Sent, E.C. & Anor v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd [1986] FCA 110
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
CATCHWORDS
Practice and procedure - application for
interlocutory order °- application brought
proceeding - whether application can be
original proceeding as a notice of motion.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s.4
Federal Court of Australia Rules 0.13, 0.52
EDWARD CHRISTIAAN SENT and BRIAN FORSHAW
and
JET CORPORATION OF AUSTRALIA PTY. LIMITED
(in its capacity as Trustee of the
JET CORPORATION AUSTRALIA TRUST)
V. No. G 282 of 1985
Northrop J.
17 February 1986
Melbourne
appeal from
as
separate
subsumed into
f
Ar fay --
te yn eee ee mace ee
Fee aera
wprery
eo. d
an Pay
me
Sy
SUT pte ee ep eee ee oe
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) V. No. °G 282 of 1985
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN :
EDWARD CHRISTIAAN SENT
and BRIAN FORSHANW Applicants
and
JET CORPORATION OF AUSTRALIA PTY, LIMITED
(in its capacity as Trustee of the
JET CORPORATION AUSTRALIA TRUST) Respondent
COURT: NORTHROP J.
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1986
PLACE: MELBOURNE
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: -
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent's costs of the
application.
(Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with in 0.36 of the
Rules of Court.)
hae
—---.
ee
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V. No. G 282 of 1985
wee ww
GENERAL DIVISTON
BETWEEN :
EDWARD CHRISTIAAN SENT
and BRIAN FORSHAW Applicants
and
JEL CORPORATION OF AUSTRALIA PTY. LIMITED
(in its capacity as Trustee of the
JET CORPORATION AUSTRALIA TRUST) Respondent
COURT: NORTHROP J.
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1986
PLACE: MELBOURNE
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There is before the Court an application identified
as V. No. G 282 of 1985 in which Edward Christiaan Sent and
Brian Forshaw are named as applicants and Jet Corporation of
Australia Pty. Limited (in its capacity as Trustee of the Jet
Corporation Australia Trust) is named as respondent. The
application is headed "APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL". It
is addressed to the respondent care of its solicitors. It
contains a notification that before taking any step in the
proceeding the respondent must enter an appearance in the
Registry and the applicants' address for service is set out.
ote
i.
° 2
"247 4,
BT ee eer py cre eee
Poy
It is signed by the solicitors for the applicants and it has
the stamp on it of the Federal Court of Australia,
Victoria
District Registry and is dated 16 December 1985.
The application itself
seeks leave to appeal from
the judgment of the Court given
on 25 November 1985 in
proceedings V. No. G 109 of 1383 by which the respondent was
given leave to amend
its Statement of Claim and application
in that proceeding.
By way of background,
on 25 November 1985
in matter V. No. G 109
of 1983, Tet
Corporation of Australia Pty. Limited was granted leave
to
amend its Statement of Claim in the form set out in
exhibits
to affidavits filed in that matter. In particular, the
orders made affected the applicants
in the present matter,
and Brian Forshaw.
arder was very specific, namely:-
Edward Christiaan Sent
Order 3 of that
"That it is a condition of the allowance of the
amendment of the Statement of Claim that so much
of the action as is concerned with the cause of
action introduced by these amendments shall he
deemed to have begun for the purposes of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 on the date on which this order
is made."
When judgment was given on that motion by Jet
Corporation of Australia Pty. Limited for leave to amend the
Statement of Claim, counsel for
Messrs. Sent and Forshaw
raised the problem that the amendments raised a matter
which
was binding upon the Federal Court constituted by a single
Judge and in all probability upon a Full Court of the Federal
it is sufficient to say that
Court, but was a matter which was then subject to special
leave of the High Court. To some extent, order 3, which has
been set out above, protects the rights of Messrs. Sent and
Forshaw in that regard but after judgment had been given,
counsel raised this matter as well by asking whether the
order granting leave to amend could be made conditional upon
there being liberty given to the eighth and ninth respondents
to apply to strike out the amendments in the event of the
High Court appeal being successful.
