Re Barnard Jerome Higgins Ex Parte Bernard Jerome Higgins, Archibald Nicholson [1984] FCA 392
Federal Court of Australia
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342 CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - application to stay any action or
execution upon warrants issued for arrest of
bankrupt - prior to sequestration bankrupt
found guilty of offences under Builders'
Registration and Home-Owners' Protection Act
(Qld) - warrants issued for default in payment
of fines and costs - application of sub-s.
60(1) of Bankruptcy Act - whether fines and
costs ordered to be paid within sub-s.
60(1)(b) (i) - 3.82(3) of Bankruptcy Act
providing penalties or fines imposed in
respect of offences against a law not provable
- application refused.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss. 60(1), 82(3)
Builders' Reqistration and. Home-Owners'
Protection Act 1979-1983 (01d) ss. 53, 80, 83
Justices Aet 1ARB-1982 (91a) ss. 157, 159,
160, 161, 174
RE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS
EX PARTE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS (Applicant)
ARCHIBALD NICHOLSON (Respondent)
(No. 571 of 1984)
SPENDER J.
BRISBANE
23 NOVEMBER 1984
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) No. 571 of 1984
GENERAL DIVISION }
BANKRUPECY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )
RE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS
EX PARTE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS (Applicant)
ARCHIBALD NICHOLSON (Respondent)
DATE OF HEARING: 30 OCTOBER 1984
DATE JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 23 NOVEMBER 1984
COUNSEL :
- for the applicant My H. Gillman instructed by
Trilby Misso and Company.
. for the respondent Mr P. McMurdo instructed by
John C. Walker for Noble.
23 November 1984
S. KIFT
ASSOCIATE TO SPENDER J.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION )
NO. 571 OF 1984
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )
RE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS
EX PARTE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS (Applicant)
ARCHIBALD NICHOLSON (Respondent)
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: SPENDER J.
DATE OF ORDER: 23 NOVEMBER 1984
WHERE MADE: BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: The Application be dismissed.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISTON ) NO. 571 OF 1984
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )
RE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS
EX PARTE: BERNARD JEROME HIGGINS (Applicant)
ARCHIBALD NICHOLSON (Respondent)
SPENDER J. 23 NOVEMBER 1984
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by Bernard Jerome Higgins for an
order that the Court stay any action or execution upon any
warrant against the applicant. I dismissed the application and
indicated I would give reasons later.
On 10 September 1984 in Petition No. 849 of 1983 on the
petition of Alcan Australia Limited, a sequestration order was
made against the estate of Bernard Jerome Higgins ("Mr Higgins").
In or about March 1983, Mr Higgins was served with a
complaint containing three counts alleging offences against s.53
of the Builders' Reqistration and Home- Owners' Protection Act
1979-1983 (Qid). Mr Archibaid Nicholson, the Registrar of the
Builders' Registration Board of Queensland, was the complainant
in respect of those three counts.
In substance the first complaint alleged that between 1
April 1981 and 30 April 1981 at Morven near Charleville,
Bernard Higgins, not being a registered builder, performed
building work for Mr and Mrs Cooper, the value of which exceeded
$3,900. The second count was that between 17 June and 26 June
1981 at Morven he, not being a registered builder, performed work
for Mr and Mrs Sheppard, the value of which work exceeded $3,000.
The third count alleged that between 15 July 1981 and 31 July
1981 at Morven he, not being a registered builder, performed work
for one Clara Magdalene Johnson, the value of which work exceeded
$3,000.
Mr Higgins communicated with the Magistrates Court at
Charleville and indicated that he intended to plead guilty. His
pleas of guilty in writing were not accepted and he then received
anotice of hearing in respect of the three matters. He alsa
received a letter from the solicitors for the complainant, Mr
Nicholson, confirming that the matters would be heard on 11 July
1983.
