Re Gray, E.A. v. Ex parte Horne, S.L. & Anor [1987] FCA 68
Federal Court of Australia
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Bankruptcy -
good faith
trustee.
CATCHWORDS
Disposition of property -
Bankruptcy Act 1966 - s.121
Family Law Act 1975 - s.86
Vandervell v. I.R.C. £19673 2 A.C. 291.
RE: ELIZABETH ANN GRAY
EX PARTE:
STIRLING LINDLEY HORNE v.
CORPORATION PTY. LTD.
No. 344 of 1
Jenkinson J.
Melbourne
20 February,
Whether parties acted in
- Intent to defraud creditors -
FIRST
Void as against
INSURANCE CREDIT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF VICTORIA
No. 344 of 1983
RE: ELIZABETH ANN GRAY
Bankrupt
EX PARTE: STIRLING LINDLEY HORNE
(as trustee of the estate
Elizabeth Ann Gray,
Bankrupt )
Applicant
AND: FIRST INSURANCE CREDIT
CORPORATION Pry. LTD.
Respondent
CORAM: Jenkinson J.
PLACE: Melbourne
DATE: 20 February, 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application by a bankrupt's trustee for a declaration
that a disposition of land which is occupied by the bankrupt and
of which the respondent is the registered proprietor of an estate
in fee simple is, by virtue of the operation of 5.121 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966, void as against the trustee.
The land is the site of a residence where the bankrupt
and her husband and children lived until he separated from her in
1970. Thereafter she has lived in the house with children of the
marriage. Her husband, Donald Edgley Gray, had become the
2.
registered proprietor of the fee simple estate in the land in
1963. A deed dated 20 September 1982 between the bankrupt and her
husband, which included a covenant by each to "join in seeking the
registration of this Maintenance Agreement in the appropriate
Court under the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975", commenced
with the following recitals:
"A. The husband and wife were married at
Bendigo East in the State of Victoria on
the 10th day of February 1962, and no
Application has been made for Dissolution
of the Marriage.
B. That there are two children of the
Marriage under the age of 18 years, as
follows:
PETER GRAY born the 6th September 1964,
and
STEVEN GRAY born the 9th June 1966.
Cc. The parties ceased to co-habit or live
together as husband and wife on the 16th
June 1970.
D. The husband is registered as sole
proprietor of the former matrimonial home
which is situated at and known as 38
Fintonia Street, North Balwyn in the
State of Victoria andis the land more
particularly known as Lot 42 on Plan of
Subdivision No. 42191 Parish of
Boroondara and being the whole of the
land more particularly described in
Certificate of Title Volume 8485 Folio
637.
E. The former matrimonial home is by mutual
agreement valued by the parties in the
sum of $150,000.00.
F. The former matrimonial home as stated in
clause BD. is subject to a registered
Mortgage to the Hotham Permanent Building
Society (Melbourne Branch). The balance
outstanding to Hotham Permanent Building
Society as at the 31st August 1982, was
$71,186.71.
G. The husband and wife contributed equally
3.
to the establishment of the former
matrimonial home in which the wife and
children of the Marriage have been
residing since the date of separation.
H. The husband and wife have reached
agreement in relation to the settlement -
of their respective interests ain the
former matrimonial property and is the
desire of the husband and wife that their
intentions with respect to the former
Matrimonial home are as outlined in this
Agreement."
The covenants of the agreement relating to the land were:
"1. That the husband shall within thirty (30)
days of the date of this Agreement
transfer to his wife absolutely the
former matrimonial home being all that
piece of land being Lot 42 on Plan of
Subdivision No. 42191 Parish of
Boroondara and being the whole of the
land more particularly described an
Certificate of Title Volume 8485 Folio
637 which is situated at and known as 38
Fintonia Street, North Balwyn in the
State of Victoria.
2. That the husband shall forthwith continue
and assumes liability for and to meet all
instalments due pursuant to the Mortgage
over the property to the Hotham Permanent
Building Society Loan Account No. 1.2572
and shall indemnify and keep indemnified
the wife in respect of all such Mortgage
repayments due to the Hotham Permanent
Building Society.
