Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: McCarthy v Health Care Complaints Commission [2019] NSWCATOD 142 Hearing dates: On the papers Date of orders: 11 September 2019 Decision date: 11 September 2019 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Cowdroy AO QC ADCJ, Principal Member Decision: (1) The application for varying the suppression order made by the Tribunal on 25 May 2018 is refused. (2) Insofar as the non-disclosure order made by the Tribunal on 25 May 2018 may be considered deficient because of the reference to cl 7(1)(b)(iii) of Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, instead of a reference to cl 7(1)(a) of such Schedule, the Tribunal makes an order pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 that the name of any patient mentioned in the Complaint in the principal proceedings and in the evidence adduced during the hearing is not to be disclosed. (3) The question of costs is reserved. (4) If any application is to be made by either party for costs, then written submissions are to be provided to the Tribunal and the other party in support of the application within 21 days of the publication of this decision; and the receiving party is to respond within seven days thereafter by written submissions to be provided to the Tribunal and to the other party. At the expiration of such period, the decision on costs is reserved for determination. Catchwords: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – health practitioners – former medical practitioner – disciplinary proceedings – non-disclosure order and non-publication order made to protect privacy of patients' statements and for clinical records – application by journalist to revoke non-disclosure order to enable access to patients' names – whether non-disclosure order should be varied Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 Court Information Act 2010 (NSW) Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 Cases Cited: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 43 FLR 129 BJQ v Children's Guardian (No 2) [2016] NSWCATAD 291 Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125 Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr Annette Dao Quynh Do (No.2) [2013] NSWMT 11 Health Care Complaints Commission v Petros [2019] NSWCATOD 83 Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid (Publication Application) [2019] NSWCATOD 31 Medical Council of New South Wales v Lee [2017] NSWCA 282 Pertsinidis v Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District [2014] NSWCATAD 130 Shoebridge v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 334 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Joanne McCarthy (Applicant on application for ancillary order) Health Care Complaints Commission (First Respondent) P Petros (Second Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: Applicant (Self-represented) Health Care Complaints Commission (First Respondent) File Number(s): 2018/00117097 Publication restriction: Publication of the names of any patient which might be ascertainable from this decision or the principal decision is prohibited pursuant to s 64(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 (NSW). REASONS FOR DECISION 1. The Tribunal delivered its decision on 23 May 2019 in the matter of Health Care Complaints Commission v Petros: see Health Care Complaints Commission v Petros [2019] NSWCATOD 83 ("the principal proceedings"). 2. In the principal proceedings, the Health Care Complaints Commission ("HCCC") alleged that the respondent (Petros) had engaged in professional misconduct and sought consequential disciplinary orders. The Tribunal upheld the application and orders were made pursuant to s 149C(4)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law ("the National Law"). 3. The proceedings currently before this Tribunal arise from an application by a third party ("the journalist") to inspect the Tribunal file relating to the proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining the names of witnesses in respect of whom a non-disclosure order exists. The journalist was not involved in the disciplinary proceedings against Petros. However, the application is brought pursuant to Rule 42(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 ("the Rules"). 4. Rule 42(2) provides: (2) Subject to the Act and this rule, a registrar may, on payment of the applicable fee (if any), permit a person who is not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal to inspect public access documents in the Registry relating to proceedings in the Tribunal that are finally determined. 1. The term "public access document" is defined in Rule 42(8) as follows: (8) In this rule: public access document means any of the following: (a) an originating document or reply, (b) a statement, affidavit or document admitted into evidence in proceedings held in public, (c) a transcript (if available) of proceedings held in public, (d) a record of any order made or other decision given in proceedings, (e) a record of the reasons given for a decision made in proceedings. 1. The following subrule to Rule 42 relevantly provides: (4) A registrar may impose such conditions as the registrar considers appropriate in relation to the granting of access under this rule to a public access document (or a copy of such a document) by a person who is not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal. 1. In certain circumstances, described in subrule (5), access may be denied as set out: (5) There is no entitlement under this rule to give or be given access to a document in the Registry (or a copy of such a document) if: … (c) the Tribunal has ordered that the whole or part of the document not be disclosed, or … 1. Subrule (6) of Rule 42 authorises a registrar to provide copies of documents in the following circumstances: (6) A registrar may permit a person who would otherwise have no entitlement to be given access to a document (or a copy of a document) because of subrule (5) to inspect (or be given a copy of) parts of the document that do not contain or include the privileged material or other material which may not to be disclosed. 