Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Picos v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association [2019] NSWSC 1851 Hearing dates: 16 December 2019 Date of orders: 16 December 2019 Decision date: 16 December 2019 Jurisdiction: Equity - Duty List Before: Kunc J Decision: Leave to file Amended Summons refused; Summons dismissed with costs Catchwords: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - lawyers - practising certificates - Bar Council refuses application for practising certificate - Appeal - Whether suppression and non-publication orders should be continued - Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), s 100 Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Cases Cited: Picos v The Council of New South Wales Bar Association [2019] NSWSC 1382 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Connie Louise Picos (Plaintiff) Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: C L Picos (Litigant in person) P J Griffin SC (Defendant) J McDonnell (Solicitor) (Attorney General for NSW) J Hutton (Solicitor) (Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia) Solicitors: Hicksons Lawyers (Defendant) Crown Solicitor for NSW (Attorney General for NSW) The Australian Government Solicitor (Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia) File Number(s): 2019/313902 Publication restriction: No EX TEMPORE Judgment (REVISED) Summary 1. The plaintiff, Ms Picos, wishes to practise as a barrister. She has passed the NSW Bar Examination and the NSW Bar Practice Course. Unfortunately, for reasons which will become apparent, the defendant (the "Council") has determined that her application for a practising certificate should be refused. 2. Ms Picos has a right of appeal from that decision. However, for reasons best known to herself, she has brought these proceedings seeking relief which, with respect, is inconsistent with the statutory regime that has been established for appeals against decisions of the kind taken by the Council. For the reasons which I set out below, I have come to the view that the appropriate course is for her summons to be dismissed. However, that dismissal should not, and is not intended to, prevent her bringing an appeal in regular form against the decision of the Council should she wish to do so. Procedural history 1. These proceedings were commenced by a summons filed in court on 8 October 2019. That summons sought the following interim and final relief: "Interim Relief 1. Upon the plaintiff giving the undertaking below the plaintiff forthwith be granted a practising certificate as a barrister for the balance of the year ending 30 June 2020. Undertaking The plaintiff undertakes that upon being requested by the Court to do so, the plaintiff will surrender the practising certificate granted. 2. Costs of the interim relief, payable forthwith. 3. Further or other order as the Court sees fit. 4. Liberty to apply. Final relief 5. A declaration that the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian Practising certificate." 1. The summons was filed pursuant to leave granted by Slattery J sitting as duty judge. His Honour proceeded to a contested hearing of Ms Picos' application for interim relief that she forthwith be granted a practising certificate. His Honour dismissed that application: Picos v The Council of New South Wales Bar Association [2019] NSWSC 1382. These reasons should be read together with those reasons. 2. Because it will later become relevant, I should record as part of the chronology that, while his Honour was in the course of hearing Ms Picos' application, he made orders under the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) (the "CSNPO Act"). As a result of inquiries made by a media organisation for access to the Court's file (as his Honour records in paragraph [56] of his reasons), his Honour made orders in chambers on 10 October 2019 extending the scope of the orders which he had made under the CSNPO Act to cover the whole of the file. He made further orders on 11 October 2019 refining that general non-publication order to make clear that the parties were not prevented from making disclosures to their respective legal representatives in relation to the proceedings. 3. His Honour's reasons were delivered on 15 October 2019. 4. On 28 October 2019, the proceedings came before Henry J in the Duty List. Her Honour made these orders: "1. Extend the suppression and non-publication orders made by his Honour Justice Slattery on 10 October 2019 and as amended by his Honour on 11 October 2019, to include any disclosure of the proceedings before the Court today, noting that these orders are to remain in place until further order of this Court. 2. Relist the matter for directions in the Equity Registrar's List on Monday, 9 December 2019. 3. Costs reserved." 