RE: Bird (as Trustee of the Estate of Yiangos Angos Arcadiou, a bankrupt) Ex Parte: Salvatore Pozzuto, Giovanni Nigro, Pasquale Nigro and Angelo Pozzuto [1979] FCA 12 | Legal Lookup
RE: Bird (as Trustee of the Estate of Yiangos Angos Arcadiou, a bankrupt) Ex Parte: Salvatore Pozzuto, Giovanni Nigro, Pasquale Nigro and Angelo Pozzuto [1979] FCA 12
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.122 - payees having
failed to negative the inferences set out
in sub-sec, (4) (c) held not payees in good
faith; held, payment void as against the
trustee of the estate of the bankrupt.
RE: ALEX NEVILLE BIRD (as Trustee of the Estate
of YIANGOS ARCADIOU, a bankrupt)
EX PARTE: SALVATORE POZZUTO,
GIOVANNI NIGRO,
PASQUALE NIGRO and
ANGELO POZZUTO
SWEENEY J.
19 DECEMBER 1979
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION No. 68 of 1977
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF VICTORIA
RE: ALEX NEVILLE BIRD (as Trustee of
the Estate of YIANGOS ARCADIOU,
a bankrupt)
EX PARTE: SALVATORE POZZUTO, GIOVANNI
NIGRO, PASQUALE NIGRO and
ANGELO POZZUTO
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER; SWEENEY J.
WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE
DATE OF ORDER: 19 DECEMBER 1979
THE COURT DECLARES THAT;
The payment of $10,000.00 made by the bankrupt to the
respondents on 29 September 1976 1s void as against
the applicant as trustee of the property of the
bankrupt and orders that the respondents pay to the
applicant the sum of $10,000.00 together with his
taxed costs of and incidental to the application,
including reserved costs, such costs to be taxed, if
not agreed. Liberty to apply is reserved to either
party.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION No. 68 of 1977
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF VICTORIA
Re : ALEX NEVILLE BIRD (As Trustee of
the estate of YIANGOS ARCADIOU
a bankrupt)
Applicant
and
SALVATORE POZZUTO,
GIOVANNI NIGRO,
PASQUALE NIGRO and Respondents
ANGELO POZZUTO
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
C.A. Sweeney J.
19 December, 1979
In this application, as amended by leave, the
applicant seeks the following declarations and orders:
w (a)
(b)
That payment made by the bankrupt
to the Respondent on the 29th September,
1976 for $10,000.00 1s void as against
the applicant as Trustee of the property
of the bankrupt as being payment having
the effect of giving the respondent a
preference priority or advantage over
creditors of the bankrupt or alternatively
by virtue of the Bankruptcy of the
Bankrupt having been deemed to have
relation back to date the 20th day of
September, 1976 on which date the
bankrupt gave notice to some of his
creditors namely Gubbatta Nominees Pty.
Ltd. trading as Highett Timber Co.
Tasmanian Board Mills Ltd., Beneficial
Finance Corporation Ltd. and Alliance
Acceptance Corporation Limited, that he
has suspended or 1s about to suspend
payment of his debts.
An order that the respondent pay to the
applicant the sum of $10,000.00."
12/2
2.
In their notice of intention to oppose the
application, as amended by leave, the respondents relied
upon the following grounds:
"1,
THAT the Respondents and all of them were
2.
payees in good faith and for valuable
consideration and in the ordinary course
of business, within the meaning of §.122(2) (a)
of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
THAT the payment was not made under such
4. fe
circumstances as to lead to the inference
3.