1. There is no issue that the principal proceedings in this Tribunal have been finally determined, as referred to in Rule 42(7). 2. The applicant in the principal proceedings, namely the HCCC, opposes the application. The respondent to those proceedings, Petros, has made no submissions. Basis of the application 1. On 25 May 2018 before any hearing of the principal proceedings commenced, a Tribunal member made the following order: "Pursuant to cl 7(1)(b)(iii) of Sch 5D of the Health Practitioner National Law the name of any patient mentioned in the complaint is not to be disclosed." Such order has not been revoked. It is hereafter referred to as the "non-disclosure order". 1. In the principal proceedings, evidence was adduced by way of statement or admission of clinical records of more than 20 female patients. Each had undergone surgery performed by the respondent known as pelvic floor reconstruction. The reconstruction involved the use of a medical device known as the "tissue fixation system" (TFS) promoted by the respondent. The respondent was found to have had an interest in the device used in such procedure. 2. Petros was found by the Tribunal to have failed to disclose to his patients his financial interest in the TFS device as alleged in Complaint 1 in the principal proceedings. Complaint 2 alleged that Petros had failed to provide appropriate medical services to a patient whose life was endangered as a result of the surgery. Complaint 3 in the principal proceedings alleged that Petros had misled the HCCC during the course of its investigations. Each complaint was upheld. 3. The Tribunal made orders consequent upon its findings in relation to the three complaints raised against Petros. It also ordered that: "(3) the publication of the name of any patient referred to in this decision be prohibited." Application before this Tribunal 1. The journalist seeks an order that the non-disclosure order be revoked. The application is made because the journalist wishes to ascertain the name of each of the patients who provided evidence to the Tribunal or whose clinical records were used in the principal proceedings. Such access is sought for the purpose of contacting the witnesses and seeking their co-operation in assisting the applicant to write a journal article on the use of the pelvic floor reconstruction system. 2. The journalist does not challenge the order made prohibiting publication of their identities. The journalist states that she has sought access to the Tribunal file, but that access has been refused on the basis that the redaction of the names of all patients appearing throughout the files and of their clinical records would be a most time-consuming task for the Tribunal and that it does not have the resources to undertake such redaction. Without the redaction, the order of the Tribunal relating to the non-disclosure of the name of any patient would be breached. 3. The Tribunal observes that the redaction of the witness names would serve no purpose in view of the journalist's intention of seeking access to such names. 4. The journalist's application is supported by a letter dated 18 July 2009 signed by the President, Treasurer and Secretary of an association known as "Mesh Injured Australia Inc". Such association was, according to the journalist's submissions, founded by a trained therapist and two other mesh-injured women and has 1300 Australian mesh patients who communicate on a closed Facebook page. Such letter states that the journalist would undertake her writing at the highest level of integrity and that she has: "…proved to be sensitive to the needs of mesh injured women over the past five years and we have utmost confidence in her reporting on this very important issue." 1. The application is also supported by two former patients of Petros who have provided letters referring to their experience and of their desire to make better known the professional failings which have been referred to in the Tribunal's decision. 2. The Tribunal also notes that whilst the letters in support of the application refer to the operation of the Court Information Act 2010 (NSW), by the operation of s 4 of that Act, it has no application to the Tribunal: see commentary in Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid (Publication Application) [2019] NSWCATOD 31 ("Reid") at [35]. Specific submissions Power to make order 1. The journalist states that the order of non-disclosure made on 25 May 2018 and confirmed by the Registrar on 23 July 2018 states that the order was made pursuant to cl 7(1)(b)(iii) of Schedule 5D of the National Law ("cl 7(1)") but in fact the subsection referred to gives no such power. 2. Clause 7(1) provides: (1) The person presiding in proceedings before a Committee or the Tribunal may, if the person presiding thinks it appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case (and whether or not on the request of a complainant, the registered health practitioner or student concerned or any other person)— (a) direct that the name of any witness is not to be disclosed in the proceedings; or (b) direct that all or any of the following matters are not to be published— (i) the name and address of any witness; (ii) the name and address of a complainant; (iii) the name and address of a registered health practitioner or student; (iv) any specified evidence; (v) the subject-matter of a complaint. HCCC Reply 1. The HCCC submits that cl 7(1) has no application where proceedings have been concluded, as is the case with the matter of HCCC v Petros. The HCCC relies upon the decision of the Tribunal in Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 where the Tribunal stated at [13]: "This clause has a temporal quality to it. It uses the active, present tense. It vests power in the 'person presiding in proceedings', and speaks of a 'direction being given before or during the proceedings', and of a direction being 'amended or revoked at any time by the person presiding'. It does not, for example, say anything about the steps to be followed after proceedings have concluded, or where the presiding member is no longer available." 