Robinswood Pty Ltd v. Stanley, B. & Ors v. [1987] FCA 632
Federal Court of Australia
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"JUDGMENT No. 632.../, 8-1
BANKRUPTCY - deed o
arrangement - deed to terminate after certain
costs paid and distribution to creditors made - all payments made
- proceedings pending in District Court between applicant and
debtors - application under s.233(2)(b)(ii) Bankruptcy Act for
leave to proceed with counterclaim - applicant contended that deed
not terminated as terms not strictly complied with - technical and
insubstantial argument - application dismissed.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss.233, 234, 235, 236
ROBINSWOOD PTY LTD v BARRY STANLEY and LEE BERNADETTE HORSMAN and
the Trustee of their estate ANTHONY HAYES DOUGLAS-BROWN
NO. 101 OF 1984 X
FRENCH J.
PERTH "Vp
18 November 1987
Ro VED
Z ONOV 1987
FEDERAL COURT OF
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ee ee
NO. 101 OF 1984 x
BETWEEN: ROBINSWOOD PTY LTD
Applicant
and
BARRY STANLEY and LEE BERNADETTE
HORSMAN and the Trustee of their
estate ANTHONY HAYES DOUGLAS-BROWN
Respondents
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: FRENCH J.
DATE OF ORDER: 18 November 1987
WHERE MADE: PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application 1s dismissed.
2. The applicant 1S to pay the respondents' costs to be
taxed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with
in Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT )
OF AUSTRALIA )
WESTERN AUSTRALIA )
DISTRICT REGISTRY )
GENERAL DIVISION )
NO. 101 OF 1984 xX
BETWEE Ne ROBINSWOOD PTY LTD
Applicant
and
BARRY STANLEY and LEE BERNADETTE
HORSMAN and the Trustee of their
estate ANTHONY HAYES DOUGLAS-BROWN
Respondents
CORAM: FRENCH J.
18 November 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by Robinswood Pty Ltd for leave
to proceed with a counterclaim against Barry and Lee Horsman in
District Court proceedings commenced by the Horsmans against
Robinswood. Leave is sought under' s.233(2)(b)(1i) of the
Bankruptcy Act on the basis that a deed of arrangement between the
Horsmans and their creditors is still in force.
The District Court proceedings arise out of a contract
made between the parties on 21 November 1983.
Under the admitted terms of the contract, the Horsmans were to
harvest crops from land owned by Robinswood at $5.50 per acre. It
is common ground that 3,195 acres were harvested but, according to
the Horsmans, they were short paid $8,887.00 and their claim is
for that amount and for damages.
2.
Robinswood has counterclaimed alleging a failure to
commence the work on time and a failure to use the agreed number
of harvester machines.
It also alleges that the Horsmans negligently caused
damage to a field bin while operating one of their machines. The
total damages the subject of the counterclaim amount' to
$17,550.00.
The action was commenced on 16 May 1984.
However on 2 October 1984 the Horsmans executed a deed
of arrangement pursuant to a special resolution passed at a
meeting of their creditors held on 13 September 1984.
The controlling trustee is Anthony Hayes Douglas-Brown.
The central provision of the deed was clause 5 whicn, in
effect, required that the Horsmans would, on or before 31 March
1986, pay their creditors enough to yield a minimum dividend of 25
cents in the dollar.
By clause 12 the deed was to terminate after payment of
administration costs, priority debts and aé distribution of
remaining funds pro rata among the unsecured creditors. Upon
termination the debtors would be released from all provable debts.
3.
The Horsmans and the trustee maintain that, the terms of
the deed having been satisfied, the Court should find that it has
terminated and no leave is required. They will, in that event,
plead the release as a defence to Robinswood's counterclaim on the
basis that it 1s, by force of sub-s.233(1) of the Act, bound by
the terms of the deed.
Robinswood contends that the deed was never terminated
as 1ts terms were never strictly complied with.
In considering these submissions it 1S necessary first
to address in more detail the relevant provisions of the deed.