that the Respondents or any of them knew,
or had reason to suspect -
(a) that YIANGOS ARCADIOU was unable to
pay his debts as they became due from
his own money; and
{b) that the effect of the payment would
be to give the Respondents or any of
them a preference, priority or
advantage over other creditors -
so that the Respondents and all of them retain
the rights of payees in good faith, and are
not excluded from that status by the operation
of §.122(4)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
THAT the payment so made is not invalidated
in that -
(a) the transaction took place before the
date on which YIANGOS ARCADIOU became
a bankrupt;
(b) the Respondents and any of them had no
notice, at the time of the transaction
of the presentation of a petition
against YIANGOS ARCADIOU : and
(c) the transaction was 1n good faith and
in the ordinary course of business -
so that the Respondents are entitled to rely
on the validity of the transaction, which was
a payment to any or all of them as creditors
because of the provisions contained in §.123(1)
of the Bankruptcy Act 1966."
oe f3
Mr J.S. Stevenson, counsel for the respondents,
said that their sole answer to the case based upon s.122
of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 was that, within the meaning
of that section they were payces in good faith and for
valuable consideration and in the ordinary course of
business. Mr Irlacht, who appeared for the applicant,
conceded that they were payees for valuable consideration.
The sole answer made by the respondents to the
case based upon s.123 of the Act was that:
1. the transaction took place on or before
the date on which the debtor became a
bankrupt;
2. the person, other than the debtor, with
whom it took place, did not, at the time
of the transaction, have notice of the
presentation of a petition against the
debtor; and
3. the transaction was in good faith and
in the ordinary course of business.
Mr Irlicht conceded the first two propositions but not the
third.
Under s.122(3) the burden of proving that they
were payees in good faith and in the ordinary course of
business lies upon the respondents.
Section 122(4)(c) provides that for the purposes of s.122:
"a creditor shall be deemed not to be a
purchaser, payee or encumbrancer in good
faith 1f the conveyance, transfer, charge,
payment or obligation was executed, made
or incurred under such circumstances as to
lead to the inference that the creditor knew,
or had reason to suspect-
(1) that the debtor was unable to pay
his debts as they became due from
his own money; and
(11) that the effect of the conveyance,
transfer, charge, payment or
obligation would be to give hima
preference, priority or advantage
over other creditors."
rw |
Under s.123(2) the burden of proving that the
transaction was in good faith and in the ordinary course
of business lies upon the respondents.
Section 123(3) provides:
"For the purposes of sub-section (1) of
this section, a transaction shall not be
deemed not to have been in good faith and
an the ordinary course of business by
reason only that, at the time of the
transaction, the person, other than the
debtor, with whom it took place had
notice of the commission of an act of
bankruptcy by the debtor."
It was common ground that none of the respondents
had notice of the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the
bankrupt.
Mr Stevenson conceded that the bankrupt had on
20 September 1976 committed the act of bankruptcy alleged
an the application and that, pursuant to the provisions of
s.115, the bankruptcy of the bankrupt shall be deemed to
have relation back to, and to have commenced at that time,
so that, pursuant to the provisions of s.116, the sum of
$10,000.00 paid on 29 September 1976 was property divisible
among his creditors, unless his clients succeeded in relation
to the grounds of opposition set out in their notice.
The evidence showed that from September 1973 the
respondents, as concreters, carried out contracts for the
bankrupt throughout the balance of 1973 and 1974 with
increasing frequency, until they were devoting about 40% of
their working time to his jobs. Until the end of 1974 the
bankrupt was described as prompt in making payments.
Salvatore Pozzuto's narrative of the respondent's
dealings with the bankrupt then continued as follows:
"g
THAT during the year 1975 T presented
anvoices to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
for payment when I saw him on work sites,
rather more frequently than before, because
of his increasing slowness in payment. On
some occasions the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
stated that he could not pay the full amount
immediately, and on other occasions the
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU stated that he could
not pay at all for a few days, because of
delays in settling sales of his properties.
It was apparent to me, however, that the
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had a great deal of
valuable real estate which was selling
well.
THAT as 1975 drew to a close, these excuses
of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU for non-
10.
payment became more frequent. On sone
occasions, I would go to his home at
4 Glengala Road, Sunshine to present
anvoices for payment. Occasionally, there
were other people who worked for him there,
also requesting payment. Sometimes, he
would tell us about slow settlement of
sales of his properties, and that we would
have to be satisfied by partial payment
for a few days, or until the next week.
