Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Simcoe v Bate [2019] NSWCATAP 216 Hearing dates: 5 April, 16 May 2019 Date of orders: 27 August 2019 Decision date: 27 August 2019 Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel Before: L Pearson, Principal Member J McAteer, Senior Member Decision: (1) Leave to appeal on grounds other than a question of law is refused. (2) The appeal is dismissed. Catchwords: APPEAL – failure to appear - whether reasonable opportunity to be heard – whether denial of procedural fairness - whether rehearing should be ordered Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 Cases Cited: Chowdhury v Hossain [2017] NSWCATAP 109 Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 Hammond v Ozzy's Cheapest Cars Pty Ltd t/as Ozzy Car Sales [2015] NSWCATAP 65 Troy Hood t/as UR Place Landscape v Rutten [2016] NSWCATAP 250 Kalice v Borck [2017] NSWCATAP 46 Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 Tachnat Pty Ltd v Farag [2018] NSWCATAP 67 Trenholme t/as Trenholme Constructions v Paltram [2015] NSWCATAP 36 Waters v Waghorn [2016] NSWCATAP 247 Texts Cited: None cited Category: Principal judgment Parties: Peter Simcoe (Appellant) Justin Bate (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: Appellant (Self Represented) Respondent (Self Represented) File Number(s): AP 19/06518 Publication restriction: Nil Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Jurisdiction: Consumer and Commercial Division Citation: N/A Date of Decision: 26 November 2018 Before: D Moss, General Member File Number(s): HB 18/43363 REASONS FOR DECISION 1. Peter Simcoe appeals from the decision in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal on 26 November 2018 to order that he pay Justin Bate the sum of $11,500.00. 2. Mr Bate commenced proceedings HB 18/43363 on 9 October 2018, seeking an order that Mr Simcoe pay him the amount of $11,500. The dispute relates to construction of a stable block on Mr Bate's property by Mr Simcoe. In his application Mr Bate stated that he engaged Mr Simcoe to construct the stable block, including ground work, concrete slab, supply of shed kit and erection, fit out of shed with internal lining and stable boxes, external stable doors and external steel yards including installation. The total cost was $61,000, which he transferred to Mr Simcoe's bank account. Mr Bate stated that only some ground work and the concrete slab was completed; the shed kit was delivered; the external stable doors were not included; the slab was left damaged and poorly done. The concrete company had been paid $1,000 of the $6,872 bill and retain ownership of the concrete until paid for. The concrete slab is damaged and requires repair. The shed erection cost of $10,000 has not been paid for. The steel delivered for the stable boxes and yards was not completed and requires work and installation. 3. Mr Bate claimed that of the $61,000 paid to Mr Simcoe, the total spent by Mr Simcoe (and his partner) was $49,500: $20,000 for the shed kit; $16,500 for the slab (with an estimate to repair damage at $500-$1000); ground work excavation $1000; and steel for stable boxes and yards $12,000. Mr Bate sought payment of the balance, $11,500. He did not include $5812.75 owing for the concrete, on the basis that he believed it was in the hands of a debt collection agency. Procedural history 1. The matter was listed for 26 November 2018 for Conciliation and Hearing (Group List). Mr Simcoe did not appear. The Tribunal was satisfied that notice of the hearing had been duly served on Mr Simcoe and that justice required the matter be dealt with in his absence. The Tribunal ordered payment of $11,500 being compensation for failure to complete building work and for failure to perform work with due care and skill. 2. Mr Simcoe lodged an internal appeal against the decision on 7 December 2018, stating as his grounds of appeal that he was not notified of the hearing. He sought an order reducing the amount payable to $2,500. 3. The appeal was listed for call over on 8 January 2019. Mr Simcoe did not appear and the appeal was dismissed pursuant to s 55(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (the NCAT Act). 4. On 26 February 2019 Mr Simcoe applied under s 55(3) of the NCAT Act for reinstatement of the appeal, stating that he had requested leave to appear at the call over by telephone. 5. On 26 February 2019 the appeal was reinstated. Directions were made for the parties to provide to the Tribunal and to each other the evidence provided to the Tribunal below on which they intended to rely; any fresh evidence on which they intended to seek leave to rely; and submissions: Mr Simcoe by 12 March 2019, and Mr Bate by 22 March 2019, with written submissions in reply by 29 March 2019. Mr Simcoe was directed to provide a copy of all notices of hearing and directions made by the Tribunal, and Mr Bate was directed to provide the sound recording of the Tribunal hearing if he was relying on what happened at the hearing. 