District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Arissian [2019] NSWDC 642 Hearing dates: 8 July 2019, 16 July 2019 Decision date: 16 July 2019 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Norrish QC DCJ Decision: Total sentence of 8 years imprisonment; non parole period 4 years Catchwords: CRIME – Sentence – indecent assault victim under 16 years under authority – aggravated act of indecency – age difference – employer/employee – grooming – manipulation - pattern of behaviour – numerous incidents – victim resigned from job and reported to police one incident from that day – did not speak of wider behaviour until following year – prisoner serving sentence for similar prior offence when charged with these offences – pleas of guilty – letter of apology to the victim - no mental illness or personality pathology – moderate risk of re-offending – family support – limited insight into his offending - requires further counselling – sentence partially accumulative upon previous aggregate sentence Legislation Cited: Attorney General's Application No 1 of (2002) 56 NSWLR 147 Crimes Act 1900; s 61M; s 61O; s 558 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999; s 25AA; s 21A; s 25D; Div 4 Pt 1B; s 53A; s 3A; s 44 Sentencing Act 1989; s 9 Cases Cited: DPP v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 Hemsley [2004] Johnson v R (2004) 78 ALJR 616 Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 Mostyn v R [2004] NSWCCA 97 Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 16 R v BA [2014] NSWCCA 148 R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368 R v Solomon [2005] 153 A Crim R 32 R v Thomas [2007] NSWCCA 269 R v Todd [1982] 2NSWLR 517 R v Tuala, [2015] NSWCCA 8 R v XX (2009) 195 A Crime R 38 Wilson v R [2005] NSWCCA 219 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina (Crown) Sarmen Arissian (offender) Representation: Counsel: Mr E Anderson (offender) Solicitors: Ms Mansour (Crown) Mr E Fenton (offender) File Number(s): 2018/00228960 Publication restriction: Non-publication order re: any material leading to the identification of the victim Judgment 1. The prisoner Sarmen Arissian appears today for sentence in relation to a number of offences committed over a period of time between 1 January 1995 and 5 May 1996. It is necessary for me in the context of a number of issues I have to address to go through each of the matters for sentence. I should point out that the prisoner was committed for sentence from the Central Local Court and I am satisfied that the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty is such that I should provide the prisoner, in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Common Law on this topic, a discount of 25% upon the otherwise appropriate sentence for each of the sentences to be imposed. This will be reflected in both the aggregate sentence and in the indicative sentences. 2. I should point out too that the prisoner is currently in custody. He was sentenced by his Honour North J on 31 March 2017 to seven years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years; those sentences commencing on 16 December 2016. I will come back to his Honour's reasoning because it is of some relevance in a range of ways to what I am required to do today. 3. The details of the offences for which he has been committed for sentence, I need to set out in some little detail. There are a number of offences contrary to s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 as it was at the time of the offending the relevant charge being a charge that existed at law at the time of offending. That offence is an offence of indecent assault upon the victim whilst the victim was under his authority. As I said, there are a number of those charges which I will particularise in a moment, there are five Forms 1. 4. There are also a number of other charges contrary to s 61O(1) Crimes Act 1900, that is either committing an act of indecency towards or with the victim, the victim relevantly being under the age of 16 years, and in various circumstances either 14 or 15 years of age. 5. So far as the offences contrary to s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 are concerned, the maximum penalty for that offending in the mid-90's was seven years' imprisonment and naturally there was no standard non-parole period. The situation has changed, of course, in relation to the character of that offending under current laws. The maximum penalty in relation to an aggravated act of indecency: that is, committing an offence whilst the person was under the prisoner's authority when the victim was under 16 years, was five years imprisonment, and again, there is no standard non-parole period. 6. The way the matter has been treated in the Crown's Statement of Facts - and I make no criticism of this - is to identify offences numbered 1 to 7. Offence 1 is an offence that sits by itself contrary to s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act of indecent assault of the victim whilst under the prisoner's authority between 1 January 1995 and 5 May 1995. 7. Offence 2, as it is described, which is sequence 2 - and I should point out offence 1 is sequence 1 in the sequence numbers provided from the committal papers - is an offence under s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 with two offences to be taken into account on a Form 1. They are sequences 3 and 12, and both of those offences are offences contrary to s 61O(1) of that Act. 8. Offence 3, as it is described, is sequence 4. It is the only principal offence, if I might describe it as that, under s 61O(1) of the Act, and there are two such other offences required to be taken into account on a Form 1 in relation to the sequence 4 offence. They are all offences, as I understand it from the particulars, committed between 1 January 1995 and 1 January 1996. I hasten to say the earlier mentioned sequences 2, 3, and 12 were also committed between 1 January 1995 and 5 May 1995, as is sequence 1. 9. Offence 4 is sequence 6. It is an indecent assault whilst under the prisoner's authority committed between 1 January 1996 and 5 May 1996. There are three offences required to be taken into account on a relevant Form 1 for the principal offence. They are sequences 14, 15, and 16. Two of those offences are indecent acts towards or with the victim, and one offence, sequence 15, is an indecent assault. The two matters I just referred to are sequences 14 and 16. 10. Offence 5, as it is described in the facts, is sequence 8. It is, again, another indecent assault whilst under the authority of the prisoner, and has one offence on the Form 1, sequence 7. They are offences committed between January 1996 and May 1996; Offence 6 is sequence 10, and is an indecent assault whilst under the authority of the prisoner committed between January 1996 and May 1996, with two offences, sequences 17 and 9 committed within the same dates, one an offence contrary to s 61O(1) of the Act, the other an indecent assault whilst under the authority of the prisoner. 11. Offence 7, as it is described, is sequence 18 and is a solitary offence contrary to s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900. 12. The facts provide, as I understand it in the way in which they have been drafted to the best of the ability of the victim to be able to identify particular matters, a chronological account of the offending. I also bear in mind, as the facts made very clear, that the offences with which I am now concerned largely are representative counts reflecting a course of conduct over the period of time particularised in the indictment, that is, a period of something in the order of 18 months. 13. As is pointed out from the way in which I have dealt with the particulars, there are five Forms 1. Therefore, in respect of principal offences attaching to those forms, which I have identified, I am required to have regard to the law that stands in respect of treatment of matters on the Form 1. I particularly refer in this regard to Attorney General's Application No 1 of (2002) 56 NSWLR 147, which identifies the fact that where there is a matter to be taken into account on a Form 1 greater weight should be given to the need for personal deterrence in the community's entitlement to extract retribution. 