On occasions when he didn't pay, he always
reassured me, and others who might be with
me, that his business was sound. Indeed,
1t was obvious to me, and I presume to
anybody who might be present, that his
residence was of a superior nature, and
that it was full of all kinds of valuable
goods. New building supplies were stored
on the premises, in profusion. The said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU also had a new car, I
believe that it was a Ford "Fairlane".
THAT the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had, since
the beginning of 1975, stored building
ll.
materials in a part of the "Collie Paving
Company's" business premises which we were
not using. This apparent ability to purchase
building materials he was not going to use
immediately reinforced my opinion that the
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was a wealthy man, who
was well able to pay all his debts when he
wanted to.
THAT toward the end of 1975, I was told by
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU that he had bought
a large tract of land in Werribee for
$500,000.00. This reinforced my own opinion
that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's failure to
make prompt payment to me and other creditors
was due to wilful behaviour on his vart,
rather than any inability to pay. At the
«+ +/6
12.
end of November and the beginning of
December 1975, I, together with the
other Respondents herein, worked on
some of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's
Werribee construction sités, and many
other persons were working there; nobody
was complaining about not being paid.
THAT in December of 1975 I met the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU and told him that I
13.
14.
wanted the "Collie Paving Company's"
invoices to be paid before Christmas,
and@ the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU stated to
me that there would be no trouble about
that. However, no money was received.
In spite of this, I and the other Respondents
herein attended a Christmas party given by
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU for the people
who worked for him at the Sunshine Heights
Hotel, Sunshine. Many people were present
at this lavish function, and nobody except
the other Respondents herein and myself,
appeared to me to be unahppy about the
non-payment of accounts owing to them, or
anything else.
THAT during the holidays that I and the
other Respondents took immediately after
Christmas 1975, we decided not to work for
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU in the future,
until he paid us all the money that he owed
us. I proposed this action because I thought
it would put an end to what I considered to
be some financial tricks I did not understand.
THAT in February of 1976 the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU telephoned me and told me that if
15.
the said "Collie Paving Company" would do a
small job on a property at Craigieburn, he
would pay off a large part of the amount
owing to the said "Collie Paving Company".
We did that job at a fair and reasonable
price of $147.00, and the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU sent us a cheque in the amount of
$5,000.00 almost immediately.
THAT in March of 1976 I went to see the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU and told him that we needed
money to pay our taxes. The said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU said that I should not worry, that
he could easily pay the amount due to us on
the settlement of the sale of a property due
on 9th April, 1976, and that he would pay
any interest charge incurred. I told the
said COLIN ROBB BROWN of this conversation,
and on 31st March 1976 he wrote a letter to
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU which I signed and
posted."
2/7
Ty
That letter read as follows:
"We refer to the balance outstanding in
your account with us, amounting to $17686.85
at the time of writing.
We acknowledge your latest promise of a
remittance on or before 9th April, but,
as we have had to raise finance to cover
pressing commitments we now formally advise
you that we must now impose an interest charge
at the rate of 10% p.a. on the amount
outstanding on 9th. April next, until finally
liquidated.
This interest will be calculated on a daily
basis, and on the present balance outstanding
would amount to approximately $7. per day."
"16. THAT shortly after I sent the said letter
dated 3lst March 1976, I met the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU and he confirmed that he
would pay the interest. After that I did
not approach the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU so
frequently for payment, because I considered
that we had an interest-bearing investment.
However, I and the other Respondents were
Still determined not to work for the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU again, until we had received
payment in full of the amount owing to us.
17. THAT towards the end of April 1976 we did
work at a property in Werribee at the request
of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU on the promise
that a large payment of past due accounts
would be forthcoming if we did so; but no
payment was received.
18. THAT during the Winter of 1976 I had
occasion to pass the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's
properties in Werribee frequently, while on
other business. I then observed that there
were many people working there, including
some who were doing concreting work. The
development of those properties appeared
to me to be proceeding normally.
