CATCHLORDS BAYKRUDTCY - bankruptcy notice - application to set aside notice on ground Lhat sum specified in notice as amount due to creditor allegedly ervcecd- emount in fact due - whether overstatement could reasonably have misled the debtor - whether overstatement determined at time of issue or service of notice whether defect 1n notice fundamental - whether fundamental defect 15 determired by 1uference to Lhe debtor in question or a_ hypothetical debtor - "prescrited form" of notice, Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss. 41, 306 Tunkruntcy Rules r.3 RO: NCNRY FREDERICK HEATON WALSH ro. 8 2802 OF 1982 . 13 DCCEMNBER 1982 'AT SYDNDY {WN THD FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENCDRAL DIVISION NO. B 2802 OF 1982 ) ) ) ) BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) ) OF NEW SOUTID WALES AND THE ) ) ) AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY RE: "HDONRY "FREDERICK HCATON WALSH Applicant ORDERS JUDGE MAKING ORDERS: LOCKHART J, WHERE MADE: AT SYDNEY DATE OF ORDERS: 13 DECEMBER 1982 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The order for extension of time for compliance with the requirements . of bankruptcy notice "o, 2802 of 1982 previously made be varied so that the debtor may compiy with those requirements up to and including 20 December 1982 but no longer, 2. The application be otherwise dismissed, 3, The debtor pay the creditor's costs of the application including reserved costs. [eM eA BESTT ST I ee eee, Tee WS Se retcetag = gah LRT LEE PONE Le gE ce eed a " iN THE FLDEKAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENEKAL DIVISION Nc. B. 26062 OF 1982 BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE NLW SCUTH LALES AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Ree eee" kE: HENRY FREDLRICK HEATON LALSH APPLICLLT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AT_SYDNLY 13 DECELBER 1982 LOCKHART J. I propose to give judgment nov. notwithstanding that important questions of bankruptcy lav arise for determinaticn in this case. But I have reached a tirm view as to the result and have becn assisted by full and careful argument. Henry Frederick Walsh, the debtor, seeks to set aside a bankruptcy notice on the ground that 1 requires him to pay more than was due by him to the Leputy Commissioner of Taxation, the creditor. Cn 19 August 1981 the creditor signed judgment against the debtor in the Supreme Court of New South wales in the sum of $25,914.75. On 23 hovember 1961 a bankruptcy notice was assued at the request of the creditor reyuiring the debtor to pay the sum of $26,596.34, being the amount of the said judgment plus LT PRET PRE, AE ET TEATS ELT PERE EUR NT ITY PP SpA OS PEPE BU an BE ERD TIA Ste + v -2- unteresi. The debtor applied to this Court to set aside that rotice on the ground that 1t required payment of a sum which excecdea the amount in fact due. 1 set aside the notice on 2b May 1982. lhe creditcr issued a second notice which was set aside by another Judge of this Court by consent. rp A third bankruptcy notice was 1ssuec on 23 June 1962 at the creditor's request requiring the debtor to pay $23,255.41 > which, according to the notice, rcpresented the jvagment debt of $25,914.75 less the sum of $2656.34, being the amount by v.hich the judgment vas reduced after it was signed. The bankruptcy notice was served on the debtor on 30 June 1982. On 13 July 1962, within the timc allowed by the notice for payment, the debtor gave notice to the crecitor that he disputed the valadaty of the notice on the ground that the sum specified in 1t as the amount duc exceeded the amount in fact due (sub-s. 41 (5) ) of the benkruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"). The judgment debt represents income tax liébilities of the debtor for the years ended 3G June 1975 to 1978 inclusive and additional tax for late payment. Let.cen the signing of Judgment and the assue of the first benkruptcy notice correspondence passed bett.een the creditor on the one hand, and the debtor or downer TTY TENE ED ARO OL TEA ERASER ET Wy UES AT REE TN SEA NO LE EET G ETO ORE aS oe a -3- persons apparently acting on his behalf, including Mr. Peter Clyne on the other hand, in which proposals to pay the judgment debt were made and rejected. The history of the matter is more fully set out in my reasons for judgment when I set aside the first notice. Counsel for the debtor conceded for the purpose of this application that the bankruptcy notice in question here correctly states the umount due by the debtor to the creditor at the tine the notice was issued. The debtor asserted that the relevant time to consider the correct amount duc by a debtor to a creditor for the purpose of determining the validity of a bankruptcy notice 1s the time of its service, not issue. It is not disputed that payments were made on behalf of the debtor to the creditor between 24 June 1982 and 8.45 am Sydney time on 3G June 1982 totalling $98.33; the reason for the statement of the time of . Gay will become apparent later. 