14. The Court of Criminal Appeal observed that "the entire point of the process" is usually to impose a longer sentence or to alter the nature of the sentence that would have been imposed if the principal offence had stood alone. It was wrong to suggest that the initial penalty should be small, sometimes it will be substantial, and, of course, this will vary from case to case. But the sentencing process is only concerned with the principal offence, not to determine appropriate sentences for matters listed on a Form 1, or to determine an overall sentence that would be appropriate for all the offences and apply a discount, giving appropriate weight to the matters earlier identified in the judgment. The Court stated that deterrence and retribution are entitled to "greater weight than they may otherwise be given when sentencing for the primary offence." Of course the Court has to have regard to the maximum penalty for the primary offence, the principle of "totality", which I will come back to shortly, is another relevant consideration and I generally refer to the observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal at [18]-[44] of that judgment. 15. There is another matter that I need to identify at this early stage and it concerns s 25AA of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. As I will point out when I analyse in some little detail the sentencing of the prisoner by North DCJ, the prisoner, when he was sentenced by North DCJ in 2017, was not sentenced in accordance with the "sentencing patterns and practices at the time of sentence". His Honour in fact sentenced the prisoner in accordance with the law as he understood it at the time. 16. Section 25AA provides that a court must sentence an offender for a child sexual assault offence in accordance with contemporary sentencing patterns and practices, not at the time of the offence. However with regard to the standard non‑parole period of course the standard non‑parole period is only relevant if it applied at the time of the offence, not at the time of the sentencing. 17. Further, s 25AA(3) provides that when sentencing an offender for a child sexual offence the Court must have regard to the trauma of sexual abuse on children as understood at the time of sentencing, including any particular matters raised in the context of psychological research and the common experience of courts and there can be no doubt that the courts are mindful and well aware of the traumatic effect of child sexual abuse on victims. 18. In this particular case, and I will come back to this again at a later time, there is a very detailed and, dare I say it, moving victim impact statement read by a third person on behalf of the prisoner setting out the profound effect upon the victim since the offending up until the present time. I accept that there has been a profound effect upon the victim which still continues. The victim in this respect shares in general terms the same experiences as were suffered by the victim of the offending of the prisoner that was dealt with by North DCJ. 19. With regard to that aspect of the matter, I hasten to say it is to be borne in mind that one is sentencing a particular prisoner in respect of particular offences that have a particular maximum penalty, this requires the Court to apply the principles that relate to sentencing where a particular maximum penalty is prescribed. The maximum penalty providing a guide or a yardstick for offending of the worst type and involving the worst offender and there are varying matters to be taken into account in assessing the objective criminality of the offending. 20. I should point out, as it relates to some specific submissions made by the Crown and the defence to me, that I am required in dealing with the offences contrary to s 61M and s 61O of the Crimes Act to consider the circumstances of aggravation pleaded in the context of the types of circumstances of aggravation contemplated by the relevant section. 21. With regard to s 61M, circumstances of aggravation may mean that the offender was in company of another person, which may or may not be a significant aggravating factor, that the victim was under the age of 16 years or the victim was at the time of the offence under the authority of the offender or the victim had a serious physical disability or the victim had a serious intellectual disability. 22. It can be seen just by reference to those particular aggravating factors that the intensity and character of aggravating factors may vary from case to case. One cannot generalise about these matters. It depends on the facts of the particular case. But one can see, for example, where a sexual assault is committed upon a person with a serious physical disability or a serious intellectual disability, in circumstances where those disabilities prevent the victim from being able to defend themselves or being captive to the care of the relevant prisoner, that those circumstances of aggravation may be seen as more serious than other circumstances of aggravation. In relation to s 61O the same circumstances of aggravation apply, save for the fact that the section itself requires the relevant victim to be under the age of 16 years so that is not pleaded as one of the alternative circumstances of aggravation. 23. I am required to detail the facts to relate the respective offences and the particular individual sequenced offences to one another. This is a responsibility in public session to detail the reasoning and the facts upon which decisions are made. This is the very character of open justice but it is noted that there should be no publication of any material that would lead to the recognition or the identification of the victim. 24. The victim was born in May 1980. In 1994 he turned 14 years of age and in late 1994 or early 1995 he started working at a restaurant which was owned by the prisoner. The prisoner was born October 1961 and was 18 and a half years older than the victim. The prisoner had operated the restaurant in a suburb of Sydney particularised in each of the charges in the indictment for approximately nine years. In fact the prisoner's offences against the earlier victim, the subject of sentence by North DCJ, arose out of a connection through the restaurant. 25. The facts go on to state the character of the relationship of the victim to the prisoner. The victim worked at the business until October 1996 and made a complaint to authorities in relation to the prisoner's conduct towards him. But the prisoner at that time was charged with one offence in the context of the complaint that had been made by the prisoner at that time which is an unusual feature of the case in itself. 26. The prisoner thus, as the criminal history reveals, was convicted at the Burwood Local Court on 30 April 1997 with an offence of aggravated indecent assault, which I take to be under the same provision of s 61M(1), with which I am concerned in relation to a number of offences. He was placed on a recognisance pursuant to s 558 Crimes Act 1900 for a period of three years to receive appropriate therapy. 27. At the time of that sentencing the prisoner had one prior conviction. That is of behaving in an indecent manner on railway property, for which he was convicted at the Liverpool Local Court in September 1985 and fined the modest sum of $300. I have the facts in relation to that matter. In that matter the prisoner's public behaviour was very similar to the character of the behaviour in this matter, contravening s 61O(1) of the Crimes Act. 28. There is just one matter I need to raise, and I have not discussed it with the parties. I note that the offence of aggravated indecent assault, albeit being a solitary offence at that point, as I understand it, that solitary offence being the subject of complaint by the current victim, was dealt with summarily. I have not received any detailed submissions as to the relevance of the possibility of summary jurisdiction being exercised in relation to the matters with which I am concerned. But it may be that in fairness, although I raised the topic, the fact that in light of the sentences imposed by North DCJ in relation to offences that could not be dealt with summarily, or some of which could not be dealt with summarily, having regard to the number of the offences and the extent of the criminality of the prisoner. It was not realistic to consider that issue. It certainly was not an issue raised before me. 29. The facts set out the circumstances of some early grooming of the victim at para 4 and then turn to the order of events. The sequence 1 offence, described as offence 1, involved the commission of an offence of indecent assault. The prisoner after some discussion with the victim began massaging his shoulders, he lifted victim's shirt, scratched his bare back with his fingernails and started moving two fingers of each hand into the back of the victim's work pants, he then moved his fingers into the victim's underwear and towards his bottom, and then moved his hands around to grab the or touch the victim's genitals with which he "played". He massaged his testicles and moved them around and was pulling the victim's penis back and forth causing sensation in the victim that made him feel "weird and disgusted". The victim eventually pushed himself and the stool away from the prisoner which caused the prisoner to loosen to grip on the victim's penis and the victim excused himself to go to the toilet. 