Becerra, Flor v Fowell, Ronald & Anor [1983] FCA 50
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
CATCHWORDS
Administrative Law - application for order of review -
application for extension of time ~ time from which time
for making the application ran - consideration of
principles applicable to granting extensions of time -
unreasonable delay ~- application dismissed,
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, ss.1l,
23{1) and (2)
FLOR BECERRA v. RONALD FOWELL and SPECIAL BROADCASTING
SERVICE ~
N.S.W. No. G246 of 1982
Morling J.
18 February 1983
SYDNEY.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G 246 of 1982
ed
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : FLOR BECERRA
Applicant
AND: RONALD FOWELL
First Respondent
AND: SPECIAL BROADCASTING
SERVICE a body created
and constituted by and
under the Broadcasting
and Television Act, 1942
Second Respondent
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER Morling J.
oy
DATE OF ORDER
18 February 1983
WHERE MADE : Sydney
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
fa
mre tree -
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G 246 of 1982
wes ww ww
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN: FLOR BECERRA
Avplicant
AND: RONALD FOWELL
Pirst Respondent
AND: SPECIAL BROADCASTING
SERVICE a body created
and constituted by and
under the Broadcasting
and Television Act, 1942
Second Respondent
MORLING J.
18 February 1983
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I have reached a firm conclusion as to the fate of
this application and will therefore give my decision
immediately. The applicant Flora Becerra was born in Lima,
Peru. For some years she has had a deep interest in the field
of ethnic broadcasting. She came to Australia in 1971. In
1975 she joined Radio 2EA, an ethnic broadcasting station, on
a voluntary basis as a broadcaster and co-ordinator of the
Spanish programme. In 1977 the Special Broadcasting Service
was established and Radio 2EA, which had formerly been
en era
bem
2.
administered by the Department of Telecommunications, was
brought under its control.
In her capacity as a co-ordinator of the Spanish
programme the applicant received a relatively small payment
for her services and the payment was increased from time to
time. In October 1978 the Special Broadcasting Service
proposed that co-ordinators should, in the future, be appoint-
ed by the Special Broadcasting Service itself and that the
appointments should be subject to annual review. Applications
were invited for the position of co-ordinator of the Spanish
'language programme. When originally advertised the
co-ordinator was offered a 12 months contract of service with
an annual remuneration of $3251.
All applications were to be submitted by 24 October
1980. On 22 October 1980 the applicant submitted her
application for the position of co-ordinator. Her application
was acknowledged on 27 April 1981 and she was interviewed by a
selection committee at the end of October 1981. The
applicant's affidavit contains a great deal of material which
is irrelevant for present purposes. It is clear from her
affidavit that she regarded one or more of the selection
committee as being less than competent.
One of the members of the committee was Mrs Fredrieka
Westerman, the Station Manager of Radio 2EA. The applicant
complained to Mrs Westerman that the Special Broadcasting
Service was trying to get rid of her. She told Mrs Westerman,
inter alia, that there were people in the Spanish community
wee = nee
3.
who were trying to destroy her career. There is much material
in the applicant's evidence that demonstrates that she has a
firm conviction that there was what she alleged to be a
"campaign of attack" against her. In support of this
allegation she made reference to articles in a Spanish
language newspaper, the El Espanol.
The evidence suggests that one particular applicant
was deemed by the selection committee to be the most suitable,
and the applicant was regarded as the next most suitable.
However no appointment was made as the result of the initial
call for applications for the position of co-ordinator.
Instead, on or about 30 November 1981, the Special
Broadcasting Service decided to call for new applications for
the position of co-ordinator and on 8 January 1982 Mrs
Westerman wrote to the applicant in the following terms:
"I would like to let you know personally that
the position of Co-ordinator of the Spanish
Language Program will be advertised a second time
to ensure that the widest range of applicants from
the Spanish speaking community will be attracted.
This action does not reflect at all on those
who have previously applied. However, after a
meeting was held with certain members of the
Spanish community it was felt to be desirable to
advertise a second time.
The applications will close on 30 January
1982, and those who have applied before will be
considered together with any new applicants."
It seems that the applicant ascertained at the end of
May 1982 from an article in The Spanish Herald that the
Special Broadcasting Service had decided to engage Mr Jose
4.
