Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: MC v Morris [2019] NSWSC 1326 Hearing dates: 9 and 10 September 2019 Date of orders: 03 October 2019 Decision date: 03 October 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Fagan J Decision: Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,510,513. Defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs. Catchwords: DAMAGES – assessment of damages – general and aggravated damages – sexual assaults – Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) not applicable by operation of s 3B(1)(a) – psychiatric damage arising from defendant's torts – loss of earning capacity – where treatment of psychiatric conditions has created debilitating physical health issues – noneconomic loss – medical care expenses – no award for exemplary damages Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) Cases Cited: Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47 MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gocic (1991) 171 CLR 657 Najdovski v Crnojlovic [2008] NSWCA 175 State of New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496 Category: Principal judgment Parties: MC (plaintiff) Robert Morris (defendant) Representation: Counsel: E G Romanick SC with J B Masur (plaintiff) T Yeh (defendant) Solicitors: Wyatts Lawyers (plaintiff) Byles Anjos (defendant) File Number(s): 2018/383843 Publication restriction: No Judgment 1. On 6 February 2019 the plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed, on a cause of action for assault and battery in the nature of sexual abuse. The judgment was regularly entered by default. The defendant did not file a defence. The provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) concerning assessment of damages are not applicable because the case falls within s 3B(1)(a) of that Act. 2. The proceedings were listed for 9 September 2019 for an assessment hearing. The defendant was notified of the fixture in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The defendant is serving a term of imprisonment for offences constituted by the sexual assaults that are the basis of the plaintiff's action. At the commencement of the hearing a solicitor who had recently been retained by the defendant attended court, together with counsel. An adjournment application was made. I dismissed that application for reasons given at the time. 3. In the title of these proceedings the plaintiff's name has been replaced with pseudonym initials. An order has been made prohibiting publication of the plaintiff's name. These steps have been taken on the application of the plaintiff, in order to avert exacerbation (through publicity) of the psychological harm that has been done to him by the assaults that are the subject of the action. 4. The plaintiff pleads in par 9 of his statement of claim that he was subjected to "regular, traumatic and violent sexual assaults" by the defendant from the age of 13 years. The assaults are pleaded in more detail in pars 10 and 11 and particulars are given under those paragraphs. The assaults upon which the action is brought are identified by reference to charges that were laid against the defendant in 2017 and to which he pleaded guilty in the District Court in November 2018. 5. Assaults on six separate occasions during 1996, 1997 and 1998 are pleaded and relied upon. The first incident occurred when the plaintiff was aged 13 years and the last when he was 15. At the time the defendant was aged between 56 (in 1996) and 58 (in 1998). The plaintiff reported the assaults to police in early 2017. On the indictment upon which the defendant was arraigned there were two counts of homosexual intercourse with a person between the ages of 10 and 18 years, contrary to s 78K (since repealed) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). On sentence the defendant consented, pursuant to s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), to four further offences being taken into account on a Form 1. These consisted of another two counts charged under s 78K and two counts of acts of indecency in circumstances of aggravation. For the purposes of these reasons it is not necessary to recount detail of the sexual assaults. It is sufficient to say that they included acts of fellatio and would have been disgusting and gravely humiliating to a boy of between 13 and 15 years. 6. In the damages assessment hearing a written statement of the plaintiff was tendered. He adopted it on oath and gave supplementary oral evidence. From 1994 and throughout the period of the assaults the plaintiff and his family lived in southwest Sydney. The plaintiff's family comprised his mother, stepfather and six siblings. The plaintiff attended a local school. Until the assaults commenced he was doing well in his studies. He enjoyed good relations with fellow students and teachers and had no emotional, behavioural or psychiatric problems. He played team sports and was happy, outgoing and active. 