3. That the husband agrees that the wife is
entitled to immediate occupation of the
former matrimonial home together with the
children of the marriage indefinitely."
There were other covenants with respect to chattels and periodic
maintenance payments. The agreement was registered in the
Magistrates' Court at Northcote in or about September 1982,
pursuant to the provisions of 5.86 of the Family Law Act 1975.
4.
But the transfer contemplated in clause 1 of the agreement did not
take place.
Mr. Gray had been for a number of years engaged in. the
business of manufacturing bodies for large motor vehicles, such as
cargo vans, pantechnicons, and vehicles for specialised use, as,
for example, vehicles for the transport of large sums of cash.
The business was carried on by Lucar Pty. Ltd., which Mr. Gray
controlled. On 14 October 1982 the Supreme Court of Victoria
ordered that the company be wound up because it was insolvent. As
guarantors of some of the company's debts the bankrupt and Mr.
Gray were themselves in financial difficulty during 1982 and in
1983 until each presented a bankruptcy petition against himself
which the Registrar accepted on 10 April 1983. Much of the
personal property of Lucar Pty. Ltd. was sold in 1982 by its
liquidator to a company which at about the time of the sale took
as its name Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. and thereafter carried on a
business similar to that which Lucar Pty. Ltd. had carried on
until the latter company went into liquidation. Mr. Gray was
employed by Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. in a managerial capacity.
The respondent Farst Insurance Credit Corporation Pty.
Ltd. has at all material times been controlled by Ronald Andrew
Miller, who and whose former wife have at all material times been
its only shareholders. Mr. Miller had for a number of years been
employed by finance companies and in the course of his employment
he had maintained a friendly business connection with Mr. Gray, to
whose company and customers Mr. Miller had over the years arranged
the granting of loans by his employers. In 1982 Mr. Miller was in
5.
a different field of business activity, but he had heard of the
financial difficulties of Mr. Gray and lLucar Pty. Ltd. and he
heard also, late in that year, that Mr. Gray was seeking to sell
his house. Mr. Miller and Mr. Gray negotiated first the sale by
the latter to the respondent of a house of which Mr. Gray was the
owner and occupier, and then they negotiated the sale by Mr. Gray
to the respondent of the house in which the bankrupt lives. In
the case of each sale there was an understanding between Mr. Gray
and Mr. Miller that the respondent would lease the house, in the
one case for occupation by Mr. Gray and in the other case for
occupation by the bankrupt. In effectuation of that understanding
a lease at a commercially reasonable rent has been granted by the
respondent to Ginet Pty. Ltd. in each case. The latter company is
associated with Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd.. Each of Mr. Gray and the
bankrupt has continued at all material times in occupation of the
house each respectively was occupying at the time of sale.
The sale of the house at 38 Fintonia Street North Balwyn
had the bankrupt's approval. In or about October 1982 Mr. Gray
suggested that the two houses be sold and that he attempt to make
arrangements under which the bankrupt would be enabled to continue
in occupation of the house at 38 Fintonia Street North Balwyn,
free of any obligation to pay rent. She agreed to his proposal,
which he coupled with a promise to try to arrange that the
bankrupt be employed by Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd.. She had been both
a director and an employee of Lucar Pty. Ltd..
The only written evidence of the arrangement between the
bankrupt and Mr. Gray for sale of the Fintonia Street house was
6.
the following document, signed by the bankrupt and by a witness,
on writing paper of her solicitors:
a
AUTHORITY
I, ELIZABETH ANN GRAY of 38 Fintonia Street,
North Balwyn in the State of Victoria, hereby
confirm my instructions to my Solicitors
Messrs. Comito, Iacovino & Co., on the 12th
October 1982, that in view of cordial
discussions between myself and my estranged
husband DONALD EDGLEY GRAY and arrangements
made between myself and my estranged husband I
directed my Solicitors not to implement the
Terms of Agreement pursuant to Section 4&6
dated the 20th September 1982, re: the
transfer of the home at 38 Fintonia Street,
North Balwyn (more particularly described in
Certificate of Title Volume 8485 Folio 637),
to me. I hereby confirm those instructions
that arrangements had been made between myself
and my ex-husband and that my said Soliticors
are not in default in not having pursued the
Transfer of the property into my sole name in
accordance with the Agreement hereinbefore
mentioned.
