Abduramanoski, E. & Anor v Aidan Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Aiden City Centre Markets Unit Trust & Ors [1987] FCA 607
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. 607/21.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - interrogatories - application for leave
to interrogate - historical background to leave requirement ~
practice of leave application - criteria - necessity and utility -
flexibility of procedure - use of draft anterrogatories -
determination of leave and objections at one hearing - alternative
short statement of issues - interrogatory by way of request for
particulars ~ interrogatories as to implications.
Federal Court Rules 0.16 r.1
Australian High Court and Federal Court Practice (CCH) Vol.1 5-501
Bray's Law of Discovery and Digest (1885)
Aste v Stumore (1883) 13 QBD 326
Tye v Willoughby (1894) 38 Sol. Jo. 338
Codd v Delop (1906) WN 57, 78
Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd (1982) 2 NSWLR 221
Nella v Kingia Pty Ltd (No. WAG 18 of 1983 unrep. French J.
4/9787)
ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI and ZERA ABDURAMANOSKI v AIDAN NOMINEES PTY
LTD as Trustee for the AIDAN CITY CENTRE MARKETS UNIT TRUST and
BINDOOK PTY LTD
AIDAN NOMINEES PTY LTD as trustee for the AIDAN CITY CENTRE
MARKETS UNIT TRUST v ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI, ZERA ABDURAMANOSKI,
PATRICK EDWARD MULLALLY and JUDITH MARGARET MULLALLY, AND BINDOOK
PTY LTD
NO. WAG 129 of 1986
French J. REE
Perth ar
2 November 1987 « 9NOV (987
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NO. WAG 129 OF 1986
BETWEEN: ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI and
ZERA ABDURAMANOSKI
Applicants
and
AIDAN NOMINEES PTY LTD
as Trustee for the AIDAN CITY CENTRE
MARKETS UNIT TRUST
First Respondent
and
BINDOOK PTY LTD
Second Respondent
AND BETWEEN: AIDAN NOMINEES PTY LTD as
trustee for the AIDAN CITY
CENTRE MARKETS UNIT TRUST
Cross Claimant
and
ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI and
ZERA ABDURAMANOSKI
First Cross Respondents
and
PATRICK EDWARD MULLALLY and
JUDITH MARGARET MULLALLY
Third Parties to the
First Respondent's Cross
Claim
and
BINDOOK PTY LTD
Second Cross Respondent
2.
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: FRENCH J.
DATE OF ORDER: 2 NOVEMBER 1987
WHERE MADE: PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The first respondent do by the 16 November 1987 provide
to the applicants the further and better particulars of
Gefence and counterclaim as ordered by this Court on 24
June 1987.
The first respondent do allow the applicants to inspect
documents numbered 61 on the first respondent's List of
Bo Semenes by 16 November 1987.
The applicants have leave to interrogate the second
respondents in accordance with interrogatories 5 to 12
inclusive, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 23 of their draft
interrogatories filed 22 October 1987.
The applicant have leave to administer interrogatories
to the third parties in accordance with interrogatories
7 to 13 inclusive, 16, 19 except (b)(iii), 23, 24 except
(b) (iii), 25, 26 except (b)(iii), 27 except (c), 29, 30
except (b)(iii), 31, 33 except (c)(iii), 34 except
(c)(iii) of the draft interrogatories filed 22 October
1987.
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The third parties have leave to administer
interrogatories to the applicants in accordance with
the draft interrogatories filed 28 October 1987.
In each case in which leave to interrogate has been
granted the party responding do file and deliver its
answers on or before 23 November 1987.
The question of the applicant's interrogatories to the
first respondent and the first respondent's
interrogatories to the applicant be dealt with on 23
November 1987 at 9.30 am.
The directions hearing be relisted for 1 December 1987
at 9 am.
