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TOA
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISTON BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL
TERRITORY
No. 448 of 1983
JOSEPH HEDRLIN
Bankrupt
RE:
ORDER
Judge Making Order: Gummow, J.
Where Made: Sydney
Date of Order: 19 March 1987
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The application for annulment is refused.
(2) The application for disch
arge is refused.
(3) The bankrupt is to pay the costs of the Trustee.
Note: Settlement and entry of
Bankruptcy Rule 124.
orders is dealt with in
iN
RUCFIVEN
23 APR 1987
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA
GENERAL DIVISION BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES No. 448 of 1983
AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL
we SS ee
TERRITORY
RE: SOSEPH HEDRLIN
Bankrupt
CORAM: Gummow, J.
DATED: 19 March 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By his amended application filed 2 February 1987 Mr
Hedrlin ("the Applicant") seeks, in substance, an order for
discharge from his bankruptcy, pursuant to s.150 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"). When the application came on
for hearing the Applicant indicated that reliance was to some
extent also placed upon the provisions as to annulment (s. 154
of the Act). Despite the procedural inadequacies of such an
approach, I decided to proceed as if both issues were before
the Court and the hearing was conducted accordingly.
On 3 March 1987 the Trustee sent a notice to creditors
of the hearing of the application for discharge. There were
five creditors in question, particulars being:
Ww
.
Name & Address of Creditor Amount of
Proof Lodged
$
ANZ Bankcard
Sth Floor, 68 Pitt Street
SYDNEY 2000 618.09
Australia & New Zealand Banking
Group Limited
FPoveaux & Commonwealth Street
SYDNEY 2000 2,107.60
Commonwealth Bankcard
4th Floor, 5 Hunter Street
SYDNEY 2000 4,043.16
E.J. Walsh & Company
Level 5, 17 Castlereagh Street
SYDNEY 2000 720.00
The Proprietors of Strata Plan
No. 3670
7-9 Loftus Street
ASHFIELD 2131 6,734.04
No creditors appeared at the hearing.
A sequestration order was made in respect of the
applicant's estate on 18th May 1983. An appeal against that
order was dismissed by the Full Court on 29 June 1983. Since
that date there have been numerous applications to the Court by
the Applicant. A ten page summary 15 included as annexure "C"
to the affidavit of the Trustee sworn 20 February 1987 in the
present application. On 6 March 1986 the Trustee filed a notice
of objection to what otherwise would have been the "automatic"
discharge of the Applicant by force of s.149 of the Act upon
the expiration of three years from the date of the bankruptcy.
Mr Hedrilin represented himself on the present
application. He emphasised with some vehemence his belief that
he should never have been made bankrupt and that he should no
longer remain so. The Trustee (by his solicitor) opposed the
application for discharge and offered submissions to assist the
Court on the application for annulment.
I turn first to the question of annulment. On 30
April 1986 Lockhart J. dismissed what was then the most recent
application for annulment. In doing so his Honour said of Mr
Hedrlin -
"Although some of the matters which he has
mentioned are expressed differently or with
different degrees of emphasis, they do ain
substance, in my view cover the same ground that
has been covered in previous applications for
annulment.
The same, in my view, remains true of the latest
application. Plainly the unsecured debts of the Applicant
which have been proved in the bankruptcy have not been paid in
full, nor has he obtained a legal acquittance of them (s.154(1)
(b)). That leaves the point whether the sequestration order
ought not to have been made (s. 154 (1) (a)). The Applicant
asseverates that he ought not to have been made bankrupt. The
judgment debt of the petitioning creditor was founded upon an
order for costs in proceedings in the Supreme Court of New
South Wales. The history of the matter and the legal
principles and statutory provisions (including the New South
Wales Strata Titles legislation' which are involved are dealt
with in the judgment of the Full Court delivered on 29 June
1983. The matters which were there agitated by the Applicant
were reagitated again before me and reference in particular was
made to the Strata Titles legislation of New South Wales.
On 18 February 1986, Burchett J. delivered a detailed
judgment on an application by Mr Hedrlin for annulment of his
bankruptcy. There had been a number of previous such
applications. That application was said to be on a fresh
ground, viz the sequestration order ought not to have been made
because the Applicant had in fact been able to pay his debts.
Burchett J. dismissed that application. His Honour said that
he was unable to accept the applicant's evidence concerning his
property affairs or income except where 1t was corroborated.
Further, his Honour said he was unable to accept any
explanation of the Applicant's statement of affairs consistent
with the case he was then seeking to make out on the
application for annulment.