6. Mr Bate contacted the Tribunal on 27 March 2019 stating he had not yet received anything from Mr Simcoe and could not provide his response by 29 March 2109 as directed. The Registry sent a reminder to Mr Simcoe. Mr Simcoe responded by email on 1 April 2019 that he had sent "this info" along with copies of the original appeal forms. Grounds of appeal 1. The Notice of Appeal states as the grounds of appeal: I have not received any notification of this hearing that it was even on, the only time I have been made aware of this at all was when I received mail on the 30th Nov 2018 notifying me of the order. Not one notice was given to me to know prepare or defend let alone attend. 1. Mr Simcoe sought leave to appeal on the ground that the decision was not fair and equitable, stating "I simply need this listed again and re heard as the only notice I have been given is a final order that's been made at no time at all I was notified of any such event". 2. Annexed to a second copy of the Notice of Appeal, received on 8 March 2019 (after the appeal was reinstated), is an unsigned and undated statement. That document includes the statement that Mr Simcoe is happy to pay $2500 back to Mr Bate for not installing the steel work, estimated at three days to install at $500 a day plus an extra two days allowed, total $2,500. The statement includes the statement that the original job was quoted at $68,000, Mr Simcoe received $61,000, and the outlay to date is $62,921. That amount was made up of 15 x 9m "best shed steel kit form shed", $20,431; $990 delivery; $18,500 concrete slab quoted and accepted price; $8,000 steel yard structures quoted and accepted price; $12,500 steel cables quoted and accepted price; $1500 excavation works; $1000 crusher dust fill/gravel. The statement concluded: The has been delivered Concrete slab done Steel yards and stables delivered but not erected Excavations and fill delivered and done I cannot see how an order of $11,500 has been made against me when work and quoted prices have been performed and delivered Reply to appeal 1. The Reply to Appeal states that: The appellant is buying time to further delay the original judgment made, and further shift assets. This appeal should not be allowed. The appeal hearing 1. The appeal was listed for hearing on 5 April 2019. On 3 April 2019 Mr Simcoe by email requested that the hearing be vacated, stating that he had had throat surgery the previous Friday, and could provide a medical certificate. Mr Bate opposed the vacation of the hearing. The matter remained listed. On 5 April 2019 Mr Simcoe provided a medical certificate stating that he was unfit for work for the period 4 to 10 April 2019. At the beginning of the hearing the Appeal Panel contacted Mr Simcoe by telephone and it was apparent that he was unable to participate. The hearing was adjourned to 16 May 2019. 2. At the resumed hearing Mr Simcoe stated that he had not received any notice by post or email for the Tribunal hearing. He received an email from Mr Bate after the Tribunal orders. Mr Simcoe confirmed his address at the time of the Tribunal hearing as xxx Yarramalong Road Wyong Creek, and stated that he had moved from that address three weeks before the appeal hearing. 3. Mr Simcoe submitted that if he had known about the Tribunal hearing he would have attended to put his case forward. The first notice he received of the matter was Mr Bate's email and then he received the notice of the order by email. He is prepared to pay Mr Bate $2,500, being $150 for each gate, $100 x 4 for hinges and latches and $500 to fix the damage to the concrete. Mr Simcoe stated that he was prepared to go up a bit on the amount and proffered a revised figure of $4,500. 4. Mr Simcoe stated that he has tried to negotiate, and did not receive notice of the hearing. The Tribunal should send notices by courier or registered post. He did not apply under reg 9 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 to have the order set aside because he is not a lawyer and did not know how. 5. Mr Bate submitted that the decision is fair and just. He is not prepared to discuss the matter as he has been waiting for 12 months for a resolution and there are additional costs for the concreting, and landscaping costs. 6. At the conclusion of the hearing the Appeal Panel reserved its decision, and directed Mr Simcoe to inform the Tribunal by 17 May 2019 of his new postal address. Availability of appeal 1. This is an internal appeal pursuant to s 80 of the NCAT Act. The appeal may be brought as of right on a question of law or, with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on other grounds. As this appeal is brought from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal, by virtue of cl 12(1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act, leave to appeal may only be granted under s 80(2)(b) if the Appeal Panel is satisfied an appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because: 1. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable, or 2. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence, or 3. significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with). 1. Even if an appellant from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division satisfies the requirements of cl 12(1) of Sch 4, the Appeal Panel must still consider whether it should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b): Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [80]-[84]. Discussion and findings Whether there was an error on a question of law 1. The appellant is not legally represented, and the Appeal Panel must determine whether a question of law has in fact been raised, subject to any procedural fairness considerations that might arise to the respondent: Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [12]. 2. Section 38(5) of the NCAT Act, and the general law rules of procedural fairness, require that the Tribunal ensure that each party to proceedings in the Tribunal has had a reasonable opportunity to appear and put their case before the Tribunal. To determine a matter in the absence of a party, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the party had notice of the hearing. The issue in the appeal is whether, in proceeding in the absence of Mr Simcoe on 26 November 2018, there was a denial of procedural fairness. If established, that would be an error of law: Prendergast at [12](4). 3. The central contention in the appeal is Mr Simcoe's position that he received no notice of the hearing of 26 November 2018 and that the Tribunal should not have proceeded in his absence. 4. In the exercise of its power conferred by s 38(2) of the NCAT Act to "inquire into and inform itself on any matter" as it thinks fit, the Appeal Panel obtained the Divisional file in proceedings HB 18/43363. That file contains the initiating application and correspondence from NSW Fair Trading as to Mr Bate's attempts to resolve the dispute with Mr Simcoe, the Notices of Hearing, and the Notice of Order dated 26 November 2018. The Notice of Hearing was dated 26 October 2018, addressed to Mr Simcoe at xxx Yarramalong Road Wyong Creek. The Notice included the statement that "the Tribunal may decide the matter in your absence", and advised that while the parties were not required to bring witnesses, they "should bring with you all relevant documents or materials to support your case". The Appeal Panel invited Mr Simcoe to comment on the Notice, and he confirmed that that was his address, and stated he had received nothing by post or email. The Notice of Order dated 26 November 2018 was addressed to Mr Simcoe at his postal address. 5. Rule 13 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (the Rules) provides as a manner of service: (2) Means for service or giving of notices and documents A notice or document may be served on or given to a person or body: (a) by means of personal service, or (b) by posting a copy of the notice or document, addressed to the person or body: (i) to the person's or body's address for service, or (ii) if the person or body does not have an address for service, to the person's or body's business or residential address (or the business or residential address last known to the person or body serving the notice or document), or 1. Rule 13(4) of the Rules provided at the time the notice was posted that the time at which it was taken to be served was at the end of the fourth working day after the date on which the notice or document was posted to the person. Rule 13(4), as amended with effect from 21 December 2018, now provides for seven working days. Even on the latter calculation, the Notice of hearing was taken to be served well before the hearing of 26 November 2018. There is no indication in the file that the Notice was returned to the Tribunal unable to be delivered. 2. Rule 35 of the Rules relevantly provides: 35 Ex parte proceedings in Consumer and Commercial Division (1) This rule applies to proceedings for the exercise of functions of the Tribunal that are allocated to the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal. (2) Where a hearing is held for proceedings to which this rule applies, the Tribunal may proceed to hear the proceedings in the absence of a party who has failed to attend the hearing if: (a) the Tribunal is satisfied that notice of the hearing was duly served on the party, or (b) the Tribunal, being satisfied that service of notice of the hearing on the party has been duly attempted or having given directions under rule 15 to bring it to the notice of the party, considers that justice requires that the matter be dealt with in the absence of the party. … 1. The Tribunal Member could proceed with the hearing in the absence of Mr Simcoe if satisfied that he had been properly served with notice in accordance with rule 13, and if satisfied that justice required the matter be dealt with in his absence. The Notice of listing was posted to the address provided by Mr Bate, and which was confirmed by Mr Simcoe as his address. There is no indication on the Division file, for example undelivered mail returned to sender, that there was any reason to consider that Mr Simcoe may not have received the notice. The sound recording of the hearing is not before the Appeal Panel. The Tribunal Member recorded her satisfaction on both matters required by rule 35 of the Rules in her reasons. The Appeal Panel is satisfied that the Tribunal was entitled to proceed with the hearing in Mr Simcoe's absence. 