In late July 1983, Mr Higgins received advices of
convictions from the said Court advising him that on the first
count, he had been fined $100 and ordered to pay costs of 48.22,
professional costs of $274.00, $26.50 witness expenses and
$200.00 travelling allowance, making a total of $608.72 and
further advising him that the fine and costs were due to be paid
within three months of 11 July 1983; in default a warrant of
commitment would be issued for his imprisonment for one month.
In respect of each of the second count and third counts, he was
fined 4500 and ordered to pay costs of $8.22, professional costs
of 3274.00, $240 mileage expenses and $26.21 witness expenses,
making a total in each case of $1048.43, Those fines and costs
were to be paid within three months; in default a warrant of
commitment would issue for imprisonment for three months on each
count.
Mr Higgins did not appeal or apply for a re-hearing in
respect of any of those matters.
In reduction of those amounts, Mr Higgins made a number
of small irregular payments to the Magistrates Court office at
Charleville. These were credited to the reduction of the amounts
ordered to be paid in respect of the first count. Subsequently
Mr Higgins' health deteriorated and he required hospitalization
in January 1984. He is currently on sickness benefit which is
his sole source of income.
In about mid-September 1984, Mr Higgins was notified by
the Bribie Island police that they held warrants for his arrest
in respect of non-payment of the amounts ordered to be paid,
hence this application.
The warrants themselves, or the terms of them, are not
before me.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1980, sub-s. 60(1)
of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 was as follows:
"The Court may, at any time after the
presentation of a petition, upon such
conditions as it thinks fit, discharge an
order made against the property or person of a
debtor under any law relating to the
imprisonment of fraudulent debtors and stay
any action, execution or other civil legal
process against the property or person of the
debtor and discharge him out of custody."
The High Court held in Commissioner for Motor Transport
v. Train (1972) 127 C.L.R. 396 that that sub-section did not
authorize the discharge out of custody of a person held under
criminal process and that prosecutions for offences against the
Road Maintenance (Contribution) Act 1958-1969 (N.S.W.) did not
constitute civil legal process within the meaning of the
sub-section.
The Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1980 repealed sub-s. 60(1)
and replaced it by the following sub-section:
"(1) The Court may, at any time after the
presentation of a petition, upon such terms
and conditions as it thinks fit -
(a) discharge an order made, whether
before or after the commencement of
this sub-section, against the person
or property of the debtor under any
law relating to the imprisonment of
fraudulent debtors and, in a case
where the debtor is imprisoned or
otherwise held in custody under such a
law, discharge the debtor out of
custody; or
(b) stay any legal process, whether civil
or criminal and whether instituted
before or after the commencement of
this sub-section, against the person
or property of the debtor -
(1) in respect of the non-payment
of a provable debt or of a
pecuniary penalty payable ain
consequence of the non-payment of
a provable debt; or
(ii) in consequence of his
refusal or failure to comply with
an order of a court, whether made
in civil or criminal proceedings,
for the payment of a provable
debt,
and, ina case where the debtor is
imprisoned or otherwise held in
custody in consequence of the
non-payment of a provable debt or of a
pecuniary penalty referred to in
sub-paragraph (i) or in consequence of
his refusal or failure to comply with
an order referred to in sub-paragraph
(ii), discharge the debtor out of
custody."
Gibbs C.J. observed in Storey v. Lane (1981) 147 C.L.R.
549 at pp.555-556:
"... The legal process which may be stayed is
process instituted against the person or
property of the debtor in respect of the
non-payment of a provable debt or of a
pecuniary penalty payable in consequence of
the non-payment of a provable debt, or in
consequence of his refusal or failure to
comply with an order of a court for the
payment of a provable debt. The custody fron
which the debtor may be discharged is custody
in which he is held in consequence of the
non-payment of a provable debt oar of a
pecuniary penalty payable in consequence of
the non-payment of a provable debt, or in
consequence of his refusal or failure to
comply with an order of a court for the
payment of a provable debt. Stated shortly,
the effect of the provision is to empower the
court to relieve a debtor, against whom a
petition has been presented, from process
(civil or criminal) instituted against him
because of his failure to pay a_ provable
debt. The objects of the paragraph are to
ensure that if a sequestration order is (or
has been) made against the estate of the
debtor his assets will be available for
administration in the interest of his
creditors generally, to prevent one creditor,
who has the right to enforce payment of his
debt under some other law, from exercising
that right so as to gain an advantage over
other creditors, and to protect the debtor
from punishment because he has not paid the
debt when payment might be a breach of the
bankruptcy law. ..."
