Re Latona, Mary Elizabeth Ex Parte Leslie, Yvonne May [1983] FCA 12
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - Petition based on default judgment -
Power of Court to go behind judgment - Test in
determining whether there was a true debt - Whether
satisfied there was a debt in substantially same
amount as claimed in judgment - Court not satisfied
of existence of debt.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.52
RE: MARY ELIZABETH LATONA EX PARTE: YVONNE MAY LESLIE
No. P.1036 of 1982
ELLICOTT J.
CANBERRA
4 FEBRUARY 1983
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE
)
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) No. P.1036 of 1982
)
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
RE: MARY ELIZABETH LATONA
EX PARTE: YVONNE MAY LESLIE
CORAM: Ellicott J.
4 February, 1983
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Yvonne May Leslie (Mrs Leslie) seeks a
sequestration order against the estate of Mary Elizabeth
Latona (Mrs Latona) for non-compliance with a bankruptcy
notice served on Mrs Latona and based on a debt of
$6574.47, being the amount due under a final judgment
recovered by Mrs Leslie against Mrs Latona, her husband,
and a company, The TreesService Centre Pty. Limited,
in the District Court of New South Wales on 1 June 1982.
The consideration for the judgment debt is alleged to
be wages due and not paid.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE
)
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) No. P.1036 of 1982
)
)
)
)
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
RE: MARY ELIZABETH LATONA
EX PARTE: YVONNE MAY LESLIE
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Ellicott J.
DATE OF ORDER: 4 February 1983
WHERE MADE: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: -
1. The petition be dismissed.
2. The petitioner pay one half of the costs of
Mary Elizabeth Latona of these proceedings.
Mrs Latona resists the making of a
sequestration order claiming (inter alia) that no
amount is due by her to Mrs Leslie for unpaid wages.
The initial judgment in the District Court was
obtained by default. In the action, the Statement of
Liquidated Claim claimed $6459.44 as arrears of wages,
salary and annual leave for work done and services
rendered by Mrs Leslie as an employee for the defendants
or one of them.
The particulars given were:-
(a) Wages and overtime from 2 May
1981 to 31 July 1981 - 13 weeks
at $479.16 per week $6,299.08
(b) Accrued annual leave - 18 weeks
at 3.08 hours per week, i.e.
55.44 hours at $4.15 per hour 230.36
$6,459.44
Interest was also claimed from 31 July 1981 at 102.
On 4 February 1982, Mrs Latona and her co-defendants
moved to have the judgment set aside and for the purposes of
those proceedings, grounds of defence were filed which alleged
that there was no contract of employmentamd thatMrs Leslie and her
husband were friends of Mr and Mrs Latona who gave them certain
assistance as she was in receipt of a pension and was not able
to be employed. It was also alleged that at no stage was there
an agreement to pay Mrs Leslie wages as claimed. The motion was
heard by Ford D.C.J. on 28 April 1982 who ordered that the
judgment be set aside and that the matter proceed to trial purely
and simply on the basis of quantum but on condition that
Mr Latona pay into Court within 28 days $1,000 as security for
3.
Mrs Leslie's costs. In default, Mrs Leslie was to have
leave to sign judgment forthwith upon filing an affidavit
verifying the quantum of her claim. No moneys were paid into
Court and Mrs Leslie signed judgment on 1 June 1982.
On 10 September 1982, Mrs Latona moved to set aside
the judgment of 1 June. In support of that application, she
claimed that she was not and never had been indebted in the
amount claimed and she sought to excuse non-compliance with the
orders of Ford D.C.J. on the basis of her involvement in many
other cases and her consequent confusion. This application came
before the District Court at Penrith on 27 September 1982 and
was dismissed.
The judgment therefore remains and Mrs Leslie, who
served the bankruptcy notice on 15 July 1982 and filed her
petition on 3 September 1982 continues to rely on it.
I have been asked by Mrs Latona to go behind the
judgment debt and to hold that there was no consideration fot it.