There is nothing that has been put to me upon the
present application which takes the Applicant's case upon
annulment any further. In my view no case for annulment has
been made out.
I turn now to the application for discharge. As I
have said, the Trustee opposes the application. He does not
rely upon ss.(5) and (6) of c.150, but points to the width cf
un
the terms of ss.(9) and to decisions such as Re Harding (1981)
57 FLR 320, and Re Shepherd (1985) 4 FCR 258. I should refer
also to the following passage in the judgment of Woodward J. in
Re Maher (1985) 7 FCR 240 at 246:
"An application for discharge from bankruptcy is
never treated lightly by the court. As with the
granting of a sequestration order, an application
for discharge involves looking beyond the
interests of the applicant and his or her
creditors to considering both the interests of the
public and commercial morality, (see Re Mallan
(1975) 25 FLR 20, Re Harding (1981) 57 FLR 320 and
Re Reilly,(1979) 36 FLR 268 at 278). The trustee
reports to the court onan application and may
appear at the hearing of the application to
represent the public interest. In making a
decision under s 150(9), the court has a wide,
unfettered discretion (see Re Harding, and Re
Gianacas; Ex parte Official Receiver (1983) 48 ALR
537)...
In exercising its discretion under subs (9) the
court is not restricted to consideration of
matters of the type listed in subs (6), although
these of course will be relevant."
The Applicant, as I have said, emphasised his belief
that he should not have been made bankrupt and should not
remain so. He gave his account of how his bankruptcy came
about and made critical remarks as to the conduct of the
Trustee and his solicitor. That criticism is unsupported by
the evidence. The Applicant also referred to the social stigma
and embarrassment suffered by his family and to the long period
that has elapsed since the commencement of the bankruptcy.
The Trustee pointed, in particuiar, to the following matters:
{a)
(b)
The only realization in the Estate has been $2.08
credit in a bank account. There is presently before
the Court an application by the Trustee concerning a
property at Woolgoolga. The respondents to the
application are three members of Mr Hedrlin's family.
On 2 November 1983 the Trustee became registered as
tenant-in-common in an half share, in the place of Mr
Hedrlin. Mrs Hedrlin is the other tenant in common.
Mr Hedrliin contended before me on this present
application that at all natural times he held the
legal and equitable title purely as trustee for
members of his family. A son of Mr Hedrlin was in
Court during the hearing. The Trustee by his pending
application seeks orders and declarations which would
operate to deny the creation of any such trust, or
alternatively,to establish that by dint of s.120 of
the Act any settlement is void against the Trustee.
An application by the Trustee under s.305 of the Act
to fund this proceeding has been successful.
The administration of the Estate has been extended and
rendered more difficult and expensive by the conduct
of the Applicant, as instanced both by the large
number of unsucceszful applications to the Court by
the Applicant, and dy the conclusions reached by
Burchett J. in the judgment to which I have referred.
fice fo pe eet
ve Ge
(c) There are passages in the evidence of the Applicant
before Burchett J. on 18 February 1986 in which he
admitted earning income since his bankruptcy and not
notifying the Trustee of this. On 25 February 1986
the Trustee wrote to the Applicant requiring the
provision to him of particulars of that income. In
response to a question from me, Mr Hedrlin said that
he had not replied to that letter, and it is plain
that he has not provided any of the particulars sought
in it. Mr Hedrlin showed no willingness even at this
stage to supply that information.
(d) The Applicant still refuses to acknowledge the
existence of the proved debt of the petitioning
creditor and indicated strongly to me that he will
continue in that refusal. The proved debt of Messrs
E.d. Walsh and Company is also still repudiated by the
Applicant. He indicated 1n his submissions to me some
willingness to deal with the other proved creditors'
debts but it would be appropriate first to see whether
this comes to pass.
Each application for discharge must of course be
viewed in the light of its own circumstances. In the present
case, whilst taking anto account the complex history of this
bankruptcy (including the comparatively small sum of the proved
a
8.
debts and the lapse of time since 1983} and the submissions by
the Applicant, I give great weight to the matters stressed by
the Trustee. Having regard to all the circumstances I have
reached the view that the application for discharge should he
refused.
Accordingly, the applications for annulment and
discharge are refused and the applicant should pay the cost of
the Trustee. The exhibits may be returned.
I certify that this and the seven (7}
preceding pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Mr Justice
Gummow.
Associate: paste fwhs
Date: 19 March 1987
The Applicant in person: Mr doseph Hedrlin
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr P.J. Duggan
Date of Hearing: 16 March 1987
Date of Judgment: 19 March 1987