The costs of 29 October and 2 November 1987 be in the
cause.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AND BETWEEN:
ee ee ew
NO. WAG 129 OF 1986
ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI and
ZERA ABDURAMANOSKI
Applicants
and
AIDAN NOMINEES PTY LTD
as Trustee for the AIDAN CITY CENTRE
MARKETS UNIT TRUST
First Respondent
and
BINDOOK PTY LTD
Second Respondent
AIDAN NOMINEES PTY LTD as
trustee for the AIDAN CITY
CENTRE MARKETS UNIT TRUST
Cross Claimant
and
ESTREF ABDURAMANOSKI and
ZERA ABDURAMANOSKT
First Cross Respondents
and
PATRICK EDWARD MULLALLY and
JUDITH MARGARET MULLALLY
Third Parties to the
First Respondent's Cross
Claim
and
BINDOOK PTY LTD
Second Cross Respondent
CORAM: FRENCH J.
2 November 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Leave to Interrogate)
In January 1984 Estref and Zera Abduramanoski operated a
take-away food business known as "Chicken Hut" at the Glendalough
Shopping Centre.
Aidan Nominees Pty Ltd ("Aidan") was at the time
sub-lessee of basement premises at 726 Hay Street, Perth at which
the Aidan City Centre Market was conducted.
On 17 January, Mr and Mrs Abduramanoski signed an offer
to lease a stall on the Aidan premises from which they intended to
operate another "Chicken Hut" business.
These proceedings arise out of false pre-contractual
representations said to have been made to them by Aidan's agent,
Bindook Pty Ltd ("Bindook"), acting through its employee, Eric
Hamer.
The effect of the alleged representations was that the
applicants would be able to sell at the Aidan market centre the
same range of food stuffs, including cool drinks, which they were
selling at the Glendalough business.
Following the acceptance of their Offer to Lease and
after taking legal advice, the applicants signed an under-lease,
3.
paid a premium of $16,000.00, fitted out premises at the market
and commenced operating the business.
On 17 February solicitors for Aidan wrote to tell them
that they were not permitted to sell cool drinks from their stall.
The company contended that the sale of cool drinks was
in breach of the terms of the under-lease and that they had been
told this at the outset by Hamer.
That message was also said to have been conveyed in
various discussions with the male applicant by one of the
company's employees, David Sherar.
In March 1984 an interlocutory injunction restraining
the applicants from selling cool drinks in the centre was granted
by the Supreme Court. A permanent injunction was granted on 15
May. It was set aside on 31 May to give the applicants leave to
defend.
On about 22 January 1985 Aidan terminated' the
under-lease and, according to the applicants, entered the premises
and seized equipment and money thereon.
The applicants claimed as against Aidan and Bindook
damages for contravention of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974,
4.
They also set up other causes of action against Aidan in
respect of the alleged representation that they would be able to
sell cool drinks from the premises, characterising 1t as a
collateral warranty and, alternatively, as a term imported into
the under-lease.
Fraud and negligent misstatement are also raised on
substantially the same material.
The applicants further seek orders that the under-lease
be set aside or declared void ab initio under s.87 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974.
Aidan has cross-claimed for unpaid rent and damages for
repudiation of the under-lease.
It has also cross-claimed against its former agent,
Bindook, for an indemnity in respect of the applicants' claim.
The applicants have instituted third party proceedings
by way of a cross-claim against the solicitors whom they engaged
to give advice on the terms of the proposed under-lease.
They received advice, so they allege, that the terms of
the under-lease were in order and could be signed by them. It 1s
said that the solicitors were negligent in failing to advise them
that the terms of the under-lease would not permit the sale of
cool drinks.
5.
They also claim that the solicitors failed to advise
that the under-lease could be rescinded or to tell the applicants
of the risks of merely withholding rent.
Proceedings have now reached the stage where pleadings
are closed and discovery has been given.
By way of further directions the applicants seek leave
to interrogate Bindook and their former solicitors. Drafts of the
proposed interrogatories have been filed in Court.
Leave to Interrogate
Before a party to proceedings in this Court may
administer interrogatories, it has to obtain the leave of the
Court to do so. That requirement is imposed by 0.16 r.1] which
provides:-
"1. The Court may, in its discretion, give leave to any
party to file and serve upon any other party, within the
period limited by the Court for this purpose, a notice
requiring the party served to answer interrogatories
relating to any matter in question between' the
interrogating party and the party served."