Section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act")
provides that at the hearing of a creditor's petition, the
Court shall require proof of the matters stated in the petition,
service of the petition and of the fact that the debt relied
on is still owing. If not so satisfied it may dismiss the
petition (s.52(2)).
It is well established that this Court, sitting
in bankruptcy, has jurisdiction to go behind a judgment debt
relied upon by a petitioner. In Corney v. Brien (1951)
84 C.L.R. 343 at p.347, the principle was stated by Dixon J.
(as he then was) and Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ. as follows:-
"Section 56(2) (a) of the Bankruptcy Act
1924-1950 provides that the court at the
hearing shall require proof of the debt
of the petitioning creditor. Under this
provision the Court of Bankruptcy has
undoubted jurisdiction to go behind a
judgment obtained by default or compromise
or where fraud or collusion is alleged and
inquire whether the judgment is founded on
a real debt."
In Wren v. Mahony (1972) 126 C.L.R. 212 at
p.224, Barwick C.J., after referring to what was said
by Lerd Esher in Re Flatau (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 83 said:-
"His Lordship, in using this expression, was
not intending, in my opinion, to weaken the
emphasis he had always placed on the need for
the Court of Bankruptcy to be satisfied of the
existence of the petitioning creditor's debt.
Rather, if one reads all his expressions in
the several cases I have cited, he was pointing
out that the Bankruptcy Court could in general
accept a judgment debt as sufficient proof of
that debt particularly where it resulted from
a fully heard contest between parties but that
it always had the power to go behind the
judgment and if the case was a proper one,
should do so. The judgment is never conclusive
in bankruptey. It does not always represent
itself as the relevant debt of the petitioning
ereditor, even though under the general law,
the prior existing debt has merged in a judgment.
But the Bankruptcy Court may accept the judgment
as satisfactory proof of the petitioning
ereditor's debt. In that sense that court has
a discretion. It may or may not so accept the
judgment. But it has been made quite clear by
the decisions of the past that where reason is
shown for questioning whether behind the judgment
or as it is said, as the consideration for it,. .
there was in truth and reality a debt due to the
petitioning creditor, the Court of Bankruptcy can
no longer accept the judgment as such satisfactory
proof,"
When this matter initially came before me,
evidence was given which, if accepted, would have meant
that Mrs Leslie, although employed, had been paid. That
evidence suggested, in part, that she had been employed by
the company, The Trees Service Centre Pty. Limited, had been
so employed under an assumed name and had been paid. On the
basis of this, I indicated to the parties that I was prepared to
consider whether Mrs Latona was in truth indebted to Mrs Leslie
as the judgment appeared to suggest and both parties proceeded
to put further evidence before me.
I think it is clear that s.52 of the Act requires
me to be satisfied that Mrs Latona is indebted to Mrs Leslie
for the amount claimed. In forming a view, I must give due
weight to the fact that judgment was signed for the amount in
question and it might even be regarded as prima facie evidence
of the existence of a debt. However, I am entitled to consider
the whole of the evidence placed before me and if, having done
so, I am not satisfied that Mrs Latona is indebted to Mrs Leslie
for the debt relied on, I should dismiss the petition.
This approach, I consider to be consistent with
the authorities. In taking it, I should look at it as a matter
of substance, that is to say, if Mrs Leslie is to obtain a
sequestration order I should be satisfied that Mrs Latona is
indebted to Mrs Leslie for an amount of $6459.44 or an amount
approximating that sum for wages and overtime between 2 May
1981 and 31 July 1981.
ere
ee eet ee na ee a ne = —— -- --
6.
I shall put aside at the outset Mrs Latona's
claim that Mrs Leslie was employed not by her but by the
company, The Trees Service Centre Pty. Limited. Some
evidence was adduced in an attempt to establish the existence
of the company, its ownership of the business known as "The
Trees Service Centre" and the employment by it
of people including Mrs Leslie, in the course of that business.