7. In 1996 the plaintiff began doing lawn-mowing and yard maintenance work for neighbours in his suburb, to earn pocket money. This brought him into contact with the defendant. He regularly mowed the defendant's lawn and carried out odd jobs for him. During the first few visits to the defendant's property the plaintiff was groomed by the defendant with sexual talk. The defendant ingratiated himself by buying the plaintiff treats such as lollies, chips and cordial. The defendant gained a degree of psychological influence over the plaintiff and then induced him to engage in homosexual acts, either in a caravan that the defendant kept on land at some distance from his home or within the home, during periods when the defendant's wife was away. 8. There were many sexual assaults over the years 1996-1998. Those particularised in the six charges for which the defendant was sentenced in the District Court are the ones for which the plaintiff was able to provide sufficient specific detail to police to enable charges to be framed. It is only for those six assaults that damages are to be assessed as they are the only matters pleaded in the statement of claim and comprehended in the default judgment on liability. I am satisfied that the entirety of the plaintiff's psychological and physical symptoms have been caused by the six assaults pleaded. They constituted a sustained course of abuse over three years. 9. I accept that there were numerous other assaults of a similar nature interspersed with these, the detail of which the plaintiff has not been able to recall in enough detail to be able to plead. This does not mean that the pleaded instances were not the cause of the damage to the plaintiff. Rather, it means that these six assaults upon which the action is brought took place against a background of extensive and persistent abuse of which the defendant, as perpetrator, well knew. The damage described by the plaintiff and by his mother, siblings, current partner and treating and forensic medical practitioners is causally attributable to the specific assaults alleged. 10. The predominant injury caused by the assaults has been psychological. This commenced with humiliation and a sense of degradation while the assaults were occurring. It quickly progressed to behavioural reaction by the plaintiff and dysfunction in his relations with his family and his school community. In turn this lead to premature termination of the plaintiff's education. The plaintiff says that in high school while the sexual abuse was occurring he commenced to have physical confrontations with other students and to act and react violently and destructively. He became difficult and uncooperative. From the age of 15 (in 1998) he began smoking and drinking alcohol to excess. The plaintiff ceased to play team sports during the period of the abuse and gravitated toward friendships with "a few classmates who had disabilities". 11. The plaintiff now considers that all of this deterioration of behaviour was his reaction to the "guilt and stress of being sexually abused". I have no doubt that is the case. At the time the plaintiff said nothing about the sexual abuse to which the defendant was subjecting him. He did not speak of this to his siblings, his friends, his parents or his teachers. I accept that the abrupt behavioural change in the plaintiff, from the age of 13, was caused by the abuse. The severity of the change in personality and the timing of it is confirmed by evidence given by the plaintiff's mother and two of his siblings. A reaction of the nature described, accompanied by failure to disclose the humiliating cause, is a phenomenon familiar to the courts in such cases. 12. The distraction and disturbance that resulted from the sexual assaults compromised the plaintiff's school performance. It led to constant fighting with other students and culminated in the plaintiff's expulsion part way through year 10, in 1999. In that year that the plaintiff moved to a town in rural New South Wales and was able to form a relationship with a young woman. When that relationship ended he returned to southwest Sydney. The plaintiff subsequently formed a relationship with another partner and married. The marriage lasted several years and from it the plaintiff has three children. His relationships with both partners and with his children were disturbed by aggressive and unwarranted outbursts of anger over which the plaintiff had no control and of which he retained little memory. His tendency towards behaviour of this kind has continued and has permanently damaged his relationships with his now estranged wife and with his children. 13. Psychological damage to the plaintiff festered over the years following the end of the sexual abuse in 1998. In 2010, eleven years after leaving school, the plaintiff's mental health was in crisis. He told his wife, with whom he was still living at that time, to leave their house and to take the children. He then proceeded to smash the house. Police were called and the plaintiff was committed to a mental health facility as an involuntary patient. He remained there, in psychiatric care, for three months. Upon discharge the plaintiff lived with his mother for some time. He has remained separated from his wife and he still has little contact with his children. 14. The plaintiff suffers from recurrent intrusive thoughts of the abusive incidents and has nightmares about them. He suffers poor sleep, irritability, anxiety and social withdrawal. These symptoms have been persistent since 1998. From the time of his admission to the mental health facility in 2010 anti-anxiety and psychotropic medication has been prescribed for the plaintiff. A side-effect of this treatment regime has been significant weight gain, exacerbated by lack of exercise. Loss of motivation for physical activity is a symptom of his psychiatric disorder. The plaintiff's present weight is 185 kg, approximately double a healthy weight for his frame. 