Ether Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors v. Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd & Ors [1985] FCA 427
Federal Court of Australia
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ' aa
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTPICT PEGISTRY
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GENERAL DIVISTON
BETWEEN : ETHER HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
First Applicant
GREGORY RAYMOND LILLINGTON
Second Applicant
KEPRY ANNE LILLINGTON
Third Applicant
Fourth Applicant
ELIZABETH MARTIN HOOD
Fifth Applicant
COLIN EDWAPD EMANUEL
Sixth Applicant
ROBYN MARGARET EMANUEL
Seventh Applicant
AND: CUT PPICE DELI PTY LIMITED
Fespondent
AND: OUT PPICE DELI PTY LIMITED
cross Claimant
AND: ETHEP HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
First Crass
Fespondent
WILCOX J.
12 AUGUST 1985
SYDNEY
(2
GREGORY PAYMOND LILLINGTON
KERRY ANNE LILLINGTON
GERALD H90D
ELISABETH MAPTIN HOOD
COLIN EDWARD EMANUET
ROBYN MARGARET EMANUEL
Second Cross
Respondents
MINUTE OF ORDERS
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
tJ
.
NOTE:
The Cross Claim is dismissed,
The cross claimant pay to the cross respondents any
sasts incurred by them of the Cross Claim including
any reserved costs.
lement and entry of orders 1
> of Fhe
s dealt with in
Federal Court Rules.
'NOTE: Thia judgment rela
tea
predominantly to its own facts and
us not of sufficient general interest to justify circulation)
IN THE FPEDEPAL COURT OF AUSTPALTA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN :
AND:
No.
ve]
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ra
'D
of 1984
ETHER HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
First Applicant
GREGORY PAYMOND LILLINGTON
Second Applicant
KERRY ANNE LILLINGTON
Third Applicant
GERALD HOOD
Fourth Applicant
ELIZABETH MAPTIN HOOD
Fifth Applicant
COLIN EDWARD EMANUEL
Sixth Apelicant
POBYN M&PGARET EM&aNVeEL
Seventh Applicant
CULr PRICE DELI PTY LIMITED
AND;
Pespondent
cur PRICE DELI PTY LIMITED
Ww
AND: ETHER HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
First Cross
Respondent
GREGORY RAYMOND LILLINGTON
KEPRY ANNE LILLINGTON
GERALD HOOD
ELIZABETH MARTIN HOOD
COLIN EDWARD EMANUEL
ROBYN MARGARET EMANUEL
Second Cross
Respondents
TORAM: WILCOX J.
DATE: 12 AUGUST 1985
PLACE: SYDNEY
EXTEMPOPRE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is a hearing of a Cross Tlaim brought by Cut
Price Deli Pty Limited against a company known as Ether
Holdings Pty Limited and six individuals who were apparently
associated with Ether Holdings at some stage of its
activities.
The principal proceedings were commenced on 19 Tulyv
1984 by Ether Holdings and six individuals, and in an amended
Statement of Claim filed on 15 November 1984 varisus
allegations were made against Cut Price Deli in relation tea
conduct said te contravene $.52 of the Trade Practices Act
1974, One of the matters which was referred to was the fact
that the company, Cut Price Deli, did not at the time of
granting a franchise agreement have registration of that
business name in the State of Queensland.
I am not concerned with the substance of the
allegations made in the amended Statement of Claim in any
direct sense. The reason for this is that there was default
in complying with directions in relation to the principal
proceedings, that default apparently being associated with the
financial vicissitudes of Ether Holdings. I qather that the
company is now either in the course of liquidation or in
receivership.
On 31 May 1985 an application was made to dismiss the
principal proceedinas for want of prosecution and I acceded to
that application. I adjourned the matter of the Tross Claim
and gave directions regarding filing and service of affidavits
in support of the Cross Claim.
The Cross Claim came on for hearing today when the
cross claimant relied upon the affidavit evidence of Mr Enzo
Saambellone, a director of Cut Price Deli Pty Limited. Mr
Scambellons also gave oral evidence and a number of documents
were tendered.
4.