Ansaldo to take charge of the Spanish programme. She
complained about his appointment.
On 1 June 1982 the applicant was invited to a meeting
with Mrs Westerman and Mr John Martin, the assistant manager
of Radio 2EA. Mrs Westerman told the applicant that the
Special Broadcasting Service had decided to terminate her
services and to replace her with somebody else. According to
the applicant, Mrs Westerman said that she, the applicant,
had been "too long in the job" and that the time had arrived
for changes to be made. She then told Mrs Westerman that she
would appeal against the decision.
On 1 June 1982 Mrs Westerman wrote to the applicant
in the following terms:
"During our meeting this afternoon I informed
you that it has been decided by the Special
Broadcasting Service not to engage you for a
further term as Co-ordinator of the Spanish
Language Program.
It was agreed that you would relinquish your
duties as Co-ordinator as from today.
The Special Broadcasting Service will provide
you with Co-ordinator's Fees until 27 June 1982.
I would like to express my appreciation for
the efforts you have made and the work you have
done to co-ordinate the Spanish Language Programs
during the past six years. "
Sometime after 1 June 1982 the applicant was invited
to meet the new co-ordinator of the programme, Nuria Benet.
On 7 June 1982 the Australian Journalists'
Association, of which the applicant is a member, wrote on her
behalf to the executive director of the Special Broadcasting
5.
Service. The letter was expressed to be written on behalf of
the applicant. The letter referred to the requirements of
s.13(1) and (2) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act (the Act) and went on to state:
"On behalf of Ms. Becera I therefore request
in_writing in relation to the decision not to
continue her engagement:
1. The findings on material questions of fact
by the decision maker which led to the
decision.
2. The evidence or other material upon which
the findings were based, and
3. The reasons for the decision."
A reply dated 28 June was sent to the Australian
Journalists' Association. The reply furnished a good deal of
information in relation to the employment of persons engaged
in ethnic broadcasting and concluded with the following
paragraph:
"With regard to your request under Section
13(1) and (2) of the Administrative Decisions
(JUDICIAL REVIEW) Act, I must advise that I am of
the opinion that you are not entitled to make such
a request since Section 5(1) of that Act specifies
that only aggrieved persons as defined in Section
3(4) may make requests under Section 13."
The applicant's response to this letter was to write
a letter of 5 July 1982 in which she requested a statement
under s.13(1) and (2) of the Act.
She received a reply to that letter dated 3 August
1982. That reply was in the following terms:
6.
"I refer to your letter of 5 July 1982 and
your request pursuant to Section 13(1) and (2) of
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act,
in relation to your unsuccessful application for
engagement as Co-ordinator of the Spanish Language
Program on Radio Station 2EA.
In response to your request the following
information is provided:
(1) The position of Co-ordinator for the
Spanish Language Program on Radio Station
2EA was advertised as part of the overall
restructuring process of all language
programs broadcast on 2EA and 3EA. You
were an applicant. You were interviewed
along with a number of other applicants.
You were ranked suitable by the Selection
Committee. However, you were not
preferred over the nominated candidate,
who was considered to be better qualified
for the position.
(2) Findings of the Selection Committee were
based on presentation at interview and
information provided by the candidates in
their application forms, including
relevant experience in broadcasting.
Referees' comments were also taken into
account by the Selection Committee.
(3) The reason for the decision to engage
someone other than yourself was that the
recommended candidate was assessed as
better qualified to co-ordinate the
production and presentation of programs to
meet the perceived needs of Spanish
speaking listeners to 2EA."
Being dissatisfied with this reply, the applicant
again wrote to the Special Broadcasting Service on 11 August
1982 in the following terms:
"I refer to my previous letter to you dated
July 5, 1982, and to your reply dated August 3,
1982. I suggest that the answers which you have
provided in no way meet the questions put to you
and therefore request again in relation to the
decision of S.B.S. to terminate my engagement:
7.
1. The findings on material questions of fact
by the relevant decision maker which led
to the decision;
2. The evidence or other material upon which
the findings were based, and
3. The reasons for the decision.
I look forward to the proper attention being given
to this request."
