McLaughlin, Re W.H. Ex Parte Tooth & Co. Ltd [1986] FCA 210
Federal Court of Australia
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Tt THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. B1188 of 1986
GENERAL DIVISTON
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
PE: William Henry McLaughlin
Debtor
EX PARTE: Tooth & Co. Ltd
Judgment Creditor
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Evatt J.
DATE OF ORDER: 30 May 1986
WHERE MADE: Sydney
THE COURT DECLARES THAT: It is not satisfied that the affidavit
of the debtor filed herein pursuant to s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy
Act 1966 discloses that the debtor has a counter-claim, set-off
or cross demand as is referred to in paragraph 40(1)(g) of the
Act.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Ll. The application under s.41(7) be dismissed.
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2. Costs reserved.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of
the Federal Court Rules.
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. B1188 of 1986
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
RE: William Henry McLaughlin
- Debtor
- EX PARTE: Tooth & Co. Ltd
Judgment Creditor
CORAM Evatt J. 30 May 1986
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Bankruptcy Notice herein, dated 18 March 1986 addressed to
William Henry McLaughlin, (the debtor), claims that the District
Court judgment obtained on 25 October 19385 by Tooth & Co. Limited
(the judgment creditor) against the debtor in the amount of
322319.39 together with interest set out remained unsatisfied.
The Bankruptcy Notice which 1s stated to be a 14 days notice was
served on the Debtor on 27 March 1986.
On 10 April 1986 the debtor filed an affidavit pursuant to
3.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act (1966) (the Act) wherein he states
that he believed that he had a count@r-claim, set-off or cross
demand within the meaning of s.40(1)(q) of the Act.
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The Registrar on 29 April 1986 gave notice to the debtor and the
judgment creditor, Tooth and Co. Limited, pursuant to r.10 of the
Bankruptcy Rules appointing Monday, 26 May 1986 as the time when
the debtor was to appear before the Court for the purpose of
satisfying it that he has a counter-claim, set-off or cross
demand as is referred to in paragraph 40(1)(g) of the Act.
When the matter was called on on 26 May 1986 Mr Farrar, Counsel
for the Debtor and Mr K.V. Taylor, Counsel for the Judgment
Creditor, appeared. After hearing Counsel the Court determined
Chat it was not satisfied the debtor had an appropriate
counter-claim. set-off or cross demand within the meaning of
paragraph 40(1)(g) of the Act and then indicated that it would
publish full reasons for judgment. These are those reasons.
The debtor's affidavit claims that the alleged counter-clain,
set-off or cross demand is in the form of the application for
orders or awards under s.88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act
1940 (New South Wales) aqainst the judgment creditor which
application was filed in the Industrial Commission of New South
Wales on 15 October 1985. Annexed to his affadavit 1s a copy of
the Notice of Motion and affidavit in support thereof as filed in
the Commission. That motion seeks orders or awards declaring
void the whole or part or varying the whole or part either ab
anitio or from some other time oral contracts arrangements, or
conditions and/or collateral arrangements entered into on or
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about 17 August 1981 or on or about 15 March 1982 respectively
between the debtor and the judgment creditor whereby the debtor
was required to perform work in any industry. Thereafter is set
out the grounds or reasons claimed to support the making of such
orders or awards. Those grounds or reasons dono more than
reflect the formal terms of s.88F(1).
The debtor's affidavit in support of that motion is dated 15.
October 1985 and consists of but two paragraphs which read:
I am the applicant herein for relief under the provisions of
Section 88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940, from the
terms of each of two oral agreements made between myself and
the respondent on or about 17 August 1981 and 15 March 1982
respectively whereby I took possession respectively of the
licensed premises known as the "Rose and Crown" Hotel
situated at Glenmore Road, Paddington in the said State and
the licensed premises known as the "Union" Hotel situated at
576 King Street, Newtown in the said State.
The grounds and reasons set forth in the Notice of Motion
filed in this matter are to the best of my knowledge and
belief true in substance and fact. .
The judgment creditor commenced it. action against the debtor in
the District Court by Plaint. No. 17945 of 1983. The Court was
anformed that this plaint was issued in approximately the middle.
of that year. The cause of action was for the recovery of monies
paid by the judgment creditor in respect of the license fees due _
in respect of the two licensed premises claimed to be payable by
the debtor to the judgment creditor pursuant to the same
contracts or arrangements made respectively in 1981 and 1983 as
is referred to in the debtor's motion before the NSW Industrial
Commission. In addition. the judgment creditor claimed monies
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due to it from the debtor in respect of rent of the said premises—-
and for the supply of certain goods.
The District Court action came on for hearing before Judge Nash
in October 1985, His Honour giving judgment therein on 25 October
1985. The overall effect of that judgment was that the judgment
creditor had satisfied the Judge that 1t had made out its claim
in respect of certain aspects of its total claim and a judgment
was entered against the debtor in the sum of $22319.39 together
with costs. A copy of His Honour's reasons for judgment were
handed up to the Court. Those reasons disclose that His Honour
on 25 October 1986 had been made aware of the s.88F application
which had been filed by the debtor in the New South Wales
Industrial Commission only some ten days earlier. At the
conciusion of Judge Nash's reasons, the following appears:
There will therefore bea verdict for the plaintiff of
$22319.39 and judgment accordingly. The exhibits may be
returned. There will also be a verdict for the plaintiff on
the cross "2mand. '
(Counsel for the defendant sought a stay of proceedings
pending action in another Court).