'he debtor asserted that these payments made between the issue and service of the notice Operated to anvalidate the notice and to require that it be set aside. Before turning to the submissions of the parties I will refer to some of the evidence. 'lhe creditor has many offices throughout Australia. Between 1% August 1981 when judcgment was entered and 23 June 1982 when the bankruptcy notice was issued about 110 payments were made on behalf of the debtor on various days and at various times to about 24 different offices of the va natty ca ee ee A ete EN, FEST ? RS STE Ny See APES TE TNE ET Stat Ware aig Sn te reg a -4- creditor in Australia. The payments varied in amount from $2.26 to $242.60, but most of them were in small denominations under $10.60 each. Indecd, each payment made after 8 June 1982 and on or before 23 June 1962 was of an amount less than $10.00. the offices of the creditor where payments were mede were as far flung as Cairns, Darwin, Perth, Alice Springs, Adelaide, Hobart, sydney and Melbourne. Some payments were made in capital cities and "others zn places including Mt. Gambier, Toowoomba, wollongong, Lismore and Albury. lt 2s obvious that the cebtor has embarked cn 4 mischievous plan of making payments to the creditor in varying but generally small amounts all over Australia to take advantage of the administrative problems that necessarily beset an Organization as large and widespread as the Department of Taxation in the hope that the creditor would fail to credit him with some payment, no matter how sméll. Plainly the debtor hes done this to enable him to plead in courts that the particular claim an any bankruptcy notice issued at the request of tne creditor overstated the amount in fact due and was therefore invalid within the principles laid down in In re A bebtor, Neo. 478 of 1906, [1908] 2 K.B. 684, and many other cases. A bankruptcy notice sets ain motion the whole process leading to bankruptcy and must, since the proceedings are of a guasi penal nature, be construed strictly. The effect of defects un bankruptcy notices has generally arisen 1n cases where the a A a Ra Rk CT PRL a la i a tal alee ei ae RE ae > -5- petitioning creditor claims that the defect is formal and therefore, by operation of s. 306 of the Act, does not invalidate the notice. It has been long established that, if a detect in a bankruptcy notice 1s of such a4 kind as could reasonably mislead a debtor upon whom it is served, it invalidates the notice ind cannot be validated by s. 306: Pallaia v. Comptrolier of Inccme ; Tax £1970] A.C. 1124 at p. 1135 per Lord Diplock who delivered the judgment of the Judiczal Committee; In re A Jucgment Debtor, 530 of 1908 [1¢908} 2 K.B. 474; in re A Debtor, No. 47& cf 19u8 (supra); and In re A Debtor, No. 21 of 1956, [1951] Ch. 313. The question 1s not whether the debtor was in fact misled by the mistake in the notice but whether 1t could misleaa him. WNotyithstanding some confusion in the reported cases us to whether the invalidity of the bankruptcy notice 1s determined by reference to a hypothetical debtor or the particular debtor to whom the notice 1s directed, I held in Re Wimborne; Lx parte The Debtor (1979) 24 A.L.R. 494 (at pp. 499-500) that at as the latter to whom the Court looks to Getermine the validity of 4 bankruptcy notice. Sheppard J. took the same view in ke Prestcn; Ex parte The Commercial Bank cf Australia Limited, 13 Octcber 1982, as yet unreported. in cases where petitions are undefended, generally nothing turns on this description but, where a debtor defends a Dene IE wry RRS AO RISE BAST RS TURE TSS SUT OM STONE LD LNT BER NE IL OR RE A BER ~ TP ras "ham re -b- petition and asserts that he could have been misled by some defect in the notice, it seems to me to be absurd to suggest that the courts must ignore facts which would negate the debtor's assertion. ke Wimborne 1s one illustration. 1t as difficult to imagine a better illustration of the point than the present case where the debtor has deliberately set out to frustrate the creditor and the law by engineering events designed to proauce defects in bankruptcy notices which may be issued against him. He 2S not a debtor who cculd be confused by the alleged defect in the bankruptcy notice, he is the wilful source of the alleged confusion. 