It is to be noted that this is a further amelioration of
the position of persons unable to meet their financial
obligations. The history of the bankruptcy law has been a steady
mitigation of the former power a creditor had to secure the
imprisonment of their debtors. The obvious intention of the
amendment was to enable a court, in appropriate circumstances, to
discharge out of custody a person who was in fact imprisoned
because of his failure to pay a provable debt ora penalty
payable in consequence of the non-payment of a provable debt or
because or his non-compliance with an order to pay a provable
debt.
Sub-section 82(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 provides:
"(3) Penalties or fines imposed by a court in
respect of an offence against a law, whether
a law of the Commonwealth or not, are not
provable in bankruptcy."
The first and bravest submission on behalf of Mr Higgins
was that the fines and costs ordered to be paid by the
Magistrates Court at Charleville for the respective breaches of
8.53 of the Builders' Registration and Home-_Qwners' Protection
Act 1979-1983 (Qld) were provable debts.
Indeed for this application to succeed, the amounts that
were ordered to be paid by the Magistrates Court at Charleville
have to be categorized either as provable debts or as pecuniary
penalties payable in consequence of the non-payment of a provable
debt within the meaning of s.60(1)(b)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act
1966. It is necessary to have regard to the relevant parts of
some Queensland statutory provisions.
Section 53 of the Builders' Registration and Home-
Qwners' Protection Act 1979-1983 (Q1d) provides:
(2) A person who is not a registered builder
shall not -
(b) perform building construction for
another whether pursuant to a contract
or not;
unless the value of the building construction
does not exceed $3000 or he is exempt,
pursuant to section 56 or 57, from the
requirement that he be registered as a
registered builder.
"Penalty: $2000. ..."
Section 80 provides -
"(1) A person who contravenes or fails to
provides:
comply with a provision of this Act commits
an offence against this Act.
(2) Proceedings in respect of offences
against this Act shall be by way of summary
proceeding under the Justices Act 1886-1979
upon the complaint of a person authorized,
generally or in a particular case, by the
Board in writing..."
Section 83 provides -
"Every pecuniary penalty paid by a person on
account of his conviction of an offence
against this Act shall be paid to the Board."
Section 157 of the Justices Act 1886-1982
"In all cases of summary convictions and
orders ... the justices making the same may,
in their discretion, order by the conviction
or order that the defendant shall pay to the
complainant such costs as to them seem just
and reasonable."
Section 159 provides -
"The sum so allowed for costs shall in all
cases be specified in the conviction or order
or order of dismissal, or order striking out
a complaint for want of jurisdiction."
Section 160 provides -
"The sum allowed for costs in a conviction or
order by which a penalty or sum of money is
adjudged to be paid shall be recoverable in
the same manner and under the same warrants
as the penalty or sum of money adjudged to be
paid by the conviction or order is
recoverable."
Section 161 provides -
"When any decision adjudges or requires the
(Qld)
payment of a penalty or compensation or sum
of money or costs and when the Act by virtue
of which such decision is made does not
expressly provide -
(b) That such person in default of payment
of such penalty or compensation or sum
of money or costs either immediately
er within a time to be fixed by the
adjudicating justices is to be
imprisoned for any period not
exceeding the period stated in such
Act,
then the adjudicating justices shall in their
Giscretion either direct that the amount of
such penalty or compensation or sum of money
or costs shall be recoverable by execution
against the goods and chattels of the person
liable to make such payment or in the
alternative direct that in default of payment
of such penalty or compensation or sum of
money or costs either immediately or within a
time to be fixed by them such person shall be
imprisoned for any period not exceeding the
period stated in this Act or in the Act by
virtue of which such decision is made."