2. The issue is whether in doing so he was denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard or otherwise have his submissions considered. 3. As noted in Troy Hood t/as UR Place Landscape v Rutten [2016] NSWCATAP 250, it is relevant that Mr Simcoe had an opportunity to apply to have the Tribunal's decision set aside under reg 9 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013. Reg 9 provides: 9 Additional power to set aside or vary decision determining proceedings (1) In addition to any power that is expressly conferred on the Tribunal by the Act or enabling legislation to set aside or vary its decisions, the Tribunal may order that a decision it has made that determines proceedings be set aside or varied in either of the following circumstances: … (b) if the decision was made in the absence of a party and the Tribunal is satisfied that the party's absence has resulted in the party's case not being adequately put to the Tribunal. 1. An application under reg 9 needed to be made within 7 days after the decision was made (subject to the possibility of extension of time), and could not be made if an internal appeal against the decision "has been lodged or determined": reg 9(5)(a). 2. Mr Simcoe did not avail himself of the set aside procedure. Information on the set aside procedure is available on the NCAT website, under "Decisions and Orders", as is information on internal appeals. Had Mr Simcoe applied under reg 9 he would have been required to establish that not only that he was absent from the hearing, but that his absence resulted in his case not being adequately put to the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to set aside the decision: Hammond v Ozzy's Cheapest Cars Pty Ltd t/as Ozzy Car Sales [2015] NSWCATAP 65. That decision confirms that the Tribunal would need to address whether there was a real likelihood that it would be unjust to let the decision stand, and that would only be likely to result if Mr Simcoe an arguable defence or arguable case that a different decision could have been reached. Relevant considerations would be why he was absent, and whether he had a reasonable opportunity to be heard or have his submissions considered, and whether he had an arguable defence or case that a different decision could have been reached. The Appeal Panel accepts that Mr Simcoe was not aware of the set aside procedure: however, that information was readily available to him. 3. Differently constituted Appeal Panels have considered the question of the circumstances in which an appellant who has failed to appear at a hearing can establish a breach of procedural fairness, in the context of the legislative framework applicable to matters in the Consumer and Commercial Division which includes rule 35, and reg 9. In Hood v Rutten [2016] NSWCATAP 250 the Appeal Panel held: 5. It is not in every case where a Tribunal has determined a matter in the absence of a party that there will be a breach of procedural fairness. Where notice of a hearing has been given, it will be necessary for an appellant to demonstrate that through no contumelious, dilatory or careless conduct, he or she was nevertheless unable to be present at the hearing. In such cases it may be appropriate for the appellant to rely upon evidence that was not before the Tribunal at first instance, in order to prove the breach of procedural fairness. The Appeal Panel noted as follows in Waters v Waghorn [2016] NSWCATAP 247 at [27] –[34], [36]: Procedural Fairness [27] The Tribunal has a duty to ensure that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered in the proceedings: s 38(5)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal is subject to the rules of natural justice: s 38(2) of the Act. Nevertheless, it will not be in every case where proceedings were heard in the absence of a party, that there will have been a breach of procedural fairness. Rule 35 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (the Rules) applies to proceedings in the Consumer and Commercial Division (and this was such a proceeding) and provides, in effect, that the Tribunal may hear and determine proceedings in the absence of a party who has failed to attend a hearing, if the Tribunal is satisfied that notice of the hearing was duly served or duly attempted to be served on the party. Clause 9 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2013 (NSW) provides that the Tribunal may set aside a decision of the Tribunal that was made in the absence of a party, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the party's absence has resulted in the party's case not being adequately put. Due to the existence of these rules and regulations, in the usual case, a party will not be denied procedural fairness merely because the proceedings were determined adversely to them in their absence. 