19. THAT on a day late in September 1976 the
$aid YIANGOS ARCADIOU telephoned me and
asked if the "Collie Paving Company" was
prepared to do some work for him. I replied
that we were unwilling to work for him unless
we were paid the full amount of money owing
to us; to this he answered that if I went to
the Real Estate firm of Tribe and Associates
in Sunshine the next night, he would see to
it that we were paid.
---/8
20.
21.
22.
THAT I proceeded to the premises of
the firm of Tribe and Associates as
instructed by the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
and there I met the said Yiangos Arcadiou's
son PHILIP ARCADIOU. The said PHILIP
ARCADIOU then gave me a cheque in the amount
of $10,000.00 which had been written out by
him, but signed by the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU;
1t was quite usual that the cheques I
received from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
were prepared for his signature by the said
PHILIP ARCADIOU. I asked the said PHILIP
ARCADIOU where the balance of the money
owing to us was, and he replied that we would
get it the next week. I then said that we
would not start work until all the money due
to "Collie Paving Company" had been paid, and
the said PHILIP ARCADIOU replied that there
was plenty of money, and that everybody was
being paid.
THAT the balance due to "Collie Paving
Company" was never paid, and the "Collie
Paving Company" never did work for the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU again.
THAT I continued to telephone the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU from time to time, accusing
him of unfairness in that he had not paid
the said "Collie Paving Company" in full when
he had paid off his other creditors. The
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU continued to give
various excuses for non~payment. Novertheless,
I was astonished when a "Notice of Meeting"
of the creditors of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
was sent to the "Collie Paving Company" late
an February 1977, just one week after the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU removed property which he had
stored free Of charge at our business premises.
The removal of that property is certainly an
action I would not have permitted, 1f I had
known that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was in
such grave financial difficulties.
Under cross-examination on his affidavit Salvatore
Puzzuto conceded that he must have known of the bankrupt's
failure to make prompt payment to other creditors when he
referred in paragraph 11 to his "failure to make prompt payment
to me and other creditors". Occasionally when he called at
the bankrupt's home to present invoices for payment there were
other people who worked for him also requesting payment. The
ee,
bankrupt made frequent promises to pay him but broke his
promises. He had never requested any other debtor to pay
interest on unpaid accounts and the respondents had never
had another debtor whose account was overdue for anything
like the time the bankrupt owed them money.
Mr Colin Brown made an affidavit in which he set
out the accountancy services which he rendered to the
respondents.
"7.
His affidavit continued as follows:
THAT until the end of 1974 it appeared
to me that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
was paying invoices within a few days
of the time when I prepared them.
THAT on 14th January 1975 the said
SALVATORE POZZUTO gave me a cheque in
the amount of $2,000.00 he had received
from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, to process.
This disturbed me, because it upset the
system whereby I could see what invoices
had been paid. The said SALVATORE POZZUTO
explained to me that the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU had told him that he had a
temporary shortage of cash, due to a delay
in settling a sale of real estate; during
the next month, payment was made in an
amount sufficient to bring the account back
to ats usual current status.
THAT early in 1975 I visited the business
premises of the "Collie Paving Company"
and observed that there were several
thousand feet of architraves stored there.
On enquiry, I was informed that they
belonged to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. Over
the next few months, this accumulation of
architraves built up to about 100,000 feet.
I knew from my experience in and exposure
to the building trade at that time that
such architraves were worth about .18¢ per
foot, so that 100,000 feet would be worth
about $18,000.00, and readily saleable.
At about the end of 1976 or the beginning of
1977 I further observed that about 10 new
washing machines had been stored on the
business premises of the "Collie Paving
Company", and again I was informed that they
belonged to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. This
storing of valuable goods on the premises of
the "Collie Paving Company"was a factor which
helped to confirm my belief that the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU was solvent at all times.
222/10
TT ete
10.
ll.
