aside a subpoena addressed to his client. He submitted that the Authorities had to be accepted for what they purported to be and that any question directed to the Commissioner which sought to "go behind" them could not be relevant. Counsel said that it might be possible to obtain declaratory relief in the Supreme Court, but that this was a matter for the applicants. There followed the institution of the Supreme Court proceedings. On 13 April 2006 the applicants were committed for trial. The trial of Mr Gedeon has yet to take place. Mr Dowe was convicted on 15 November 2007 after a trial in the New South Wales District Court before Judge Hulme and a jury and on 7 March 2008 he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve years with a non-parole period of eight years. His appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal is pending. It should be noted that the conviction of Mr Dowe occurred after the delivery of the decision of the Court of Appeal upholding the validity of the Authorities. As Basten JA indicated in his dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, the applicants have an interest in challenging the validity of the Authorities. In the case of Mr Gedeon, this is the exclusion of evidence at his trial, pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act and, in the case of Mr Dowe, it is to found a complaint in his appeal against conviction that s 138 should have been applied in his favour at his trial. Declaratory relief The course of this litigation should not be taken as authority that the submissions made by counsel for the Commissioner on 28 March 2006 at the committal proceedings were correct. The reasoning in Ousley v The Queen supports the contrary position at least where, as here, the argument is that the issue of the Authorities was an administrative act beyond the statutory power conferred on the Commissioner. Further, s 138 of the Evidence Act, in speaking of "evidence ... obtained ... improperly or in contravention of an Australian law", in a situation such as that respecting the validity of the Authorities, presents an issue under that section which calls for the trial judge to rule on a "collateral" attack. With respect to the exercise of the power to make the declaratory orders now sought by the applicants, authority in this Court affirms an important general principle. This is that power to make declaratory orders should be exercised sparingly where the declaration would touch the conduct of criminal proceedings. The fragmentation of the criminal process is to be actively discouraged. In any event, a declaration may be of limited utility where founded, as would be the case here, on facts admitted only for the purposes of the satellite litigation. 1. I have emboldened the paragraphs that have the most significance to the present issue. The decision in Gedeon neither supports nor refutes the argument made by Queens Counsel for Mr Taleb. It recognises the power of a trial court to consider the lawfulness of conduct authorised by a controlled operations authority and to determine, on a collateral attack, the validity of the authority itself (at least where it is submitted that the issue or the warrant was ultra vires). However, the decision does not support the proposition that a trial judge can entertain an argument that the authority is invalid because of the insufficiency of the material upon which it was granted. In Gedeon, the invalidity arose because "the issue of the authorities was an administrative act beyond the statutory power" [22] of the Commissioner. That is, the authorities purported to authorise conduct that was effectively proscribed by the LECO Act and the "grant of the authority was beyond power". [23] 2. The final thing to say about Gedeon is that the administrative law case at first instance was determined by reference to agreed facts. [24] There appears to have been no issue arising from any attempt to obtain the material upon which the controlled operation authorities was issued. When the matter was returned to the trial court, after the High Court declared the authorities to be invalid, there was extensive examination on the voir dire of that material and the states of mind of the investigators, and the Commissioner who issued the authorities. [25] That examination was not calculated to determine the sufficiency of the material to support the authorities. Rather, it related to the facts relevant to the question of whether the illegally obtained evidence should be admitted pursuant to the discretion in s 138 of the Evidence Act. 3. Whether or not there is any real distinction between the principles applying to warrants and those applying to a controlled operation authority, the fundamental issue remains whether the accused has established a legitimate forensic purpose in seeking production of the material. There is no such purpose in an attempt to discover material that will support an argument that there was insufficient material upon which to grant the authority. There may be a legitimate forensic purpose in uncovering material that is relevant to the validity of the certificate (beyond the sufficiency of the material upon which it was granted) and the lawfulness of the operation including the propriety of the application for the authority. However, there must be some basis or foundation upon which the material is sought. A party is not entitled to seek such material to discover whether there is any material that might support a case of impropriety or illegality. Paragraphs of the subpoenas where the disputes between the parties were resolved and paragraphs where