Re Jacka, J.N. v. Ex parte Jacka, J.N. [1986] FCA 248
Federal Court of Australia
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RAS
CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - Public Examination - Whether Bankrupt has a right or
entitlement to put questions to a witness summoned under s.81 of
the Bankruptcy Act.
Bankruptcy Act, 1966
Re Beall; Ex parte Beall [18941 2 Q.B. 135.
Re Cside1; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 39 F.L.R. 387
Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 C.L.R. 106
IN THE MATTER of a reference by the Deputy Registrar in
Bankruptcy to the Court under rule 119 of the Bankruptcy Rules in
Re: Joy Naomi Jacka; Ex Parte Joy Naomi Jacka.
No.781 of 1985
Spender J.
28 May 1986
Brisbane
isi
Uh 3°
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISTON
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
ESTATE NO.781 OF 1985
RE: JOY NAOMI JACKA
EX PARTE THE ABOVE
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER RULE 119
SPENDER J.
DATE JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 28 MAY, 1986
APPEARANCES :
for the Official Trustee - Mr. F. Clair, instructed
by Messrs. McLaughlin Gordon & Lennon
. for the Bankrupt - Mr. J.A. Logan, instructed by
Messrs. Primrose, Couper, Cronin & Rudkin.
Peter Applegarth
Associate to Spender J.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALTA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
ESTATE NO.781 OF 1985
RE: JOY NAOMI JACKA
EX PARTE THE ABOVE
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER RULE 119
MINUTES OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Spender J.
DATE ORDER MADE: 28 May 1986
WHERE MADE: Brisbane
Answer the question referred as follows:
Question: Does the bankrupt have a right or entitlement to
put questions to a witness summonsed to give
evidence pursuant to the provisions of Section 81
of the Bankruptcy Act?
Answer: No.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISTON
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
ESTATE NO.781 OF 1985
RE: JOY NAOMI JACKA
EX PARTE THE ABOVE
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER RULE 119
SPENDER J.
28 MAY, 1986
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Pursuant to r.119 of the Bankruptcy Rules, the Deputy
Registrar in Bankruptcy has submitted the following question
which he seeks to have determined by the Court:
"Does the bankrupt have a right or entitlement to
put questions to a witness summonsed to give
evidence pursuant to the provisions of Section 81
of the Bankruptcy Act?"
In my opinion, the answer is "No".
It is necessary to set out s.81 of the Bankruptcy Act
1966, in full.
"81(1) The Court or the Registrar may, on the
application of a creditor who has proved his debt
and on such terms as to costs as the Court or the
Registrar thinks fit to impose, or on the
application of the Official Receiver or the
trustee, at any time summon -
(a) the bankrupt or the spouse of the
bankrupt; or
(b) a person who is known or suspected to
have in his possession any of the
property of the bankrupt, or is
supposed to be indebted to the bankrupt
or to be able to give information
concerning the bankrupt or his trade
dealings, property or affairs,
to attend, on a date and at a time and place fixed
in the summons, before the Court or the Registrar
or, if the Court or the Registrar thinks fit,
before a magistrate, to give evidence concerning,
and produce any books (whether or not in existence
at the time the bankrupt became a bankrupt) in his
custody or power relating to, the bankrupt or his
trade dealings, property or affairs.
(2) An examination under this section shall be
held in public.
(3) The Court, the Registrar or a magistrate may
at any time adjourn the examination of a person
under this section either to a fixed date or
generally, or conclude the examination.
(4) The Registrar or a magistrate may at any time
adjourn the examination of a person under this
section for further hearing before the Court.
(5) Where the examination is adjourned by the
Registrar or a magistrate for further hearing
before the Court, the Registrar or the magistrate,
as the case may be, may submit to the Court such
report with respect to the examination as he
thinks fit.
(6) Where the examination is adjourned for further
hearing before the Court, the Court may -
(a) continue the examination;
(b) at any time direct that the examination be
continued before the Registrar or a
magistrate; or
(c) make such other order as it thinks proper in
the circumstances.
(7) A person summoned to attend before the Court,
the Registrar or a magistrate for examination
under this section is entitled to be represented,
on his examination, by counsel or a solicitor, who
may re-examine him after his examination.
(B) The trustee or a creditor of the bankrupt may
take part in the examination and, for that
purpose, may be represented by counsel or a
solicitor or by an agent authorized in writing for
the purpose.
(9) Without limiting the generality of sub-section
(8), where the Official Trustee is the trustee,
the Official Trustee may, for the purpose of
taking part in the examination, be represented by
the Official Receiver.