30. The Crown, I just point out by reference to some submissions seeking to characterise the character of the offending, points to that and the offence that constitutes offence number 6, that is sequence 17, as being the more serious of the offences. In relation to what is described as offence 2 the way the facts have related the relevant matters to offence 2 is to describe the sequence 3 offence, that is the offence on the Form 1, first. This is an offence of the prisoner parading himself with his pants down, holding his shirt up and not wearing any underwear, and the victim asking him when he saw the prisoner's penis "What are you doing?" That is an offence under s 61O. 31. The second offence on that relevant Form 1 in order in which it is listed in the agreed statement of facts is sequence 12. On this occasion the victim walked into the restaurant area at the commencement of his shift and saw the prisoner with his pants down and his penis in view, and the victim, being disgusted, turned his head, this is another offence contrary to s 61O. 32. The sequence 2 offence which is the principal offence and is an offence contrary s 61M(1) involved the prisoner coming up to the victim, sitting next to him on a stool, asked the victim to bring the stool in front of him and he would give him a massage, the offender placed both of his hands inside the victim's underwear and grabbed his penis and testicles. 33. The offence that I and the Crown described as offence 3, is sequence 4. Offence 3 is an offence contrary to s 61O(1) and on this occasion, on a Saturday night shift, the victim was cleaning up, the restaurant was closed, the victim walked into the kitchen, the prisoner passed him a magazine, told him to sit in the freezer and asked him to read aloud from the magazine. The victim did this in a somewhat confused state. The prisoner then pulled his jeans down and sat on a milk crate. The victim read a story of sexual character. The prisoner started grunting and the prisoner started in effect masturbating in front of the victim. During the time this happened the prisoner's noises were louder and louder, and then the prisoner ejaculated onto the floor. With regard to this offence, called offence 3 or sequence 4, there are matters on a Form 1. Sequence 5, is another situation of the prisoner masturbating in front of the victim, shocking the victim. Sequence 13 is another occasion where the prisoner masturbated towards the victim as the victim walked into the kitchen area and ejaculated on the floor between himself and the victim. There were other instances of the prisoner masturbating in the presence of the victim. 34. Towards the latter part of 1995 the victim turned from working every week to working just one on the basis that he could not cope with the conduct of the prisoner and he thought by limiting his time with the prisoner this conduct might stop. The victim was 15 years of age at this time but the conduct did not stop. 35. With regard to offence 4, the first offence identified as a matter on a Form for it, which is sequence 14, was an occasion the prisoner invited the victim to show him his penis. The victim declined. So the prisoner pulled his own penis out of his pants and said words to the effect "Look, mine is pretty small", shocking the victim. 36. The next offence in time, according to the agreed facts, is again a matter on a Form 1 to offence 4 and that is sequence 15. On this occasion the prisoner asked the victim again to show his penis but the victim refused. The prisoner grabbed the zipper of the victim's pants and tried to unzip his pants. The victim pulled away but quickly showed the prisoner his penis before putting it back in his pants and doing up his zipper. The prisoner made a comment about the size of the victim's penis and asked the victim to touch his penis. The offence that is described as offence 4, the principal offence to those matters on the Form 1, is sequence 6. This again is another offence of indecent assault. On this occasion the prisoner grabbed the victim's hand and put it on top of, as I understand it, the prisoner's penis. The prisoner was leaning back against the refrigerator and wrapped the victim's fingers around the prisoner's penis and moved the victim's hand up and down. The prisoner then said to the victim, "You do it". The victim felt disgusted and only placed three of his fingers on the prisoner's penis. The victim was in these circumstances stroking the prisoner's penis until it started "weep". When he saw that he stopped, the prisoner invited the victim to continue but he declined. There is one other matter on a Form 1 in relation to offence 4 or sequence 6 and that is sequence 16. In that matter the prisoner repeated what he had done before, he took hold of the victim's penis with his thumb and index and middle finger and the victim eventually left and went back to tidying up. 37. With regard to offence 5, which is sequence 8, there is a matter on a Form 1 which is sequence 7. The facts state on the next shift the same thing occurred; the prisoner took hold of the victim's hand and guided it onto his penis. The victim then pulled back and forth on the prisoner's penis as instructed until he saw it began to "weep". The victim then stopped and moved away. Sequence 8 is another offence of indecent assault. The prisoner immediately afterwards, as I understand the facts, walked towards the victim and said, "Look, I'll do it to you". The victim was obviously scared and was frozen in place. The prisoner walked towards him and then called the victim back to him. The prisoner grabbed a hold of the victim's zipper and pulled it down, he pulled the penis of the victim out of his pants, he took hold of the victim's penis with some fingers and his thumb and pulled it back and forth for a few minutes. Each time this occurred the victim felt his penis becoming erect. He put his hands over his penis and pushed the offender away. 38. In relation to what is described as offence 6, which is sequence 10, there are two offences identified in the facts as being matters on a Form 1, sequences 17 and 9. Sequence 17 involved an allegation of indecent assault where the victim was forced to pull the penis of the prisoner until apparently he ejaculated. And in relation to sequence 9, that involved the prisoner immediately after this taking hold of the victim's penis and moving his fingers back and forth but the victim's penis was not erect. 39. The final offence in time, as it is described in the Agreed Facts, is what is described as offence 7, which is sequence 18. This was in 1996 when the victim was preparing food in the kitchen. The prisoner approached him from behind and put both of his hands into the victim's trousers. He grabbed the victim's penis and started pulling on it. He moved his testicles around; there was no build up to this. The victim tried to move away so that it would stop. The prisoner did not say anything. When the victim shuffled aside the prisoner removed his hands and went on to do something else and they did not speak about what happened. 40. As the facts state and as I earlier noted these were not isolated incidents. The massaging of the victim's penis and testicles occurred on numerous occasions and the masturbation by the prisoner in the presence of the victim occurred on numerous occasions. The prisoner forced the victim to masturbate the prisoner's penis on several occasions. 41. The victim left the employ of the restaurant and the restaurant itself on 17 October 1996 and reported an incident from that day to the police. The prisoner was arrested and prosecuted in relation to that matter in the way in which I have earlier identified. The victim however did not speak of the wider behaviour of the prisoner until approached by police in 2016, providing a detailed statement in 2017. 42. This brings me then to the matter before his Honour Judge North where his Honour imposed the sentence of seven years with a non-parole period of four years. His Honour was concerned with nine principal offences committed as it was pleaded between 1986 and 1992, although there was a disputed facts hearing, the precise details of which are denied me by reference to the judgment. But the offending occurred in relation to a victim who was as young as 13 and relevantly as I would understand it under 16 at the time of the offending, or at least under 18 at the end of the offending. 43. The prisoner was also sentenced, as part of the nine offences with which his Honour was concerned, in relation to an offence of possession of child abuse material. This child abuse material was found when the prisoner was arrested in June 2014 upon the complaint by the victim in relation to the earlier offences. 