15. Until 2010 the plaintiff did not speak to anybody about the abuse he had suffered. In that year he confided in one of his friends. Then in 2011 the plaintiff commenced an "on and off" relationship with a female friend and he confided to her in 2013. He told his mother and some of his siblings about what that defendant had done to him shortly before he reported it to police in March 2017. Having informed police, the plaintiff then cooperated with them to meet with the defendant and engage in conversation about the sexual assaults of 20 years earlier, while police recorded the conversation through a concealed listening device. This led to the defendant's arrest on 17 May 2017. 16. In 2017 and 2018 the plaintiff continued to suffer severe depression, undoubtedly caused by the sexual abuse. This led to him making three or four attempts on his own life, by overdosing on prescription medication and on one occasion by cutting his wrists. Employment history 1. After leaving school in 1999 at the age of 16 the plaintiff first worked for 3 to 4 months for a kitchen manufacturing company. The temperamental instability that had characterised his last three years at school continued to plague him and he lost this job as a result of fighting with a fellow worker. The plaintiff says that an aspect of his psychological disturbance is an intolerance of taking instructions. This, combined with his volatility and tendency to quarrel and fight with co-workers, has led to the plaintiff's inability to hold a job for any significant duration. 2. After termination of his employment with the kitchen manufacturing company the plaintiff worked as a cladding installer for a home improvement company. There followed a number of unskilled jobs and then employment in welding and painting with an ironwork manufacturer. None of these jobs lasted longer than four months. During the early years after leaving school the plaintiff also worked on and off with his natural father, for periods of 3 to 4 months. This was sheet metal work in which the plaintiff learned to install air-conditioning ducting. 3. The plaintiff has not worked since about 2016. Towards the end of the period during which he had intermittent employment, the plaintiff's difficulty holding down a job was exacerbated by his lack of motivation and lethargy. That would undoubtedly have been a consequence of the plaintiff's gross overweight, in turn a side-effect of his psychiatric disorders and the medication he has been taking. Psychiatric and psychological reports 1. Dr Synnott, a consultant psychiatrist, reviewed available records and obtained a detailed history from the plaintiff. In a report dated 27 February 2019 he said the plaintiff described experiencing sufficient psychological symptoms to meet the diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder. The doctor concluded: Based on the evidence available, in my opinion it appears the sexual assaults in his teenage years have been the dominant feature in the onset and perpetuation of his psychological difficulties – and their impact on his life – to the present day. I have no evidence of other factors being significant in the onset and perpetuation of his psychological difficulties. It is not uncommon for people subjected to sexual assaults to 'keep it secret' and not talk about it at the time – it is revealed years after the event. 1. In Dr Synnott's opinion reticence to report what has occurred in cases such as this is often a result of the psychological impact of the abuse. He is of the view that the plaintiff's symptoms will likely be permanent. I accept that that is the case. The severity of the current and likely continuing symptoms was summarised by the doctor in the following terms: [The plaintiff] has been severely impaired in his capacity to work and participate in other life roles for many years – in the last ten years, he has spent just 5% of that time in employment; this is consistent with his psychiatric incapacity to work. It would appear this has been the case for many years; at least a decade … . In my opinion he will likely remain psychiatrically incapable of employment for the foreseeable future; as well, he is significantly impaired in his capacity to participate in other life roles – such as a partner/husband, doing household tasks or as a parent to his children. In my opinion, it appears psychological therapy and psychotropic medication have been of no obvious benefit; the course of his psychiatric symptoms is largely beyond the reach of the medical profession – and will be determined by his personality resources and motivations. [I]n relation to his psychiatric injuries, he will need ongoing domestic assistance – one hour a day three days a week; not in self-care and personal hygiene but things like the household chores, cleaning the house and the like. It is likely to be permanent. 1. Mr Lander, a consultant psychologist, assessed the plaintiff on 5 March 2019 particularly with respect to the impact of the sexual abuse and the plaintiff's consequent psychological deterioration upon his education and acquisition of employment skills. Having assessed the plaintiff's underlying intellectual capacity and taken a history from him regarding his early intentions and ambitions with respect to a career, Mr Lander expressed this view: [Had the plaintiff] not been subject to the sexual abuse, between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, a range of occupations would have been open to him, including: sheet metal work, including welding and associated skills. Most significantly, since he was a young boy, his father taught him the trade of constructing and installing air conditioning ducting and units. 