For instance, there is evidence that wages books relating to
people employed at The Trees Service Centre were kept in the
name of the company and that group certificates were issued to
employees in its name. There is also evidence that "With
Compliments" slips and a letterhead with the company's
name on them were used and that its name appeared on the door
of the office used in the business. However, notwithstanding
this, I am not satisfied that it was brought home to Mrs Leslie
that she was being employed by the company and not by Mr
and Mrs Latona. .
I will subsequently refer to the conversations
out of which her employment arose. Nothing occurred in those
conversations to indicate that it was the company that was
employing her and she was entitled to assume that Mr and Mrs
Latona were themselves offering her employment. Furthermore,
there was no satisfactory evidence adduced to show that the
company acquired the business. For instance, the minute book,
bank account, cheque books and other relevant documents which
might indicate that the company was the owner of the business
and the employer, were not produced. The existence of such
7.
books should have been within Mrs Latona's knowledge
and it was for her to cause them to be produced. In the
circumstances, I am not prepared to hold that the company
was the employer.
Mrs Latona's other ground admits that Mrs Leslie
was employed but asserts that she was in fact paid and that
at least for a period she was employed under an assumed name.
Mrs Leslie, on the other hand, says that she was employed
for $200 per week clear, that she worked for long hours and
that her employment stretched from 2 May 1981 to early in
September 1981 and that she did not receive one cent in respect
of it.
It will be immediately apparent that Mrs Leslie's
assertion is not, on the face of it, in Line with the
Statement of Liquidated Claim on which the judgment is based,
for that Statement claims wages and overtime for a different
period,2 May 1981 to 31 July 1981, and for a different amount,
$479.16 per week.
Needless to say, as is apparent from the authorities,
when this Court looks behind a judgment debt, it is important
to take into account what took place in the Court in which
judgment was entered. As already indicated, in this case,
it was initially by default. There followed an application
to set it aside which came before Ford D.C.J. He decided
that it should be set aside in relation to quantum and in so
doing made the following observations: -
8.
* "One thing that has concerned me is that in the
Statement of Claim there is no sufficient
particularisation of the basis on which the
wages are compiled. Wages and overtime are
claimed for thirteen weeks at $479.16 per week,
and there is no statement of the work alleged
to have been done. Whether the claim is made
pursuant to some award I do not know. The
position so far as the defendant is concerned
I think is most unsatisfactory, but I consider
that there is at least some merit in the submission
made to me: the quantum of the plaintiff's claim
is open to question - perhaps serious question."
His Honour made it a condition of his order that
$1,000 be paid into Court by Mr Latona. It was not paid
and judgment was entered.
Although I have the transcript and copy of the
judgment of the proceedings before Ford D.C.J., I have none
in relation to the second motion taken out before the
District Court which was heard on 27 September 1982 and
dismissed.
However, when the matter was debated between the
parties before Ford D.C.J.,far from judgment being confirmed
in favour of Mrs Leslie, his Honour made the pertinent .
observation that the quantum of Mrs Leslie's claim for which
judgment was entered was "open to question - perhaps serious
question". On the basis, therefore, of what is known to me
about the proceedings in the District Court, that Court seems
to have had some doubts about the extent of Mrs Leslie's .
claim.
Having given due weight to what transpired before
the District Court, including the fact that judgment was
entered and remained in effect after two applications to set
it aside, but taking into account all the evidence now before
me, I am not satisfied that Mrs Latona is indebted to
Mrs Leslie for the 'amount for which judgment was entered
or anything like it. I have had no evidence put before me
to justify the precise amount of $479.16 per week,nor am
I able to find any basis in the evidence for arriving at such
a figure. Indeed, Mrs Leslie's evidence supports a different
figure. She says that the arrangement was she would receive
$200 per week clear, which, before tax, is approximately
$260 per week. She gave no evidence of also being entitled to
overtime and even if she was so entitled, by implication,
I have insufficient before me to justify a figure of
approximately $479 per week.
On the evidence, putting her case at its highest, I
am unable to conclude that she is entitled to anything beyond
$260 per week for the period from 2 May 1981 to 31 July 1981,
an amount of approximately $3380. However, I am not prepared
to find this as a fact because, having considered the evidence,
I am satisfied, for reasons I will explain, that she received
amounts on account of wages during the period of her employment.