10,
THAT until August of 1975 payment from
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was slower
than it had been in 1974, but the
maximum delay in payment was well under
60 days purchase of the average of
business being done, and in view of the
size of the account and the time it had
been running, and my high opinion of the
worth of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, I
was not at all concerned that the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU might not be able to
pay his debts.
THAT in August of 1975 the payment of
Sot
12.
13.
14.
round figure" amountsrather than exact
invoice amounts resumed, but the said
SALVATORE POZZUTO explained to me that
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had told him of
slight liquidity problems due to delays
in settling sales of properties, and I
was satisfied with that explanation.
THAT on several occasions during 1974 and
1975 I went to construction sites to see
the said SALVATORE PO2ZZUTO when some
matter had arisen which I wished to discuss
with him. On some of those occasions I saw
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. Though 1 never
exchanged more than formal greetings with
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU I was much
impressed by his obvious energy and Grive,
and this added to my confidence in him which
lasted into 1977.
THAT I thought 1t appropriate to confirm the
favourable impression I had formed of such a
large customer of "Collie Paving Company" as
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, and asked
acquaintances of mine who are prominent in
the building trade, and who I consider to be
most reputable, what was their opinion of
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. On the occasions
when I made such enquiries 1n 1975 and 1976,
I was reassured by the replies I received.
THAT no delinquency in payment which I
considered serious occurred until the end
of 1975, when the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's
failure to make as substantial a payment as
had been promised in December caused me some
alarm. However, I was once again reassured
not only by my own enquiries, but also by
the Respondents herein, who appeared to be
convinced that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was
not in serious financial difficulties.
-e-/1ll
15.
16.
11.
THAT early in 1976 the Respondents herein
told me of their determination not to
work for the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU until
he had paid off the amount due to them;
it was thought by me that the payment he
could well afford could be forced out of
him in this way.
THAT in March of 1976 1t became apparent
that the Respondents herein would be
unable to pay all of their provisional
income tax due on 3lst March 1976 unless
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU paid off the
amount that he owed to the "Collie Paving
Company". After the said SALVATORE POZZUTO
had had a meeting with the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU I composed and typed a letter to
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU inposing an
interest charge on the amount outstanding
1f he did not pay as he had promised."
This was the letter earlier set out.
17,
18.
19.
"It was my idea that the interest charged
would offset the interest that the
Respondents herein would have to pay on
overdue taxes and finance charges; because
of all I had seen on construction sites,
and been told by various persons, I still
held the opinion that the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU was a wealthy man who was seeking
to augment his working capital by delaying
payment to the "Collie Paving Company",
though he was well able to pay promptly
had he wished to do so.
THAT once the interest charge was imposed,
I felt happier about the situation, in that
I felt I had ensured that the "Collie Paving
Company" and the Respondents herein would
not lose money through the said "YIANGOS
ARCADIOU's capricious failure to pay.
THAT 1t appeared to me that, in general,
the years 1975 and 1976 were profitable and
buoyant for the building trade in the Western
suburbs of Melbourne, and I knew of no reason
why the building operations of the said
YIANGOS ARCADIOU should prove to be any
exception to the rule.
THAT my confidence was reinforced when
payment of $10,000.00 was received from the
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU on 29th September 1976.
I certainly knew of no meetings which the
said YIANGOS ARCADIOU may have attended at
about that time.
26/22
12.
20. THAT on several occasions, both before and
after September 1976, I have participated
in meetings with the Respondents herein,
when it was decided to write off bad debts.
There was never any discussion about writing
off any amounts owed by the said YIANGOS
ARCADIOU prior to 1977, because they were
always considered to be good.
22. THAT on one or two occasions the "Collie
Paving Company" has obtained judgements
against debtors who had failed to pay. Legal
action was taken on my advice on those
occasions; but I never advised legal action
against the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, nor was
any ever taken, because it seemed to me
that the best and least expensive course
to adopt with a slow payer who was financially
sound was to inpose an interest charge, and
wait until he paid.