1. The issue in Waters v Waghorn [2016] NSWCATAP 247 was the refusal by the Tribunal of an adjournment sought on medical grounds on the basis that there was no medical evidence supporting the application. The Appeal Panel considered the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to admit on the appeal evidence that was not before the original decision maker, in that case medical evidence, and held: … [33] What emerges from a review of authorities is that, in order to demonstrate breach of procedural fairness, it is necessary to point to something outside the control of the party, which led to the denial of procedural fairness. It would not, for example, be sufficient if the party, having notice of the hearing, simply decided to not attend the scheduled hearing. [34] An appeal on the grounds of breach of procedural fairness is unlikely to succeed when the party had notice of his or her unavailability and through contumelious or dilatory conduct failed to appear. Where a party becomes aware of his or her unavailability for a scheduled hearing, it is appropriate to seek an adjournment and put forward appropriate evidence to justify the application for an adjournment. … 1. The circumstances in Hood v Rutten were similar, and the Appeal Panel in that case concluded, based on the additional medical evidence provided, that the appellant had a compelling reason not to attend the hearing and that by holding the hearing without him he was denied an opportunity to present his case. In Tachnat Pty Ltd v Farag [2018] NSWCATAP 67 the Appeal Panel allowed an appeal where a party had been unwell and had attempted to contact the Registry, but the Tribunal Member was not made aware of the request for an adjournment and that request was not considered. Those decisions are distinguishable from the present circumstances, there having been no request by Mr Simcoe for an adjournment. 2. In Trenholme t/as Trenholme Constructions v Paltram [2015] NSWCATAP 36 the Tribunal had proceeded with a hearing in the absence of the respondent without referring to his absence or providing reasons why it had proceeded in his absence as permitted by rule 35. In Chowdhury v Hossain [2017] NSWCATAP 109 service of the notice of hearing had not been effected in accordance with rule 13, and that failure, in circumstances where the respondent was not in fact aware of the hearing, meant the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the proceedings. Those decisions are distinguishable from the present circumstances, in which rules 13 and 35 were complied with. 3. In Kalice v Borck [2017] NSWCATAP 46 the respondent landlord had arrived at the Tribunal after the hearing had concluded and the Tribunal had ordered return of rental bond provided by the tenants. The Appeal Panel concluded there was no denial of procedural fairness, on the basis that the Tribunal had had evidence to be satisfied the landlord was aware of the hearing and had a reasonable opportunity to appear; in respect of the landlord running late none of the issues raised by the landlord in respect of his running late were issues he was not aware of before the hearing; and the failure to appear on time was due to the dilatory conduct of the landlord. In its reasons the Appeal Panel referred to Waters v Waghorn and Hood v Rutten, and to the requirements of s 36 of the NCAT Act, stating: 25. The obligation of the Tribunal under s 38(5) of the NCAT Act is that it must be satisfied a party has had a reasonable opportunity to appear and put their case before the Tribunal. To determine a matter in the absence of a party, it must further be satisfied that the party had notice of the hearing. The opportunity to be heard is not an immutable right, and the Tribunal must consider the just, quick, cheap and efficient resolution of the real issues in the proceedings under s 36 of the NCAT Act. 1. In Kalice v Borck the Appeal Panel commented: 26. The Member on 30 September 2016 had evidence to be satisfied the landlord was aware of the hearing, and had a reasonable opportunity to appear. At least one of the tenants was present, and ready to proceed. The rental bond is prima facie the property of the tenant, and there is clear prejudice to the tenant if proceedings are not determined with reasonable expedition, as the tenant is denied property which the landlord is only holding on trust. 