1. On 5 December 2019, the Council made its decision. That decision was initially communicated to Ms Picos in a notice described as being a notice under s 464 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (the "LPU Law"): "A. DECISION At its meeting on 5 December 2019 the Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (Bar Council) made the following decision in respect of your application dated 7 November 2019 for an Australian Practising Certificate: RESOLVED, to refuse the application of Connie Louise Picos on 7 November 2019 for a practising certificate, pursuant to section 45(2) of the Legal Professional Uniform Law (NSW), on the basis that the Bar Council considers that Picos is not a fit and proper person to hold an Australia Practising certificate. B. REASONS FOR THE BAR COUNCIL's DECISION The Bar Council's reasons for decision are set out in the attached document 'Annexure A'. C. RIGHT OF APPEAL 1. Section 100(1) of the Legal Professional Uniform Law (NSW) and s 11 of the Legal Professional Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) provide that you may apply to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a review of the Bar Council's decision. 2 Any application for review of the Bar Council's decision must be made by the end of the period of 28 days after you are notified of the decision. [Notification is taken to be 2 business days after the date this Notice is posted to you]. 3. Section 100(4) of the Legal Professional Uniform Laws (NSW) provides that an application for review does not stay the Bar Council's decision subject to any order of the Court." 1. The Council subsequently became aware of an error in the notice's description of Ms Picos' appeal rights. That resulted in a further notice under s 464 of the LPU Law being issued on 9 December 2019: "A. DECISION At its meeting on 5 December 2019 the Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (Bar Council) made the following decision in respect of your application dated 7 November 2019 for an Australian Practising Certificate: RESOLVED, to refuse the application of Connie Louise Picos on 7 November 2019 for a practising certificate, pursuant to section 45(2) of the Legal Professional Uniform Law (NSW), on the basis that the Bar Council considers that Picos is not a fit and proper person to hold an Australia Practising certificate. B. REASONS FOR THE BAR COUNCIL's DECISION The Bar Council's reasons for decision are set out in the attached document 'Annexure A'. C. RIGHT OF APPEAL 1. Section 100(1) of the Legal Professional Uniform Law (NSW) and s 11 of the Legal Professional Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) provide that you may apply to the New South Wales Supreme Court for a review of the Bar Council's decision. 2. Any application for review of the Bar Council's decision must be made by the end of the period of 28 days after you are notified of the decision. [Notification is taken to be 2 business days after the date this Notice is posted to you]. 3. Section 100(4) of the Legal Professional Uniform Laws (NSW) provides that an application for review does not stay the Bar Council's decision subject to any order of the Court." 1. Having become aware of the Council's decision of 5 December 2019, Ms Picos emailed the Associate to the duty judge (then being Pembroke J) on Saturday, 7 December 2019 at 8.59pm, copied to the legal representatives of the Council: "Dear Associate, I refer to the above matter, which is currently listed before the Equity Registrar at 9.30am on Monday, 9 December 2019. Overnight the defendant caused me to be notified that my bar reader certificate was refused and accordingly, I am apparently a disqualified person. I am seeking that this matter be listed before his Honour as soon as possible on Monday morning for urgent relief and orders. Please clarify whether the parties should attend the Equity Registrar first or whether the matter can be listed directly with His Honour. When the matter was listed for the Equity Registrar these circumstances had not been anticipated. I attach a copy of His Honour Slattery J's previous interlocutory decision in this matter of 15 October 2019 in the event that His Honour (Pembroke J) has the opportunity and/or inclination to read the judgment in time. There is also transcript available from His Honour Rein J. Kind regards, Connie L Picos Solicitor/"Disqualified Person"" 1. The next day, being Sunday 8 December 2019, Ms Picos sent a further email at 11.11pm to Pembroke J's Associate which stated: "Dear Associate, Further to my email of yesterday evening, and as discussed with the legal representatives for the defendants, who are copied in to the correspondence: I am seeking the following, inter alia: 1. The suppression and non-publication orders be continued. 2. The suppression and non-publication orders be altered to allow NCAT to properly consider an appeal. 3. The matter be referred to the Court of Appeal to allow the relevant suppression order from 2015 to be altered to allow NCAT access to the information provided with my application for a reader certificate. 4. A declaration that the "Bar Council decision" is invalid. 5. The defendant to notify The Law Society of NSW of its investigation. 6. The defendant to notify The Legal Services Commissioner of its investigation and any investigation for disciplinary action be conducted according to law. 7. An order that I be granted an Australian Practising Certificate to 30 June 2020, either as a solicitor (currently having one) or reader (with the undertaking in Roulstone to be provided). 