1. Mr Lander recorded that the plaintiff's behavioural problems in his last years of school and the early termination of his education had the effect that upon leaving he "could hardly read or spell". Mr Lander said: [T]he abuse occurred at a critical time in the development of his brain and multiple studies indicate that this can cause changes in neural pathways which affect personality and the individual's view of the world. [The plaintiff] would have had the capacity to achieve significantly more throughout his working life, but for the abuse he suffered. In my view, but for the abuse, he had the capacity to live a normal life and to achieve a career either in sheet metal work and/or construction and installation of air conditioning ducting and units. Had he not been psychologically impaired, he could have prospered in his father's air-conditioning company, or as a subcontractor for a larger company. Metabolic syndrome 1. There was tendered on the plaintiff's behalf a report dated 4 September 2019 from Dr Daniel Cheong whom the plaintiff has consulted since 2013. The doctor states: [In the mental health facility in 2010 the plaintiff] was started on medications including Seroquel 200 mg as a mood stabiliser and by 2013 he weighed 186 kg with a [Body Mass Index] of 56. His severe mood disturbances necessitated the ongoing prescription of Seroquel by his GPs which I believe has substantially contributed to his current severe obesity. [The plaintiff] has also used eating as a form of coping during periods of severe depression which has contributed further to his weight gain. Weight gain, insulin resistance and hypertension are known side-effects of many antipsychotic and mood stabilising medications. He was unable to stay physically active or exercise due to his pervasive depressive symptoms which included constant tiredness, poor motivation and a sense of hopelessness. 1. Dr Cheong describes the following further health complications that have arisen from the plaintiff's obesity and inactivity, in turn caused by his psychiatric symptoms and the medication prescribed for those symptoms: In 2013 he suffered an acute deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism which required anticoagulation with warfarin. [Since 2014] he has regularly complained of gastro-oesophageal reflux symptoms which are most likely caused by his obesity and poor diet. [Since 2015] he developed persistent uncomfortable swelling of both lower legs which requires him to take periodic courses of diuretics. He is also developing signs of early venous eczema on the lower legs which is a complication of chronic oedema. [In July 2015] ultrasound and CT imaging revealed fatty liver, fatty infiltration of the pancreas and an enlarged spleen … . Other symptoms noted include shortness of breath when lying in bed, shortness of breath on exertion, loud snoring and constant lethargy. 1. In Dr Cheong's view the plaintiff is likely to have sleep apnoea. He has elevated blood pressure and elevated fasting glucose, which are criteria of metabolic syndrome. This syndrome is constituted by a cluster of factors that increase the risk of cardiovascular disease, diabetes and chronic kidney disease. Dr Cheong refers to literature that "suggests there is a 1.6 fold increase in mortality for patients with metabolic syndrome compared to those without it". He expresses the opinion that: [The plaintiff's] metabolic syndrome was caused by a combination of factors including comfort eating during periods of severe depression, increased appetite and metabolic complications caused by his long-term Seroquel treatment, and lack of physical exercise due to his anxiety and depression. No award for exemplary damages 1. The plaintiff claims exemplary damages, which are punitive and may be awarded to mark the Court's condemnation of a defendant's tortious conduct, to deter the defendant and others of like mind from committing similar wrongs and to assuage any urge for revenge: Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47. In Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 the appellant sued a compulsory third-party motor accident insurer for damages sustained when a driver deliberately drove a vehicle at him. The driver was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. The High Court held that exemplary damages could not be awarded in light of the driver's conviction and punishment under the criminal law. 2. Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave the following reasons for this conclusion in Gray v Motor Accident Commission at [40]-[44] (citation omitted): [40] Where, as here, the criminal law has been brought to bear upon the wrongdoer and substantial punishment inflicted, we consider that exemplary damages may not be awarded. We say "may not" because we consider that the infliction of substantial punishment for what is substantially the same conduct as the conduct which is the subject of the civil proceeding is a bar to the award; the decision is not one that is reached as a matter of discretion dependent upon the facts and circumstances in each particular case. [41] There are at least two reasons in principle why that is so. [42] First, the purposes for the awarding of exemplary damages have been wholly met if substantial punishment is exacted by the criminal law. The offender is punished; others are deterred. There is, then, no occasion for the award. [43] Secondly, considerations of double punishment would otherwise arise. In R v Hoar Gibbs CJ, Mason, Aickin and Brennan JJ said that there is "a practice, if not a rule of law, that a person should not be twice punished for what is substantially the same act". That practice or rule would be breached by an award of exemplary damages in the circumstances described. [44] Because, in this case, substantial punishment was imposed on the tortfeasor for the conduct which was in issue in the civil proceedings, it is not necessary to decide whether the bar arises only where the punishment is "substantial" or how close must be the similarity between the conduct that is the subject of the two proceedings. 1. In submitting that exemplary damages may be awarded in the present case the plaintiff argued that: [T]he defendant's sexual abuse [of the plaintiff], and its closely related emotional abuse, was more widespread, and more habitual than the two charges [on the indictment] and the [four additional] matters contained in the statement of agreed facts within the Form 1 process. 1. In support of this submission the plaintiff refers to his generalised evidence of numerous sexual assaults in addition to the few of which he was able to give sufficient particulars to police for the charges to be laid. The plaintiff also relies upon his evidence of emotional abuse that continued following the last of the physical sexual assaults. This ongoing abuse took the form of the defendant maintaining contact with the plaintiff after 1998 and talking to him about his own continuing sexual misconduct with other young boys. 2. However, the statement of claim is pleaded in such a way as to limit the particular sexual assaults upon which the default judgment has been entered. The plaintiff's case regarding the extent of sexual abuse cannot be expanded in evidence after the defendant's procedural default has occurred and after judgment for damages to be assessed has been entered. No doubt the plaintiff's cause of action has been pleaded only upon the six instances for the same reason that prevailed in the criminal jurisdiction. Namely, while the plaintiff is conscious of there having been numerous other occasions, he is not able to recall enough detail to be able to substantiate any of them in particular or to separate them from one another. The result is that the case on liability with respect to which the defendant defaulted and that is the subject of the judgment on liability is precisely coextensive with the criminal case in which punishment by imprisonment has been imposed. Applying Gray v Motor Accident Commission, exemplary damages cannot be awarded. General and aggravated damages 1. I accept the plaintiff's submission that there should be a single award of damages for all of the sexual assaults. Aggravated damages are claimed. As held by the High Court in Lamb v Cotogno: Aggravated damages, in contrast to exemplary damages, are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff's feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like. 1. The loss of enjoyment of life suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's torts has been immense. I am satisfied that he has suffered significant injury to feelings as a result of the humiliation of the degrading abuse to which he was subjected. Hodgson JA in State of New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496 at [130] referred to the difficulty of quantifying damages for hurt to feelings and the necessity to exercise caution against double counting of damage. Bearing those considerations in mind I assess the plaintiff's general damages, including aggravated damages, at $400,000, comprising $250,000 for past damages and $150,000 for the future. In this assessment I make allowance for the grave physical ill-health into which the plaintiff has descended as a consequence of the psychological damage done to him and as a side effect of the attempts to treat and stabilise that damage with medication. I have a sense that if the plaintiff cannot address his obesity his life expectancy must be reduced but the evidence does not permit me to quantify this to any standard of probability. 2. I will award interest on the component for past general damages at 2% per annum over the whole period from October 1996 to the date of this judgment (23 years). This interest rate is adopted taking into account the judgment of the High Court in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gocic (1991) 171 CLR 657 and bearing in mind that the non-economic loss for which this damages award is made has been suffered progressively over that period. Past loss of earnings 1. I calculate the plaintiff's past loss of earnings on the basis that if the sexual abuse had not occurred the plaintiff would have remained at school in full-time study until late 2000. But for the defendant's torts I am satisfied that, from early December 2000 to early December 2012, between the ages of 18 and 30 years, the plaintiff could have earned the equivalent of average weekly earnings for a male employee in New South Wales. Total net earnings in full-time employment on this basis would have been $604,679. Allowing for periods of unemployment between jobs I estimate his total potential earnings over these years at $540,000. 