Re Hill, R.G.D. & Anor v. Ex Parte Galluzzo, A. & Anor [1985] FCA 26
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWBWORODS
BANKRUPTCY - application to set aside bankruptcy notice - whether
"final" judgment obtained against debtors - Certificate of
judgment including a guarantee by debtors - manner in which
courts should construe final judgment or order.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 5.40{1)(g) .5.41(3)
Re
cry
ROBERT GRAHAME DOUGLAS-HILL and ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL
Debtors
Ex Parte : ANTONIO GALLUAZOQ and ELMA RITA GALLUZZO
Judgment Creditors
Fisher J.
Adelaide
23rd January 1985
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISTON
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
JUDGE MAKING ORDER
WHERE MADE
DATE OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
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No.1018 of 1984
:ROBERT GRAHAME
DOUGLAS-HILL and
ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL
Debtors
Ex Parte :ANTONIO GALLUZZO
ORDER
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and ELMA RITA
GALLUZZO
Judgment
Creditors
FISHER J.
ADELAIDE
23 JANUARY 1985
The bankruptcy notice No.1018 of 1984 be set aside.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
No.1018 of 1984
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GENERAL DIVISION }
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BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF }
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SOUTH AUSTRALTA
Re :ROBERT GRAHAME:
DOUGLAS-HILL and
ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL
Debtors
Ex Parte : ANTONIO GALLUZZO
and ELMA RITA
GALLUZZO
Judgment
Creditors
23 January, 1985
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FISHER J.: On 29 October 1984 the judgment creditors applied to
the Registrar for the issue of a bankruptcy notice addressed to
the debtors. For reasons which will ultimately become apparent
the form of application (Form 3) prescribed by Rule 7{1) of the
Rules under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") was necessarily
varied. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Form 3 are as follows:
"2. I produce (here state 'an office copy of the final
judgment' or otherwise describe the document to he
filed in accordance with sub-rule 7(2)) against the
judgment debtor obtained by in
the court of on the day of
2.
3. Execution of the final judgment (or order) has not
been stayed at the time of the making of this
application."
The application filed by the judgment creditors was in
respect of relevant paragraphs in the following words:
"2. They produce herewith a Certificate of Judgment
(incorporating deed of guarantee) obtained by them
against Primary Fertilizers Pty. Ltd. in the District
Court of Leeton, New South Wales on the 5th day of
September 1984.
3. The judgment and verdict of seventeen thousand five
hundred dollars ($17,500.00) together with interest at
14.5% making a total of seventeen thousand eight
hundred and fifty four dollars and forty five cents
($17,854.45) remains unpaid by Primary Fertilizers Pty.
Ltd. at the date hereof.
4. Execution of the final judgment has not been stayed
at the time of making this application."
This departure was obviously necessitated by the terms
of the Certificate of Judgment dated 12 October 1984 which must
be set out in full. It was as follows:
"IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
AT LEETON No.23 of 1983
BETWEEN ANTONIO GALLUZZO
and ELMA RITA GALLUZZO
Plaintiffs
AND ROBERT GRAHAME DOUGLAS ~-
HILG
First Defendant
AND JEANNE ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL
trading as NATURES OWN
PRODUCTS
Second Defendant
AND KENNETH ROBERT JONES
and MARILYN FAYE JONES
trading as K.R. and M.F.
JONES
Third Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT
I,RONALD THEODORUS JOHANNES FRIESEN, Registrar of the
District Court of New South Wales for LEETON, being the
officer having ordinarily the custody of the records,
documents, proceedings and minuted of the Court at that
Place, do hereby certify that:
1.
In this action there was judgment for the plaintiff
on the Sth day of September, 1984, in accordance
with paragraph 2 of the Terms of Settlement handed
up in Court.
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
BY CONSENT and without admissions as to liability.
1. PRIMARY FERTILIZERS PTY. LIMITED be substituted
as Second Defendant in lieu of the present second
defendant JEANNE ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL.
2. Verdict and judgment for the Plaintiffs against
the substituted Second Defendant PRIMARY FERTILIZERS
PTY. LIMITED in the sum of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED DOLLARS (817,500.00), inclusive of costs.