1o ignore the facts that establish this woula be a mockery of the law. Counsel for the debtor supmittead that an overstatement an a bankruptcy notice of the amount due by the debtor necessarily vitiates the notice provided the debtor gives the reguisite notice under suk-s. 41 (5). This conclusion was said to arise both from judgment of the courts, in particular In re A Marco (1952) 16 A.k.C. 66, and from the terms of sub-ss. 41 (5) and (6) themselves. In re A Debtor, No. 476 of 1908, the bankruptcy notice required the debtor to pay the amount of the judgment debt due tc the creditor and in addition a further small sum due by the debtor to the creaitor. The Lnglish Court of Appeal held that this ws not a mere formal defect and that the notice was invalid. THLE mera srenn oS SHES Ses \ SPONTA PAY The SS METI Pen ee aE Ee MERIAL TSE: PLES EE REE ST EE ES oa bs ST ae . -7- To say that a benkruptcy notice 1S necessarily bad because it overstates the aemount which is in fact due by the Gebtor by no matter how small a sum 1s 1n my Opinion too wide a proposition. Generally such a notice would be bad, but there mey be circumstances which in a particular case would save the notice from invalidity. ln Re a Debtor, No. 478 cf 190%, and ke Prossimo are 1llustrations of cases where bankruptcy notices were held invalid, but they must all be viewed in the laght cf the overriding question whether the mistake in the notice could reasonably mislead the debtor. Indeed, {fn re A Debtor, No. 478 of 1908, itself 1t seems to me that Farwell L.J. (at p. 690) and Kennedy L.J. (at p. 6%1) considered the etfcct on the validaty of a bankrupicy notice of an overstatement of the amount due by reference to vhether it cculd mislead or embarrass the debtor. The same analysis of that case was made also by Harman J. In re A Debtor, Neo. 21 of 1950 (supra) (at p. 320). I note that Harman J.'s judgment was approved by the Privy Council in Pillai's Case (at p. 1135). in my opinion the cases do not establish an invariable rule (I leave aside for the moment the effect, 1f any, of sub-ss- 41 (5) and (6) ) that an overstatement in a bankruptcy notice ot the amount due necessarily avoids the notice. It has this consequence if the overstatement could reasonably mislead the debtor on whom it is served, but not otherwise. Section 41 cf the Act provides that a bankruptcy notice under the Act shall be in the prescribed form and shall recuire the debtor to pay the judgment debt, or sum ordered to be paid, an accordance with the terms of the judgment or order, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor or the Court, and shall state the consequence of non-compliance therewith and shall be served in the prescribea tanner. Sub-sections 41 (5) and (6) provide:- "al (5) A bankruptcy notice is not invalidated by reason only that the sum specified in the notice es the amount due to the creditor exceeds the amount in fact due, unless the debtor, within the tame allowed for payment, gives notace to the creditor that he Gisputes the validity of the notice on the ground of the mis-statement. 41 (6) Where the amount specified in a bankruptcy notice exceeds the amount in fact due and the debtor does not give notice to the crea@itor in accordance with sub-section (5), he shail be deemed to have complied with the notice if, within the time allowed for Payment, he takes such action as would have constituted compliance with the notice if the amount due had been correctly specified in it." These sub-secticns are taken from s. 53 oi the Bankruptcy Act 1924 which in turn was repreduced from the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914 and its predecessor the Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement Act 1913. It has been said that these provisions were enacted to overcome the judgment In re A Debtcr, No. 478 of 1968 (supra). Plainly enough, as long ago as 1913 the predecessors of sub-ss. 41 (5) and (6) were intended to ensure eet ro ng BERS OE LTT AE MR ae EP oe ATS YO gE EY ag ot oS eng ASR Ry ee eR Hone Sade) Sees -~9- that, when courts would ctherwise hold bankruptcy notices invalid on the ground of overstatement of the amount due the consequences of invalidity was not to follow unless the debtor gave the requisite notice under sub-s. 41 (5) or its then equivalent. They are ameliorating provisions. 