Although the requirement for leave was only introduced
in the rules of this Court in 1986, it has existed under the
English Rules of the Supreme Court since 1883. Its genesis in
those Rules was explained by Bowen LJ in Aste v Stumore (1883) 13
QBD 326 at 329:-
6.
"Before the Judicature Acts on one side of the law was
the system of Chancery which had applied the principles
of discovery very widely. Upon the other side was the
common law with commercial cases between rich litigants;
ee.» In the Common Law Courts there was not the same view
taken as to interrogatories and the discovery of
documents as in Chancery; there was more difficulty in
getting interrogatories allowed. The Judicature Acts
were passed, and under them every Court was bound to do
complete justice, and, for good or for evil, a new
system of discovery at common law was introduced; they
placed a more perfect, but most expensive, machinery in
the hands of every person. Notwithstanding all the
advantages introduced by the Judicature Acts, they were
followed by a great increase of interlocutory
proceedings; and it became an object of great importance
to prevent the power of discovery being used where it
was not really wanted. In order to check unnecessary
expenditure, the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, have
now provided that except in cases of fraud or breach of
trust, interrogatories are not to be administered
without the leave of the Court."
It is evident from the judgment of Brett MR in the same
case that the leave requirement could not be circumvented by the
consent of the parties:-
"The Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, were made by the
judges, and what I understand the view of the Rule
Committee to have been been is, that they ought to
protect the parties litigant against themselves, even
although it should be said that they consented to
interrogatories such as I have mentioned." (at 329)
Against this background and the recent introduction of a
leave requirement into the Federal Court Rules, there 1s a nice
irony in the contemporary commentary which refers to the absence
of such a requirement in the High Court Rules as "a modern
innovation", and a change which was "clearly an improvement",
speeding up the pre-trial period and easing the burden of the
7.
court - Australian High Court and Federal Court Practice (CCH)
vol.
r.1)
interrogate generally.
at
1 5-501.
The leave given under the English Rules (R.S.C.
was not to administer specific interrogatories but
92 describes the practice on applications for leave
follows:-
application to settle the interrogatories,
"It 1s sufficient therefore if the applicant state the
nature of the action, the issues involved and the
general scope and object of the proposed
interrogatories; if upon that statement 1t appears that
they would be irrelevant, or that the matters intended
to be inquired after are scandalous or come under any of
the objections enumerated in rules 6 and 7 the judge
will exercise his discretion by refusing to allow any
interrogatories to be administered in order to avoid
expense. It is not therefore necessary before the
hearing of the application to serve the other party with
a copy of the proposed interrogatories. All that the
judge has to do is to see that it is a fit case for
interrogating, that the general character of the
proposed interrogatories is not improper, and that it is
not sought to administer them for the mere purpose of
annoyance and worry: where these conditions are
satisfied, if the interrogatories can possibly be in any
degree relevant, the order will be made: the party will
not be tied down to any specific interrogatories
although he must interrogate only as to the particular
points he has put forward, and if he interrogates as to
other matters it will be at the peril of having his
interrogatories struck out... This practice leaves it
open to the judge on any subsequent application under
rule 7 to strike out...any particular interrogatories,
or under rule 6 to relieve the party from answering
them..."
0.31
to
Bray's Law of Discovery and Digest (1885)
as
It is not part of the function of the court on a leave
they should be permitted. - Tye v Willoughby (1894) 38 Sol.
338; Codd v Delop (1906) WN 57, 78.
but to decide whether
Jo.
8.
The discretion conferred by 0.16 r.1 is broad and it 1s
inappropriate to suggest a code of criteria for its exercise.
The purpose underlying it is clear enough however and
that 1s to enable the court to regulate the availability of the
facility of interrogation.
That regulation will have regard to a variety of
factors, but in particular the necessity for and utility of the
proposed interrogatories to the fair and expeditious conduct of
the proceedings.
The factors that may be taken into account at the leave
stage are necessarily wider than the grounds of objection to the
provision of particular interrogatories set out in 0.16 r.6(3),
although these may include considerations which would arise under
that sub-rule. There is, I think, room for flexibility in
practice.
