Taylor, Re D.R. Ryan, Ex Parte J.C. [1986] FCA 401
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - unsigned creditor's petition bad.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.47(1)(a), 306
Re:
Desmond Robert Taylor
Ex parte:
James Conrad Ryan
Qld P716/86
PINCUS Jd.
BRISBANE
15 September 1986
RECEIV"D
17 SEP 1986
FEDERAL cou,
AUSTRALIA. OF
PRINCIPA|
REGISTAY
~
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION ) QLD PET 716 of 86
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
~
RE: DESMOND ROBERT TAYLOR
EX PARTE: JAMES CONRAD RYAN
MINUTES OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: PINCUS J.
DATE OF ORDER: 15 SEPTEMBER 1986
WHERE MADE: BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The creditor's petition presented on 4 July 1986 be
dismissed.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISTON
~
QLD PET 716 of 86
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
~
RE: DESMOND ROBERT TAYLOR
EX PARTE: JAMES CONRAD RYAN
PINCUS J. 15 SEPTEMBER 1986
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is a creditor's petition under the Bankruptcy Act
with an unusual defect; it is not signed. The authorities suggest
that irregularities in the signing of a petition should be rather
leniently treated: see, for example, Re Marsden; Ex parte E.H.
Sellers and Sons Ltd. (1921) 91 L.Jd.Ch. 318, 126 L.T. 408.
Section 306 of the Bankruptcy Act obliges the Court to treat any
formal defect or irregularity as not invalidating "unless the
Court ... is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused
by the defect or urregularity and that the injustice cannot be
remedied by an order of that Court".
I think that no substantial injustice has been caused;
the unsigned petition is annexed to a verifying affidavit properly
executed by the petitioning creditor. The question then, so far
as s.306 is concerned, is whether the non-signature of the
petition is a formal defect or irregularity.
Rule 195 takes a slightly different approach to the
problem of procedural errors, but is inapplicable here because
r.195 applies only to non-compliance with the Rules. The
requirement that the petition be executed derives from the Act:
s.47(1)(a) requires that a creditor's petition be in accordance
with the prescribed form, and that form (No. 5) includes provision
for signature. The requirement of adherence to the form is
repeated in the Rules (r.12(2)), but that does not mitigate the
effect of non-compliance with the Act.
I am thus concerned only with the application of s.306.
It requires that one have regard to the distinction between
nullities and irregularities; an example of its application is to
be found in In re Pritchard Deceased (1963) Ch. 502. That case
(which brought about a change in the English Rules - see Harkness
v. Bell's Asbestos and Engineering Ltd. (1967) 2 Q.B. 729 at
p-734) was one in which a summons was issued out of a district
registry anstead of out of the central office, as the Rules
required. The Court of Appeal held that it was a nullity; in the
judgment of Upjohn L.d. with whom Danckwerts L.J. agreed, he said
at p.523 that the authorities established some classes of nullity,
one of which was "proceedings which have never started at all,
owing to some fundamental defect in issuing the proceedings".
The question is whether a document purporting to bea
petition, but signed by no one, is a nullity.
In favour of the petitioning creditor, there is the fact
that the Act does not specifically attach significance to
execution of the petition. What is critical is that it be
presented and, of course, the date of presentation has everyday
1mportance for the purposes of s.122. The notion of presentation
was analysed by the Full Court in Purden Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar in
Bankruptcy (1982) 64 F.L.R. 306; it means handling or delivering
the petition to the appropriate court officer and acceptance of it
by hin.
To my mind, the most cogent argument against the
validity of this petition is that courts have, ona number of
occasions, troubled to determine whether or not deficiencies in
execution were fatal. A recent example is the decision of
Lockhart J. in Re Spitzer; Ex parte Weltrans Agency Establishment
(1979) 25 A.L.R. 447. It would hardly have been necessary to
consider that question if it was thought that a completely
unexecuted petition could be good. The only direct authority on
the point which I have noted is in Re Barry (1862) 1W. & W. (I.E.
& M.) 174, in which Chapman J. held that a petition for
sequestration not signed by the petitioning creditor could not be
amended.
On the whole, I think I should hold that the failure to
sign the petition is neither a formal defect nor an irregularity
and s.306 therefore does not apply. The petition will be
dismissed.
+ certify that this and the & preceding
pages are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment herein of His Honour
Mr, Justice Pincus ptt Lijrro ;
7 A
ssociate
Dated i" Sem Ce btr 1986 ,