Re Walsh, Ian John Hamilton, William James v Walsh, Yvonne Lorraine [1983] FCA 44
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - settlement of property - whether gifts of
gewellery, a fur and a cutlery set were settlements and,
if so, whether the settlements were "1n consideration of
marriage" - Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.120.
RE IAN JOHN WALSH
WILLIAM JAMES HAMILTON v. YVONNE LORRAINE WaLSH
N,S,¥, W 382 of 1982
Coram: Sheppard J.
7 February, 1983
Sydney
tinea
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
THE BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE
STaTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE No. 382 of 1982
Ne eee
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
re JAN JOHN WALSE
BETWEEN WILLIAM JAMES HAMILTON
Apolicant
YVONNE LORRAINE WALSH
Respondent
ORDER _AND DECLARATION
JUDGE MAKING ORDER AND
DECLARATION : SHEPPARD J.
DATE OF ORDER AND DECLARATION: 7 FEBRUARY, 1983
WHERE MADE : Sydney
THE COURT DECLARES THaT the items of property referrea
to 1n the schedule avpended to the application form part
of the estate of tne bankrupt.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT ;:
l. There be liberty to anvply.
2. The respondent, Yvonne Lorrazne Welisn pey tne
applicant's costs of the application inclucing any
"reservec costs,
be ly
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
THe BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE AUSTRALIAN No. 382 of 1982
ed
CAPITAL TERRITORY
re IAN JOHN WALSH
BETWEEN WILLIAM JAMES HAMILTON
Applican
AND
~~ YVONNE LORRAINE WALSH
Responden
CORAM: SHEPPARD J. 7 February, 1983
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This 1s an application made pursuant to s.120 of tne
Bankruptcy Act 1966 by "she trustee in bankruptcy of the
bankrupt estate of Ian John Welsh. Tne application was
originally against two respondents, the anzlicant's wife,
Yvonne Lorraine Walsn and a firm, Cornelius Furs, For
reasons which need not ce mentioned it was not ultimetely
proceeded with in respect of the second respondent.
During a relationship whicn Mr. and Mrs. Walsh nad
before their marriage on 8 April, 1982, Mr. walsr mace a
number of gifts to Mrs. wWalsn, mostly of jewellery. The
gifts are specified in the affidavits of the parties and
may be summariseca as be:ng gifts of a scla pendant, a gold
Chinese cracelet, a diamonc engagement rzng, a zianond and
fe)
D
gold watcn, some diamond earrings, e mink coat, two
further rings, described in the eviderce as a wedding
ring and an eternity ring, a gold cutlery set, a pearl
necklace and pearl earrings. There 1s no dispute
between the parties that the gifts were mede nor as to
the dates when they were made.
Prior to tne marriage of Mr.' and Mrs, Walsh tney
lived for a time as man and wife. They first met,
according to Mrs. walsn's eviaence, which is unchallenged,
towards the end of 1980, They made various visits to
places ouzside Sydney, inclucing Perth and certain
places in the United States of america.
The first of the items, tne subject of these pvro-
ceedings, was acquired by Mr. Walsh for Mrs. walsh in
February 1981. The engagement ring was purchased on or
about 14 February, 1981, from a firm of jewellers, Bruce
and walsh. Its purchase price wes $6,000. According
to Mrs. Walsh's evidence, which 1s not challengea, not
long before the acquisition of the engagement ring, there
had been a conversation between tnem at Little Bay Beach,
Sydney, in which amongst otner things she kad said to
Mr. Walsh, "No matter how much I ioved a man I would never
marry nim unless he could prov:ce for me", Mr. salsh
said, "That's OK I wouldn't be offerin= to marry vou if
I could not provide for you", i take it from that
evidence that prior to the acouisition of tne engage-
ment ring there had oeen an offer of marriage made by
Mr, Walsh which Mrs. walsh had acceptea.
The wedaing ring and the eternity ring were
purchased at the same time. They were purchased,
according to Mrs. Walsh, in August or Sestember 1981.
