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Bankruptcy ~- application to annul bankruptcy under s.154(1)(a) of
Bankruptcy Act 1966 - whether sequestration order "ought not to
have been made".
CATCHWORDS
RE: COLIN MAXWELL MIDDLETON AND MARIE MICHELLE MIDDLETON
No. W1353 of 1986
Beaumont, J.
Sydney
4 February 1987.
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
No. W1353 of 1986
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
RE: COLIN MAXWELL MIDDLETON and
MARIE MICHELLE MIDDLETON
MINUTES OF ORDER
Judge making order: Beaumont, J.
Date order made: 4 February 1987
Where made: Sydney
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
l.
2.
Note:
Application dismissed
Costs reserved.
Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Bankruptcy Rule 124.
2.
appear and Wilcox J. made a sequestration order.
The affairs of the applicants are complex and it is not
possible, at this stage, to indicate, in specifics, their assets
and liabilities. A number of partnerships are involved and the
applicants did not attend at the hearing of their application -
they were represented by counsel and solicitor, although it
should be noted that the applicants live in Tamworth and that Mr.
Middleton's father, who lives on the central coast 1s seriously
ill. However, 1t 1S common ground that in about June 1986, the
applicants forwarded to their accountant, Mr. McCarthy, details
of their liabilities and gave Mr. McCarthy instructions to pay
certain liabilities out of funds then paid by the applicants into
his firm's trust account. There 1s a dispute between the
applicants and Mr. McCarthy as to the precise terms of his
retainer. The applicants say that they directed Mr. McCarthy to
pay the petitioning creditor the amount owed to it under its
judgment. On the other hand, Mr. McCarthy says that his retainer
was more general. According to him, his instructions were to pay
all creditors who were pressing for payment so far as the funds
entrusted to him would permit. Unfortunately, Mr. McCarthy, who
also lives in Tamworth, was not available to give oral evidence
and, as has been said, the applicants were not able to come to
Sydney for the hearing. In the result, it is not possible to
resolve this conflict of evidence. However, for reasons which
will be given, even if I were to accept the applicants' version
of events, 1t would not follow that the present application would
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES No. W1353 of 1986
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
RE: COLIN MAXWELL MIDDLETON and
MARIE MICHELLE MIDDLETON
CORAM: Beaumont, J.
DATED: 4 February 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicants, Mr. & Mrs. Middleton, were made bankrupt
by a sequestration order made on 4 November 1986. They now seek
to annul their bankruptcies on the ground that the sequestration
order "ought not to have been made" (Bankruptcy Act 1966),
s.154(1)(a)).
Ry its petition for a sequestration order dated 29
September 1986, WEA Records Pty. Limited, trading as Warner Home
Video, claiming a debt owed by the applicants in the sum of
$3,284.91 due under a final judgment, alleged that the applicants
had committed an act of bankruptcy on 29 July 1986 by their
failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on them on 8
July 1986. The petition was returnable on 4 November 1986. On
that date, although they had been served, the applicants did not
succeed.
It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that, for
the purposes of s.154(1)(a), the sequestration order "ought not
to have been made" and their bankruptcies annulled accordingly
because, 1f Wilcox J. had known of the applicants' instruction to
Mr. McCarthy to pay the petitioning creditor's debt, no
sequestration order would have been made but, rather, the
petition would have been adjourned to enable the debt to be paid.
It is common ground that the debt owed to the
petitioning creditor was not paid by Mr. McCarthy until some
time after the sequestration order was made.
In my opinion, the application should be refused. It
may be accepted that the discretion conferred by s.154(1)(a) 1s a
wide one (see the examples given by Halsbury 4th ed. Vol.3,
para.454; cf. Re Anasis; Ex parte Total Australia Limited (1985)
63 A.L.R. 493). In Re Griffiths (1892) 3 B.C. (N.S.W.) 6,
Manning J. said (at p.9) that the words "ought not to have been
made" mean not only upon the case as disclosed at the time, but
as it would have been disclosed had all the true facts, as shown
in the application for annulment, been before the judge on the
making of the order. His Honour later said that if an offer had
been made to pay all creditors an order would not have been made
and, further, if that position 1s established by the fact of
payment, the adjudication in bankruptcy should have been annulled
4.
(at p.10). In Bleez v. Fopp (1911) 13 C.L.R. 324, a notice under
the Insolvency Act 1861 (S.A.) required payment of a judgment
debt within a specified period and stated that in default of
payment insolvency proceedings would be taken was served on the
debtor. Negotiations took place betwen the representatives of
the parties with a view to a settlement. A tender of the amount
of the debt was made to the creditor personally and he refused to
accept the money. Some weeks later an adjudication of insolvency
against the debtor was obtained by the creditor. The Full Court
of the Supreme Court of South Australia reversed the order of the
Court of Insolvency and annulled the adjudication. The High
Court refused special leave to appeal.
In my opinion, both these cases are distinguishable
here. In the present case, not only was no tender of the
judgment debt made to the creditor but the evidence, so far as it
goes, suggests that at the time of commission of their act of
bankruptcy, the applicants were unable to pay their debts as they
fell due. The entrustment by the applicants of the future
conduct of their financial affairs to Mr. McCarthy is consistent
with a situation of insolvency on their part. It follows, in my
view, that even if the applicants had instructed Mr. McCarthy to
pay the judgment debt owed to the petitioning creditor, the
petition would not necessarily have been adjourned by Wilcox J.
On the contrary, if the true facts had been revealed to his
Honour on 4 November 1986, it is probable that an application to
adjourn the petition would have been refused and that a
5.
sequestration order would have been made in any event. The
position would no doubt have been different if, on that date, the
applicants had been in a position to adduce evidence to the
satisfaction of Wilcox J. that they were then able to pay all
their debts as they fell due. The applicants were not in that
position then and, indeed, are not able to adduce satisfactory
evidence of their solvency to-day.
The application will be dismissed. This dismissal 1s,
of course, without prejudice to any future application for
annulment made on the ground specified in para.(b) of s.154(1).
I certify that this and the
preceding "ou / (4)
pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of
his Honour Mr. Justice Beaumont.
SS [a i / ,
A/ Associate
Dated: 4 February 1987
Counsel and Solicitors Mr. G. Underwood instructed by
for Applicants: Messrs Everingham, Solomons &
Co., Tamworth, by their City
agents Messrs Marshall Marks.
Date of hearing: 4 February 1987
Date Judgment Delivered: 4 February 1987