3. Verdicts for the First and Third defendants
against the Plaintiffs with no order as to costs.
4. The Court notes the undertaking and guarantee by
Robert Grahame DOUGLAS -HILL and Jeanne Elsa
DOUGLAS-HILL as set out hereunder.
5. These terms not to be disclosed.
UNDERTAKING AND GUARANTEE
DEED OF GUARANTEE
In consideration of the Plaintiffs agreeing to
compromise and settle action number 23 of 1983
brought in the District Court of New South Wales at
LEETON and further in consideration of the
Plaintiffs agreeing to the substitution of PRIMARY
FERTILIZERS PTY. LIMITED as second defendant
therein, we ROBERT GRAHAME DOUGLAS-HILL and JEANNE
ELSA DOUGLAS-HILL jointly and severally undertake
and guarantee to the Plaintiffs to pay to the
Plaintiffs the said judgment and verdict of
4.
$17,500.00 in the event that the said verdict' should
remain unpaid by PRIMARY FERTILIZERS PTY. LIMITED at
the expiration of 28 days from the date hereof.
2. %I am informed by the judgment creditor that no
amount has been paid in respect of the judgment
DATED: 5 September, 1984
(Signed)
Registrar. "
On 30 October 1984 a bankruptcy notice addressed to the
'debtors was sealed and issued. It was a fourteen day notice and
with one exception was in accordance with Form 4 prescribed by
Rule 8. The exception was contained to the preamble which
vecited that the final judgment was "obtained by the judgment
creditors against Primary Fertilizers Pty. Limited". It made no
reference to any final judgment having been obtained against the
debtors.
On 14 November 1984 each of the debtors filed in the
Court an affidavit in similar terms. The body of each affidavit
was as follows:
"2. The said notice was served on me on the 5th day of
November 1984,
3. No judgment has been obtained against me in any
Court by the alleged Antonio Galluzzo and Elma Rita
Galluzzo in excess of the amount claimed to be due
to the said Antonio Galluzzo0 and Elma Rita
Galluzzo.
4. I personally have a good and valid claim against
the said Antonio Galluzzo and Elma Rita Galluzzo in
excess of the amount claimed to be due to the said
Antonio Galluzzo and Elma Rita Galluzzo.
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5.
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5. I seek an order setting aside the said notice or
alternatively an order prohibiting the said Antonio
Galluzzo and Elma Rita Galluzzo from using a
petition in bankruptcy against me pursuant to the
Said notice and costs."
These affidavits were accepted by the Acting Registrar
as an affidavit under paragraph 40(1)(g) of the Act to the effect
that each of the debtors had a counter-claim of the kind referred
to in that paragraph. There was no application under s5.41(6A) to
.extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the
bankruptcy notice. However the affidavit in which an application
to set aside was contained was filed within the time stipulated
for compliance with the bankruptcy notice (Re Sterling 44 F.L.R.
125) and the application under 40(1)(g) currently remains on
foot. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no formal
application such as contemplated by Rule 102 to set aside the
bankruptcy notice, counsel for the judgment creditors took no
_point and expressly agreed that I should consider the validity of
the notice aS a preliminary point. The debtors were not at any
stage represented by solicitors or counsel. At the conclusion of
the address of counsel for the judgment creditors I indicated
that I could not accept that the bankruptcy notice was based on a
final judgment or final order against the debtors. Counsel
expressed the wish that I make the order to this effect promptly
and agreed that short reasons only were necessary.
Understandably the debtors concurred with this course.
The requirements of the Act concerning the form and
6.
substance of a bankruptcy notice are to be found in. s.41.
Section 41(3) provides that a bankruptcy notice shall not issue,
inter alia,
"(a) except on the application of a creditor who has
obtained against the debtor a final judgment or
final order within the meaning of paragraph
40(1)(g) or ... "
Paragraph 40(1){g) repeats the twin requirements that
the creditor must have obtained against the debtor a final
'judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed and
also that there must be a judgment debt or sum payable under the
order. Strict compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy
legislation and rules in relation to bankruptcy notices is
essential (See Re Wimborne 24 A.L.R. 494 at 498 per Lockhart d.
and the cases there cited).