The most important exhibit in the case is the
franchise agreement which bears date 29 July 1983. The
exhibit is signed by four only of the individuals who are
named as cross respondents: that is to say, by Mr and Mrs
Lillington and by Mr and Mrs Emanuel. It is not signed by Mr
and Mrs Hood. The role of these individuals under the
agreement was to act as guarantor. Mr Slater on behalf of the
cross claimant has drawn my attention to the pleadings in
which it is admitted on behalf inter alia of Mr and Mrs Hood
that they were quarantors. Having regard to the conclusion
that I have reached 1t is not necessary to consider whether
this furnishes sufficient evidence to attach liability to Mr
and Mrs Hood in the absence of their signatures to the
agreement.
The franchise agreement contained certain recitals.
The vendor company is identified in the agreement as Rechi
Enterprises Pty Limited. This is the same company as the
cross claimant. Cut Price Deli Pty Limited, the name having
been changed in the meantime.
Pecital A states that the vendor has owned and
cperated retail businesses specializing in the gale of
delicatessan-type products, identified principally by the
trade name and mark, the name of which is set fcrth in the
schedule beside the words "The Name". Recital B states that
the franchisee. that is to gay, Ether Holdings Pty Limited.
5.
desires to acquire the right to utilize the name within a
specified area and to conduct therein a franchise-type
business as a sub-franchisor of the franchisor on the terms
and conditions hereinafter defined. Recital C states that the
vendor is desirous of selling the rights on the terms and
conditions hereinafter defined.
The subject matter of the franchise 1s described in
o1.2 of the agreement, namely, the right to own, operate and
conduct a franchise business within the area of the State of
Queensland. This right includes the option to conduct
businesses at locations by itself and/or to franchise the
operations to sub-franchisees. By cl11.3 and 4A provision is
made for the choice of business locations, the granting of
licences, advertising arrangements and so on.
Clause 5 deals with the payment for the franchise and
other fees. It requires an initial payment of $200,900 on
settlement. It is not at all clear what is meant by the words
"on settlement" but apparently the parties acted upon the
basis that this meant when the contract came into affect. that
153 on completicn of execution.
There is then provision made for further fees to he
paid as subsequent businesses were cpened. They include. in
subcl.(f), a reference to one-third of qoodwill being payable
to the franchisor. In a document which is not distinquashed
6.
for its draftsmanship this subclause is outstanding in being
almost unintelligible. It is not at ali clear whether the
requirement for one-third of the sale price of goodwill
applies to each of the situations in the subclause cr only the
third of them, in which case it is irrelevant to the present
case.
I am asked on behalf of the cross claimant to read
subcl./f) as an agreement by the franchisee that if it causes
any franchise business to be operated by a person other than
itself then one-third of the amount payable by the purchaser
of the business for goodwill is to be payable to the
franchisor. As I say, this is far from clear to me but once
again I do not think it is necessary for me to come toa
conclusion as to whether this construction is open.
Clauses 6, 7 and 8 deal with matters of common
interest to the franchisor and the franchisees including the
products to be supplied, prices and promotional activities.
It was quite clearly contemplated that there would be benefits
to both parties in joint activities; they no doubt attracting
some economies of scale. Clause 93 describes what 15 called
"the system". The system is said to have "the distinaguizhing
characteristics" of "the Name" and of "a licence hereby
transferred" including "a trade mark, a logo and business name
fand) a developed marketing concept and uniform procedure for
the operation of franchise locations".
Clause 19 sets out certain obligations' of the
franchisor and cl.11 sets out obligations of the franchisee.
These include in subcl.(1) an acknowledgement of the
franchisors "interest and exclusive right to the Name and its
distinguishing characteristics including the name and style of
the Name. materials and operating procedures". In subcl.(5)
the franchisee is made to acknowledge "the need for uniformity
in the System". In subcl.(6) the franchisee agrees to operate
the franchise granted herein under the franchise name. The
subclause goes on to provide for the franchisor to qrant to
the franchisee the right to register within the location the
franchise name and to licence it in its use by its franchisee.