Not having received a reply to this letter, the
applicant, for the first time, consulted her solicitors who,
on 20 September 1982 wrote a letter requesting a statement
pursuant to section 13. The solicitors received a reply dated
1 October 1982 which, it is conceded, was a statement which
complied with the requirements of the section. The letter is
lengthy, and paragraph 2(iii) of it is significant. It was in
the following terms:
2. (iii) Pollowing the obtaining of referee
reports, the preferred candidate was
considered to be unsuitable. The SBS
considered that the initial advertisement
had not attracted a good range of
applicants and that readvertising of the
position would be necessary. This
decision was reinforced by an approach
made to the SBS at the time by prominent
members of the Spanish speaking community
who expressed serious dissatisfaction with
Ms Becerra's past performance as
Co-ordinator and with the program's
standard and content. A community
consultation was held subsequently with
members of the Spanish speaking community.
The 2EA Spanish program was criticised for
not having substantially changed during
the seven years of Ms Becerra's leadership
and for its perceived low standard. The
meeting supported the readvertising of the
position."
8.
Subsequently an application for an order of review
was lodged on 16 December 1982. The application seeks a
review of the decision of the Special Broadcasting Service not
to engage the applicant in the position of Co-ordinator of the
Spanish language programme on Radio 2FA. Notice of objection
to competency of the application was lodged on 21 December
1982. The notice contended that the application had not been
lodged within the time prescribed by s.1l of the Act or within
further time allowed by the court.
Thereupon, on 4 February 1983, a motion was taken out
which, in substance, seeks that leave be granted either to
file an application for order of review or to proceed with the
application already filed. There is no doubt that the court
has jurisdiction to grant the application should it think it
proper to do so.
The first question which needs to be examined is the
time from which time for making the application ran. Mr
Farmer argued that the letter of 7 June 1982 was a proper
request under section 13, it having been made on the
applicant's behalf by the Australian Journalists' Association.
Mr Shaw argued that it was not a proper request and supported
the stance adopted in the final paragraph of the letter of 28
June 1982.
In my opinion, it was competent for the applicant to
make a request under s.13 by her authorised agent. Plainly
she authorised the Australian Journalists' Association to make
the request on her behalf and I can see no reason why it
9.
should be regarded as being incompetent. Mr Shaw afgued in
the alternative that if this were so, then the final paragraph
of the letter of 28 June was tantamount to a statement that
the applicant was not entitled to make the request and that
therefore by virtue of the provisions of s. 11(3)(b)(ii) of
the Act time for the making of an application to this court
ran from the date of that letter.
I think this argument is technically correct but
because of the events that followed I do not regard the time
that elapsed between 28 June and 3 August 1982 as being an
unreasonable delay in the making of an application to the
court. Clearly, the Special Broadcasting Service treated the
applicant's subsequent letter as a request under s.13 and
dealt with it on a formal basis. The question arises whether
the letter of 3 August was a statement which sufficiently
complied with the requirements of the legislation. In my
opinion, it was. It seems to me to furnish, in sufficient
detail, the material that an applicant is entitled to receive
under s.13(1).
However, Mr Farmer argues that even if that is right,
the applicant should not be blamed for not approaching the
court within 28 days of 3 August 1982 because it was not until
the receipt of the subsequent letter of 1 October 1982 that
the applicant could have appreciated that she had any ground to
attack the decision. In this respect he relied upon the terms
of para. 2(iii) of the letter which I have set out above. He
argued that the material in that paragraph gave the applicant,
10.
for the first time, real grounds for belief that she might
have a remedy under the Act.
I think there is some substance in this argument.
Nevertheless the fact is that for some ten weeks thereafter no
application for review was filed. It is to be remembered that
the applicant had been aware since June that another person
had been appointed to fill the position that she had formerly
occupied. There is no evidence as to the way in which the new
appointee has discharged her duties, but I think I am entitled
to assume that she has been actively engaged since June 1982
in the role of co-ordinator.
I do not think much turns upon the precise date of
expiry of the time for the making of the application for
review. In the view I take of the substance of the matter
the applicant knew for many months prior to making her
application that it would be opposed by persons who did not
think it should succeed. She must have been aware of the time
limits in the Act because she had taken advice as to her
rights under it.
She has sought to explain the delay which occurred
after 1 October 1982 by reference to her efforts to obtain
legal assistance to bring this application. There is evidence
that she spent some time making an unsuccessful application
for legal aid. But I can see no reason why at least she could
not have made her application within time, leaving until a
later date the making of a final decision as to whether she
would pursue it to its conclusion without legal aid.
ll.