1. The HCCC submits that where the Tribunal is functus officio, there is no longer a presiding member for the matter, for the purpose of cl 7(2) which provides: "A direction may be amended or revoked at any time by the person presiding." 1. In Reid (delivered 21 February 2019) at [13], the Tribunal said: "I pause to note that the words "presiding member" are defined in s 165C to mean the member referred to in s 165B(2)(a). That section is as follows: Except as provided by subsections (4), (5) and (5A), the Tribunal, when conducting an inquiry or hearing an appeal under this Law, is to be constituted by— (a) 1 Division member who is an Australian lawyer of at least 7 years' standing or, in the case of medical practitioner proceedings, 1 Division member who is a senior judicial officer; …" 1. In Reid, the Tribunal determined that although the member hearing the application to amend the suppression order was the same member who presided at the hearing, there was no power to vary the order under cl 7 because the original proceedings had been completed. 2. In the application now before the Tribunal the facts are different, in that the order of suppression was not made by the presiding member nor the Tribunal member hearing the present application. However, the result is no different, since the hearing of the principal matter has been completed and the presiding Tribunal of that hearing is now functus officio. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no power under cl 7 to revoke or amend the existing order. 3. In respect of the use of alleged erroneous power to make the order of non-disclosure under challenge, the HCCC submits that the erroneous reference is immaterial: the Tribunal member making the order possessed power to do so under cl 7(1)(a). The order was not made without power. 4. The HCCC also submits that the refusal to give access is supported by Rule 42(5) of the Rules which provides: (5) There is no entitlement under this rule to give or be given access to a document in the Registry (or a copy of such a document) if: (a) a claim for privilege has been made with respect to the document but not decided by the Tribunal, or (b) the Tribunal has decided that the document contains matter that is privileged, or (c) the Tribunal has ordered that the whole or part of the document not be disclosed, or (d) the disclosure of the whole or part of the document to the person is otherwise prohibited by or under the Act or any other legislation or law, or (e) the document is or includes a note or working paper produced by or for a member in relation to any proceedings. Note. See, in particular, Division 6 of Part 4 of the Act, which contains provisions concerning the disclosure of information for the purposes of the Act and also section 67 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997. 1. An order having been made under Rule 42(5)(c), the Registrar correctly refused access to the file. The Tribunal again notes that even if the names of the patients were redacted, this would serve no purpose: the journalist wishes to know such names. Consideration 1. In Reid, the Tribunal considered a circumstance in which a relative of a deceased patient of Dr Reid could seek an order exempting that patient's name from a non-publication order made under cl 7 of Schedule 5D of the National Law. The Tribunal adopted the observations referred to above in HCCC v BXD (No 2), namely that where the proceedings have been completed, or where the presiding member is not available to determine an application to vary an earlier order, there is no power to do so under cl 7. The Tribunal referred (at [27]) to the observations of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Medical Council of New South Wales v Lee [2017] NSWCA 282. In this decision Sackville AJA considered the question whether s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 (NSW) ("NCAT Act") (contained in Part 4 of the NCAT Act) which empowered the Tribunal to prohibit or restrict publication or disclosure of the name of any person a party to proceedings or a witness before the Tribunal, was subject to the requirements of the National Law. 2. Section 64 of the NCAT Act relevantly provides: (1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason, it may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) make any one or more of the following orders: (a) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal or a witness summoned by, or appearing before, the Tribunal), (b) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication or broadcast of any report of proceedings in the Tribunal, (c) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication of evidence given before the Tribunal, whether in public or in private, or of matters contained in documents lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, (d) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the proceedings of evidence given before the Tribunal, or of the contents of a document lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings. (2) The Tribunal cannot make an order under this section that is inconsistent with section 65. (3) The Tribunal may from time to time vary or revoke an order made under subsection (1). (4) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person. 1. Sackville AJA found that since the provisions of Part 4 of the NCAT Act were made "subject to" the laws (including the National Law), the National Law prevailed. 2. However, in Reid, the Tribunal found at [28] that there was no conflict between the operation of s 64 of the NCAT Act and cl 7 of Schedule 5D of the National Law, since cl 7 was limited to a defined period of time "when the members of the panel to hear a matter have been appointed…". 3. At [28] paragraphs (3) and (4) Boland ADCJ said: "(3) I do not find that s 64, being a provision of the NCAT Act, can be invoked to vary an order made under cl 7 of Schedule 5D as the power to vary an order in s 64(3) is limited to variation of an order made under s 64(1). (4) I am satisfied that a new order can be made under s 64 as an ancillary order and that order, by implication, will rescind any order made under cl 7 of Schedule 5D and supercede that order." 