1. In the present case, Mr Simcoe's approach to the appeal does not contest that he owes Mr Bate money: his concern is to reduce the amount to be paid. His position in correspondence with Fair Trading, in the Notice of Appeal and the supporting statement provided on 8 March 2019, and at the appeal hearing, is that he is prepared to pay Mr Bate $2,500. The basis on which he asserts that an amount less than $11,500 should be paid has changed. His position at the appeal hearing was that the $2,500 he is prepared to pay is calculated by $150 for each gate, $100 x 4 for hinges and latches and $500 to fix the damage to the concrete. In contrast, his position as recorded in the statement provided on 8 March 2019 is that that amount represents the time he estimates to install the steel work based on a daily rate, with no allowance for damage to the concrete. It was not clear from the comments in the Appeal hearing precisely how the quotation amount was arrived at by Mr Simcoe. 2. In the present proceedings, the Tribunal Member on 26 November 2018 had evidence to be satisfied that Mr Simcoe had been properly served with notice of the hearing, and had a reasonable opportunity to appear. On the appeal, Mr Simcoe has not provided any formal evidence as to any difficulties with his mail deliveries or some other reason why the notice of hearing may not have reached him. The applicant in proceedings HB 18/43363 had provided a detailed breakdown of the amounts claimed as compensation for the building work not completed or poorly completed, on which the Tribunal based its order. Mr Simcoe is not contesting that the work was incomplete, and his position on the appeal is to seek to negotiate a reduced payment. Mr Simcoe has not provided any formal evidence to substantiate his claim for a reduction. 3. A decision made in the absence of a party may, depending on the circumstances, constitute a failure to provide procedural fairness, as discussed in Hood v Rutten and Waters v Waghorn. Mr Simcoe did not make a set aside application, which is a relevant factor to consider in the circumstances: Hood v Rutten at [17]. He does not dispute that he owes Mr Bate money. Having regard to how Mr Simcoe has put his position for a reduction in the amount to be paid, it is unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome had Mr Simcoe pursued a set aside application. Mr Simcoe has not established that there was a failure to provide procedural fairness in respect of the decision of the Member to hear the matter in his absence. The Appeal Panel concludes that there was no error on a question of law. Whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice 1. Mr Simcoe seeks leave to appeal on grounds other than a question of law, contending that the decision was not fair and equitable. That is one of the three bases specified in cl 12(1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act on which leave can be granted. 2. In order to establish that leave to appeal on grounds other than questions of law should be granted, the Appeal Panel would need to be satisfied that the tenant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 the meaning of "substantial miscarriage of justice" was summarised at [71] and [79] as follows: [71] …[I]t can be seen that the concept of a substantial miscarriage of justice refers to a failure in the way a matter was conducted or decided which deprived the appellant of a chance that was fairly open of achieving a better outcome than occurred… [79] In order to show that a party has been deprived of a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" of achieving a different and more favourable result … it will be generally be necessary for the party to explain what its case would have been and show that it was fairly arguable. If the party fails to do this, even if there has been a denial of procedural fairness, the Appeal Panel may conclude that it is not satisfied that any substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 1. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied that Mr Simcoe has established that he may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice. He has not established that there was a denial of procedural fairness, which is a basis on which it might be said that a decision is "not fair and equitable": Collins v Urban at [77](1). Further, it cannot be said that the decision was not fair and equitable in circumstances where Mr Simcoe accepts that the work done for Mr Bate was incomplete and that he should repay some of the $61,000 paid to him by Mr Bate. Mr Simcoe would have to establish that there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance that was fairly open" of a different or more favourable outcome, and in view of his inconsistent approach to quantifying the value of the incomplete and poorly done work, the Appeal Panel is not satisfied that he has established that he may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice. Leave to appeal should be refused. Orders 1. The orders of the Appeal Panel are: 1. Leave to appeal on grounds other than a question of law is refused. 2. The appeal is dismissed. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar Amendments 08 October 2019 - Paragraph 19 correction DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 October 2019