Because of the unsatisfactory state of the evidence, I am
unable to find precisely what that amount was. However, this
inability does not matter because it is sufficient ground
for dismissing the petition if I am not satisfied that
Mrs Latona is indebted to Mrs Leslie for wages for the period
in question, in an amount approximating that claimed in the
judgment. As I am not so satisfied, I propose to exercise my
power under s.52(2) and dismiss the petition.
Having stated my conclusion, I propose now to set out
briefly the facts which are somewhat complex and in so doing
deal with a number of issues raised by the parties.
10.
Mrs Leslie says that on 26 April 1981 she
and her husband visited the Latonas and Mr Latona asked
her to come and work for them. He said "Come and work
for us and we'll give you $200 a week clear". She
replied that she did not really want to work for him to which
he said "We're short staffed". She asked "What sort of
work do you want me to do" and he said "You can have
office work, garage work, restaurant or horses". Mrs Leslie
then said she would think it over. On 30 April she
telephoned him and said she had thought it over and would
accept. They then arranged for her to start on 1 May.
Mrs Latona agrees that this was the substance of
the conversation and that no mention was made about Mrs Leslie
working for The Trees Service Centre Pty. Limited. Both
she and Mr Latona say that Mrs Leslie was employed from
26 April. Mr Latona's evidence was that Mrs Leslie was to
receive the award rate, not $200 per week. His version was
that he said "We'll give you a job. You pick which entity
in the business you want to work at and you will be paid
the award rate". I am satisfied, having heard the evidence,
that the arrangement was that Mrs Leslie would receive
$200 per week clear. However, as I indicated earlier, nothing
was said with regard to hours of work or overtime.
li.
At this time the Leslies and Latonas were
friendly and in the previous year Mr and Mrs Latona had
agreed to guarantee a loan of $20,000 to Mrs Leslie by
the Bank of New South Wales Savings Bank Limited which was
to enable Mrs Leslie to acquire land and have a house moved
onto it which she and her husband were to occupy. At the *
time the guarantee was executed, Mr Latona says the Bank
manager asked them if they could give Mrs Leslie a job to
help her pay for the land andjehis is how it finally came
about that they employed her. Mrs Leslie did not recall the
conversation but did not deny it and admitted in evidence
that the reason she originally went to work at The Trees
Service Centre was because she wished to obtain income so
she could pay off the loan.
On the evidence, I think it is clear that the
reason why she went to work was to obtain money to pay off
the loan.
At the time she was first employed she and her
husband were pensioners, each of them receiving approximately
$128 a fortnight. They had no other income out of which
to pay off the loan. Because they were pensioners she was
not able to earn $200 a week without it affecting the amount
of the pension.
Mrs Latona alleges that, at Mrs Leslie's request,
she was actually employed under the name "Robin Woodgood".
She says Mrs Leslie said to her "I don't want to be in the
wages book and if I do I don't want to be under my own name".
12.
Mrs Latona said "Why" and she says Mrs Leslie replied
"Because my husband told me not to. Put me in the wages
book but I can't go under my own name."
Mr Latona gave a similar account of the
conversation and each of them says that Mrs Leslie was then
entered in the wages book under the name "Robin Woodgood".
They produced the wages books and the entry in question. It
purports to show that a person known as "Robin Woodgood"
worked there from the week ended 4 May 1981 to the week
ended 29 June 1981 at a gross wage of $158 'per week and a
net wage after tax of $130.75. It also contains signatures.
Seven of them are "R. Woodgood" and two of them are "R. Woodwood".
There is also a copy of a group certificate in the name "Robin
Woodgood" for the same period.
The name "Robin Woodgood" is written into the
wages book over part of a page where what had been there was
covered by a white substance. There is sufficient appearing:
of what was covered to leave it open to the inference that
the name "Leslie" previously appeared. Mrs Latona says the
name "Leslie" was originally there and that Mrs Stackpool
whited it out and wrote in "Robin Woodgood".