Mr. walsh puts the date as being May 1981. There is
no documentary evidence to indicate which of Mr. or
Mrs. Walsh is correct in his or her recollection, but
it is immaterial to come to a conclusion on the matter.
At the tame Mr. and Mrs. Walsh met, Mr. Walsh was
married. His marriage remainea on foot until Septerber
or October 1981 when the marriage was Gissolved. From
acout May or June 1981 the two commenced to live in the
de facto relationship to wnich I have earlier referred.
It 1s common ground that they continued to live together
in this way until late in October 1981 wnen the relation-
ship was discontinued due to disagreements oetween tnem.
According to Mrs, walsh, she had a conversation with
Mr. Walsn at Christmas time 1961 ana tne two agreed to
resume their relaticnship. In his affidavit Mr. walsh
agrees that tne two did go back to live together, but
not until February 1982. Again, any airference in
tneir evidence 1S immaterial.
3.
whe
,
ee
Accordingly, the engagement ring, the wedding ring
and the eternity ring, like tne otner items of property
which are in dispute, were acquired and civen to Mrs.
Walsh well before the marriage, which, as I have said,
took place on 8 April, 1982.
Mr. Walsh's estate was sequestrated by order of
this Court on 15 June, 1982. The act of bankruptcy
upon which the petition which led to Mr. Walsh's bankrup-
tcy was basec, was committed on 8 March, 1982, Thus all
the items in dispute were tne subject of gifts to the
respondent within the period of two years from the
commencement of the bankruptcy.
Mr, Walsh's statement of affairs disclosed debts in
total of almost $1,000,000, and assets of only a little
over $30,000,
Section 120 of the Bankruptcy Act upon which this
application is dasedad provides in sub-section (1):
"A settlement of property, whether made before or
after tne commencement cf this Act, not ceing -
(a) a settlement made before and in consideration
of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser
or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuatle
consideration; or
{b) a settlement made on or for the spouse or
chiléren of tne settlor of property that nas
accrued to tne settlor after marriage in rignt
£ tne spouse cf tne settlor,
is, 1f the settlor oeccmes a carkrupt ana tre settle-
ment came into overation after, or "ithin 2 years oefore,
the commencement of tne bankruptcy, void ss ega:inst the
trustee in the bankruotcy." .
As I have said tne eviderce estaolishes that eacn or -
the acquisitions of vcroperty end <eifts was made within two
we
years of 8 March, 1982. It 1s conceded by the
respondent, Mrs. Walsh, through her counsel, that
the gifts are settlements of property within the
section. In the light of the decision in In re
Vansittart (1893) 1 G.B. 181, the concession was
clearly one whicn was properly made.
The only issue which has been raised relates to
the question of whether in each case the settlement
or gift was made, not only before, but also in consider-
ation of marriage. These words have not deen the subgect
of a great deal of judicial attention, at least so far as
the researches of counsel disclosed, It seems to me
that I snould adopt what was saia of the words by
R.W. Goff J., as he tnen was, in In re Densham (1975)
W.L.R. 1519. The English section with which his Lordsnip
was concerned 1S in similer terms to the Australian section.
After referring to the decision of the House of Lords in
Rennell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1564) A.C. 173,
his Lordship said (pp.1526-1527):
"Lord Cohen and Lord Guest, in considering whether
a settlement was made in consideration of marriage
within section 59(2) of the Finance (1S9CS-10) Act
1910 (not the legislation 1n guestion in the Densham
case), adopted tnree tests (1) 1t must be made on
the occasion of the marriage; (2) it must ce con-
ditroned only to take effect on tne marrizge taxing
place; (3) 1t "ust be made cy a person for tne
purpose of or with 2 view to encouraging or facili-
tating the marriage. OF these three conaltions,
the sestiement -ith waren I am cesling plainly
satisfies tie first, for it wes nade on the
occasion of the nerrizge, but, in my gudement 1t
5.
a
'tfails to satisfy either tne second or the
third. It is true that some conveyancing
difficulty seems to have been felt about the
wife executing the contract or the transfer
before marriage, but I do not think the
settlement of a share of tne beneficial interest
on her was in any way conditional on the marriage
taking place, but ever if I am wrong about that,
on the facts of tnis case it was not made for
the purpose of or with a view to encouraging or
facilitating the marriage."
