oe mu Set ey et Yar an een aver ae SOS IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL DIVISION NO. 596 of 1986 BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF weer wr wv THE STATE OF VICTORIA RE: MICHAEL FREDERICK HAINES Bankrupt EX PARTE: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY Applicant THE COURT: Sweeney J. DATE : 8 July 1986 PLACE : Melbourne a be 21 JUL 1986 \ FEDERAL CO' -T oF —_ AUETT 1k tm a4 YY, a LP foi \A LEG Ww This is an application to review a decision of a Deputy Registrar who refused to grant an application for the adjournment of a section 69 examination of the bankrupt in this case. It was pressed upon her as it has been pressed upon me that she should have granted that application because to continue it would be to expose the bankrupt to prejudice whereas to adjourn it would not prejudice the trustee. The adjournment was sought following the lodging by the applicant of an appeal against an order made by me on 12 June 1986 that the date of the period at the expiration of which the epee nee me eee we a a objection dated 22 May 1984, entered under paragraph 149(3){c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") will lapse, be 20 March 1987. The applicant submitted that if the appeal is upheld then the bankrupt would be discharged from bankruptcy as at and from 25 dune 1986 pursuant to the operation of s.149 of the Act. - prior to the date of the examination. Reference was also made to the undeniable fact that considerable time had elapsed after 2 February 1983 when the examination of the bankrupt under section 69 was adjourned until its resumption by notice given at the beginning of this month. That delay is real and is, I think, relevant. However, it was clear to the Deputy Registrar, because she had conducted the examination of a bank manager under section 81, that there was an allegation that the bankrupt had been operating a bank account under a name other than his own which account had been very active and through which large sums of money had passed. In the exercise of her discretion the Registrar refused to make an order adjourning the examination. I entertain some doubt myself whether the fact that a person is discharged by operation of law under section 149 takes that person out of the reach of section 69 which provides that: "The Official Receiver or the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt may, at any time, make an application, in writing, to the Registrar for the examination of the bankrupt, on oath as to the conduct, trade dealings, property and affairs of the bankrupt". ae we i ee tee i eet rte meyaeeuer The word "bankrupt" is defined in section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act in these terms: "Bankrupt means a person - (a) against whose estate a sequestration order has been made; or (b) ...." That definition 1s wide enought to include within its reach a. person who has been discharged by operation of section 149. That meaning, if given to the word "bankrupt" in section 69, is a meaning that may be regarded as being consonant with the general objects of the Bankruptcy Act and the bankruptcy law. The legislature might well have thought that, if it became known to a trustee after the time of the discharge of a person by operation of section 149 that there were matters upon which an examination of that person might be desirable in the interests of creditors or of the persons who had dealings with the bankrupt, or indeed in the interests of commercial morality generally, a trustee should not be shut out from having an examination of that person. However, as this matter has arisen quite suddenly and the representatives of the parties have not had an opportunity to consider that aspect of the matter in any depth and put considered submissions on it, and the court itself has had but' scant opportunity to consider it, I would prefer not to base my own decision upon an attempted answer to that question. I prefer rather to take my stance upon the following propositions - (a) that what the Deputy Registrar had before her was an order of the court which, so long as it stands, produces eee as meh as eee Om (b) (c) 4. the result that the bankruptcy in question continues; a notice of appeal having been given does not give rise to any stay of that order; and in exercising her discretion it seems to me it was perfectly proper for her to refuse to grant the adjournment that was sought, even given full allowance to the circumstances which Mr Scerri has put in favour of the bankrupt's case. I find no error in what she has done and I would not interfere with her decision. I herefore leave the decision of the Deputy Registrar standing and direct that the examination be continued before her. I certify that this and the preceding three (3) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of The Honourable Mr. Justice Sweeney Dated: 8 eA Associate eee eee age. —-- -