2. I find that had the plaintiff not suffered the disruption to his education and vocational development, by the age of 30 years (in December 2012) he could have attained qualifications as a Sheet Metal Trades Worker or as an Air-conditioning and Refrigeration Mechanic. Evidence before me indicates that the range of gross incomes across these two roles presently lies between $1,304 and $1,536 per week gross. The average of these two figures is $1,420 per week gross, or $1,121 after tax. 3. I consider it appropriate to adopt this average figure in respect of the period from December 2012 to the present as an approximation. This allows for the likelihood that wages for these trades would have been lower at the beginning of the period than they are today. It also allows for the likelihood that the plaintiff would have progressed to higher earnings during the period, through development of his personal skill. 4. On this basis, total earnings that the plaintiff might have earned over the six years and 11 months from when he turned 30 in December 2012 to the present time could have been $403,560 I will adopt a figure of $400,000, making minimal allowance for periods of unemployment between jobs having regard to the evidence of Mr Lander concerning availability of work in the subject trades. 5. The sum of the figures for the two periods, $940,000, represents an estimate of what the plaintiff would have earned but for the effect upon him of the defendant's sexual assaults. The plaintiff submits that what he has in fact earned from intermittent employment over all of these years, from the age of 18 in late 2012 to 36 at the date of this decision, is $106,192. This is itself an estimate, which I will round down to $100,000. The difference, being his loss of net income, is $840,000. 6. The plaintiff's loss of superannuation contributions, at 11%, is $92,400. His total past economic loss is therefore $932,400. The average of the prescribed interest rate over the period in question (being just eight weeks short of 19 years from early December 2000 to the present) is 8.06%. I will calculate interest at that rate for nine years. That is slightly under half of the relevant period, reflecting that more of the loss is likely to have been sustained in the last half of the period than in the first half. This calculation produces an interest figure of $676,363. Future loss of earnings 1. It is appropriate to calculate the plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity on the basis of the upper end of the range of weekly earnings for the trades in which he could have expected to find full-time employment. That is a rate of $1,536 per week gross, being $1,199 per week after tax. I find it likely that the plaintiff would have worked to approximately the pensionable age of 67 years, being a further 31 years from the present. It is appropriate to adopt the 3% discounted multiplier, 1059.2. That produces a figure of $1,269,981 2. From the above figure there must be a deduction of 15% to allow for the vicissitudes of life. That leaves a discounted figure of $1,079,484 Applying the decision in Najdiovski v Crnojlovic [2008] NSWCA 175, loss of future superannuation payments is to be calculated at 14.17%, yielding $152,963. Future medical and care expenses 1. The cost to the plaintiff of treatment that he has received to date has been in the order of $25 per week, after allowance for concessions and refunds. It is reasonable to assess his future medical expenses as continuing at approximately the same level of cost to himself. A rounded allowance of $20,000 is in my view sufficient for this aspect of the plaintiff's damages. 2. The current prescribed rate for gratuitous care is $31.03 per hour. In the absence of direct evidence about the cost of care that might be provided to the plaintiff on a commercial basis, I accept the plaintiff's submission that it is reasonable to adopt a rate of $40 per hour. In Dr Synnott's view the plaintiff requires approximately three hours of domestic assistance per week. That appears to be reasonable having regard to the evidence of his present physical and psychiatric condition. 3. At a cost of $120 per week this component of damages should be calculated on the basis that the assistance will be required for 34 years, until the plaintiff is aged 70. It is reasonable to assume that from that age he would have required assistance irrespective of the debilitating effects of the sexual assaults. The 3% multiplier for 34 years is 1119.2. This produces a figure of $134,304 as the net present value of the plaintiff's requirement for future care. Summation of damages 1. In summary the components of the plaintiff's damages are as follows: General damages $400,000 Interest on general damages for past suffering $115,000 Past economic loss (wages) $840,000 Past economic loss (superannuation) $92,400 Interest on past economic loss $676,363 Future economic loss (wages) $1,079,483 Future economic loss (superannuation) $152,963 Future medical expenses $20,000 Future domestic care $134,304 Total $3,510,513 1. This significant award reflects the reality that the defendant's predatory pursuit of his depraved sexual interest in a boy of early teenage years has all but destroyed what might have been a contented and useful life. There will be judgment for the plaintiff for $3,510,513 and an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 03 October 2019