No provision is made under the Builders' Registration and
Home-Owners' Protection Act for imprisonment in default of
payment.
Section 174 of the Justices Act provides -
"The period of imprisonment imposed by
justices exercising summary jurisdiction
under this Act or under any other Act,
whether past or future, upon the non-payment
of any penalty, compensation, or sum of money
or costs, adjudged or required to be paid by
a decision, ... shall, notwithstanding any
enactment to the contrary in any past Act, be
such period as in the opinion of the justices
will satisfy the justice of the case, but not
exceeding in any case the naximum fixed by
10.
the following scale, that is to say -
Where the amount cf the sum The period of
or sums of money adjudged or imprisonment
required to be paid shall not
(including costs) - exceed -
Exceeds $500 6 months"
Section 82(3) of the Bankruptcy Act makes it quite clear
that fines or penalties imposed in respect of offences are not
provable debts.
Before me some attempt was made to distinguish that part
of the order made by the Magistrates Court at Charleville which
is described as a fine and the other items ordered to be paid
which are generally described as costs.
In respect of that submission some observations may be
made. First, the provisions of the Justices Act to which I have
above referred make it plain that those items are but components
of a total sum which has a punitive character in that non-payment
of which is visited by imprisonment. They are, in my view,
properly to be characterized as penalties imposed by a Court in
respect of an offence.
Secondly, useful reference may be made to two Australian
cages: Re Bradbury; Ex parte The King (1931) 3 A.B.C. 204 and
Re Caddies; Bx parte Stapleton (1962) 19 A.B.C. 155.
In Re Bradbury, the bankrupt before sequestration had
li.
been charged under the Game Act 1928 (Vic) with certain offences
under that Act and had been convicted and fined & 1,000 and
ordered to pay & 22,148.64. costs. The fines and costs being
unpaid at the date of the sequestration order, a proof of debt
was lodged on behalf of His Majesty for # 1,022.148s.6d., asa
debt due to the Crown. The Official Receiver rejected the proof
of debt on the ground that being a fine the debt was not a debt
provable in the bankruptcy. It was held by Mr Justice Lukin that
the proof of debt was rightly rejected.
In Re Caddies, supra, Caddies was convicted on 9 April
1962 ina police court ona charge of faise pretences, fined
#10 and ordered to make restitution in the sum of of 250 in
default of payment within 3 months to be imprisoned for 3 months.
On 26 June 1962, a sequestration order was made against the
estate of Caddies and on 18 September 1962, he was arrested and
imprisoned for non-compliance with the order made on 9 April
1962. An application was made to the Court for a discharge of
the order insofar as it required Caddies to make restitution in
the sum of & 250 and for the consequential release of Caddies
from prison. Mr Justice Gibbs (as he then was) held that the
then s.63(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 did not enable the Court
to discharge from custody a debtor who was serving a sentence of
imprisonment imposed on conviction for a crime, that it did not
give power to stay a legal process of a punitive character or to
discharge a bankrupt from imprisonment imposed as a punishment.
It was submitted on behalf of Caddies that the order of
the police court insofar as it dealt with restitution was a
"legal process against the property or person of the debtor"
within sub-s. (1) of 3.63 as it then stood, and that the Court
therefore had the power to stay the process and discharge Caddies
out of custody. The submission was that Gibbs J. should exercise
his discretion in Caddies' favour on the ground that it was
unjust that Caddies should be kept in prison, since once the
sequestration order was made, all Caddies' property became vested
in the Official Receiver, and, if he had any money, he could not
have used it to make restitution to the person to whom
restitution was ordered. Mr Justice Gibbs in refusing the
application said at p.158:
"In the present case, it is quite clear that
the order of the police court was of a
punitive character. The power ta make the
order arose when Caddies was convicted of a
criminal offence. The magistrate then had a
discretion under s.444 of The Criminal Code
as to whether or not he should order the
offender to make restitution and once he
decided to make such an order he had further
to consider whether in the exercise of his
diseration under s.161 of The Justices Acts,
he should order that the offender should be
imprisoned in default of payment of the sum
ordered to be paid as restitution, and if so,
for what period. It seems to me that the
order made by the police court was not merely
legal process to procure payment, but was
something in the nature of punishment. It
follows that I am bound to refuse the
application."