8. The plaintiff to file and serve a statement of claim on or before 15 January 2020. 9. The matter be listed for mention on [XX] February 2020. 10. Such other order as the Court may think just and equitable. I rely on the following: 1. Decision of Slattery J of 15 October 2019. 2. Reports of Dr Klug (to be brought to Court). 3. Affidavit of Connie Louise Picos filed on 8 October 2019. I rely on the following authorities: [to be tidied up by morning and provided in Court] Mayfair Trading Co Pty Ltd v Dreyer Tait v The Queen (High Court) James v Pope 46 CLR 640 Banks v TRB (1968) 119 CLR 222 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149 Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487 Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296, esp at 322 Bond v Sulan (1990) 26 FCR 580 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 Saraceni v ASIC (2013) 211 FCR 298 NAAV v Minister (2002) Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146 at 164-165 Doolan [previously provided] Harness Racing [previously provided] Outline of submissions: • My livelihood is seriously affected. • Equity co-exists with statute law. • Equity has the ability to prevent a person from using their statutory power unconscionably. • Dixon CJ said: "I have never had any doubt that the incidental powers of the Court can preserve any subject matter, human or not, pending a decision. (Regarding a person who was about to be hanged) • Injunctions are available in the administration of justice. • The Court may also grant an injunction pending the hearing of a case in another court (or Tribunal) which has no injunctive power, so that that other court can fairly deal with a matter properly before it. • A right to procedural fairness. • A right to a hearing before a licence/practising certificate is cancelled. • Fairness dictates that the person should be warned that they may be disqualified and given a chance to show cause why they should not be. • Procedural fairness applies to investigations. • The Court can intervene to prevent "serious legal errors" in the application of a statute. • Judicial power exists to provide protection against arbitrary official power. • Legislation can never diminish the Court's power. [Emphasis added] • Some errors will always be jurisdictional no matter what an Act might say. Bad faith is an obvious candidate; because it is unthinkable that officials should ever be authorised to violate those restrictions. • There is a "conclusive evidence" clause in the Legal Profession Uniform Law regarding the Bar Council's decision and reasons. The Court can intervene to prevent the plaintiff having to appeal an obviously faulty set of reasons, which do not allow for a proper appeal to NCAT. Kind Regards, Connie L Picos" 1. The matter then came before his Honour sitting as duty judge on 9 December 2019. His Honour closed the court (something which I have not done) and after hearing argument delivered these short reasons: "HIS HONOUR: This is an application for interlocutory relief, which has been brought without notice and without any notice of motion. The proceedings were commenced by summons filed in Court on 8 October 2019. By her summons, the plaintiff sought a declaration that she was a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate. She also sought interim relief, to the effect, that she be granted a practising certificate as a barrister for the balance of the year ending 30 June 2020. The application for interim relief came before Slattery J and was heard on 8, 9 and 11 October and determined on 15 October 2019. At that stage, the NSW Bar Association had not made a decision on the application that was then before it by the plaintiff seeking the practising certificate. That application was later withdrawn and a fresh application was made. Slattery J dismissed that claim for interlocutory relief. His reasons included that a judge in the Equity Duty List is ill-equipped to decide a question of whether or not a practising certificate should be issued on an interim basis to a plaintiff in a case such as this. He drew attention to the fact that the Uniform Law gives extensive powers of investigation under s 95 to the Bar Council, which can be exercised in an orderly considered way and by the making of external enquiries such consideration is not open to the Court. Slattery J also relied upon the fact that: "A Court should not lightly interfere by way of an interlocutory injunction with the statutory scheme for the grant of Practising Certificates under Uniform Law s 45, which has attached to it statutory rights of review." After that decision, the matter came before Henry J, on 28 October, who extended the suppression and non-publication orders until further order of this Court, relisted the summons for mention before the Equity registrar on 9 December 2019 and noted that the plaintiff would not proceed with her summons seeking declaratory relief in the event that the Bar Association grants her a Bar reading certificate. As events have turned out, the Bar Council has determined that a practising certificate should not be issued to the