(10) The Court, the Registrar or the magistrate
may put to a person being examined under this
section, or allow to be put toa person being
examined under this section, such questions
concerning the bankrupt or his trade dealings,
property or affairs, as the Court, the Registrar
or the magistrate, as the case may be, thinks
proper.
(11) A person being examined under this section
shall answer all questions that the Court, the
Registrar or the magistrate puts or allows to he
put to him.
(12) Where a person admits on examination under
this section that he is indebted to the bankrupt,
then, the Court, the Registrar or the magistrate,
as the case may be, may, on the application of the
trustee or a creditor who has proved his debt,
order the person to pay to the trustee, at or by
such time and in such manner as the Court, the
Registrar or the magistrate, as the case may be,
thinks fit, the whole or a part of the amount in
which the person admits he is indebted to the
bankrupt.
(13) Where the bankrupt or another person admits
on examination under this section that he has in
his possession or power any of the property of the
bankrupt, then, the Court, the Registrar or the
magistrate, as the case may be, may, on the
application of the trustee or a creditor who has
proved his debt, order the bankrupt or the other
person, as the case may be, to deliver that
property to the trustee at or by such time, in
such manner and on such terms as the Court, the
Registrar or the magistrate, as the case may be,
thinks fit.
(14) The Court, the Registrar or the magistrate,
as the case may be, may direct that the costs of a
person examined under this section shall he paid
out of the estate of the bankrupt.
4.
(15) The Court, the Registrar or the magistrate,
as the case may be, may cause such notes of the
examination of a person under this section to be
taken down in writing as the Court, the Registrar
or the magistrate, as the case may be, thinks
proper, and the person examined shall sign the
notes.
(16) The power conferred on the Court, the
Registrar or the magistrate, as the case may be,
by sub-section (15) is in addition to the powers
of the Court, the Registrar or the magistrate, as
the case may be, under section 255.
(17) Notes taken down and signed by a person in
pursuance of sub-section (15), and the transcript
of the evidence given at the examination of a
person under this section (being a transcript
certified, or certified, signed and sealed, in
pursuance of section 255) -
(a) may be used in evidence in any proceedings
under this Act in which the person is a
party; and
(b) shall be open to inspection by the person,
the bankrupt, the trustee or a person who
states in writing that he 1s a creditor of
the bankrupt without fee and by any other
person on payment of the prescribed fee."
In Re Beall; Ex parte Beall £1894] 2 Q.B. 135, a
bankrupt had desired to be present at an examination of witnesses
who had been summoned for examination under s.27 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1883 (U.K.). The bankrupt had desired also to
cross-examine the witnesses but the Registrar had refused to
allow him to be present. The bankrupt argued in the Court of
Appeal that, as he had no opportunity of cross-examining the
persons examined in private, their evidence was one-sided. He
sought therefore the removal from the file of proceedings in the
bankruptcy of the depositions of these witnesses. Counsel for
the Official Receiver was not called on. Lord Esher M.R. said at
136-7:-
"Mr. Reed's first great complaint was that, when
these witnesses were examined under s.27, the
debtor was not allowed to be present to
cross-examine them as to the truth of what they
said, and as to their character. It was said
that, this being contrary to natural justice,
these depositions ought not to be put on the file.
Ought, then, the debtor to be allowed to be
present for that purpose at that stage? Every
judge has decided that the debtor has no right to
be present then. As to the notion that it is
contrary to natural justice that the debtor should
not be permitted to be present, there is no
adjudication against him at that stage. There is
only information being collected for the purpose
of being laid before the Court of Bankruptcy when
it has to consider whether it will or will not
grant a discharge to the bankrupt, under ss.28 and
69 of the Act. The examination is in one sense a
judicial proceeding, because it is a step in the
course of judicial procedure, but it 1s not a
judicial decision."
Lopez L.J., at p.139 said:-
"T also am of opinion that this application cannot
be granted. It 1s an substance an application
that these documents, containing the evidence of
certain witnesses, should be taken off the file.
It was said (and at first I was inclined to think
that there was some force in this argument) that
it was very unjust to the debtor that this
evidence should be taken behind his. back. I
thought at first that there was something in that;
but, when one considers the purpose and result of
this evidence, I think there 1s nothing unjust in
its being so taken. The examination of these
witnesses is taken by the official receiver simply
for the purpose of instructing his mind and
enabling him to make his report."