The agreement goes on to make orovision in respect of
numerous other matters but I need not set those out as they
are not material to the present question. The evidence
indicates that before the making of the agreement two
locations had been established in the State of Queensland,
being the area in respect of which the franchise was to be
given by the cross claimant to Ether Holdings, namely
Toowoomba and Kawana Waters. Stores had been cpened in each
of those places during the first six months of 1982,
apparently under the name "Cut Price Deli". At some time
around the middle of the year it apparently became known to
the parties that there was a problem about the availability of
the business name. "Cut Price Deli" because of the fact that
8.
tha name had been registered in the State of Queensland by 4
company having no association with any of the parties, namely
Cut Price Stores Retailers Limited. This led to something of
a crisis and on 12 July 1983 Mr Sgambellone and his
co-director, Mr Rechichi, went to Brisbane to have a meeting
with Mr Emanuel and Mr Lillington, the latter two gentlemen
being two of the six individual cross respondents and people
who were apparently in charge of the affairs of Ether
Holdings.
Mr Sgambellone,. according to his own evidence. said
that his company could sue Cut Price Stores for passing off.
He said that he would follow that action and, as he put it in
his avidence. "make sure we get our name back". He further
iar
said this was treated with relief by Messrs Emanuel and
Lillington who accepted the assurance and that there was no
further discussion about the matter of the name between that
date and the date when the agreement was siaqned. The written
agreement, as I have mentioned, required $200,000 to be paid
on settlement.
In fact, shortly after the date of the agreement. a
total sum of $100.000 was paid, according to Mr Sgambellone,
and there was discussion regarding the second half of the
initzral amount. Mr Sgambelloane was told that there was some
datficulty or delay in obtaining thia money because of finance
requirements and he offered to extend the time until December
ty
without requiring any interest payment. In fact that second
half of the initial payment has not ever been paid and that is
part of the claim which is now brought. In the meantime some
other stores were opened in Queensland. The store at
Maroochydore was opened on 6 December 1983. A store was
opened at Townsville on 28 November 1983, at Springwood on 5
Qctober 1983, at Tweed City -- which was apparently treated as
part of Queensland for the purposes of this agreement -- on 3
November 1983. at Stafford City on 6 March 1984 and a Ashmore
un April 1984.
These stores were apparently opened by Ether Holdings
but upon the basis that they would be operated by a
sub-franchisee rather than Ether Holdings itself. The
evidence 1s very skimpy in regard to that matter. However. Mr
Sgambellone was able to give evidence by way of admissions
made to him either by Mr Emanuel or by Mr Lillington as to
sums of money said to have been paid by sub-franchisees of
these stores for the right to enter the sub-franchise
agreement. The total payments for the goodwill ingredient
from the sub-franchisees in respect of these stores appear=e ta
amount to $419,000. The cross claim claims to recover
one-third of this amount pursuant to cl.5(f) of the agreement.
The evidence as to subsequent events is even
more skimpy. It appears that, in some cases, the
th
tores may
still be operating; although Mr Sxyambellone save they are not
10.
well operated and that they are badly run down. It appears
that there is no present active involvement by Ether Holdings
or by any of the six individuals in relation to any of the
existing stores. Consequently, there 1s not any basis upon
which injunctive relief could be granted. Nothing is being
done by the cross respondents which presently adversely
affects, or threatens in the future adversely to affect, the
continuing interests of the cross claimant. Indeed, counsel
for the cross claimant very fairly accepts that this 1s so.
In essence then the claim comes down to one for
recovery of the balance of the initial sum of $100,000
together with one-third of $410,000 which is $136,666. The
fundamental problem in the path of the cross claimant as I see
it 1s that it has never been able to overcome the difficulty
regarding the unavailability to it of the name. The evidence
indicates that Mr Sgqambellone did make an approach to Cut
Price Stores in an endeavour to come to an amicable
arrangement under which the name Cut Price Deli would be
available for use by the cross respondents in Queensland.
That approach failed. He then apparently gave some
instructions to his solicitors about legal action but it is
not clear whether legal proceedings were actually instituted
against Cut Price Stores. If they were, they seem to have
petered out very quickly. In any event, 1t is quite plain
that no effective action was taken to enable any of the
parties in this case to obtain registration in Queensland of
ll.
the name. There was from time to time discussion between them
regarding a substitute name. At one stage a suggestion was
put that the cross respondents might accept as a substitute
the name "Rite Price Deli". This was apparently considered
but rejected.