there remains a dispute The first subpoena 1. In relation to the first subpoena, the parties reached agreement in relation to a number of the paragraphs in the schedule. Those paragraphs, and the basis of the resolution relating to them, is set out in the table and is as follows: * Paragraph 1 – not pressed. * Paragraph 2 – not pressed. * Paragraph 3 – nothing to produce (and a separate subpoena has been issued for related documents). * Paragraph 4 – not pressed. * Paragraph 5 – not pressed because the material is contained in the brief of evidence. * Paragraph 11 – not pressed. * Paragraph 12 – scope of paragraph narrowed and documents will be produced. * Paragraph 14 – not pressed. * Paragraph 15 – scope of paragraph narrowed as to dates but expanded to include "duty books". Documents will be produced subject to redaction based on a claim for public interest immunity. * Paragraph 16 – not pressed. * Paragraph 17 – not pressed. * Paragraph 18 – not pressed. * Paragraph 19 – subject to narrowing the scope of the paragraph, documents will be produced. * Paragraph 20 – not pressed. * Paragraph 21 – nothing to produce. * Paragraph 22 – not pressed. * Paragraph 23 – not pressed. * Paragraph 24 – produced in relation to CB CO 17/097; claim for public interest immunity over Register relating to CB CO 17/023. 1. There remained a dispute in relation to paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13 of the schedule to the first subpoena. The second subpoena 1. The agreements reached in relation to the second subpoena were as follows: * Paragraph 1(d) – not pressed (because the information sought was already obtained). * Paragraph 2 – pressed in relation to CB CO 17/023 but not in relation to CB CO 17/097. * Paragraph 4 – not pressed. * Paragraph 5(c) – not pressed. * Paragraph 6 – not pressed in relation to CB CO 17/097; pressed in relation to CB CO 17/023 and its variations (v1 and v2). 1. This left in dispute paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c), paragraphs 2 and 6 insofar as it related to CB CO 17/023 (and variations v1 and v2), paragraph 3 and paragraph 5(a) and (b) of the second subpoena. Items sought by paragraphs 6 and 7 of the first subpoena 1. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the subpoena seek: 6. A copy of NSWPF Eagle 1 entries and database records in respect of Moudasser Taleb. 7. A copy of NSWPF Internal emails or other correspondence concerning Moudasser Taleb. 1. Unlike other paragraphs in the first subpoena (for example, 10, 11 and 12), there was no correspondence emanating from Mr Taleb's solicitor narrowing the scope of the subpoena. No legitimate forensic purpose was identified that would justify compelling production of records not relevant to the present investigation. There is no reason to believe that, nor is it "on the cards" that, documents "in respect of" or "concerning" Mr Taleb not relating to the investigation leading to the current charges would assist Mr Taleb in his defence or have relevance to the pre-trial issues concerning the lawfulness of the police investigation. Further, the breadth of the subpoena has the potential to cause oppression because of the use of the words "in respect of" and "concerning". On one view this would compel production of any document in which Mr Taleb is mentioned no matter how far removed from the facts of the present case. 2. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the schedule to the first subpoena will be struck out. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the first subpoena 1. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the first subpoena seek production of the applications and authorities under controlled operation CB CO 17/023 and the variations numbers 17/023 v1 and 17/023 v2. It will be necessary to return to the fundamental debate between the parties about the capacity of a trial court to compel production of such material. However, the same material is sought under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the second subpoena although those paragraphs are drafted with greater clarity and particularity. 2. As a matter of convenience, in view of the repetition between the two subpoenas and the greater clarity in the terms of the second subpoena, I will strike out paragraphs 8 and 9 of the first subpoena. Documents relating to controlled operation CB CO 17/023, excluding the application and associated documents 1. The authority CB CO 17/123 authorised the controlled operation that commenced on 25 January 2017. The authority was renewed twice. 2. Initially, the Commissioner took the approach that there was no legitimate forensic purpose in seeking documents relating to this operation because the prosecution brief did not include any material gathered prior to the granting of controlled operation authority CB CO 17/097 (issued on 24 March 2017). However, the report for the latter operation was produced in the course of the argument and it included reference to the earlier controlled operation(s) and said they were "with respect to the same criminal activity/corrupt conduct". In those circumstances, there is a legitimate forensic purpose in the accused having access to the material. It is not a "fishing expedition" because it is known that there was an investigation into his activities for about two months before controlled operation CB CO 17/097 commenced. It is reasonable to suppose that the earlier investigation may have disclosed evidence going to his activities and motivations. In view of the foreshadowed attack on the lawfulness of the subsequent operation, and the suggestion that Mr Taleb was reluctant and subject to pressure to become involved in an overseas incursion, it is on the cards that this material may assist Mr Taleb in his defence. 