And, later, he said on the same page:-
"When, therefore, one considers what is the object
of such an examination, I do not think it can be
said that there is anything unjust to the debtor
in not allowing him to be present. But there is
ample authority to show that the debtor has no
right to be present when such evidence is being
taken."
Notwithstanding the numerous changes in bankruptcy legislation
since 1883, it seems that there is no more recent case touching
on this question.
Counsel for the bankrupt sought to distinguish Beall's
Case. He relied in particular on the circumstance that the
examination of witnesses under s.27 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883
(U.K.) was in private, a consideration to be contrasted with the
provision of 81(2) and, more particularly, on the provisions of
s.81(12) and 81(13) which, he submitted, amounted to a power for
the Court, Registrar or magistrate to make orders in respect of
property, in which it was submitted the requirements of natural
justice would dictate that the bankrupt would be entitled to he
heard.
By s.81(8), provision is expressly made for the trustee
and any creditor to take part in the examination of a person
summoned under s.81(1). The absence of a similar provision in
respect of the bankrupt is a very telling indication that the
bankrupt has no similar entitlement. Notwithstanding such
omission, it was submitted that the principles of natural justice
require a bankrupt to be entitled to take part in such an
examination.
In the light of that submission, the nature and purpose
of a s.81 examination must be looked at.
7.
Section 81 is directed to the discovery of the property
of the bankrupt and permits any of the persons referred to in (a)
or (b) of s.81(1) to be summoned and give evidence concerning the
bankrupt, his trade dealings, property or affairs. A s.81
examination relates to a single witness and, although there may
be anumber of persons examined in respect of any particular
bankrupt, each is a separate examination; there is not one
enquiry with a number of witnesses.
The nature of a 5.81 examination was discussed by
Lockhart J. in Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 39 F.L.R. 387 at
391:-
"The analogy between bankruptcy and the winding up
of companies in this respect, and the nature of
the inquisitional power conferred by s.96 of the
Bankrutcy Act, 1869 (Imp.), a predecessor of s.81
of the Act, was expressed by Jessell M.R. in Ex
parte Willey; Re Wright in these terms: 'Now that
is a very grave power to entrust to any Court or
any man, viz., power to summon any other man whom
you suspect (for mere suspicion will do) to be
capable of giving information, and to get any
information from him, although that information
may be extremely hostile to the interests of the
man himself. It is a power which, so far as I
know, is found nowhere except in bankruptcy and
the winding-up of companies (which is a kind of
bankruptcy); it is avery extraordinary power
indeed, and it ought to be very carefully
exercised' (1883) 23 Ch.D. 118, at p.128. See
also Rees v. Kratzmann per Windeyer J. (1965) 114
C.L.R. 63, at p.79.
The power conferred by s.81 to summon persons to
attend to give evidence or produce documents is,
like the power conferred by s.294 of the Uniform
Companies Act, 'an extraordinary power of an
inguisitorial nature': see Re North Australian
Territory Company per Bowen L.J. (1890) 45 Ch.D.
87 at 93. The examinee is not a witness in the
ordinary sense and the ordinary rules of procedure
do not govern the examination.
The application to examine is made ex parte and
the person whom it is sought to examine is not
heard on the application for the issue of a
summons. "
Of this "extraordinary power", it is to be noted that
there are some significant differences between the provisions of
5.69, dealing with the public examination of a bankrupt, and
s.81, dealing with the examination of a person, who may be the
bankrupt, in respect of the bankrupt, his trade dealings,
property or affairs. Section 69(12), in addition to terms
similar to s.81(11), further provides:-
",..unless the Court, the Registrar or the
magistrate, as the case may be, otherwise directs,
{the bankrupt) is not excused from answering any
such question by reason only of the fact that the
answer to it may tend to incriminate him."
No similar express exclusion of the privilege against
self incrimination appears in s.81l.
Until 1980, a bankrupt was not entitled to be
represented on his public examination. Section 69(8), which
was substituted by s.38 of the Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act 1980,
permits a bankrupt on his examination under s.69 to be
represented by counsel or solicitor, but not by an agent, which
is a means which the trustee ora creditor has of being
represented: s.69(9).
Similarly, s.81(7) provides that a person summoned to a
s.81 examination is entitled to be represented by counsel or
solicitor, while s.81(8) provides that the trustee or a creditor
may "take part in the examination and, for that purpose be
represented by counsel or a solicitor or by an agent authorised
in writing for that purpose."
Very recently, para.81(17)(a) was amended, to enable the
transcript or notes of the relevant examination to be used in
proceedings "in which the person is a party"; previously the use
was restricted to proceedings "against the person". A similar
amendment was made to para. 69(20)(a).