I note there is a Notice of Motion pending in the Industrial
Commission of New South Wales returnable on 29 October 1985
seeking orders that the contracts, the subject of these
tenancies, be declared void in whole or in part or that they
be varied in whole or in part either ab initio or some other
time. I do not consider that the application in itself is
sufficient grounds for granting a stay of execution. If the
defendant and the plaintiff do not agree on the question of a
stay, of course, it is open for the defendant to make
application formally to this Court in relation thereto if he
is unable to pay the amount of the judgment.
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This Court has been informed that no such formal application to_--
the District Court in relation to the said judgment has been made
by the debtor. This Court was further informed that the
application before the Industrial Commission was stood over
generally when it was listed on its return date, 29 October 1985
and that no application has been made to restore it for hearing.
It is clear that the jurisdiction under s.88F of the New South.
Wales Industrial Arbitration Act is exclusive to the New South
Wales Industrial Commission so that such any claim by the debtor
against the judgment creditor under that section could not have
been ra1rsed by the debtor in the said District Court action.
The s.41(7) affidavit of the debtor filed herein consists of six
paragraphs, four of which are formal or merely identify the
annexed documents filed in the NSW Industrial Commission. The
remaining paragraphs, V1lZ paragraphs 3 and 5 are set out:
3. I am informed and verily believe 'that in terms of
Section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966, I have a
counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that I could not
have set up in the action in which the Judgment was
obtained against me.
5. The said Application Cie the Motion under s.88F before
the Commission] arises out of the same subject matter,
namely oral contracts entered into on or about 17th
August, 1981 and on or about 15th March, 1982 between
myself and the Judgment Creditor which gave rise to the
action in the District Court of New South Wales in which :
the said Judament was obtained against me.
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Mr Farrar submitted that in accordance with sub-s.(2) of s.88F_.. I.
the NSW Industrial Commission could, if the debtor was successful F
in having the contracts declared void either in whole or in part, ,
make an order as to the payment of a sum of money equal to the F
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amount referred to in the Bankruptcy Notice. That sub-section
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88F(2) The Commission, in making an order or award pursuant
to subsection (1), may make such order as to the
payment of money in connection with any contract,
arrangement, condition or collateral arrangement
declared void, in whole or in part, or varied in
whole or in part, as may appear to the Commission to
be just in the circumstances of the case.
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My Taylor, on the other hand, submitted that in accordance with
authority the debtor's counter-claim etc must be a claim which 1s
measurable in an amount of money and that what the debtor was
really claiming here amounted to rectification which is nota
counter-claim referred to under s.40(1)(g) of the Act. Further
he submitted, that even though the debtor's counter-claim need
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not be for a liquidated sum i1t must be capable of being a
quantified 1n terms of money, (see Re Jocumsen (1929) 1 ABC 82; i
——— ,
James vy Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 654 @ 664) and that a s.41(7)
affidavit filed by the debtor should quantify it in some way. {
(Ex parte The Debtor v_ National Westminister Bank (1983) 3 All ~
E.R. 545 @ 553). Here, it was submitted, no attempt is made by
the debtor to so quantify his alleged counter-claim etc.
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In my view the debtor's s.41(7) affidavit does not demonstrate_.- _,7
that even if the motion filed under s.88F 1s a proper claim under
that section and if he were to succeed on his motion before the
Commission. the Commission of necessity must make an order that
the debtor be paid a sum of money by the judgment creditor let
alone an amount equal to the figure set out in the Bankruptcy
Notice. Even on the most benevolent construction (see Eastick v
ANZ Bank#mq Group Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 91 @ 93-4) of the paragraphs.
of the debtors s.41(7) affidavit or upon such a construction of
the motion and affidavit in support filed in the Industrial
Commission, I am not satisfied that the claim before the
Commission must be capable of being quantified in terms of money
as that expression is used in the authorities. A fortiori, I am
not satisfied that the s.41(7) affidavit of the debtor has
attempted in any way to quantify it.
Further Mr Taylor submitted that the undisputed facts in this
matter are such that it is clear that the debtor has been guilty
of delay in prosecuting any counter-claim etc he may have had
under s.88F of the N.S.W. Act against the judgment creditor. I
agree. The District Court action was commenced against the
debtor in mid-1983. Yet he did nothing to prosecute his alleged
counter-claim etc until the very hearing of the District Court
action in October 1985. No explanation is given by the debtor in
his affidavit for such delay. Nor indeed was any such
explanation offered at the hearing of the present application.
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3.
In ali circumstances. I am-not satisfied that the debtor's —-_.—
affidavit filed pursuant to s.41(7) of the Act discloses that he
has a counter-claim etc equal to or exceeding the amount of the
sum payable under the judgment debt as is referred to in H
paragraph 40(1)(g) of the Act. Further I am of the view that the
debtor's delay in prosecuting any s.88F claim he may have is such
that the Court should refuse his present application.
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I certify that this and the Seyen '
preceding pages are a true copy of the F
Reasons for Judgment herein of his '
Honour Mr Justice Evatt
Associate
Dated: 30-S- 86 7