3. For this reason, and in the course of the two weeks over which the argument intermittently proceeded, the Commissioner decided to produce (to the Court) some of the documents relevant to CB CO 17/023. [26] Redacted versions were also produced. [27] These documents contain material that may be (or will be) subject to claims for public interest immunity. Accordingly, they were returned to counsel for the Commissioner so that their security can be maintained by the CSO. 4. In relation to CB CO 17/023, there was some duplication between the material sought by the first subpoena and the documents sought under the second subpoena. Legitimate complaint was made about the vagueness of the terms of the first subpoena. Paragraph 13 of the schedule to the first subpoena seeks: "A copy of all NSWPF Planning Documents and formal reporting documents regarding progress and strategies concerning and touching upon Moudasser Taleb." 1. It is unclear whether this paragraph purports to be limited to the documents required to be created under the provisions of the LECO Act. If not, its scope is potentially very wide ranging and the terms have a capacity to cause oppression. The schedule to the second subpoena seeks "the plan for the controlled operation [17/023]" and "the report … pursuant to s 15 of the LECO Act." In context, "the plan" must be a reference to the plan required by s 5(2A)(a) of the LECO Act. 2. I propose to strike out paragraph 13 of the first subpoena but to order production of the plan and report relating to CB CO 17/023 (and its variations) pursuant to the terms of paragraphs 1(a) and 6 of the second subpoena. Paragraph 10 of the first subpoena 1. Paragraph 10 of the first subpoena calls for production of "a copy of the application to conduct a cross border controlled operation (CB CO 17/097)". Similar, but more specific, paragraphs were contained in the second subpoena but these were not pressed presumably because certain documents were produced and paragraph 10 of the first subpoena covered any material not produced under the second subpoena. 2. The controlled operations certificate is Ex VD B and the plan was produced in the course of the hearing and became Ex VD 3. The plan discloses that the aim or objective of the operation was to gather evidence and information relating to an offence under s 310J of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Membership of terrorist organisation) and an offence under s 119.4 of the Criminal Code Act (Cth) (my emphasis). A "relevant offence" for the purpose of such a cross-border controlled operation does not encompass the latter offence. Relevant offences are restricted to offences "against the law of this jurisdiction". [28] This is the foundation of Mr Taleb's contention that the NSW Police were acting unlawfully. In light of this evidence, I do not accept that Mr Taleb is on a "fishing expedition" when he seeks production of the application that led to the granting of the controlled operations certificate. As I understand it, this consideration is at the heart of the proposed submission that the NSW Police acted unlawfully in investigating a Commonwealth terrorism type offence. 3. The Commissioner submitted that, insofar as the asserted unlawfulness rested on the NSW Police investigating a Commonwealth offence, this much was patent on the face of the operational plan (Ex VD-3). Accordingly, the defence did not need further information and had no legitimate purpose in seeking the application for the authority. While that submission is correct insofar as it goes, the bare fact that a Commonwealth offence was being investigated may be insufficient for the accused properly to pursue his argument that the evidence gathered under the controlled operation CB CO 17/097 should be excluded under s 138 of the Evidence Act. It is "on the cards" that the application may contain information relevant to a number of the criteria in s 138(3) including the gravity of any impropriety or contravention of the legislative scheme, whether any such contravention was deliberate or reckless, and the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without the impropriety or contravention. 4. For those reasons, and subject to any claim for public interest immunity, I will order the production of the application for controlled operation certificate CB CO 17/097. Documents relating to the applications for controlled operation authorities CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2 1. Different considerations apply to the documents that led to the grant of the controlled operation authorities that pre-dated controlled operation CB CO 17/097. As I have said, the report in relation to CB CO 17/097 specifically identified an earlier authority as CB CO 17/023. It came into existence on 25 January 2017 and was varied on 16 February 2017 and 24 February 2017. I will order production of the plan and report relating to this earlier controlled operation because it is on the cards that those documents may contain evidence relevant to Mr Taleb's defence. 