Counsel for the respondent did not submit that I
should not apply the test wnich Goff J. adopted for the
purposes of nis judgment in In re Densham, and I am satis-
fied that I snould apvly it. I think one needs, when
considering this provision, to nave it clearly in mind
that the words used by the legislature are "in consider-
ation of marriage", These words are very different from
words which are sometimes seen in other legislation - I
unstance s.l11A of the Marriage Act 1961 - "in contemplation
of marriage". More will be required where the words, as
here, are "in consideration of marriage", than in cases
wnere they are "1n contemplation of marriage", In my
opinion the evicence here does not disclose eny of the
gifts - that i1s,.any of the settlements - was made in
consideration of marriage. It couia not te suggested
that any was made on the occasion of tne marriage;
a fortiori it could not be said tnat ary was conditioned
only to take effect on the marrizge taking piace. zach
of the gifts had taken effect a substantial time
prior to the marriage.
It seems to me to pe likely, although the
evidence does not spell it out, that the engagement
ring, and subsequently the wedding ring and the
eternity ring, were acquired so that Mrs. Walsh would
have conventional rings to wear in her role as the de
facto wife of Mr. Walsh. In his affidavit he said:
When I gave the atove gifts to Mrs. Walsh
(I interpolate to say he refers to each of
the gifts 1n question) I did not state in
any form to Mrs. walsh or anyone else that
I would take back any of the above gifts
from Mrs. Walsh if we did not get married,
nor did I make a statement to that or similar
effect."
Mr. Walsh was not cross-examined on that statement and,
accordingly, I accept his evidence. In any event, there
1s no evidence given by Mrs. Walsh to a contrary effect.
Some reliance was pleced by ner counsel on a letter
annexed to ner affidavit. The letter was sent by
solicitors acting for Mr. Walsh to solicitors acting for
Mrs. Walsh; it 1s dated 6 November, 1981, and was written
during the time that tne parties were separated pcetween
October 1981 and the end of that year or early 1982. The
letter demanced the return of éli of tn2 jewellery and
otner items which haa been giver. Mrs. waish down to trat
.
time, exeept for the cutlery set. It was suggested
that this indicated that Mr. Walsh regarded the items
as returnable to him in the light of the break up
between the parties whicn had occurred on the basis
that they were given only in consideration of marriage,
ana taking the position as it was-.at that time, the
marriage having not taken place, the articles properly
belonged to him. All I say about that submission 1s
that it 1s contrary to what Mr. Walsh himself has sald.
No cross-examination of nim took place and no contrary
evidence was given by Mrs. Walsh herself. The submission
therefore fails.
It was also submitted by counsel for Mrs. Walsh
that the onus of proof throughout was upon the trustee.
I agree that that 1s right; but this, so it seems to me,
1s not a case to be decided upon the onus of proof, The
evidence, as I remarked during the course of the argument,
is sketchy and one might in other circumstances have had
some of the gaps filled in. But the essential things
are there. The parties are in agreement really as to
when and under whet circumstences these varzcus accu1sitions
of property were made. Thus there 1s no roor for ny
decision of the case basec upor tne avplicant's failure
to discharge tne orus of croof, The essential facts are
known, These, as I have incicatec, militate against any
mM
- ween
finding that the facts fit any of tne recuirements
laid down by Goff J. 1n Densham's case.
For the reasons I have given, I have reached the
conclusion that the applicant is entitled to succeed.
I make the declaration sought in paragraph 1 of
the application, with liberty to apply. I order the
respondent, Yvonne Lorraine Walsh, to pay the applicant's
costs of the application, including any reserved costs,
ri. oo for
7 lppai S} tte
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3s0ciate
raat 7 Febrwooy \AsS