'They do not e2zther in terms or in substance themselves ipvalidate anything. They save some bankruptcy notices from what otherwise would be invalidity, but the sub-sections are not based on an assumption that overstatement necessarily leads ain every case to invalidity of the bankruptcy notice. It dees where, but only where the debtor could be reasonably misled by the overstatement. As the debtor in this case could not conceivably have been misled by the allcged overstatement of $98.33, 1t follows that the bankruptcy notice 1s not invalid on that ground. , before turning to the question whether it 1s the time of zssue or service of a bankruptcy notice that cGetermines the question of overpayment of the amount itself, 1 progose to make some brief observation pertaining to this casé and generally. The law of bankruptcy 1s not intended to protect rasceéls, rather it should flush them out and deal with them fairly end according to law. In recent times there is a growing and disturbing tendency of unscrupulous debtors to use the technicalities that traditionally surround bankruptcy law to deliberately explo1t the courts and the system they administer. The principles laid down by judges over many yeirs relating to bankruptcy notices did not | ~~ ang shee tute He = PS ot EPEAT OT STARE Age AER REED EEE A SPEER EN LOO EE ITN TOIT IT EO | APN EGS Sh PINE VT BT AMS -= 2 ~lo- envisage this development. The courts must not aid the ruthless and cynical exploitation of the laws of insolvency by unscrupulous debtors. I do not suggest for one moment that bankruptcy statutes should not be construed othcrwise than according to their ordinary and natural meaning in the light of their evident purpose and guided by well established principles develcpec py the courts. But where the application of these principles would necessarily lead to a manifest absurdity or anjustice, the courts must strain agéinst it and ensure that the laws of insolvency are unterpreted and applied firmly and fairly in the interests of debtors an@ creditors alike. 1£ this means that some old principles laid down by the courts of yesteryear must go, then so be it. 'Yhe law does not stand still impervious to changing times and conditions. If the laws of bankruptcy are allowed to become the haven or refuge of the rascal they have utterly faazled the community which they are designed to serve. In my view none of the cases to which I was referred by counsel deny the propositions which I have expressed but, if I should be wrong and if cases such as in re A Debtor, ho. 478 of 1908, or Re Prossimo stand in the path of my conclusion, 4s they do not band this Court, 1 woula decline to follow them for the reasons 1 have given. I turn to the submission of counsel for the debtor that Be nate EEA ORT SBMS 9A tne Vere ee reer ¢ Ue Re She 28i0 BVPI Vee SAE La 08, pam tee etecan ent pn ety URE PORTIA TEENA TE SBNIM DA PSOE TS NERSRU NTI ¢ NIE PARMA TR ee TEBE TNE RES IT OE LES, in sede tes FIN x ' 7 ® i = - a : oe 28 -f e -ll- the question whether overstatement of the amount due invalidates a bankruptcy notice should be Getermined at the time of service,not issue, of the notice. I do not perceive why the time of service of the notice determines this question. A bankruptcy notice can only say what it does, and this must be determined when the ink is dry namely, at the time of its issue. The argument on behalf of the debtor confuses the two quite separate guestions of validity of a bankruptcy notice and any operation or effect which the notice might have. li a caebter complies with the requirements of a notice by paying the amount reguired, or securing payment of it, or compounaing it, or satisfying the court that he has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand of the kind referred to in para. 40 (1) (gq) end sub-s. 41 (7) then he will not commit an act of bankruptcy and the notice has no relevant consequence. Likewise, if a debtor pays the full amount of the judgment debt tcgether with interest, 1f applicable, after a bankruptcy notice 1s issue but before 1t 1s served, then plainly the notice cannot be the vehicle for the commission of an act of bankruptcy. The researches of counsel revealed no case supporting the proposition that the relevant time to determine the correctness of the amount due by the debtor is the time of service of the notice, not the time of its issue. but counsel for the debtor relied strongly on un ex tempore decision ct a Divisional Court in Re Child; Ex parte Child (1892) 2 &.B. 77. The debtor Child, had acted as agent for the CGueen Insurance SEITEN A GR ALR RINE MONTY SLAP TT SAE n SS Ema RETEST IA ARTE TERT ater HATE SSS TO -. -12- Company, but in Lecember 1868 he was dismissed from his employment. On 20 Lecember 1888 judgment was obtained by the insurance company against the debtor the sum of one hundred and fifty-four pounds and seventeen shillings. An arrangement was thereupon come to between the manager of the insurance company and the debtor by which the latter assigned to the company certain books debts, together with the lease of a house and, under the same arrangement it was agreed that Child should be credited in the books of the company as against the judgment debt with the sum of one hundred ana eighteen pounds being the amount due to him on renewals of policies of insurance effected with the company through his agent. Nothing further was done until 13 November 1891, on which date a bankruptcy