plaintiff. That decision was made on 5 December 2019. If the plaintiff wishes to proceed with her summons, it will need to be amended to reflect the decision of the NSW Bar Association. I have no doubt that these events are causing stress to the plaintiff and I am naturally sympathetic to the situation in which she has found herself. But the Bar Association has statutory powers of a wide-ranging nature and type that Slattery J explained. They include the right to conduct external enquiries. At the time of the hearing before Slattery J, Dr Phillips had provided a report dated 23 September 2019. Subsequently, he provided a further report dated 17 October 2019 and a third report dated 23 October 2019. Those further reports were considered by the Bar Association. I have not seen them. It appears from the reasons of the Bar Association that those reports gave rise to matters of significant concern. It is not for me to make a judgment about the merits of the issue on which the Bar Association arrived at its conclusion. The real question is what to do with these proceedings. It is entirely inappropriate in the circumstances to make any sort of interim mandatory order which would enable the plaintiff to have a practising certificate for the time being. It was not appropriate before Slattery J made his decision. It is even less appropriate now, given the decision and reasons of the New South Wales Bar Association. The plaintiff needs to amend her summons to identify the relief that she seeks on a final basis. It would seem appropriate that these proceedings be expedited given the importance of the issue to the plaintiff. I will leave that matter to the parties. In the meantime all that the plaintiff has sought to do, in the absence of a notice of motion, is to re-agitate the same claim for interlocutory relief that is set out in the current summons, namely the claim for interlocutory relief which was dismissed by Slattery J when the circumstances and facts were different and the Bar Association had not yet made a decision. To the extent that she does so Mr Griffin SC for the defendant seeks an adjournment. The defendant did not have notice of this application until Saturday night. The plaintiff does not rely on any new affidavit, but points to the fact that Slattery J found that she was subjected to stress. This is natural in the circumstances. She alleges, without any apparent evidentiary support, that the decision of the Bar Association is vitiated by bad faith and a lack of procedural fairness. The defendant is clearly entitled to an adjournment to address these serious issues. In some respects I am reluctant to grant an adjournment because it is, to my mind, merely postponing to another judge, on another day, an application for interlocutory relief, which seems to me to be most unlikely to succeed. However, I will make the following directions: 1. I direct that the plaintiff serve and deliver to my Associate by noon on Wednesday 11 December an amended summons and any further affidavit on which she wishes to rely. 2. I direct that the defendant serve and deliver to my Associate any evidence on which it proposes to rely by 4 pm on Friday 13 December. 3. I list these proceedings before the Duty Judge on Monday 16 December 2019 at 2 pm." 1. Conformably with the directions made by Pembroke J at the end of his reasons, Ms Picos has served and delivered to Pembroke J's Associate an amended summons. However, she did not comply with his Honour's direction to file and serve any further affidavit on which she proposed to rely, nor did she comply with his Honour's direction to serve a notice of motion identifying the precise interlocutory relief which she sought. 2. In accordance with his Honour's directions, the matter came before me as duty judge at 2pm today. Ms Picos appeared for herself. Mr P J Griffin of Senior Counsel appeared for the Council. 3. The amended summons sought this relief: "Interim relief 1. Upon the plaintiff giving the undertaking below The plaintiff forthwith be granted a practising certificate as a reader barrister for the balance of the year ending 30 June 2020. Undertaking The plaintiff undertakes that upon being requested by the Court to do so, the plaintiff will surrender the practising certificate granted. 2. Costs of the interim relief, payable forthwith. 2b In the alternative to [1], a stay on the operation of the decision of the first defendant of 5 December 2019 3a Additionally, an injunction restraining the first defendant from initiating any disciplinary action against the plaintiff, until further order. 3. Further or other order as the Court sees fit may think just and equitable. 4 Liberty to apply. Final relief 5. A declaration that the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian Practising certificate. 6. A declaration that the resolution of the first defendant of 5 December 2019 to refuse the plaintiff an Australian practising certificate is invalid. 7. A declaration that the Notice under section 464 of the Legal Professional Uniform Law issued to the plaintiff on 9 December 2019 is invalid. 