44. As with here the offences that the prisoner was sentenced for were representative charges. There were two offences of commit gross indecency with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. There were six offences of sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18 years and over the age of ten years and, of course, the one offence of possessing child abuse material. The offences of committing a gross indecency had a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. The offences of homosexual intercourse with a person under the age of 16 years and over the age of ten years had a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. The possess child abuse material carried a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. That was clearly disconnected from the earlier offending, by reason of the particulars I have supplied. There were a number of matters on a Form or Forms 1. The intercourse alleged against the prisoner that he admitted included fellatio and anal penetration. 45. These offences were committed over a period of four years, not just in the pizza shop or the restaurant to which I have referred, but also on an occasion in the prisoner's apartment. On one such occasion, the prisoner filmed the victim. The sentencing judge properly took into account, the long term consequences of being sexually assaulted by the prisoner, reflected in the victim impact statement. It was noted, with the exception of count 9, that the offences did not comprise isolated acts. As I said earlier, the Judge purported to sentence the prisoner by reference to the sentencing range at the time of offending, citing R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368. Although his Honour referred to this principle, he did not refer to any particular judgments or sentences of the time that provided some guidance as to the range of sentences at the time of the offending. 46. The material before his Honour clearly was, in many respects, much the same material as before me. He noted also objective facts that are very similar to the offending with which I am concerned, although I am not concerned, with any allegations of intercourse. Not saying, of course, that the indecent assaults committed upon the victim, were not serious. The victim was considerably younger than the prisoner, as is the case here although the difference in age was not as great as it is here. 47. The Judge found that the prisoner had taken advantage of the employment relationship he had with the victim. He concluded, as I conclude here, that the prisoner had manipulated the victim and was able thus to avoid the necessity of direct violence or threats although in the cases that he was concerned with, the existence of threat was clearly subliminal. He noted the character of the penetration, the inherent violence of the acts performed by the prisoner and he made an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending on the facts available to him. He reflected upon the need for both general and personal deterrence, as I am required to consider. He sentenced the prisoner on the basis that the prisoner's time in custody up until the time of sentencing, had been difficult, not a matter claimed at this point in this matter. 48. So far as the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty were concerned in relation to the sexual assault offences, he gave the prisoner a discount of 12.5%, for the utilitarian value of those please and the context of the disputed facts hearing. He had some evidence before him of the prisoner's, "limited association", in custody but citing the Court of Criminal Appeal decision of Mostyn [2004] NSWCCA 97, particularly at [179]‑[180], noted that whilst it may be assumed that the prisoner may serve his sentence in more rigorous conditions than the general population, that it is not necessarily the case that that would be so and that the Court should not make predictions about the nature of custody to be endured in the future because circumstances may change. 49. In sentencing the prisoner he took into account the delay of 20 years in respect of the matters coming forward for sentence, the totality of criminality, and also made a finding of special circumstances, noting the first time the prisoner had been in custody was for the purposes of those matters and that the prisoner would benefit, as would the community, from the prisoner receiving counselling and, "treatment". He had available to him the two psychological reports that had been tendered before me. I must note by reference to this judgment, that the offending with which his Honour was concerned, was of a more serious character. Most of the offences had greater maximum penalties than the maximum penalties required to be considered in this particular matter. I note that at particular times, that victim was at various points, younger than the current victim. 50. On the other hand, his Honour was not required to have regard to s 25AA of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, hereinafter to be referred as, "the Act", and he was sentencing the prisoner in the context of that offending pre‑dating the offending with which I am concerned. Of course, in this particular matter, the prisoner is now convicted of that prior offending at the time of sentence today. Those matters appear in his criminal history as part of his antecedents reflecting upon the issue of whether the conduct with which I am concerned is uncharacteristic, which it obviously is not. His prior criminal history is relevant for sentencing purposes in this matter, in a range of ways. It particularly does not entitle him to any leniency. 51. Whilst the offender had prior convictions at the time of being sentenced by North J, the criminal history of the prisoner at that time was not as unfavourable and significant as it is now. Thus, the sentences imposed by his Honour provide a context for the sentences I must impose and the offending with which I am concerned. But they do not necessarily provide a guide to the appropriate sentences in the current matters notwithstanding the fact that the offending with which I am concerned is objectively less serious than that held by his Honour. The sentencing of this offender at this time involves a considerable array of matters required to be instinctively synthesized. 52. I referred to the victim impact statement relating to the victim. I do not propose to read out the detail of it. As I said, it was a very detailed and considered document and it reflected upon what the legislation advises judges of, and of which judges are aware, the profound effect that sexual abuse can have on individuals. It should be said in passing although it does not apply to this particular victim, that many people that we see coming to court, having committed crimes or having resorted to drug addiction and the like, are people that have histories of sexual abuse which has had the result of, if I could use the expression, channelling their lives in a direction that might not have been the case but for the sexual abuse that was committed upon them. 53. The victim has referred to a great deal of counselling and assistance he has received, to only minimal effect and I note what is said in relation to that aspect of the matter by the victim. I do not doubt that it is true. But I am also required to note, as everyone in court would understand, that there are several legal issues that need to be considered in the context of considering the victim impact statement. Obviously, absent the terms of the Act, the impact of an offence or offences on a victim has always been taken into account in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence and having regard to the harm of the victim is a relevant matter. 54. However, where there is sought to be established an impact more deleterious than generally anticipated, from the circumstances of the offence, such as to render it an aggravating circumstance, generally one requires evidence supporting this issue beyond a victim impact statement (R v Solomon [2005] 153 A Crim R 32 at [26] and other cases). The statutory scheme of victim impact statements has been considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal, and there were a number of decisions about their evidentiary value. I particularly note that the Court receives a some victim impact statement if it considers it appropriate to do so, and I certainly accept that it is appropriate that I should do so and full regard be had to it. But I am also required to consider what was said about the matter by, for example, Simpson J, in R v Tuala, [2015] NSWCCA 8, particularly at [52]‑[76]. Also those observations of Basten J, in R v Thomas [2007] NSWCCA 269, particularly at [36]‑[37], noting the requirement of certain matters of aggravation to be determined beyond reasonable doubt. There are also further observations by Simpson J in the decision of Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219 particularly at [25]. 