Thus in discharge proceedings, which are not proceedings
"against the bankrupt", neither the transcript of the bankrupt's
evidence in his public examination under s.69, nor an examination
of him under s.81 previously could be used. However, it seems to
me that the transcript or notes of the evidence of a person,
other than the bankrupt, summoned under s.81, cannot be used ona
discharge application by the bankrupt, because that person is not
"a party" to those proceedings. This goes some way to addressing
the "natural justice" basis of the reference.
As to a consideration of s.81(12) and (13), close
attention to those provisions shows that the power given to the
Court, Registrar or magistrate is, on application by the trustee
or a proved creditor, to give effect to an admission by the
person being examined concerning the property of the bankrupt,
and does not involve a judicial determination of competing rights
as to property. If an admission is erroneously made that an
amount is owed to the bankrupt, or that property of the bankrupt
is held, the person properly entitled, which ex hypothesi is not
10.
the bankrupt, is not precluded by an order under s.81(12) or (13)
from enforcing his or its rights. I do not see any room, based
on the principles of natural justice, for asserting that the
bankrupt is entitled to be heard before such an order is made.
These provisions may reflect a consciousness of the limitations
on the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
My main concern has been the precise point that
initially troubled Lopez L.d. in Beall (supra). In that case,
the depositions from witnesses who had been examined in the
absence of the bankrupt, and therefore without cross-examination
by him, formed part of the basis for the report of the official
receiver, on which the registrar refused to grant the bankrupt a
discharge. On whether "it was very unjust that this evidence
should be taken behind his back", Lopez L.J. said at 139:-
"When the debtor applies for his discharge, his
application is brought before the tribunal which
has to decide whether he shall be discharged or
not, and then he has the fullest opportunity, 1f£
he thinks fit, of impeaching the evidence of these
witnesses. I am inclined to think that he might,
if he desired it, call the witnesses himself and
cross-examine them, inasmuch as they would be in
the nature of hostile witnesses, and might thus
extract everything from them - everything which
would go to impeach their testimony. When,
therefore, one considers what is the object of
such an examination, I do not think it can be said
that there is anything unjust to the debtor in not
allowing him to be present."
Under s.149(3)(c),the Registrar, the Inspector-General
or the trustee, or a creditor with leave, may enter an objection
to the automatic discharge of a bankrupt by operation of law.
Often the objection will be based, in part, on the evidence of
11.
persons summoned under s.81. The effect of lodging the
objection, in many cases, will be to require the bankrupt to
apply to the Court under s.150 for discharge. On such an
application, s.150(3) provides:-
"On the hearing of an application under this
section, the Court shall take into considertion a
report in writing by the trustee concerning the
bankrupt, his conduct, trade dealings, property
and affairs both in respect of the period before
and the period after the applicant became a
bankrupt."
And s.150(12) provides:-
"A report referred to in sub-section (3) 1s, for
the purposes of this section, prima facie evidence
of the statements contained in it."
It emerges that a bankrupt may be denied, on material he
is not able to challenge by cross~-examination, automatic
discharge by operation of law. Moreover, such material may lie at
the heart of the trustee's report under s.150(3), with the
evidentiary consequences of prima facie validity that s.150(12)
confers.
However, it is an error to confuse questions of onus
with the quite different question of the right to be heard. On
an application for discharge, the bankrupt has the right to
challenge all that is asserted against him. In my opinion, the
fact that he cannot undertake that challenge at an earlier stage,
does not involve a denial of natural justice: Twist v. Randwick
Municipal Council (1976) 136 C.L.R. 106.
12.
This is the conclusion to which the Court of Appeal came
in Beall.
The principles of natural justice and the circumstances
calling for their application have received a great deal of
curial attention since that case was decided: I refer, merely by
way of example, to Ridge v. Baldwin £1964] A.C. 40; Mahon v. Air
New Zealand Ltd. (1983) 50 A.L.R. 193; Kioa v. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 62 A.L.R. 321. In the
light of the many changes in bankruptcy legislation since Beall
was decided in 1894 and, more particularly, the significant
changes in 1980 touching the right of a bankrupt to
representation, the omission in s.81 of a reference to a right of
a bankrupt "to take part in the examination" of a person summoned
under that section manifests, 1m my opinion, a clear intention
that a bankrupt has no such right.
I answer the question referred as follows:
"A bankrupt has no right or entitlement to put
questions to a witness summonsed to give evidence
pursuant to the provisions of Section 81 of the
Bankruptcy Act."
rudqaem herein of His Honour
Associ