At a meeting held in the Sydney office of the cross
claimant in March 1984, Messrs Hood and Emanuel said that they
would be prepared to accept the name "Slice the Price Deli"
but in the same conversation they indicated the view that they
should not be required to pay the outstanding $100,000 and
they suggested quite extensive alterations to the schedule of
payments due to the agreement. There was discussion during
which Mr Sgambellone offered to spend certain money
advertising the name "Slice the Price Deli" and to undertake
the cost of changing the signboards on the existing shops. Mo
resolution of the matter was reached and Messrs Hood and
Emanuel said they would think about it and in fact according
to Mr Sgambellone they never came back with an answer one way
er the other.
It is impossible to obtain out of the evidence of Mr
Sgambellone in respect of the March meeting any concluded
agreement by the parties to substitute a different name for
that which is provided by the agreement itself. The critical
question then is: what is the effect of the inability of the
franchisor to procure for the franchisee the use of the name
12.
specified in the agreement? Mr Slater contends that the
reference to the name should not be read as a condition but
merely as a warranty. He said it was not fundamental to the
arrangement between the parties.
I cannot accept that categorisation. The evidence
indicates that the franchisor operated numerous stores in both
New South Wales and Victoria under the name of "Cut Price
Deli" and one would think it axiomatic that the value of a
franchise would be greatly increased if the franchisee was
able to obtain the use of a name which was well known in those
two States. I have in mind the opportunities of benefitting
by advertisements in those other States, whether in magazines
or television or newspapers, or otherwise, together with such
custom as might be available by people who have patronized the
stores in the southern States. But one does not have to qo
beyond the terms of the agreement itself to see the emphasis
that the parties chose to place upon the name. As I have
indicated, the system is described as including the name and
the franchisee 1s made to acknowledge the need for uniformity
in the system. It seems to me impossible, under those
circumstances, to accept the submission made on behalf of
ct
aa
i)
franchisor that there 1s no need for uniformity in one aspect
of the system, namely the name which is to be used by, and
upon, the retail outlets at which trading 15 to be carried
out.
13.
It seems to me that the inability of the franchiser
fo deliver to the franchisee the right to use the particular
name nominated in the agreement and which was already itself
the subject of some reputation and apparent goodwill in other
places is something that struck at the heart of the agreement.
It amounts to a fundamental approach and prevents any recovery
by the cross claimant under the agreement.
It is a matter of some surprise that the parties put
themselves in this position. As I have pointed out, the
agreement was dated 29 July 1983 at which time the parties
were aware that there was a problem about the name in
Queensland. However, Mr Sgambellone was apparently very
confident that this was only a temporary problem and 1t would
appear likely that his confidence not only led him to commit
his company to go ahead with an agreement which was firmly
tied to the name "Cut Price Deli", but also that his
confidence swept along Mr Emanuel and Mr Lillington and their
respective wives. In the event the confidence turned out to
be misplaced. That is unfortunate from the point of view of
the cross claimant but I think it is the direct result of a
course which it chose to undertake.
Had it been, as suggested in submissions before me, a
matter not of critical importance to use the name "Cut Price
Deli" then, particularly in the circumstances as they were
14,
then known, I would have expected the agreement to provide a
let-out clause with a substituted name in the event that "Cut
Price Deli" was not able to be obtained.
I have come to the conclusion that the cross claimant
is precluded from recovering under this agreement and that the
Cross Claim must be dismissed. In relation to costs of the
Cross Claim I expect they will be very small indeed because Mr
Emanuel appeared by leave to represent himself and the other
five individual defendants. The company, Ether Holding
rer
, was
not represented. However, there may have been some costs
incurred in regard to the Cross Claim during the progress of
the matter and, to the extent that there are such costs, they
should be paid by the cross claimant.
The order will be that the Cross Claim is dismissed
and that the cross claimant pay to the cross respondents any
costs incurred by them of the Cross Claim including any
reserved costs.
I certify that this and the thirteen (13)
oreceding pages are a true copy of
the Reasons for Judgment herein of
his Honour Mr. Justice Wilcox.
Associate:
Date: 29 Auqust 1985
Appearance for the applicants
and cross respondents:
Counsel for the respondent
and cross claimant:
Solicitors for the respondent
and cross claimant:
Date of hearing:
15.
Mr C E Emanuel in person
Mr A H Slater
Messrs Picone & Co
12 August 1985