1. As was referred to in Reid, the Tribunal may make an ancillary order, as defined in s 4 of the NCAT Act, being a decision that is preliminary to, or consequential on, a decision determining proceedings. Adopting the reasoning in Reid, this Tribunal finds that it possesses power, insofar as there may have been any deficiency in such order made under cl 7, to make an order to the same effect pursuant to s 64 of the NCAT Act. It follows that whilst the order made under cl 7(1) cannot be varied nor discharged, the Tribunal may make an ancillary order under s 64 of the NCAT Act to reflect the intention of the Tribunal at the time the order was made, and to clarify any doubt that might exist concerning its validity by reason of the erroneous reference to the power to make such order. 2. It follows that the journalist's application to set aside the order made under cl 7 does not succeed. Public interest 1. The journalist submits that in accordance with the principles of open justice, the non-disclosure order should be set aside. The journalist submits that the subject matter of the proceedings involved issues of significant public importance to many women in Australia who have been implanted with: "…a myriad of different devices ranging from the late 1980s to the present. I have a history with mesh groups across the country that I contact if I need to speak to women, who are supported when they elect to contact me back. I envisage that happening if I am granted access to the Petros file, if it is necessary to contact some women, although as I conceded in my original application, it could be I do not write any article based on gaining access to the file." The journalist states that there are over 100 women whom she may wish to communicate with concerning their surgical procedures. 1. The journalist stresses that it is not her intention to publish the names of the patients: rather it is limited to ascertaining their names for the purpose of communicating with them. The journalist makes other observations which in effect have at their basis the principle of open access to court files. The journalist states that the registrar has a discretion concerning access to Tribunal documents once a matter is determined. 2. The HCCC submits that it supports open justice principles but that exceptions to this principle apply. The HCCC states that in some instances it is necessary to depart from the open justice principles, as was recognised by the making of non-disclosure orders in this matter. Consideration 1. In Reid, the Tribunal considered the extent of an ancillary order being made under s 64 of the NCAT Act. The Tribunal considered the aspects of confidentiality which apply to both proceedings and to former patients who might be called as witnesses: see paragraphs [26] to [41]. The Tribunal granted an order lifting the suppression of the name of the deceased patient whose daughter had made the application, specifically because the order would not significantly adversely affect the practitioner and the fact that the names of the other patients had already been made public. 2. The tension between the public conduct of court proceedings and the protection of private interests has been long recognised: see Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125 ("Ibrahim"). At [47] Bathurst CJ referred to the decision in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 43 FLR 129 at 133-134 and said: "47 … Bowen CJ identified the public interest in the administration of justice as "the public interest that the court should endeavour to achieve effectively the object for which it was appointed: to do justice between the parties": at 133. That might be thought to be too limited a description of the concept. However, his Honour accepted a broader view at 134, in relation to the protection of confidential information: "It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the very proceedings before the Court should not be permitted to destroy or seriously depreciate the value of such confidential information. If it were otherwise, not only might the parties and members of the public consider the Court was not paying proper regard to confidentiality but also it might open the way to abuse." 48 The broader concept of the administration of justice, including consequences not just for the present case but for future cases, including the supply of information from victims of unlawful conduct and the willingness of witnesses to give evidence, accords with the approach taken in this Court: see John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (Receivers and managers appointed) v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 at 161 D-E (Mahoney JA, Hope AJA agreeing), approved in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court at [47] (Spigelman CJ, Handley JA and MW Campbell AJA agreeing) and in R v Kwok [2005] NSWCCA 245; 64 NSWLR 335 at [13] (Hodgson JA), [34] (Howie J) and [38]-[40] (Rothman J); see also Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256 at [12]. Each of these cases was dealing with the implied power of courts, operating prior to the commencement of the Suppression Orders Act, and each involved orders which impinged on the operation of the open justice principle. Accepting that broad view, at least in some circumstances, the factors referred to in paragraphs (c) and (d) of s 8(1) may overlap with (a), because orders falling within those paragraphs might also be necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice." 1. Whilst the decision in Ibrahim related to publication of information, the discussion is relevant to the public interest in court proceedings. It should be noted that the Tribunal in the principal proceedings conducted the hearing in an open forum, and was attended on some day or days by the applicant. 