55. In relation to the prisoner's subjective case the prisoner did not give evidence. There were tendered two psychological reports that were also tendered on the prior occasion. One by Dr Peter Ashkar dated 20 March 2017, who is a psychologist, and another report from Ms Caroline Hare dated 31 October 2016. I also have a letter of apology addressed to the Court by the prisoner, two affidavits from the prisoner's niece, one obviously available for the sentencing proceedings before his Honour Judge North. 56. The two affidavits of the niece reflect a change of circumstances so far as the prisoner's relationship with the rest of his family. But I bear in mind also the fact in the context of considering particularly the psychological report and the letter of apology, the prisoner has not given evidence and one must approach any hearsay representations made by the prisoner that are untested with some circumspection. 57. It is to be pointed out in relation to the reports from the psychologists that they are obviously written without knowledge of the offending with which I am concerned. In other words, those reports were written in relation to the previous sentencing proceedings and the only knowledge that the authors had of the prisoner's history of offending towards the current victim would be gleaned from the one conviction to which I earlier referred to that was recorded in 1997. 58. The significance of this offending with which I am concerned thus would have been denied to those psychologists. In the course of giving a history to those psychologists I note the prisoner did not admit to a course of offending against the current victim. Ms Hare's report was primarily concerned with treating the prisoner to address his sexual offending behaviours. That treatment commenced on 8 October 2014 and apparently continued for over two years up until the time that Judge North remanded the prisoner in custody in December 2016 before sentencing him two or three months later. 59. The prisoner attended upon 28 sessions which he self-funded. The purpose of the treatment was to develop the prisoner's social support network in the context of an Armenian upbringing which left him isolated in the context of his sexuality. He was engaged to identify what were described by the psychologist as "cognitive distortions" in relation to his interest in viewing images, a reference no doubt to the possess child abuse material and also receiving unacceptable sexual gratification from viewing those images. 60. It also counselled him in relation to what were in a very mild manner described as "inappropriate sexual interest". The prisoner admitted to the psychologist that he had a sexual interest in younger males, possibly aged about or just below 16 years of age which is the case here. There were improvements in the prisoner's attitudes during the course of this counselling, of course too late for the victim with which I am concerned and the other victim. 61. The prisoner saw himself as "damaged goods" and feeling that it was "too late" to make meaningful changes to his life. I note such improvements as identified by the psychologist but I also note again, as I have said earlier, the psychologist was completely unaware of the current offending and that ignorance can be seen to be a matter that may have affected the assessment of the prisoner by that psychologist. 62. The truth of the matter is, as the proven offences that I am concerned with and Judge North was concerned with show, that the prisoner had a long-standing inappropriate and criminal interest in sexual relationships with young males. The later report of Dr Ashkar sets out in more detail the prisoner's history but again this history is again handicapped by an absence of complete detail of the prisoner's offending over the years. I am prepared to accept from the history given by the prisoner, because it does not seem to me a great controversy that the prisoner was born in Cairo, Egypt. He is Armenian in background, has an older brother and sister and came to Australia when he was 12 years of age. He had a dominating father who was apparently well educated and well qualified, but he was treated very strictly by his father as one might expect in a conservative household. He grew up in a conservative cultural context. He had difficulties learning English as one would expect of a 12 year old coming to Australia for the first time without English and also over the years struggled to come to terms with what was described as his "sexuality" particularly in the context of his cultural setting, homosexuality being looked down upon, in fact shunned, if I could use that expression, by people within his community. 63. He commenced working at the age of 16 in his brother's pizza restaurant, although he did complete year 12. He owned a pizza business for 16 years where these offences were committed. After selling the business he apparently was involved in the music industry predominantly playing and producing music for people from Armenian and Assyrian communities. 64. He had a homosexual relationship with another man in the early 1990s for approximately two years. That man was in his early 20s but that person died in a motor vehicle accident in 1992. He did not indulge in alcohol or illicit substances to excess. He, himself, was the subject of inappropriate touching by an adult male when he was 14. However, he did not find that event traumatic. He had been taking some antidepressant medication after his arrest in 2014, no doubt reactive to his then circumstances. 65. The psychologist opined that he demonstrated an obvious "immaturity of reasoning regarding moral and ethical issues". This, I feel, is something of an understatement. At the time of the relevant offending with which the psychologist was concerned the prisoner had difficulty understanding the incapacity of persons under a certain age to meaningfully consent to conduct with which he was charged. This psychologist felt that he had benefitted from the counselling from Ms Hare. The psychologist undertook some psychometric testing which showed the prisoner to be of average intellectual functioning being in the 25th percentile, that is, amongst aged matched peers, but he had weaknesses in verbal skills likely the result of English being a second language. 66. There was absolutely no evidence of mental illness or any serious emotional disturbance such as clinical anxiety, depression or any particular thought disturbance. There was no evidence of what was described as "personality pathology". The psychologist's assessment of his risk of recidivism using the Static 99R Instrument reflected a "moderate-high" risk of re-offending. This, I feel, is an understatement particularly in the context of the psychologist not being fully informed of the prisoner's past offending. 67. The summary of the prisoner's circumstances by the psychologist proceeded on an assumption "that the prisoner at the time of reporting had no other offending history" which is not correct. It was thought by the psychologist in 2017, when the report was prepared, that the prisoner had developed a modicum of insight into his behaviour but needed offence specific treatment to correct what was described as "social deficits and cognitive distortions", another way of saying to correct an illegal interest in sexual relationships with young people. 68. Although I note, as part of the history of the prisoner, that he claimed that for some years prior to his arrest in 2014 he had been celibate, that claim of celibacy has to be seen in the context of the fact that in 2014 he was in possession of a range of child abuse material, which obviously shows an inappropriate interest in the sexual activities of young people. Although I note, in the context of having sentenced many people for child abuse material possession and dissemination, that the amount of material he had in his possession, compared to many others I have seen, was quite limited and certainly in the lower categories of seriousness under what was described then as the CETS scale. 69. The psychologist was of the view that the prisoner needed counselling and other offending sensitive treatment within the community, although he rather optimistically thought that the prisoner might on be gaoled for the offences for which the report was originally prepared. 