Mrs Leslie strenuously denies the conversation or
any use of the name "Robin Woodgood" or "Robin Woodwood" or
any similar name in the books of The Trees Service Centre
Pty. Limited as referring to her. Mr and Mrs Latona both
asserted that Mrs Leslie had been paid in full for the work
she did and each of them said that on several occasions they
13.
were actually present when Mrs Leslie was handed money
representing her wages. Mrs Leslie, as I have previously
stated, says that she did not receive anything.
Mrs Hanney was the accounts clerk at The Trees
Service Centre during the period Mrs Leslie was there and
she says that she never paid wages to Mrs Leslie or saw her
paid. She was aware of the name "Robin Woodgood" being in
the book at a stage when only the name appeared. She says
she asked Mrs Latona who it was and she replied "It's nothing
to do with you". Although I accept Mrs Hanney as a basically
truthful witness, for reasons I will give, I think it
possible, notwithstanding her contrary evidence, that she
was present when Mrs Leslie was paid money which was on account
of wages. I would not expect her to remember all occasions on
which employees were paid in her presence over a period of
four to five months.
A form of sworn statement is in evidence by Mrs
Eileen Stackpool, now deceased, who worked in the office and
who was said to be a close friend of the Latonas. She also
was there in the capacity of a wages clerk and secretary. She
said that Mr Latona told her that Mrs Leslie was to receive
$200 per week clear, together with petrol and oil and food
from the restaurant free. She also says that she did not see
her receive any pay nor did she make up any for her. Mr Latona
says Mrs Stackpool finished in May 1981. In view of her death,
it is difficult to place a great deal of weight on
14.
her statements, particularly as "Robin Woodgood" is
alleged to be in her handwriting on the whited out page
in the wages book and she could not be cross-examined about it.
The only other explanation put forward as to
the identity of the person "Robin Woodgood" was in an
affidavit by Mrs Stackpool's daughter Debbie Stackpool, who
said she overheard a conversation between Mr Latona and her
mother after which her mother had said to her "Terri
Duddington's working again. She is working under an assumed
name of "Woodgood"'. The person then known as Terri
Duddington, now Mrs Shung, also gave evidence. She denied
working there under the name "Woodgood" and she denied
signing the page in the wages book referring to "Robin
Woodgood". Mrs Shung also seemed to me to be a truthful
witness and I accept her evidence that she did not adopt the
name "Robin Woodgood".
Although Debbie Stackpool's affidavit was read
she was not available for cross-examination and I do not
propose to accept her evidence. I think it is relevant to bear
in mind, however, that it was Mrs Leslie who tendered her
evidence and put forward what turned out to be a false
explanation.
There is evidence from a number of employees that
they were not paid their wages in full during the period
from May to September 1981, that in some cases they later
took proceedings against Mrs Latona for the amount outstanding
and that she accepted liability. Mrs Latona agreed that
15.
she had sone so. It also appears that on several occasions
during the period,the employees saw letters from finance
companies indicating that a large amount would be made
available to the business and seeking their agreement not
to press for wages. On one occasion, at least, they signed a
document to this effect. They were also given [.0.U's.
There is also evidence that employees were asked
to sign the wages book even though they had not been paid
so that it could be established that the wages book was
being properly kept if the Departmental officer called. Some
of them, on occasions, complained about non-payment to the
Latonas and were then paid.
I accept the substance of this evidence from former
employees. It establishes that during the period the
business was going through difficult times, that cash was
short, that the wages book was signed when the wages signed
for had not been paid and that employees were left unpaid. °
On the other hand it does establish that in a number of
cases employees were in fact paid when they pressed for
payment either wholly or substantially. Mrs Leslie said she
pressed for payment but was not paid.
.