The Court as then constituted said that if the High
Court appeal was successful, there should be no doubt that in
some way the order could be set aside. This is based on the
fact that this was an interlocutory order, there was no final
order and if, before the action came on for trial, the High
Court declared what the law was and if that declaration was
contrary to the law as declared by the Full Court, the
Federal Court would be bound to follow the High Court ruling
and in those circumstances all necessary amendments to the
Statement of Claim could be made to give effect to that,
Notwithstanding that, Messrs. Sent and Forshaw then
purported to make application for leave to appeal and in
doing so, failed to comply with the requirements of 0.52 r.10
of the Federal Court Rules which provide for cases where
leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments of the Federal
Court is sought. Rule 10 is as follows:-
"10. (1) An application for leave to appeal
from an interlocutory judgment of the Court may be
made orally to the Judge who has pronounced the
Oct i
os
judgment at the time of its pronouncement or within
such further time as that Judge may fix.
(2) Where an application has not been made in
accordance with sub-rule (1), any application shall
be made by motion on notice in the proceeding, and
the provisions .of Order 19 shall apply.
(3) An applicant under sub-rule (1) or (2)
may present his case and his argument to the Court
in writing pursuant to rule 15A."
That rule is clear. It refers to any application
for leave to appeal being made either orally to the Judge who
gives judgment at the time judgment i5 pronounced or within
such further time as that Judge may fix, or by motion on
notice in the proceedings. It does not allow for a separate
proceeding to be commenced seeking leave to appeal.
In this case Messrs. Sent and Forshaw did not
comply with the requirements of 0.52 r.10 but made a separate
application for leave to appeal. That separate application
was treated as a separate proceeding, given a different
number for administrative purposes and did not comply with
the requirements of the forms set out in the Federal Court
Rules as to new applications. To this extent, the Registry
was at fault in accepting that document.
At the same time, the solicitors for Messrs. Sent
and Forshaw were at fault in not complying with the
requirements of the Rules. In any event, any appeal does not
operate as a stay of proceedings and the mere giving of a
notice of motion for leave to appeal does not operate as a
Stay. In reality, what Messrs. Sent and Forshaw were seeking
way
see tet oe
4g
ae we ns ere,
ee
Vee =
—
a
wee epost
a
re .
ares po a
ore eer
Was a stay of the operation of the order giving leave to
amend the statement of claim pending the hearing and
determination by the High Court of the matter currently
before the High Court. As far as I know, that motion for a
stay has not yet been made, except to the extent that today
counsel for Messrs. Sent and Forshaw has submitted that under
0.13, the Court should give leave to amend the application in
matter V. No. G 282 of 1985 and to treat that as a notice of
motion in proceeding V. No. G 109 of 1983. In my opinion,
that is not permissible. They are separate proceedings and
that separateness 15 not overcome by the definition of
"proceeding" appearing in s.4 of the Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976. They are separate proceedings and should
not be treated as if they were in the one proceeding. In any
avent, the proceeding V. No. G 109 of 1983 is complicated
enough and is not to be further complicated by the
introduction of a separate file.
In all the circumstances, the Court must dismiss
the application which was issued on behalf of Messrs. Sent
and Forshaw and being the matter before the Court today, V.
No. G 282 of 1985, with costs. The matter was commenced by
those applicants without jurisdiction and the Court in those
circumstances must dismiss that application. In any event,
as a matter of discretion, even if the Court had power, I
would refuse leave to amend the matter by treating it as a
motion.
wee oe ee
7 paar
he
This does not mean that Messrs. Sent and Forshaw,
if they are so advised, are prevented from taking out a
motion seeking a stay of the order for leave to amend the
Statement of Claim. That is a matter that they must
determine for themselves. Seeing there is no basis for the
application, it must be dismissed with costs.
Accordingly, the following orders are made:-
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent's costs of
the application.
Lcein'y that this and the Bive. (S)
preceding pages are a true copy of the
Peason: for Judgment herein of the
. Justice log rdlire q
ssociate
ao iohnaeen dada ahead
op ee ers