70. The prisoner's niece's most recent affidavit reflected upon the settled character of the prisoner's incarceration, a matter noted in part by the psychologists. The niece also noted that when the prisoner was on bail in relation to the other matters in 2015, his father died and then his mother died in 2018 whilst he was in custody in relation to these matters. The niece noted that, notwithstanding his offending, there was support from his immediate family - and in recent times it would seem, something of an improvement upon the situation in 2017 - the prisoner is receiving regular visits from his family. The most recent affidavit notes that the prisoner will continue to have support when he is released, and that it is proposed that he will live at Eastlakes. Apparently he has a property there. The earlier affidavit prepared by the niece reflected upon his then isolation, the lack of support while he was in custody and the closed mindedness of the Armenian community about the sexuality of the prisoner. 71. The prisoner also wrote a letter of apology to the Court. He said he wished to apologise to the victim for the damage he had caused him, and made a number of comments about the matter. He said, and I quote from his letter: "I understand how what I did has caused great emotional trouble in his life". I do have difficulty, I must say, accepting that the prisoner understands this, bearing in mind the detail of what is contained in the victim impact statement, but I take that to be an expression of contrition. 72. The prisoner reflects upon the fact that when he was sentenced on the last occasion he was aware of the victim's allegations, but he had not been charged with those matters at that time. He apologised to the victim for the delay in the matter being resolved, although to be fair to the prisoner, the delay in resolving these matters is not entirely in his court. As was particularised in the submissions to me from the bar table, there was an extensive delay after the victim's allegations came to light and before the prisoner was actually charged, and when he was charged he was already commencing the sentence that had been imposed by Judge North. It seems to me that it would have been far better for the one judge to have dealt with all matters at the same time, if there was a prospect of the prisoner being charged with a number of offences. 73. The prisoner reflects upon his sexuality and the circumstances of his not being able to deal with that in the context of his family and cultural situation. He said, amongst other things - and I need to put it on the record - that he did not want to make any excuses for what he did to the victim. I am having difficulty understanding why the prisoner's homosexuality would in any way be some explanation for his conduct towards the victim. Many homosexual people do not commit offences of this type, and I believe the prisoner needs to have insight into his personality and his attitudes that contribute to his offending, that go beyond simply his homosexuality. 74. The Crown's written submissions were very helpful, and it is to be fairly said that counsel for the prisoner, some of whose submissions I have already dealt with as with some of the Crown's submissions, reflected upon the Crown's analysis of the assessment of the objective gravity of the offending and largely concur. I want to go to the Crown's analysis in this regard, because it is a helpful starting point and appears at p 4. 75. In relation to each of the matters that are described by "offence" numbers, not "sequence" numbers, the Crown sets out various circumstances relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness. I do not criticise the Crown Prosecutor's scholarship and the industry of the submissions, but the submissions do not reflect the character of the circumstances of aggravation which are of course a very relevant matter in assessing the seriousness of the offending. 76. In the analysis there is said, at p 5, that the comparison required with the analysis of objective seriousness demanded by Div 4 Pt 1B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. There is no such requirement for me to make an assessment of matters falling within or without the middle range of objective seriousness. That is a statutory expression specifically required in relation to offences of the type that have standard non-parole periods. 77. That having been said, I appreciate what the Crown is attempting to do. That is, to place the offences within some continuum of seriousness. Obviously the offences are offences of seriousness. The circumstances of aggravation, however, are not the most serious or even the more serious of the type that one could contemplate. I bear in mind that the relationship between the prisoner and the victim was one of employer and employee. I appreciate, to an extent, that the prisoner had the victim within his thrall. But certainly not to the same extent as a person being sexually abused by a parent or an older relative, or someone who had responsibility for the care of somebody with a physical or psychological disability, as described in the respective pieces of legislation. 78. In assessing the objective seriousness, I note, concerning offences requiring proof of offences occurring under the age of 16, the victim was, in relation to offences 1 and 2, as they are described, 14 years of age, and was either 14 or 15 years of age at the time of the offending described in offence 3, and I take it in respect of the matters on the Form 1, and was relevantly 15 years in relation to the other "offences" as they are number 4 to 7. I bear in mind of course those ages and their relationship to the age of 16. It is well known that the younger an offender is by relationship to a particular age limit for an offence being committed, the more serious the offending might ordinarily be. I have taken into account the character of the prisoner's offending that rises under s 61O in the conduct. Again, the seriousness of that offending is self-evident, but it is not in conjunction with the circumstances of aggravation, the most serious offending. It is certainly not at the lower end of the scale. But it is to be borne in mind too, in considering each of the individual offences, that they represent a course of conduct, not just representative counts, and in considering the appropriate sentence one imposes upon the prisoner, one must have regard to the progression of events. Where the offender, for example at the time of committing offence 7 as it is described, had already committed 17 or 16 other offences as reflected in the principal offences and the Forms 1 matters. 79. Thus, by reference to each of the categories of offending, that is, under s 61M(1) and s 61O(1) there is to be fairly said by reference to, for example, a consideration of the relevance of the prisoner's antecedents and ascending level of seriousness pursuing a course of conduct notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the commission of the last offence in time the prisoner was not being charged or convicted but he was in fact an unconvicted offender towards the victim. 80. I have had regard, of course, to the maximum penalty which is, as I have said earlier, a guidepost towards the appropriate sentence. I have had regard to the character of the degree of physical contact, it varies, but I accept the Crown's submission, as it was ultimately put, that the offences described as 1 and 6 are the more serious of the offences pursuant to s 61M(1) having regard to the degree of touching or fondling of the victim's genitalia. But that having been said, it is not required that I should impose the same sentence for offence 1 as offence 6 for two self-evident reasons. One is that offence 1 stands alone. Whereas, offence 6 requires matters to be taken into account on a Form 1. As I have earlier tried to explain, offence 6 occurs after a period of offending, after a course of conduct towards the victim. The Crown in its helpful written submissions comments upon the significance of the age of the victim by relationship to the range encompassed by a particular offence, and I adopt what the Crown has put in that regard. 81. I note in this matter by comparison to the other matter that the offences occurred over 18 months consistent with a course of conduct, but in the context of what has gone before not over the same period of time as the previous offending which occurred over a four year period. 82. The Crown noted, and I accept, that the absence of violence is not a "mitigating factor". I accept that that is so by reference to McCallum J observations in R v BA [2014] NSWCCA 148 particularly at [33]. But that goes without saying. 