DATED: this 9th day of February 1983."
The bankrupt and Mr. Miller gave evidence. Mr. Gray did
not. She swore that she did not believe that she had given any
thought, at the time when the house was being sold, to the
possibility that unless the house were sold under the arrangement
she made with Mr. Gray the creditors who were pressing her and him
for payment would take the house in satisfaction of her
indebtedness. She swore that she thought, at the time of the sale
of the house, that no great sum would remain of the purchase price
after discharge of the mortgage to which she knew the land at 38
Fintonia Street was subject, and that ownership of the land was of
little value to her in comparison with retention of her job and a
7.
right to occupy the house free of rent. She swore that she simply
"went along" with the proposals Mr. Gray made to her, just as she
had habitually done his bidding in affairs of business. She swore
that she took no legal advice in connection with her agreement
that the house be sold. She swore that it was her belief that the
proceeds of sale of the house, after payment of the indebtedness
secured by mortgage, (proceeds she believed to have been about
$30,000) had been lent to Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd.
If that was her belief, she was mistaken. Mr. Miller
gave evidence that he had intended, when he first agreed to buy
the Fiantonia Street house, to provide about $30,000 of the
purchase price, which was $102,000, out of his own funds, which he
expected to be shortly augmented by substantial commissions. The
balance was to be financed by a loan to be secured by first
mortgage. His expectation of the commissions was, as he swore,
disappointed and he thereupon told Mr. Gray that he "would have to
renege on the deal". It was then agreed between Mr. Gray and Mr.
Miller that Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. would lend the respondent
$31,500 which it would apply in part payment of the price. In the
result, only $10,200 of the purchase price came from Mr. Miller's
own funds. The source of the funds advanced by Lucar (Vic.) Pty.
Ltd. was said to be Mr. Gray. Certainly Mr. Gray lent that
company $30,000 at about the time when the loan by the company to
the respondent was made.
Mr. Miller swore that he entered into the purchases of
the two houses upon the understanding, which he confirmed before
settlement with the directors of Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd., that each
house would be let to that company, for occupation by Mr. Gray in
the one case and by the bankrupt in the other. He swore that he
regarded the business which Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. had acquired as
one which would be profitable, and thought that Lucar (Vic.) _Pty.
Ltd. would be a satisfactory tenant. It was at some unspecified
later time that Ginet Pty. Ltd. was proposed, and accepted by the
respondent as tenant. Mr. Miller swore that it was represented to
him by Mr. Gray that it was in consideration of Mr. Gray's
undertaking employment by Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. as the general
Manager of the business that that company was prepared to take a
lease of each house.
Mr. Miller gave in evidence his belief that Mr. Gray was
moved to sell the two houses because he "was in very dire
financial straits and he had no choice; he could not meet his
payments". Mr. Miller was not aware that the bankrupt had any
proprietory interest in the Fintonia Street house. He knew that
she lived there and would continue to live there, if the proposal
made by Mr. Gray were carried out. He knew that the bankrupt had
been a director of Lucar Pty. Ltd.. He agreed in evidence that,
if at the time of the sales of the houses he had adverted to the
Matter, he would have assumed that the bankrupt, no less than Mr.
Gray, had guaranteed the performance of substantial financial
obligations of Gucar Pty. Ltd... Mr. Miller swore that he did not
remember whether he had adverted to the matter.
It was the submission of Mr. R. Johnstone of counsel for
the applicant trustee that the transfer of the legal estate in the
land known as 38 Fintonia Street Balwyn from Mr. Gray to the
9.
respondent with the consent of the bankrupt effected also a
"disposition", within the meaning of that word in 5.121 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966, of the equitable fee simple estate which
according to Mr. Johnstone's submission had been in the bankrupt
from the time - and in consequence of the making - of the
agreement embodied in the deed dated 20 September 1982. The
disposition had been made by the bankrupt with intent to defraud
her creditors, and it was not a disposition in favour of a person
who acted in good faith, Mr. Johnstone submitted.