The circumstances in which extensions of time should
be granted to permit the bringing of applications under the
Act have been referred to in a number of recent authorities
and I need do no more than refer to the decisions of Northrop
dg. in Duff & Ors v Freijah & Ors 41 A.L.R. 479; Fisher J. in
Doyle v Tooth & General Staff 42 A.L.R. 283; Keely J. in
Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission 43 A.L.R. 535; and
Fitzgerald J. in Lucic v Nolan & Ors (1 November 1982,
unreported).
Some differences are discernible in those decisions
as to the emphasis which should be given to various matters in
deciding whether or not an extension of time should be granted
in a particular case. Northrop, Fisher and Keely JJ. appear
to take the view that the principles applicable to the
granting of extensions of time in ordinary litigation should
be applied in applications for extensions of time under the
Act. On the other hand, Fitzgerald J. appears to hold a
somewhat different and wider view. Thus at p.13 of his
judgment in Lucic v Nolan & Ors (supra) he makes the following
observation:
"I do not think that the court, in exercising its
power to make exceptions in appropriate cases,
should confine its attention to the consequences
to the applicant of a refusal to extend time.
Justice, as the ultimate object to be obtained by
the exercise of the discretion, seems to me to
require that regard be _ had to broader
considerations than merely the interests of the
applicant. Further, whilst there will be some
matters which are relevant to the question whether
time should be extended (in ordinary litigation
inter parties) which are also relevant in this
context, it seems to me likely that the overlap is
pres
12.
only partial and that different emphasis is
appropriate to some of the common factors. It may
be that exceptional circumstances need not always
be shown before time can be extended. However, I
consider that an applicant for an extension of
time maintains throughout the burden of showing
why, in all the circumstances, the extension of
time should be granted. I do not think that,
given proof of certain matters by an applicant,
e.g-, an explanation for his delay in making
application, an evidentiary onus shifts to the
respondents to establish that prejudice will
result if the extension is granted; nor, in my
opinion, if the delay is explained and there will
be no personal prejudice to the named respondents
should an extension always be granted. All else
aside, there will often be no question of
prejudice to a respondent decision maker."
If it became critical to do so, I would be disposed
to adopt the view of Fitzgerald J. as to the proper approach
to be taken in matters of this kind. However, for the purpose
of disposing of this application I do not think it is
necessary to pursue this matter any further because I would
arrive at the same conclusion whichever approach was taken.
It seems to me that even if time did not begin to run
until 1 October 1982, the lapse of a further ten weeks after
that time has not been satisfactorily explained. The time
which elapsed after that date has to be considered in the
light of what had already transpired. As I have already
sought to show, the applicant must have been aware that there
were people in the Spanish community who opposed her
appointment. She made that quite clear in her conversations
with Mrs Westerman. She was formally acquainted of that fact
on 1 October but took no action so far as the making of an
application was concerned until mid-December. During all that
ra
13.
time I must assume that the new Spanish programme co-ordinator
was continuing to carry out her functions. I think that the
longer the new co-ordinator occupied her position the weaker
became the applicant's case for an extension of time.
I think considerations of public interest must enter
into the exercise of discretion in a case such as this. I
think it would be against the public interest that the
efficient running of Radio 2EA be put at risk if a change is
made in the position of co-ordinator of the Spanish radio
programme. Under all the circumstances, therefore, I do not
think this is an appropriate case for an extension of time.
I should state that the respondent did not argue on
this application the question whether the decision not to
appoint the applicant was a decision within the meaning of the
Act. I express no view upon that matter although it may well
be a real question. Nor have I had regard to the applicant's
prospects of success on the substantive application. Mr
Farmer referred me to the decision of Ellicott J. in
Cunningham v Cole & Ors (14 November 1982, unreported). I
would have thought myself that that decision and the decision
of Sheppard J. in Ioannou v Ronald Fowell & Ors (17 August
1982, unreported), and which is referred to by Ellicott J.,
would not necessarily have availed the applicant in these
proceedings. However, that is a matter which I am not called
Leertity that this and the
application is dismissed. preceding pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour
Mr. Justice 7
upon to determine. For th reasons I have give oMectee (2)
72)
biks
Le
Dated: /8/2/ 93