8. A declaration that the plaintiff was validly admitted to the Australian legal profession on 17 February 2017 9. A declaration that the first defendant is not the "admitting" authority or body in the State of New South Wales. 10. A declaration that the plaintiff is a fit and proper person." Removal of new parties 1. Although not apparent from the relief claimed in the amended summons, it sought to join, in addition to the Council, the Attorney General of New South Wales as second defendant and the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia as the third defendant. The attempted joinder of those parties excited applications on behalf of the two Attorneys General that each of them be removed as a party pursuant to r 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. Mr J McDonnell, solicitor, appeared for the putative second defendant, the Attorney General of New South Wales. Mr J Hutton, solicitor, appeared for the putative third defendant, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia. 2. I dealt with those applications as though each of them had in fact been joined to the proceedings. However, in doing so, I had not appreciated that leave to file the amended summons had not in fact been granted. It seems to me, looking at the matter from a strictly technical point of view, that the directions made by Pembroke J on 9 December 2019 did not go so far as to grant leave for the filing of an amended summons. In practical terms, nothing turns on that. 3. Each of the Attorneys submitted that they should not be party to the proceedings (either actually or putatively) because no relief was sought against them and they had no interest (in the technical sense) in the matters purportedly raised by the amended summons. I accepted those submissions. 4. Ms Picos submitted that the Attorney General for New South Wales was a proper party because he was ultimately responsible for the administration of the LPU Law and that, for reasons which I did not entirely understand, there was no means of appeal available to Ms Picos from the decision of the Council other than in the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. That seemed to be based upon a reading of s 100 of the LPU Law which, with respect, I do not follow. I shall return to the terms of that law in a moment. 5. The basis for joining the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, as explained by Ms Picos, was even more remote. Ms Picos is a registered migration agent and was concerned that the decision of the Council somehow impeded her capacity to continue to act in that role. Neither the Council nor the solicitor appearing for the Attorney General for the Commonwealth was suggesting that was the case. Mr Griffin SC also made clear that the Council was not suggesting that their decision prevented Ms Picos from undertaking the other occupation in which she has been recently engaged, namely providing research services to a barrister. 6. In those circumstances, I was of the view that neither Attorney General was a necessary or proper party to the proceedings and I indicated that I would, at the conclusion of the hearing, make orders in accordance with the notices of motion that each of them had filed. I will do so notwithstanding the technical nicety to which I have referred concerning the status of the amended summons. Ms Picos' application for interim relief 1. To understand the course of the argument which followed it is necessary to set out s 100 of the LPU Law: "100 Right of appeal or review about Australian practising certificates (1) An applicant for or the holder of an Australian practising certificate may, in accordance with applicable jurisdictional legislation, appeal to the designated tribunal against, or seek a review by that tribunal of, any of the following decisions of the designated local regulatory authority under this Chapter— (a) a decision to refuse to grant or renew the Australian practising certificate; (b) a decision to vary, suspend or cancel the Australian practising certificate or, without limitation, to impose a condition on the Australian practising certificate; (c) a decision that a person is not entitled to apply for an Australian practising certificate for a specified period (see section 94). (2) An appeal or review under this section may be made to review the merits of the decision concerned. (3) The designated tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate on an appeal or review under this section, including any of the following orders— (a) an order directing the designated local regulatory authority to grant, or to refuse to grant, an application for an Australian practising certificate; (b) an order directing the designated local regulatory authority to suspend for a specified period or cancel an Australian practising certificate, or to reinstate an Australian practising certificate that has been suspended or cancelled; (c) an order that an applicant or holder is not entitled to apply for the grant of an Australian practising certificate for a specified period not exceeding 5 years; (d) an order directing the designated local regulatory authority to vary an Australian practising certificate in the manner specified by the designated tribunal. (4) Except to the extent (if any) that may be ordered by the designated tribunal, the lodging of an appeal or application for review under this section does not stay the effect of the refusal, variation, suspension or cancellation concerned. (5) The designated tribunal may not order the imposition of conditions on an Australian practising certificate without first taking submissions from the designated local regulatory authority. (6) In proceedings on an appeal or review under this section, fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for matters considered by the designated local regulatory authority, may be given. (7) In proceedings on an appeal or review under this section in which the question of whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate is at issue— (a) the onus of establishing that a person is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate is on the person asserting that fact; and (b) it is to be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that any statement of facts in the reasons of the designated local regulatory authority for the decision concerned is a correct statement of the facts in the matter; and (c) a document that appears to be a document issued for the purposes of or in connection with any application, proceedings or other matter arising under the Bankruptcy Act is admissible in the proceedings and is evidence of the matters stated in the document. (8) The designated local regulatory authority is to give effect to any order of the designated tribunal under this section." 1. By reason of the operation of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (the "Application Act"), an appeal under s 100 of the LPU Law from the decision of the Council lies to this Court. This is a straightforward conclusion with which it seemed Ms Picos was determined to take issue. 2. She moved for the interim relief in the amended summons to the effect that she should forthwith be granted a practising certificate as a reader barrister for the balance of the year ending 30 June 2020. 3. That was opposed by the Council on the basis that it was an extraordinary form of relief which this Court would hardly, if ever, grant for two reasons. 4. First, it was submitted that there was a clear statutory scheme of appeal available to Ms Picos set up by s 100 of the LPU Law. It was contended that the Court would not lightly interfere with that. 5. Second, attention was drawn to the Council's reasons for decision (Annexure 'A' to each of the notices set out in paragraphs [8] and [9] above). The reasons are 58 pages long. It was submitted that the reasons are, on their face, thorough, regular and carefully reasoned. Given such reasons, Mr Griffin SC submitted that the Court would not without very good reason interfere in an interim but nevertheless peremptory way with a decision of the Council exercising its statutory responsibility. 6. Without expressing any view as to the merits of the decision itself or its correctness, I accept the Council's description of those reasons on their face. I also accept and adopt the Council's two reasons as to why the Court would not grant interlocutory relief of the kind sought by Ms Picos. 7. Before turning to the balance of the final relief claimed in the summons and the amended summons, I will next consider, to the extent I understood them to be pressed, the other two prayers for interim relief sought by Ms Picos. The first of these was: "2b In the alternative to [1], a stay on the operation of the decision of the first defendant of 5 December 2019." 1. That application can be shortly dealt with. The decision of the Council was to refuse to do something. In those circumstances, there is nothing to stay. Relief in the terms sought, with respect, makes no sense. 2. The second of these was: "3a Additionally, an injunction restraining the first defendant from initiating any disciplinary action against the plaintiff, until further order." 1. The Court declines to grant that relief because Mr Griffin SC made it quite clear that the Council has no current intention to initiate any disciplinary action against Ms Picos and was not aware of any reason why it should do so. Ms Picos replied that she would feel more comfortable if the Council gave an undertaking to that effect. I accept Mr Griffin SC's submission that it is inappropriate for the Council to give such an undertaking which, in my respectful view, would be an impermissible fetter upon the Council's statutory responsibilities should they need to be exercised at some time in the future. In the circumstances of an urgent hearing in the Duty List, it seems to me that where there was no present threat of any disciplinary action being taken by the Council against Ms Picos there was no proper basis upon which the Court could make an order as proposed by paragraph 3(a) of the amended summons. Dismissal of the summons 1. The hearing then took something of an unusual turn. I can say for the record that when this matter was drawn to my attention in chambers, it was apparent to me that if Ms Picos was bringing an appeal under s 100 of the LPU Law, it was a matter which for obvious reasons should, if possible, be considered by this Court on an expedited basis. As I indicated to the parties, I had made informal arrangements with the expedition judge (Sackar J), who happened to be sitting this afternoon, for the matter to be referred to his Honour immediately to enable directions to be made for the appeal to be progressed. 