An attempt was made, by evidence, to link the
signatures "R. Woadgood" and "R. Woodwood" in the wages
book with Mrs Leslie. Mr Humphrey-Reeve, a consultant
graphologist, who is skilled in the science of handwriting,
was asked to compare the handwriting of these signatures
with the handwriting on certain pages of a day book which
er te Nghe ay
16.
it was said were written by Mrs Leslie. He concluded that
they were written by the same person.
Mr and Mrs Latona gave evidence that they had
seen Mrs Leslie sign the wages book and that she had also
written what was on the pages in the day book which were
shown to Mr Humphrey-Reeve. Mrs Leslie denies that she signed
the wages book under the name "Robin Woodgood". When she
was confronted with the pages in the day book and was asked
"Is that your writing" she said "I do not think so, no".
She was asked:-
"Did you write that there?---No, I was not -
in the office then.
What date did you go into the office?---
13 or 14 July around about then."
Subsequently she was asked whether any of the
pages in the book were her handwriting and she answered
"It is hard to say because I can't remember these messages,
you see."" Subsequently I asked her "Why do you say it is :
not your handwriting?---It just does not look like it, and
besides you should recollect some messages you took down,
you would think, would you not, in an office."
She was also asked about two signatures "Y. Leslie"
in a receipt book and she denied that they were her signatures.
She said - "No because I never sign for anything like this".
These were for amounts of $130 and $50 and were dated in May
1981. There are a number of dockets and receipts which are
signed "Y. Leslie" in evidence which she does agree were signed
by her. These were for petrol which she admits receiving.
17.
I am not satisfied that Mrs Leslie was frank
in her evidence with regard to her handwriting. It seemed
to me she was reconstructing on the basis of what was
likely to have happened consistent with her own case,rather
than giving direct evidence as to whether what she was asked
to identify was in fact her handwriting. I would expect her
to know her own handwriting.
I do not accept her denial that the two signatures
"Y. Leslie" were not her signatures. When compared with
admitted signatures, including those on affidavits, I have
little doubt in my mind that they are her signatures. I
also think it possible that the pages in the day book upon
which Mr Humphrey-Reeve relied to express his opinion, are
in her handwriting. I was not convinced by the manner in
which she gave her evidence on these matters.
However, the evidence relied on to establish that
the first 7 pages of the day book are in the handwriting of
lirs Leslie is that of Mr and Mrs Latona and they have been far
from consistent or accurate in their assertions regarding
Mrs Leslie's employment. For instance, in the hearing before
Ford D.C.J., there was no mention by them that Mrs Leslie
had been employed under the name "Woodgood". Indeed,
Mr lLatona said there was no contract of employment. It was
also suggested that towards the end of Jume an officer of the
Social Security Department visited The Trees Service Centre
and asked whether Mrs Leslie was being employed there under
the name "Woodgood"'. Mr Latona says he denied, contrary to
18.
the fact, that she was, He says that thereafter "Robin Woodgood"
was not entered in the wages book, that Mrs Leslie was
not employed at the Centre on other than a casual basis
and that she chose to come to the premises as it suited her.
This is inconsistent in two respects with other evidence.
First, Mr Johnston, a Social Security Officer, gave evidence
and he said that his visit to the Centre took place on
29 July 1981. He said that Mr Latona indicated that Mrs Leslie
was employed there but that she and Robin Woodgood were not
one and the same person. Mr Latona also told him that
Mrs Leslie was working for no remuneration. This visit resulted
from some anonymous information received on 30 June 1981.
He also gave evidence that, at the time, Mrs Leslie was
receiving a wife's pension, her husband being an invalid
pensioner. Mr Johnston says he went to the Centre on three
occasions. On the second occasion (28 July 1981) he had a
conversation with a person who was the assistant manager .
who said there was a "Robin Woodgood" employed there but
said Mr Latona was not in and could he come back the following
day.
There is therefore an inconsistency between
Mr Latona's evidence and Mr Johnston's evidence as to when
the visit took place. I am satisfied it took place at the
end of July and not the end of June. If Mrs Leslie was
employed full time till the visit from Mr Johnston, as
Mr Latona suggests, this would have been till the end of
July, not June.
rete te -
19.