23. THAT because I never had any suspicion that
the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was anything more
than a slow payer with occasional liquidity
problems, I never warned any of the Respondents
herein that the said Yiangos Arcadiou might
have a fundamental financial problem which
would prevent him from paying all his debts
without any great delay; and I knew of no
person to whom the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
owed money to the extent that such person
would, in my opinion, have been well advised
to contemplate taking legal action against him,"
For the purposes of the hearing, a schedule was
produced, which Mr Brown verified, in the following form:
"SCHEDULE OF AGE OF BALANCES OWING BY
YIANGOS ARCADIOU TO COLLIE PAVING COMPANY
AT END OF QUARTER, 31.12.73 TO 31.12.75
Less than
Date Balance = 30-60 days 60-90 days 90-120 days
oo 30 days s
31.12.73 §$ 239.00 $ 239.00
31.3.74 842.00 842.00
30.6.74 3174.10 3174.10
30.9.74 4246.20 4246.20
31.12.74 8805.50 8805.50
31.3.75 7423.80 6595.80 828.00
30.6.75 13194.36 6609.31 6585.05
30.9.75 15164.00 10338.70 4825.30
31.12.75 22539.85 10343.20 4235.30 4797.35 3164.00"
226/13
13.
As will be seen from the reasons delivered in
the case brought by the trustee of this estate against
Casabene and others, which have also been published today,
I am of opinion that it is for the respondents to prove that
they were payees in good faith within the meaning of s.122
and to negative the inferences set out in sub-sec.(4)(c). In
my opinion, the respondents have failed to do so.
As at 31 December 1975 the respondents were owed
$22,539.85 by the bankrupt, including the amounts set out in
the schedule above which ranged from the ages of less than
30 days to 90-120 days. Repeated pleas for payment in 1975
had been met with promises which had been broken. During the
Christmas holidays, the respondents decided not to work for
the bankrupt in future, until he paid the whole of his account.
In February 1976 the bankrupt promised that if the respondents
did a small job for him he would pay off a large part of the
amount due. They agreed to do so and received a payment of a
mere $5,000.00. In March 1976 they told him of their need for
money to pay their taxes and received what was described as his
"latest promise of a remittance before 9 April", which was not
honoured. They imposed an interest charge which he agreed to
pay but did not.
In April 1976 they ayain agreed to do some work
for the bankrupt on the promise that "a large payment of past
due accounts would be forthcoming". It 15 interesting to note
that the bankrupt did not offer a promise to pay the whole of
the amount outstanding, and in the event he made no payment.
In September 1976 the bankrupt asked the respondents
to work for him and the reply was given that they were unwilling
to do so unless they were paid the full amount of the money
owing to them. He promised to do so but they received only
$10,000.00 and said that they would not work until they were
paid in full.
2.2 14/
14.
The payment of $10,000.00 was made under such
circumstances as to lead to the inference that any reasonable
business man in the position of the respondents must, at the
least, have had reason to suspect the two matters specified
in s.122(4)(c) (a) and (ii). In my opinion, the evidence
establishes that the respondents in fact had reason so to
suspect. They hoped that by promising to do more work for
the bankrupt that they would receive payment for their past
work, in preference to other creditors.
A man who was able to pay his debts as they became
due from his own money would hardly have needed to plead with
the respondents to work for him in return for a promise to
pay accounts which were long overdue and had been the subject
of earlier broken promises. The September promise to pay in
full was itself broken. The fact that the bankrupt chose to
store building supplies free of charge on the premises of the
respondents does not disturb the conclusions to which the
history of their dealings with the bankrupt so strongly points.
It 1S unnecessary to consider the applicant's
claim based upon s.123.
The Court declares that the payment of $10,000.00
made by the bankrupt to the respondents on 29 September 1976
is void as against the applicant as trustee of the property of
the bankrupt and orders that the respondents pay to the
applicant the sum of $10,000.00 together with his taxed costs
of and incidental to the application, including reserved costs,
such costs to be taxed, if not agreed. Liberty to apply is
reserved to either party.