It is plainly not necessary that draft interrogatories
be filed for the purpose of an application for leave under 0.16
rel. However where they are filed and it is convenient to the
parties and the Court to do so, both the question of leave and the
question whether particular interrogatories are objectionable
under 0.16 r.6(3) can be dealt with contemporaneously.
9.
Otherwise the procedure outlined by Bray (supra) is
sufficient. That is to say, the party seeking leave provides
orally or on a short minute an outline of the general scope and
object of the proposed interrogatory.
The Court can then determine on criteria, including
those which I have outlined above, whether leave should be granted
and objection to particular interrogatories, should it arise, can
be taken in the answers and dealt with separately. Against that
background it is now necessary to turn to the application
presently before the Court.
Applicants' Interrogatories for the Second Respondent
The nature of the discretion to grant or withhold leave
to interrogate under 0.16 r.1 does not, in my opinion, require the
provision of elaborate reasons for its exercise in particular
cases. I therefore give no more than a brief indication of views
in respect of the draft interrogatories submitted by the
applicants.
In my opinion leave to interrogate should be given in
respect of proposed interrogatories 5 to 12 inclusive, 17, 18, 19,
21, 22(a) and 23.
on ren ee ee
10.
I decline to grant such leave in_ respect of
interrogatory 1 which has the form of a request for particulars.
Such interrogatories should only be permitted in exceptional cases
- Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd (1982) 2 NSWLR 221; Nella v
Kingia Pty Ltd (No. WAG 18 of 1983 unrep. French J. 4/9/87).
Interrogatories 2, 3 and 4 relate to visits made to the
applicants at Glendalough by Hamer. They concern matters directly
within the applicants' own knowledge and in which they can give
direct evidence which, if uncontradicted, would no doubt stand.
If 1t 1s to be contradicted, the answers will be of little
assistance in this case.
While these interrogatories may be unobjectionable in
form, they are unlikely to involve any saving in costs or
expedition of the case. In this respect the applicants already
have sufficient information to enable them to conduct their case
and leave to interrogate will be refused.
Interrogatories 13, 14, 15 and 16 relate to the exchange
of business cards between the applicants and Hamer. They again
concern matters within the direct knowledge of the applicants
which may be the subject of oral testimony, will not save costs
and are unlikely to affect the applicants' ability to conduct
their case.
ll.
There 1s an additional difficulty with interrogatory 14
that is common to a number of other subsequent interrogatories.
It asks whether Hamer requested the applicants to give him any of
their business cards and asks, inter alia, whether such request
was made by implication. I would need to be persuaded of the
propriety of an interrogatory which asks its addressee about
implications. These may be matters of pleading and inferences
from proven facts. They do not, at least in the present case,
constitute a proper subject for interrogation.
Interrogatory 20 asks whether Hamer advised the
applicants about the content and legal effect of documents signed
by them. Insofar as it asks whether such advice was given "by
implication", I would not allow it. Insofar as it relies upon
oral or written advice, it is a matter on which the applicants are
able to give evidence themselves and in respect of which I do not
consider resort to the interrogatory process justified.
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that interrogatory 22 1s
necessary.
Applicants' Interrogatories for Examination of the Third Parties
I decline to give leave with respect to numbers 1 to 6
inclusive of these draft interrogatories.
12.
Although generally unobjectionable in form, they do not
seem to me to be calculated to materially assist in the conduct of
the applicants' case. They appear to address issues within the
knowledge of the applicants and able to be proven by their own
direct testimony or otherwise of secondary importance.
Leave will be given to administer interrogatories in the
form of those numbered 7 to 13 inclusive in the draft.
Interrogatories 14 and 15 address the question of the
solicitor's knowledge of the acceptance of the offer to lease
which preceded the signing of the under-lease.
The solicitor's knowledge of the acceptance or otherwise
of the applicants' offer to lease prior to the signing of the
under-lease, does not bear directly upon any issue raised on the
pleadings. It is not alleged that in the light of such an
awareness the solicitors should have taken some step which they
failed to do.