On the question whether Mrs Leslie worked on
a casual basis after July, I am satisfied from the evidence
of other employees such as Mrs Glendenning, who was there
at the time,that she probably worked Full time during the
whole of July and August. However, why she did not claim
for wages during August and part of September in the District
Court was not explained.
Because of this other evidence, however, I do not
accept Mr Latona's explanation of why the name "Woodgood"
ceased to be used after 29 June 1981 or his evidence that
thereafter Mrs Leslie was only employed on a casual basis.
Having regard to inconsistencies in Mr and Mrs
Latona's evidence and conduct in this matter, I am not
prepared to rely on their evidence alone to find that
Mrs Leslie adopted the name "Woodgood" or "Woodwood". No
other witness was called to substantiate it. At the same
time I am not convinced by Mrs Leslie's explanation as to .
handwriting. I am therefore left in a state of doubt as to
whether she used the name "Woodgood" or "Woodwood" or not.
An explanation was put forward by her that it was Terri
Duddington, but I find that to be false. Having regard to
the possible effect on her pension, there was a motive for
Mrs Leslie to adopt another name for the purpose of her
pension and there was a suggestion late in June 1981 to
Social Security that she was using it.
20.
It is also possible that some special
arrangement was made between Mrs Leslie and the Latonas
as to her employment and payment because of the fact that
she was a pensioner and the receipt of wages could affect
her pension. It would also seem that Mrs Stackpool wrote
the name "Robin Woodgood" in the wages book over her name.
However, these are matters of speculation and I am not
prepared to find positively, on the evidence, that
Mrs Leslie did adopt the name "Woodgood".
I am, however, satisfied that Mrs Leslie
received moneys on account of wages from the Latonas during
the period of her employment. I am not able to find, on
the evidence, precisely how much that was. If I accept
Mr and Mrs Latona as to occasions when they paid her, as I
do, it was at least $1200. However, it could have been more.
Qn the balance of probabilities, I think it is most unlikely,,
having regard to the limited income available to her,
the loan and the fact that she took the job to pay it off, that she
would have stood by and worked without payment for four months.
Mr and Mrs Latona say that
she was paid moneys on occasions and their evidence on this
is supported, I think, by the probabilities. In the ordinary
course, one would have expected her to have insisted on payment
or left. She was not anxious to work and the purpose was to pay
off the loan. It raises the question-why would she have
continued to work long hours if she was receiving nothing
for it. Furthermore, early in her employment, at least, she
at,
certify that this and tne
preced_23 tages ave a bao copy of the
Reasous vor Judguse.t herein of his Honour
Mr. Justice Hliico.t.
Dsie. Aly febrvery 18g
21.
was friendly with the Latonas. Although money was short,
other employees were, in fact, paid and there seems to be good
reason why the Latonas would have paid her something before
they paid others. Indeed, they had an interest to do so
because they had guaranteed the debt and they would no
doubt have wanted her to pay it off.
It follows that in all the circumstances, and
in the light of these findings, that I am not satisfied that
the judgment of the District Court truly reflects the
indebtedness of Mrs Latona to Mrs Leslie in respect of
wages during the period 2 May to 31 July 1981. It is not
consistent with Mrs Leslie's own evidence as to what she was
to be paid, nor does it give credit for amounts which I am
satisfied were paid by the Latonas to Mrs Leslie during this
period. I therefore propose to dismiss the petition.
Two other issues were raised on behalf of
Mrs Latona. First, it was submitted that the proceedings
were an abuse of the process of the Court and, secondly,
that because the guarantee had been called upon by the bank,
Mrs Latona had a set-off. In view of my decision to dismiss
the petition, it is umnecessary to consider these matters.
' I have given consideration to the question of
costs. On some issues I have found in favour of Mrs Leslie
and on others in favour of Mrs Latona. On some raised by
Mrs Latona, I have not been satisfied. In the circumstances,
taking all these factors into account, I think the appropriate
one-half of Mrs Latona's costs.
order is that Mrs Leslie pa