2. The HCCC submits that its function in bringing the proceedings against Petros was made in the exercise of its power and objective under the National Law, the paramount consideration of which is the health and safety of the public (see s 3A); that the protection of the confidentiality and privacy of the patients who provided evidence at the request or direction of the HCCC is a relevant factor in furtherance of the objective of the National Law. The HCCC refers to the decision in Pertsinidis v Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District [2014] NSWCATAD 130 at [60] where the Tribunal held: "In order for the HCCC to fulfil its investigative obligation under in section 3(1)(b) of the HCC Act, it is essential that those providing information as part of an investigation are encouraged to give frank and honest responses to the items in issue. Some people would not be prepared to speak frankly to investigators or they might not give accurate information unless they can be assured of confidentiality." 1. The HCCC states that personal health information is recognised as requiring protection, and is protected under separate legislation, namely the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002. It is so protected because it is recognised that such information may relate to invasive operations and possibly embarrassing conditions which patients would not wish to have known by third parties. Further, the HCCC states that it has obtained information using its coercive powers and, to protect the interests of those witnesses who provided information, it sought a non-publication order at the outset of the proceedings and before the hearing. 2. A large number of patients are involved: the number is said to be in excess of 110 patients, many of whom have informed the HCCC of their desire for confidentiality and have been informed of the non-disclosure orders made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is also informed that some patients are not contactable and some are deceased. Finding 1. The Tribunal granted the application made by the HCCC for the original order of non-disclosure. The Tribunal did so upon it being satisfied that the privacy of the patients, and of their clinical records, prevailed over the public interest in open access to Tribunal proceedings. The order was made to protect the privacy of the records relating to the patients. 2. Without such an order, it may well be that the patients whose information has been made available to the Tribunal, would not have been prepared to assist the HCCC in its investigations. In Shoebridge v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 334 the Tribunal made comment concerning the effect of an order under Rule 42. The Tribunal said at [8]: "There are some potential restraints on providing third parties with access to material lodged by a party, even if that party does not object. These include where the Tribunal makes orders restricting the disclosure information or material: NCAT Act, s 64." 1. The making of suppression orders or of non-publication orders only follows where special considerations have been shown. As was stated by Colefax SC DCJ in Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr Annette Dao Quynh Do (No.2) [2013] NSWMT 11 at [12]: "Prima facie, in my view the principles of open justice militate against the imposition of restrictions on information or events occurring in courts or tribunals without there being an overwhelming competing consideration." 1. In certain circumstances, as was considered in the matter of BJQ v Children's Guardian (No 2) [2016] NSWCATAD 291 (14 December 2016), a non-publication order may be set aside. However that decision related to a greater public interest, namely disclosure of certain information in the furtherance of prosecuting a potential crime. 2. The information which has been provided to the HCCC in the performance of its statutory functions of pursuing its primary objective contained in s 3A of the National Law, namely the health and protection of the public, is sufficient to justify the making of a non-disclosure order to protect the patients' information and identities. There are overwhelming competing considerations against making the identity of the patients involved known to any other person. If such constraint were not applied, it may well be that the HCCC would never be able to guarantee confidentiality to potential witnesses. They in turn may be deterred from assisting the HCCC in its investigations in pursuance of its statutory objective. 3. The Tribunal records that it is not to be suggested that the journalist does not have a genuine interest in seeking revocation of the non-disclosure order. However, it is always open to the journalist to publish a notice in a newspaper or in electronic media requesting that any patients involved in the principal proceedings make contact with her for the purpose of an investigative journal article. This is an instance where the public interest in gaining access to all material before the Tribunal must be subverted to the private interest of ensuring the privacy of witnesses, and of their clinical records. The overriding public interest is against the revocation of the non-disclosure order. Orders 1. For the above reasons, the Tribunal makes the following orders: 1. The application for varying the suppression order made by the Tribunal on 25 May 2018 is refused. 2. Insofar as the non-disclosure order made by the Tribunal on 25 May 2018 may be considered deficient because of the reference to cl 7(1)(b)(iii) of Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, instead of a reference to cl 7(1)(a) of such Schedule, the Tribunal makes an order pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 that the name of any patient mentioned in the Complaint in the principal proceedings and in the evidence adduced during the hearing is not to be disclosed. 3. The question of costs is reserved. 4. If any application is to be made by either party for costs, then written submissions are to be provided to the Tribunal and the other party in support of the application within 21 days of the publication of this decision; and the receiving party is to respond within seven days thereafter by written submissions to be provided to the Tribunal and to the other party. At the expiration of such period, the decision on costs is reserved for determination. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 11 September 2019