2. However, I was informed that the prosecution does not intend to adduce any evidence that was gathered as a result of this earlier operation. Accordingly, the legitimate forensic purpose that exists in relation to the application for CB CO 17/097 does not exist in relation to these earlier controlled operations. That is, there can be no suggestion that the application or associated documents will assist the accused in establishing that the evidence gathered should be excluded because it was obtained as a result of impropriety or in contravention of Australian law. 3. Accordingly, I will set aside the second subpoena insofar as it seeks the application or associated documents for controlled operations CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/013 v2. Orders 1. For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders: 1. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of the schedule to the first subpoena are struck out. 2. Subject to a claim of public interest immunity, order production of the application for controlled operation authority CB CO 17/097. 3. Subject to a claim of public interest immunity, order production of the authorities, operational plans, and reports created pursuant to the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) relating to controlled operation CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2. 4. Subject to order (3) requiring production of the authorities, operational plans and reports, set aside the second subpoena insofar as it seeks the application and associated documents relating to controlled operation authorities CB CO 17/023, CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2. First Subpoena 1. A copy of all warrants and applications for all telephone intercepts in respect of Moudasser Taleb for period 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Not pressed. Transcript ("T") 3/12/18 p 10 2. Copies of all transcripts of all recorded telephone conversations made by Moudasser Taleb during the period from 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 10 3. Copies of all transcripts of all telephone calls made by Moudasser Taleb after his arrest from Goulburn Correctional Centre and Long Bay Correctional Centre for period 15 June 2017 to date of this subpoena [22 August 2018]. Nothing to produce. T 3/12/18 p 10 Separate subpoena issued to the NSW Commissioner of Corrective Services. 4. Copies of all transcripts of all recorded conversations obtained by a recording device between Moudasser Taleb and undercover officer(s) during the period from 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 10 5. A copy of all surveillance notes and reports of any observations made of the accused and the undercover officer/s from 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Pressed initially, but conceded material already produced in brief of evidence T 3/12/18 p 10-11 T 5/12/18 p 13 6. A copy of NSWPF Eagle 1 entries and database records in respect of Moudasser Taleb. Pressed. T 5/12/18 pp 14-15 Objection based on breadth of subpoena (oppression) and dispute as to whether scope narrowed in correspondence. 7. A copy of NSWPF Internal emails or other correspondence concerning Moudasser Taleb. Pressed. T 5/12/18 pp 14-15 Objection based on breadth of subpoena (oppression) and dispute as to whether scope narrowed in correspondence. 8. A copy of application and authority to conduct a cross border controlled operation (CB CO 17/023). Pressed but covered by second subpoena. T 3/12/18 p 11 9. A copy of all applications and authority to conduct a cross border controlled operation (variations CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB CO 17/023 v2). Pressed but covered by second subpoena. T 3/12/18 p 11 10. A copy of the application to conduct a cross border controlled operation (CB CO 17/097). Pressed. T 3/12/18 p 11 Objection is based on the absence of legitimate forensic purpose and the impermissible attempt to go behind the Controlled Operation Authority. T 21/11/18 p 50 11. A copy of all affidavits supporting the provision of search warrants, listening devices warrant and telephone intercept warrant in relation to Moudasser Taleb during the period from 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Not pressed T 3/12/18 p 11 12. A copy of all intelligence reports arising from "Operation Tekapo". Pressed but scope narrowed to "between 1/12/16 and 15/6/17 in respect of Moudasser Taleb" T 3/12/18 p 11 Will be produced, subject to a public interest immunity claim. T 5/12/18 p 20 13. A copy of all NSWPF Planning Documents and formal reporting documents regarding progress and strategies concerning and touching upon Moudasser Taleb. Pressed. T 3/12/18 p 11 Objection is based on lack of clarity and breadth of the paragraph and, if the documents referred to, are the plan for the controlled operations, they have already been or will be produced, subject to a public interest immunity claim. T 5/12/18 pp 20-21 14. A copy of all foreign law enforcement agency materials concerning and touching upon Moudasser Taleb. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 11 15. A copy of all notebook and diary entries concerning and touching upon Moudasser Taleb that has not been previously served to the defence. Pressed but narrowed to "in relation to an investigation by NSW Police" but expanded to include duty books following examination of Detective Alam. T 3/12/18 pp 11-12, 15-18, 20 Will be produced, subject to public interest immunity claim. T 5/12/18 pp 1-2 16. A copy of all applications and authority to conduct a cross border controlled operation in respect of undercover operative by name of "Jihan Ghazzaoui". Not pressed. T 21/11/18 p 52 17. A copy of all surveillance and phone intercepts in respect of Jihan Ghazzaoui from 1 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 12 18. A copy of all applications for authority to acquire or use assumed identity and authorities for assumed identity obtained in respect of the investigation of Moudasser Taleb. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 12 19. A copy of all notebook entries, diary entries, statements and correspondence in respect of witness with pseudonym "Max Marid" and Moudasser Taleb. Subject to narrowing terms of subpoena, will be produced. T 5/12/18 p 21 20. A copy of all notebook entries, diary entries, statements and correspondence in respect of witness with pseudonym of "Max Marid" and Zali Burrows. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 12 21. A copy of letter/s of support for witness with pseudonym of "Max Marid". Nothing to produce. T 3/12/18 p 12 22. A copy of all written undertakings from civilian participants in the undercover controlled operation in respect of Moudasser Taleb. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 12 23. A copy of report given to the chief executive officer under section 15 or 20Q(1) Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 12 24. A copy of the Register relating to cross-border controlled operation of Moudasser Taleb as per section 20J Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997. Produced in relation to CB CO 17/097. T 3/12/18 pp 12-13 PII claim over CB CO 17/023. Second subpoena 1. All documents relating to the application and/or grant of the authority to conduct a controlled operation with reference number CB CO 17/023 including but not limited to those containing the following: a. Pressed. a. The plan for the proposed operation b. Pressed. b. The nature of the criminal activity in respect of which the operation was to be conducted c. Pressed. T 3/12/18 pp 9-10 c. The nature of the controlled activity in respect of which the authority was sought d. Not pressed (produced). d. The statement of whether or not the proposed operation, or any other controlled application with respect to the same criminal activity had been the subject of an earlier application for an authority, and if so whether or not the authority was given. 2. All documents relation to the application and/or grant of the authority to conduct the controlled operation with reference number CB CO 17/023 and CB CO 17/097 including but not limited to those containing the following: Pressed for CB CO 17/023 but not pressed for CB CO 17/097. T 3/12/18 p 9 a. Information relating to Moudasser Taleb concerning suspected criminal activity that had been, was being, or was about to be conducted in relation to matters within the administrative responsibility of the New South Wales Police and or Australian Federal Police. 3. All documents relation to application number and/or grant to vary the authority to conduct the controlled operation with reference number CB CO 17/023 v1 and CB 17/023 v2. Pressed. T 3/12/18 p 9 4. All documents relation to application number and/or grant to vary the authority to conduct the controlled operation with reference number CB CO 17/097. Not pressed. T 3/12/18 p 9 5. The following written documents being the formal authorities pursuant to section 8 of the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997; a. Pressed. a. Controlled Operation Authority CB CO 17/023 v1; and b. Pressed. T 3/12/18 p 9 b. Controlled Operation Authority CB CO 17/023 v2; c. Not pressed (produced). c. Controlled Operation Authority CB CO 17/097. 6. The report in relation(s) to CB CO 17/023 v1 & CB CO 17/023 v2, and CB CO 17/097 pursuant to section 15 of the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997. Not pressed in respect of CB CO 17/097. T 3/12/18 p 10 Otherwise pressed. Endnotes 1. These became Ex VD-1, VD-3 and VD-4 on the notice of motion. 2. Ex VD-A. 3. Ex VD-3. 4. Ex VD-B, noting that the number of the controlled operation was incorrectly recorded as 17/092 but the parties agree (i) this was a typographic error and should have read 17/097 and (ii) the error does not affect the validity of the authority. 5. Ex VD-1. 6. T 21/11/18 p 22. 7. Ex VD-3. 8. See R v Jenkin (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 697 at [21]-[22]. 9. Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; [1979] UKHL 4 at 1129. 10. Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; [1984] HCA 85 at 439. 11. Basten JA also footnoted my judgment in Allen v Ewing [2017] NSWSC 1696 in the same context. 12. Gould v DPP (Cth) [2018] NSWCCA 109; (2018) 333 FLR 352 at [21]. 13. T 5/12/18 p 17, line 20-28. 14. See Allen v Ewing and Anor [2017] NSWSC 1696 at [30]-[32]. 15. Allen v Ewing and Anor [2017] NSWSC 1696 at [33]-[42]. 16. [2015] NSWSC 189. 17. R v Simmons; R v Moore (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 at [75]-[76]. 18. See paragraph [11] of the schedule to the first subpoena. Ultimately, this paragraph was not pressed. 19. Attorney General for NSW v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; (2008) 182 A Crim R 536 at [12]. 20. Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 at 122. 21. Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 at 121. 22. Gedeon v Commissioner of the NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 at 133. 23. Gedeon v Commissioner of the NSW Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120; [2008] HCA 43 at 139. 24. See Dowe v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission & Anor; Gedeon v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission & Anor [2007] NSWCA 296; 177 A Crim R 44 at [9]. 25. See Gedeon, Gilbert v R [2013] NSWCCA 257. 26. Confidential Ex VD-F, T 3/12/18, pp 37-41. 27. T 5/12/18, pp 1-2. 28. Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW), s 20B. Amendments 05 April 2019 - Publication restriction lifted DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 April 2019