83. So far as his criminal history is concerned the Crown submission is that his prior criminal history does not entitle him to the leniency that can be appointed to a person with no record, that is self-evidently so, he would not be entitled to that leniency one would have thought for a range of reasons. His criminal history is very close to establishing the aggravating factor available under s 21A(2), but the Crown does not submit that that was available here. As I have said this matter is in fact, so far as the discount is concerned, affected by the operation of s 25D(2)(a) of the Act. 84. The Crown points out he has spent no time in custody referrable to the current offences and it seems to me with respect that the sentence I must impose to give proper effect to totality of criminalities to impose a sentence accumulative upon the non-parole period fixed by his Honour. 85. The Crown points to the requirement of the Court to have regard to s 3A of the Act. Obviously general deterrence is a prime matter of importance in this type of offence, and has always been so contrary to the opinion expressed by some people who were entirely misinformed about this matter. There is also a need in this case to give proper weight to personal or specific deterrence. There is a requirement under s 3A of the Act to make the prisoner accountable for his conduct to recognise the harm done to the victim, to have regard to the rehabilitation of the prisoner as well, the adequate punishment of the prisoner very much intimately bound up considerations of personal and general deterrence. I note what the Crown has written about the principle of "proportionality" I need not dilate upon those self-evident matters. 86. The Crown made specific submissions about the issue of concurrent sentences and the like. I do not need to reflect upon the Crown's helpful submissions in that regard because it is clear that in sentencing the prisoner for the current offending I am required to have regard to the concept of totality of criminality and in that regard, firstly I note what the High Court by majority said in its obiter observations in the decision of Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 16 particularly at [45]. 87. Also I note what the High Court has said about totality of criminality in a range of other decisions, including the High Court judgment of Johnson v R (2004) 78 ALJR 616 at [18] where the Court adopted what had been said by the High Court in Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59, particularly at p.63, citing from Thomas's landmark textbook "Principles of Sentencing". In the Mill case the majority adopted Thomas's observation that: 88. "The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate is 'just and appropriate'." 89. In terms of what was said in Pearce v R, of course, the remarks being obiter because the appeal was a conviction appeal, the majority had pointed out that regard was required to be had to the totality of criminality which requires the Court to turn its mind to the issues of concurrency, accumulation and or partial accumulation to reflect that totality of criminality. 90. Street CJ in his usual eloquent way in Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 observed at p 260: 91. "The principle of totality is a convenient phrase, descriptive of the significant practical consideration confronting a sentencing judge when sentencing for two or more offences. Not infrequently a straightforward arithmetical addition of sentences appropriate for each individual offence considered separately will arrive at an ultimate aggregate that exceeds what is called for in the whole of the circumstances. In such a situation the sentencing judge will evaluate, in a broad sense, the overall criminality involved in all of the offences and, having done so, will determine what, if any, downward adjustment is necessary, whether by telescoping or otherwise, in the aggregate sentences (sic) in order to achieve an appropriate relativity between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the sentences." 92. In that regard what that means in effect under sentencing in Australia generally, and in New South Wales particularly, courts end up in imposing sentences reflecting totality of criminality that do not follow the 'Texas' example of imposing continually consecutive sentences that might far outstrip the life expectancy of the particular prisoner depending upon the seriousness of the offending. 93. There are also the observations summarising authorities that have gone before of Hall J in R v XX (2009) 195 A Crime R 38, particular at [52], where his Honour sets out 11 principles that arose from recent decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal concerning the exercise of the discretion to impose sentences that are either concurrent or consecutive or partly accumulative. 94. In that regard, of course I have indicated I propose to fix an aggregate sentence with a non-parole period for that aggregate sentence but fix indicative sentences for each of the offences, having regard to the objective seriousness of the offending, the context in which the offences have occurred, the subjective case of the prisoner and the relevant discount that is required to be given to the utilitarian benefit of the plea of guilty amongst the other matters that I have identified. 95. I have not spoken directly of the very helpful submissions of counsel for the prisoner, most of which cover territory that I have already covered. I have noted ultimately there was not a particular dispute with the assessment of the Crown in relation to the matters relevant to the assessment of the objective gravity. One matter raised however, by counsel for the prisoner that I need to comment upon, particularly is the issue of delay. The defence counsel noted an 18 month delay between the initial statement and the charging of the prisoner which is not fully explained. He noted the uncertainty left in the prisoner's mind in relation to the outcome of this matter and thus the separation of this matter from the sentencing by Judge North. Now whether all the matters could have been dealt with at the one time with prompt charging I am unable to say. But it seems clear to me, based upon the information I have at the moment without having the statements tendered, that there was evidence available upon which the prisoner could have been charged and the delay that is occasioned is regrettable. Delay may be relevant in sentencing in a range of ways. There may be a course of rehabilitation over the period of delay which may be relevant to take into account. I do not believe that arises in this particular matter but it was discussed in the decision Todd [1982] 2NSWLR 517, particularly at 519. Todd was adopted, I hasten to say, by the High Court in Mill v The Queen, the judgment I earlier referred to, particularly at 66. The interesting thing about Todd is of course that whilst it is reported in the 1982 Law Reports, it was actually a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1979, but people of that generation probably would remember the reporting of cases did not occur as promptly as it does nowadays. 96. There is one aspect of the matter though arising out of Todd and that is the issue of the state of uncertain suspense of which CJ spoke of in Todd at 519. The Court of Criminal Appeal in Todd held that it was a relevant matter. It is not necessarily a significant matter, but it is a relevant matter for a court to take into account. It is right and proper for the benefit of victims and prisoners that matters the subject of criminal investigations be promptly investigated and promptly charged and that people can be brought to court promptly. I must say one of the greatest disappointments of my most recent time on the bench, and I have been a judge for 19 years, is the considerable delay I am seeing, not necessarily in this case, but in many cases people and victims waiting for cases to be resolved simply because there are not enough courts and there are not enough judges. That is a matter of considerable regret in a situation that is much deplored I must say by myself amongst other judges. 97. In any event, I acknowledge the submission made by counsel or the prisoner about the issue of delay in that respect. It was acknowledged in the submissions of counsel that there were variations in the level of seriousness which I tried to reflect allowing for the order in which the offending has occurred. It was noted there was no relevant mental illness or disability for me to take into account in accordance with those principles summarised and cases such as Hemsley in 2004 and De La Rosa the Full Bench decision in relation to a Commonwealth importation case, but particularly by McClellan CJ at CL in relation to mental illness or disability in sentencing. 