2. I gave Ms Picos more than one opportunity to agree to that course, including giving her the opportunity to take a few minutes if she wished to think about what she wanted to do next. For reasons which I do not understand, she resolutely refused to adopt that course. Indeed, at one point she indicated to me that if I was not prepared to grant the interim relief that she was seeking I should simply dismiss the entirety of the amended summons. I again gave her an opportunity to think about whether that was really what she wanted to have happen. She later submitted that the appropriate course, if the Court were to dismiss her application for interim relief, was for me to order a timetable for the balance of the proceedings to be prepared for a final hearing. 3. That later submission gave rise to the next issue which the Court has had to consider, namely whether there is any utility in the proceedings as constituted either by the final relief sought in the amended summons (see paragraph [15] above) or in the final relief sought in the summons itself (see paragraph [3] above). 4. The argument then proceeded on that question. When it became apparent to me that leave had not in fact been granted for the amended summons to be filed, I sought clarification from Mr Griffin SC as to whether he was content for me to receive his submissions on the basis that he was opposing leave for the amended summons to be filed and otherwise making an application for the summons, in particular paragraph 5, to be struck out. He said that he was. I conducted the balance of the hearing on the basis that those were the issues which I had to determine. In particular, when Ms Picos told me that she felt she had not been heard as to the fate of paragraph 5 of the summons, I gave her a further opportunity to make submissions as to why that should not be struck out. 5. There was a simple proposition at the heart of the Council's submissions as to why the amended summons should not be allowed to be filed and the summons be struck out. That was that Ms Picos has a clear and straightforward route to challenge the decision of the Council. That is by an appeal under s 100 of the LPU Law. As I earlier indicated, the Court was prepared to do everything it could to facilitate the expeditious determination of such an appeal if Ms Picos was to bring it. 6. It was submitted for the Council that none of the final relief sought in either the amended summons or the summons itself was of a kind that was directed to such an appeal or in fact addressed, having regard to s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), what was really the only matter in issue between the parties, namely whether Ms Picos was entitled to have the decision of the Council set aside and then to consequential relief, presumably being an order that the Council be directed to issue her with a practising certificate. 7. I accept the Council's submissions. Ms Picos' response seemed to be premised on a belief that there was no statutory avenue of appeal available to her and that somehow what she had to do was to bring an appeal in the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. With great respect, a plain reading of s 100 of the LPU Law with the Application Act demonstrates that view is misconceived. 8. In any event, even if she were right, other parts of the relief which she sought in the amended summons were just not directed to an issue raised by the Council's decision. One example is prayer 8 of the amended summons which seeks a declaration "that the plaintiff was validly admitted to the Australian legal profession on 17 February 2017". As Mr Griffin SC confirmed, there is no issue about the validity of her admission in February 2017. Nor do I see any utility in paragraph 9 of the amended summons seeking a declaration that the Council "is not the 'admitting' authority or body in the State of New South Wales". 9. Insofar as leave has not been given for the amended summons to be filed, I decline to grant that leave. The reason for doing so is that to the extent it seeks the interim relief to which I have earlier referred, the Court would refuse it. Insofar as it seeks the final relief to which I have referred, that relief, as I have indicated, is not directed to the matter that is really in issue between the parties, which will only be resolved by the bringing of an appeal under s 100 of the LPU Law. 10. That then leaves the summons itself. The final relief sought in the summons is a declaration that the plaintiff is "a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate". For the same reasons I have earlier given, that is not a form of relief consonant with the statutory regime under s 100 of the LPU Law. 11. I do not accept Ms Picos' submission that it is defensible on the basis that were such a declaration to be made, she would then be free to make a fresh application for a practising certificate with the benefit of a declaration that she is a fit and proper person. With the greatest of respect to her, that is not what the scheme contemplates and it would not be in the interests of the proper administration of justice for the Court to allow the proceedings to go forward as constituted by the summons in the face of the regime established by s 100 of the LPA Law. In that regard, I note s 100(7)(a) and (b) which set out how the question of "fit and proper person" is to be dealt with in the context of an appeal under s 100 (see paragraph [22] above). 