Finally, storey v. Lane, supra, while concerned
primarily with the constitutional validity of sub-s. 60(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966, as amended in 1980, highlights the
distinction between orders in respect of the non-payment of
provable debts on the one hand and an order imposing a fine and
13.
costs on the other.
In that case, Storey was convicted in the Industrial
Magistrate's Court of three offences under the Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1976 (Qld). The first two
charges were laid under 3.113 of the Act and alleged, on the
first charge, paying a lesser amount of wages than that
prescribed by an Award and, on the second charge, failing to pay
holiday pay on the termination of the employment of a named
employee in breach of the Award. The third charge was laid under
3.126 of the Act and alleged a failure to keep a time and wages
book or other similar record for all employees. On the first
charge the applicant was fined $100 plus costs of $18 and was
ordered to pay the amount of wages underpaid; in default of
payment of the total amount within 28 days, to be imprisoned for
six months. On the second charge the applicant was fined $100
and ordered to pay the amount of the holiday pay due and unpaid,
and it was directed that in default of payment of the total
amount within 28 days he should be imprisoned for six months. On
the third charge the applicant was fined $30 and ordered to pay
costs of $18, and it was directed that in default of payment of
the total amount within 28 days, he should be imprisoned for 7
days.
The High Court in addition to declaring that sub-s.
60(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, as amended by the Bankruptcy
Amendment Act 1980, was a valid law of the Commonwealth, ordered
that the applicant be forthwith discharged out of custody under
the orders made on his conviction of the two offences under 3.113
14.
of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961 (Qld), as
amended, and that any legal process relating thereto and any
further action on those convictions be permanently stayed. That
was based onthe fact that those two orders were pecuniary
penalties payable in consequence of the non-payment of a provable
debt. As Aickin J. said at p.563 in Storey v. Lane, supra:
"We are not here concerned with any question
concerning laws relating to imprisonment of
fraudulent debtors referred to in s.60(1)(a),
a topic discussed in Train's Case. The
relevant provision is par. (b) of sub-s. (1)
and the facts of the present case fall within
sub-pars. (i) and (ii), the unpaid wages and
holiday pay being provable debts, and the
applicant is held in custody for non-payment
thereof. A court exercising bankruptcy
jurisdiction would, on the words of the
section, have power to discharge him out of
custody."
8c far as the order of the fine and costs made in
respect of the offence constituted by the failure to keep a time
and wages book, Gibbs C.J. said at p.558:
"... It was not suggested that s.60(1)(b) had
any application to the third order, which was
not an order in respect of the non-payment of
a provable debt, but the applicant has fully
served the period of imprisonment for which
he was liable under the order on the third
conviction."
The position here is precisely the same as in the third
charge against Storey. The orders with which I am presently
concerned are not orders in respect of the non-payment of a
provable debt or of a pecuniary penalty payable in consequence of
15.
the non-payment of a provable debt or in consequence of his
refusal or failure to comply with an order of the Court for
payment of a provable debt.
It follows that there is no power in this Court pursuant
to sub-s. 60(1)(b) to stay any legal process in respect of Mr
Higgins. I regretfully conclude that the application has to be
dismissed. I certify that this and the [tL preceding
P2qes are a tiuc cony cf the seasons for
judgment herein of His Honour
Nir Justice Spencer
vated Bf. FG,
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