98. It was submitted to me that the reports from the psychologists reflected some insight on the part of the prisoner and that may be so but of course those reports were written ignorant of the current matters. With regard to s 21A(2) I was not brought to any particular aggravating factor other than those matters that have been pleaded or self-evidence from the facts and are to be taken into account pursuant to s 21A(1) of the Act. 99. With regard to mitigating factors that arise under s 21A(3) the pleas of guilty are a mitigating factor which I have taken into account. Of course one has to be guarded about the prospects of rehabilitation of the prisoner and the likelihood of him offending again. I cannot find on balance that he is unlikely to offend again or that he has good prospects of rehabilitation, but I do acknowledge the fact that when he finishes his non-parole period he will be that much older and perhaps will have greater insight into his circumstances. Certainly, I do acknowledge as a matter favourable, the counselling that he undertook between 2014 and 2016, but it seems even based upon the reports tendered on his behalf, he has some progress to make. 100. Obviously, there are very few other mitigating matters that can be identified under s 21A(3). It seems to me, ultimately I should conclude that the offending was not "planned" but it occurred apparently on so many occasions that the planning was really unnecessary. The prisoner had the victim available to him working with him in the shop. I am not suggesting the offending was "impulsive" because it was a course of conduct, but it was not offending that required particular planning on the part of the prisoner. Obviously, I cannot find any favour for him in relation to his character or his criminal history as mitigating factors. But I note that in the complete analysis of the situation that the prisoner has, from what I understand a background of industry, albeit part of his industry involved taking advantage of the position that he had with his employees. 101. He was acknowledged in the submissions that he has family support which will aid his progress on release and I accept that that is so. One matter that was pointed to that does not strictly arise under s 21A(3), but is important to note, and that is putting aside as I may in one sense the child abuse material possession, there is it would seem a break in his criminality between the need of his offending towards his victim and of course his arrest in 2014. This is not a case as I would find with a number of people who have paedophilic tendencies of the offenders continuing to offend, despite having been in gaol and being on parole because they just cannot resist the temptation. Their impulses lead them to offend. 102. The Crown in its submissions in reply reflected upon the circumspection of Judge North about the prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of the prisoner re-offending and I adopt what Judge North said. It also was pointed out by the Crown there may be limited insight in the letter to the Court by the prisoner, I have already made some comment upon that. It must be said in fairness perhaps that writing a letter to a judge if you are a prisoner admitting to serious criminality is a difficult exercise, particularly endeavouring to achieve the right balance. But as I have pointed out the submissions in reply, ultimately about the prospects of rehabilitation, I accept. 103. Thus, Mr Arissian, as you probably have heard I have gone through a great range of matters, probably far more than his Honour Judge North. But then again I am sentencing you subsequent to his Honour so I have an obligation to include many of the matters that arose out of that sentencing because they are pertinent to the current situation. 104. In respect of all counts, taking into account the matters on the Forms 1, you are convicted. Pursuant to s 53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 I sentence you to a term of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of four years imprisonment, to commence on 16 December 2020 and expiring on 15 December 2024, with a balance of sentence of four years to expire on 15 December 2028. 105. I just pause to point out I have made a finding of special circumstances pursuant to s 44. I note that his Honour Judge North fixed a non-parole period which I calculate to be 57% of the total sentence. I point out dealing with this matter mathematically that I have fixed a non-parole period that comprises 66% or thereabouts of the total sentence. However, I make these observations. Although I make a finding of 'special circumstances' as did his Honour, his Honour left a balance of sentence of three years which his Honour deemed appropriate for the purposes of parole. I have concluded there are special circumstances for a number of reasons. Firstly, the desirability of the prisoner having an extended period of supervision to adjust to community living, to have an extended period of supervision to undertake appropriate counselling and treatment as required by the parole authority. However, I have concluded ultimately that the longest period that that supervision should be available should be four years imprisonment in the context of the total sentence to be imposed and the non-parole period that I have fixed. 106. There is also the fact that the sentence I am imposing is accumulative upon the aggregate sentence imposed by his Honour Judge North. Accumulation of sentencing as was held in Astill v The Queen in 1989, pursuant to s 9 of the repealed Sentencing Act 1989, is itself a special circumstance. So I have given careful attention to the relationship of the non-parole period to the balance of sentence, it leads ultimately to the fact that the non-parole period I fix is greater and must of necessity be greater than that fixed by his Honour as a percentage of the total sentence because four years is the appropriate period for supervision and nothing greater is required. 107. So far as the indicative sentences of imprisonment are concerned, in relation to sequence 1, the offence of indecent assault, I fix a term of imprisonment of two years. In relation to sequence 2, indecent assault, taking into account the two matters of a Form 1, sequences 3 and 12, I fix a sentence of imprisonment of two years. In relation to sequence 4, taking into account the two matters on a Form 1, sequences 5 and 13, I fix a term of imprisonment of one year six months. In relation to sequence 6, taking into account three matters on the Form 1, sequences 14, 15 and 16, I fix a term of imprisonment of two years and three months. In relation to sequence 8, taking into account one matter on a Form 1 sequence 7, I sentence the prisoner to a term of imprisonment of two years three months. In relation to sequence 10, again an indecent assault, in circumstances of aggravation, taking into account matters on a Form 1, sequences 9 and 17, the term of imprisonment is three years imprisonment. In relation to sequence 18, indecent assault in circumstances of aggravation, the term of imprisonment is two years and six months. 108. Yes, Ma'am, anything you want to raise? 109. MANSOUR: No, your Honour. 110. HIS HONOUR: Anything you want to raise? 111. FELTON: No, your Honour. 112. HIS HONOUR: Mr Arissian, do you understand the sentence I have imposed? 113. OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour. 114. HIS HONOUR: It's a total sentence of eight years with a non-parole period of four years. That non-parole period is 50% of the total sentence but I have to reduce the non-parole period to reflect both special circumstances and the effect of accumulation upon your existing non-parole period, that's quite a mouthful I understand, even lawyers don't understand it, sometimes some judges don't understand it, but it does in the context of the requirements of s 44 push down the otherwise appropriate non-parole period. If you'd only been sentenced for these matters standing alone, I'm not saying the sentence would have been the same, but if you were sentenced for these matters alone the non-parole period may have been greater but it's brought down because of the effect of accumulation. 115. Any slips of the tongue, Madam Crown, that you picked up? There may have been occasional ones which I'll correct when I get the judgment provided but is there anything significant? 116. MANSOUR: Not significant, perhaps once there was a slip of the tongue in terms of identifying the victim or offender. 117. HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand, yes I do apologise to the victim who's in court, I sometimes - the word "victim" gets interchanged with "prisoner" but the requirement of me to survey the facts obviously required me to make many references to both prisoner and victim, so those slips of the tongue will be corrected in due course. And nothing else from you, sir? 118. FELTON: No, your Honour. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 November 2019