notice was served on Child by the company requiring him to pay to the Cuecn Insurance Company the sum of one hundred and fifty-four pounds and seventeen shillings as being the balance due on the final judgment obtained against him. Cn the same day on which the bankruptcy notice vas served, 4 letter was written by Chil@ to the company denying any indebtedness and pointing out that there was a balance due to him under the arrangement previously entered intc. On 26 November 1891 he filed a general affidavit claiming this set-off. on 7 December 16591 application was made to the Registrar by Child in person to have the bankruptcy notice set aside, when the Registrar directed him to file, before 11 December 1691, & further affidavit setting out the particulars of his set-off end Fp LEER ES MELLO SOO IS ON LS, YS EEN YEAR EAS £8 NOTIN EW RR «OE TS RY Dre a eS -13- adjourned the hearing until 14 December 1891. this further affidavit was not filed by 11 December, but as subsequently filed. At the hearing objection was taken that the affidavit had not been filed in time. 'The Registrar upheld the objection, refused to read the affidavit and also refused to set aside the bankruptcy notice. It was from that decision tnat the appeal was brought to the Livisional Court. As reported in (1692] 2 ¢.B. 77 Vaughan \2lliams J. 1s recorced as saying (at pp. 7% and &60):- "I wish to state my view of this part of the sub-section" (namely, sub-s. 4 (1) (¢) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (English) )" I thank that . under it a creditor who has obtained final jucgment 1s net entitled to serve a bankruptcy notice in respect of any amount greater than that for which he could have issued execution, ana that, thereafter, if the circumstances of the case are such that he has ceased to be entitled to issue execution for the whole zémount of the judgment debt, he has ceased to be entitled to serve a bankruptcy notice for the whole emount of the judgment debt." The emphasis 1S mine. Other references to serving a bankruptcy notice appear in his Lordship's juagment and in the judgment of Henn Collins Jd. Assuming the correctness of the report in the Law Reports of the judgment in Re Child, a matter to which I shall return soon, 1t does not support the argument cf the debtor. Khothing turned there on any distinction between the tames of issue and of ne ee a ae 2B AD AE TH QUCE CRA RE, A NR a NT et FOE LAT PED TH NILE STUY aol 6 TY RE Bt eh TES, OPP PRT OP SAE ARP AEE TSOTSI TEENY SIA, a we Pe = eee oe 52 ae 4 a -l4- service of a bankruptcy notice, which is the very point in question here. Nor can any observations of their Lordships be treated as bearing on this poant. Yhere is nothing in this report of Re Child to suggest that their Lordships turned their minds at all to the guestion involved in this case. The facts of the present case would alone merit its description as bizarre, but any traces of doubt as to the accuracy of that description would vanish in the laght of what 1 am about to say. Yhe researches of counsel brought to light the following reports of Re Child in addition to the report in the Law Reports: (1892) 9 Morrell Bankruptcy Reports 103; 61 L.J. C.B. 25; 66 L.T. 204; & T.L.R. 319; 40 wWeR. 56; and 1891-4 All Lng. heports. kach of these reports of ke Child varies from the report zn the Law Reports and from each other in some respects but, in all the reports except the Lav keports, the references by the members of the Davisional Court are to the issue of a bankruptcy notice and not to its service. For instance, ain llorrell's keports, Vaughan \.alliams J., after referring to para. 4 (1) (g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1863, is reported as saying (at p. 106): "I do not think myself that that section entitles a creditor who has obtained a tinal Judgment to issue @ bankruptcy notice for any larger amount than that for which he could lawfully issue execution; and in my judgment 1f the circumstances of the case are such that the execution creditor has ceased to be entitled to issue execution for the whole of the debt then he has ceased to be entitled to POT PP ae tao Od ARMNE pretties "APONTE Nas WEY eee ry, WAP F % age age SEES EET AN PE I BN -15- issue a bankruptcy notice for the whole amount." Again, the emphasis is mine. Counsel for the debtor sought to meet this problem of multiformity of reporting by urging the Court to adopt the report found 1n the Law Reports. 