In Opie v Opie (1951) 84 C.L.R. 362 the High Court
considered the requirements of a final judgment or final order.
As Dixon and Williams J.d. said on page 372, a final judgment on
which a bankruptcy notice can be founded must bea "final
judgment obtained in an action by which a previously existing
liability of the defendant to the plaintiff is ascertained or
established". They also agreed that a "final order", is such an
order obtained in a proceeding rather than an action. McTiernan
J. cited the observations of Vaughan Williams L.J. in the matter
of In re G.J. £19053 2 K.B. 678 at 680, namely
"There is a series of cazes in Which it has been held
that in order to support a bankruptcy notice there must
' 7.
be what is properly called a 'final judgment' against
the debtor for a sum of money..."
The comments of Bowen L.J. in Ex parte Blanchett £18861
17 Q.B.D.302 at p.307 sum up the situation in terms which are
here applicable. He said:
"The right to compel a debtor to pay at the risk of
committing an act of Bankruptcy, by serving on hima
bankruptcy notice, is one given only to a creditor who
has prosecuted his claim to judgment, and if execution
on the judgment has not been stayed, to a creditor
between whom and the full fruition of his claim there
' stands only a process of the law uncompleted. It is
' oanly this kind of creditor who is now entitled to issue
a bankruptcy notice."
In this matter the judgment creditors have failed in my
opinion to establish the right to issue a hankruptcy notice.
They have not a judgment, let alone a final judgment, against the
| debtors even on the reading of the certificate most favourable to
| then. The only money judgment certified as having been entered
was a judgment for the judgment creditors (as plaintiffs) against
Primary Fertilizers Pty. Limited for $17,500.00 inclusive of
costs. There is no order against the debtors in the proceedings
of Settlement" but in so doing merely recorded the terms of an
i
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d
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for a sum of money. The certificate purported to record "Terms
\ agreement between the parties in consequence of which they
|
| consented to -sjudgment being entered against Primary Fertilizers
{
Pty. Limited for the sum of money. The Court was recorded as
noting the undertaking and guarantee of the debtors, but it made
i no order and entered no judgment in respect of the terms thereof.
8.
*
$17,500 remaining unpaid by Primary Fertilizers Pty. Limited at
the expiration of 28 days from that date. There was no evidence
before me that it did so remain unpaid and this at least must be
established before judgment can be entered for a sum of money
against the debtors. The terms of the "Deed of Guarantee" may
have to be construed before the exact nature of the agreement
between the parties is determined and judgment entered, if
appropriate, in favour of the judgment creditors.
Paragraph 2 of the Certificate of Judgment is confusing.
From the farm of the document it appears that the Registrar was
probably certifying that on 5 September 1984 no amount had been
'paid, on the information given to him by the judgment creditors,
in respect of the judgment. Counsel for the judgment creditors
accepted this and did not rely upon the paragraph as attempting
to establish the position at the date of the certificate.
All the authorities and particularly those where a
bankruptcy notice is under consideration indicate that the
approach of the Courts is to construe strictly and technically an
alleged final judgment or order. As Riley @. said in Re
Pannowitz (1975) 6 A.L.R. 287 at p.290 "those words were
strictly construed". Moreover as Taylor J. said in Hall v
Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 C.L.R.423 at p.439 "the practice of
the Courts is to confine themselves to the character of the
particular order" in question". The certificate in this matter
has, as against the debtors, none of the characteristics of a
9.
judgment or order, let alone a final judgment or order.
.
In my opinion the bankruptcy notice was invalid and must
be set aside as it is not based on a final judgment or final
order against the debtors for a sum of money.
The order of the Court is that Bankruptcy Notice No.
1018 of 1984 be set aside as invalid.
.
I certify that this and
the @ preceding pages
are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment of
Mr. dustice —
JE 2
¢
Datea: 4 Februoy 8