12. The Court has therefore concluded that it would be completely inimical to the just, cheap and quick resolution of the issues genuinely in dispute between the parties to allow the summons to proceed in its current form, and in circumstances where Ms Picos seems to have been completely unable to be persuaded that it is in her interests to amend that document to seek relief conformable with an appeal under s 100 of the LPU Law. An examination of the transcript will disclose that I made that suggestion to her on more than one occasion and, for reasons best known to herself, she replied that was not an amendment which she wished to make. The suppression and non-publication orders 1. The final matter that I need to refer to is the fact that the proceedings have been subject to suppression and non-publication orders for some time. The orders that have been made have been expressed to be until further order of this Court. In the ordinary course, and in the absence of any further order, the order which I will shortly pronounce dismissing the summons would have the effect of bringing the suppression orders to an end. 2. I asked Ms Picos whether she wanted that to be the outcome of the dismissal of the summons and whether she wanted the suppression orders continued. She said that she did. The reason which she gave was that she might bring proceedings in the near future (which I assume to be proceedings by way of an appeal) which might in some way be adversely affected if people were able to have access to the decisions of this Court in relation to the summons (in particular the decision of Slattery J and now the reasons which I am delivering today). 3. In the circumstances of an urgent hearing in the Duty List, there has not been an opportunity fully to explore the basis on which the suppression orders ought to continue. I have very real doubts as to whether it is appropriate for them to continue. But in the exigent circumstances in which I have had to deal with the matter, I propose to continue the orders on a limited basis given that the proceedings have thus far been conducted subject to the suppression orders that were originally made by Slattery J. 4. That limited basis is to put a time limit on how long the orders should continue. Having regard to the facts that it is at the end of the legal year and that Ms Picos has said she may wish to take advice as to what her next steps should be, I am of the view that an extension of the orders up to and including Friday, 13 March 2020 is appropriate. If Ms Picos takes no steps to bring an appeal or other proceedings relating to the Council's decision within that time, then the suppression orders originally made by Slattery J will come to an end on that date. If, however, she commences such proceedings within that time, then I make it clear that it will be a matter for her if she wishes those suppression orders to continue to persuade the Court, in the light of whatever proceedings she has brought, that it is appropriate for the orders to continue pending the determination of those proceedings, whatever they may be. Conclusion 1. The orders of the Court are as follows: 1. Grant leave to the second defendant the Attorney General of New South Wales to file in Court a notice of motion dated 13 December 2019 and also to file in Court an appearance. 2. Grant leave to the third defendant, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia to file in Court a notice of motion dated 16 December 2019, a notice of appearance and the affidavit of Cameron O'Sullivan affirmed 16 December 2019. 3. Insofar as the Attorney-General for the State of NSW and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia may have been taken to have been joined to these proceedings, the Court removes each of them as a party pursuant to r 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. 4. To the extent that leave is required for filing of the amended summons dated 12 December 2019 that leave is refused. 5. The Summons filed 8 October 2019 is struck out. 6. Extend the suppression and non-publication orders made by Slattery J on 10 October 2019 and as amended by Slattery J on 11 October 2019 to include all hearings and judgments in these proceedings, such orders to continue in effect up to and including 13 March 2020 or further order of the Court. 7. The plaintiff is to pay the first defendant's costs of the proceedings. ********** Amendments 10 August 2020 - Suppression and non-publication orders have expired - judgment is now not Restricted DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 August 2020