1 am unable to yield to that entreaty when confronted with the rather extraordinary position where only one report of Re Child uses the word "serve" rather then "issue" un relation to the bankruptcy notice there in question. Re Child has been referred to in many cases but, so far as the researches of counsel could show, the references have been in contexts involving the date of issue cf bankruptcy notices. In my opinion, the relevant time for determining the correctness cf the amount Claimed in a bankruptcy notice as being die by the debtor 1s the time of issue of the notice, not the time of its service. I pass to the remaining Submissions of counsel for the debtor, all of whach concerned the addition of the words i] Lo] Q figures "at 4.21 o'clock in the afternoon" after the date oi the notice and before the signature of the Ceputy Registrar in bankruptcy who issued it. Counsel for the debtor submitted that the inclusion oi these words and figures in the notice invalidated it: (a) because 1t constituted a substantial deviation Set Orfithy SNES eee san o eis patse: ent, iw "at, DIY APT e TEE VE me SLM EMP AP OD TT MEO LE BT etc PPE ee SSR ORT NTS ee SNe REE WEES DE IE ES INE (b) -16- from the prescribed form (Form 4); because it couid cause the debtor on whose behzlf Payments were being made all over Australia to conjecture or wonder whether it was claimed that the balance of the judgment debt was said to be owing at 4.21 Perth time, Adelaide time or Sydney time; or because, by stressing the precise time of issue of the notice, it would cause the debtor on whose behali payments were being made all over Australia to conjecture or wonder whether the time required by the notice for compliance with its requirements "within 14 days after service of this notice on you excluding the date on which this notice is served on you" vywould be calculated from the precise moment of service. The ingenuity of the argument 1s matched only by its fantasy. BR b ankruptcy notice is required to be in accordance with the prescribed form: para. 41 (1) (a) and sub-s. 41 (2). Bankruptcy rule 8 provides: "tor the the purposes of paragraph 41 (1) (a) cf Act, a bankruptcy notice shall be in accordance with Form 4." I do not regard the addition of the words and figures in -17- question as constituting such a déviaticn from the prescribed form aS emounts to a defect or irregularity, whether formal or substantia]. 'his debtor, who was prone to make payments to the creditor all over Australia, could only have been assisted by the presence of the words and figures complained of. To adopt the apt words of counsel for the creditor, they aideg "the precise crystallization of his fluad position". lf, contrary to my view, the adoption of these words ana fagures gives rise to a defect or irregularity, it could not possibly be suggested that they could reasonably heve misled or perplexea the debtor. It 1s obvious from perusing the bankruptcy notice that it was issued by a Leputy Registrar in Bankruptcy for the bankruptcy District ot the State of New South Wales and the Fustralian Capital Yerritory. Indeed, the kegistrar's seal 18 affixed to the notice in various places including one place directly over the reference to the time of issue. It strains credulity too much to imagine that this, or for that matter any debtor could reasonably have thought that the notice was issuecG other than at 4.21 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Further, this debtor must have known or be taken to have known when and where he made relevant payments. It 1S a condemnation of the debtor in this case that he embarked upon a plan of making payments all over Australia at different times of the day which, dve to time differences throughout the land, necessarily occasioned difficulty to the SLAY LS cyacetrge hg Weenie PEEL ERD TTT TE RE PN UN HET A LEN HE EERE OORT Ds TEN ORE ENP ae PE ete ee . . a -l ge creditor in calculating how much vas owed by the debtor at any previous time. The only worthwhile fcature of his conduct 15s that 1t enables the Court to say that it has failed to achieve uts objective and that other like cases, mercifully few thus far and hopefully none in the future, will mect the same fate. I would dismiss the application with costs. 4s an order ais still extant extending time tor compliance with the requirements of the notice until further order, I propose to vary tke operation cf that order so that the Geptor has until 2G Lecember 1962 to comply with the requirements of the notice. The orders of the Court ere:- il. That the order for extension of time for compliance with the requirements of bankruptcy notice 2602 of 1982 previously made be varied so that the debtor may comply with those requirements up to and including 24 LGecember 1982 but no longer; 2. That the application be otherwise dismissed; anda 3. 'hat the Gebtor pay the creditor's costs cf this @applicaticn including reseryGén@P Pes this and the i) le! Po por.) f [Teed Cohen ey preceding Ppajes are a trus copy cf the Roasons for Jucomcr' Fe:on cf hs Wonour Mr Justice Lockhar! t Lh ore Lied Assac.ate Dated. [3 OZ