I am persuaded, notwithstanding the bankrupt's evidence,
that she acceded to the proposal by Mr. Gray that her house be
sold in the belief that thereby the house would be put beyond the
reach of her unsecured creditors, whom she knew she could not pay,
and that her agreement was given to the proposal with the intent
that her unsecured creditors be in that way denied recourse to the
house, her equitable interest in which she believed to be worth
some thousands of dollars.
I hold that upon registration of the deed dated 20
September 1982 (if not upon its execution) the bankrupt held the
equitable fee simple ain the land on which the house stood, and
that her agreement in the proposal that the land should be sold,
coupled with the sale and transfer by Mr. Gray to the respondent
pursuant to that agreement, constituted a "disposition of
property" by her within s.121(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. (See
Vandervell v. I.R.C. £1967] 2 A.C. 291.) The evidence did not in
my opinion support an inference that the bankrupt was expressing
an intention, or that Mr. Gray was requesting her, to surrender or
10.
release to him her beneficial interest in the land.
The intention with which I have found that the bankrupt
acceded to the proposal for sale of the land constituted, in my
opinion, an "intent to defraud creditors" within the meaning of
that expression in s.121(1). If it were mecessary to find, in
order to reach that conclusion, that the bankrupt had no
expectation, when she agreed to the sale, that the proceeds of
sale remaining after discharge of the mortgage would be made
available to her creditors, I would make that finding. Her
understanding was, she said in evidence, that those proceeds of
sale had been lent to Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd... When asked whether
the loan had been made by Mr. Gray, she replied : "Well, whoever
the money belonged to, I suppose, whether it was mine or his, or
it was in his name". Her evidence is not of the time before sale,
but of the time after sale of the house. But my finding is that
she was content that the proceeds of sale should be applied by Mr.
Gray, not in discharge of her debts, but in whatever way should be
best calculated to produce the result that she would be able to
continue in occupation of the house, rent free, and able to
continue in employment in the business which Mr. Gray managed.
I am persuaded that the consideration agreed for the
sale of the house was, although on the low side, a reasonable
commercial consideration, and so "valuable consideration" within
the meaning of that expression in s.121(1). But I am persuaded
that Mr. Miller did not act "in good faith", in the sense of that
phrase in that sub-section. I accept his evidence that he thought
that Mr. Gray was the beneficial owner of both houses, but nothing
11.
turns on that circumstance, for present purposes. Mr. Miller
believed Mr. Gray to be in acute financial embarrassment at the
time when the sales were negotiated and when they were completed.
Being informed by Mr. Gray that Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. would be
responsible for a reasonable rent of each house, each of which
would continue in the occupation of the person then occupying it,
Mr. Miller must have suspected that Mr. Gray's object in selling
on the understanding that the purchaser would let each house to
Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. was to withdraw the two houses from the
reach of Mr. Gray's creditors without losing the benefit of the
accommodation they afforded him and his family. If he had
repressed those suspicions at first, they would have been
confirmed by Mr. Gray's response to Mr. Miller's intimation that
he found himself unable to proceed because of a shortage of funds.
In each case Lucar (Vic.) Pty. Ltd. offered to lend Mr. Miller
funds, so that the sales might proceed. It is to be borne in mind
that Mr. Miller has had long experience in commerce, including
money lending. I am persuaded that Mr. Miller believed, when the
sale of the Fintonia Street house was being completed, that the
vendor's object in selling was to put the house beyond the reach
of the vendor's creditors. Mistaken though Mr. Miller was as to
the identity of the person whose creditors were to be defeated,
his state of mind was in my opinion nat that of "a person who
acted in good faith", within the meaning of that expression in
s.121(1), in relation to the transfer of the property.
12.
There will be a declaration that the disposition of
bankrupt's property is void
will hear the
the orders to be made.
representatives of the parties
as against the applicant trustee.
as to the terms
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Dated: 20 Februar a j
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the
I
of
No. 344 of 1983
Counsel for the Applicant Mr. R. M. Johnstone
Solicitors for the Applicant Cornwall Stodart & Co.
Counsel for the Respondent Mr. S.P. Newton
Solicitors for the Respondent Batley Timms & Nicholson
Dates of Hearing 4, 5, 28 and 29 August, 1986