The solicitors rely upon the existence of a binding
agreement to enter the under-lease as part of their defence. But
that is a matter which does not depend upon their state of mind.
Leave is declined in respect of interrogatories 14 and 15.
Interrogatory 16 relates to steps taken by the
solicitors to ascertain whether or not the applicants were in
13.
truth legally bound to enter into the under-lease. I have some
hesitation about this interrogatory in relation to the pleadings
but I am prepared to give leave with respect to it.
Interrogatories 17 and 18 are sweeping 1n their coverage
which extends to the "dates of all conferences or discussions
which the third parties had with the applicants or any one of them
or any one on behalf of the applicants concerning the business and
the under-lease". I am not satisfied that these interrogatories
address issues raised on the pleadings with sufficient precision
to warrant the grant of leave.
Leave is granted with respect to interrogatory 19 which
asks whether the third parties provided any advice to _ the
applicants about the under-lease before they signed it. The leave
will extend to para.(b) of interrogatory 19 except insofar as 1t
seeks details of advice "by implication".
I am not satisfied that interrogatories 20, 21 and 22
are justified. Interrogatory 20 asks a rather rhetorical question
as to the solicitors' awareness that the applicants would be
relying upon advice provided to them. The question is artificial
in character. In most circumstances where the provision of legal
acceptance of legal advice is proven, an awareness by the provider
of the advice that its recipient would be relying upon it could be
readily inferred.
14.
I do not understand why interrogatory 21 1s included in
the draft. It asks whether the solicitors requested the
applicants to seek a second opinion in relation to either the
under-lease or the business. It does not appear to bear any
relationship to any issue raised on the pleadings.
Similarly, interrogatory 22 asking whether the
solicitors had provided any disclaimers of responsibility or legal
skill does not address any issue arising on the pleadings. There
1s no suggestion in the defence of reliance upon any disclaimer.
Leave 1s denied in respect of interrogatories 21 and 22.
Interrogatory 23 will be allowed, as will interrogatory
24 except for sub-para. (b)(iii) which inquires after implied
communication by the applicants to their solicitors of the fact
that Aidan had told them before they entered the transaction that
they would be able to sell at City Centre Markets all the items
that they had sold at their shop in Glendalough.
Interrogatory 25 will be allowed, as will interrogatory
26 except for sub-para. (c)(iii) which also addresses questions of
implication.
Similarly interrogatory 27, with the exception of para.
(c), will be allowed.
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15.
Interrogatory 28 asks whether the solicitors had asked
the applicants why they were of the view that they would be able
to sell cool drinks in their business. This 15 a matter which is
within the direct knowledge of the applicants, and a matter on
which they can give testimony and in respect of which the conduct
of their case 1S not materially assisted by the administration of
interrogatories.
Interrogatory 29 will be permitted and interrogatory 30
except for sub-para.(b)(iii)} relating to implied advice.
Leave will also be given for interrogatory 31, but
interrogatory 32, which relates to the conduct by the solicitors
of other proceedings on behalf of the applicants, deals with
matters within the knowledge of the applicants. Their case is
not, in my opinion, materially advanced by it.
I give leave to administer interrogatory 33 except for
33(c)(iii), which again deals with advice by implication.
Similarly interrogatory 34 will be permitted except in relation to
sub-para. (c)(iii) dealing with the client advice.
Interrogatories of the Third Parties for the Applicants
These interrogatories are comparatively brief and,
subject to any objections which may be taken to any of them, I am
prepared to grant leave for them to be administered.
16.
I will now hear the parties as to consequential
directions.
I certify that this and the preceding
fifteen (15) pages are a true copy
of the Reasons for Judgment of his
Honour Justice French.
Associate: Ey oral Ure
Date: ao \\ O7
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms. C. Tan
Solicitors for the Applicant: Dwyer Durack
No appearance for First Respondent
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr S. Scott
Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Stables & Co.
Counsel for the Third Parties to the First Respondents Cross
Claim: Mr R.£. Birmingham
Instructed by: Marks Healy & Sands
Date of Hearing: 29 October 1987
Date of Judgment: 2 November 1987