The Deed of Arrangement
The deed was made between the Horsmans, jointly and
severally, and the trustee. By clause 2 they assigned to the
trustee all their interest in their divisible property, save for
certain plant and equipment and a school bus business. In lieu of
the excluded property, they were to pay to him, within 30 days, a
sum of $10,500.00 (clause 4).
Clause 5 provided:-
4.
"The Debtors shall pay to the Trustee on or before 3lst
March, 1986 the sum (1f any) which 1s sufficient when
aggregated with the moneys (if any) payable by the
Debtors under clause 4 and 6 to pay to each unsecured
creditor at least 25 cents in the dollar for each debt
approved by the Trustee in the separate estates each of
the Debtors and the joint estate to be dealt with by the
Trustee in accordance with the provisions hereof."
Clause 6 covered the contingency that the school bus
business might be sold or assigned by the debtors prior to 31
March 1986 and required in that case that all proceeds of such
sale or assignment were to be paid to the trustee.
Clause 8 regulated the mode of payment to the trustee
and his disposition of the funds received:-
"Subject to clause 9 the proceeds of the realisation of
assets in accordance with clauses 2 and 3 and the moneys
payable by the Debtors in accordance with clause 4, 5
(1f any) and 6 (if any) and all other property and funds
(if any) the subject of this Deed shall be paid into the
account of the Trustee and shall be applied by the
Trustee in making payments in the order prescribed by
Sections 108-114 of the Act as modified by Section
237(2)."
Under clause 1] the deed was to bind all creditors:-
"This Deed shall bind the secured creditors of the
Debtors as well as the unsecured creditors PROVIDED THAT
nothing in this Deed shall affect the right of a secured
creditor to realise or otherwise deal with their
security."
The termination provision, clause 12, was in the
following terms:-
5.
"This Deed shall terminate:~
(a) upon the payment in full of all costs' and
disbursements of the administration of this Deed
including the remuneration of the Trustee and
payment ain full of all priority debts and the
distribution of the balance of the funds' the
subject of this Deed pro rata among the unsecured
creditors whose debts have been admitted to proof
by the Trustee; and
(b) otherwise in accordance with Section 235 of the
Act."
The consequential release was provided for in clause
13:-
"If this Deed of Arrangement is terminated in such a
manner that the termination 1s not deemed to be an act
of bankruptcy pursuant to any section of the Act then
upon such termination the Debtors shall be released from
all provable debts."
Upon release under clause 13, clause 14 provided that
the trustee's interest in any unrealised assets would cease and he
was to re-transfer any such interest to the Horsmans.
Statutory Framework
The requirement for leave in respect of legal
proceedings against a debtor under a deed of arrangement is
imposed by s.233 of the Act which provides:-
"233(1) A deed of arrangement that is entered into in
accordance with this Part and complies with the
requirements of this Part 1s, upon being duly
executed by the debtor and the trustee, binding on
all the creditors of the debtor.
6.
(2) Subject to sub-sections (3) and (4), where a
deed of arrangement has become binding on the
debtor's creditors, it is not competent for a
creditor, so long as the deed remains in force -
(a) to present a creditor's petition against the
debtor, or to proceed with such a petition
presented before the deed became so binding,
in respect of a provable debt; or
(b) except with the leave of the Court and on such
terms as the Court imposes -
(1) to enforce any remedy = against the
property or person of the debtor in
respect of a provable debt; or
(ii) to commence any legal proceeding in
respect of a provable debt or take any
fresh step in such a proceeding.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the right of a
secured creditor to realize or otherwise deal with
his security.
(4) Nothing in this section shall he taken to
prevent a creditor from enforcing any - remedy
against a debtor who has executed a deed of
arrangement, or against any property of such a
debtor that is not vested in the trustee of the
deed, in respect of any liability of the debtor
under a maintenance agreement or maintenance order
{whether entered into or made, as the case may be,
before or after the commencement of this
sub-section) ."
Statutory backing 1s given to the release clauses in
deeds of arrangement by s.234:-
"234(1) Except in so far as the deed provides for the
release of the debtor from his debts, a deed of
arrangement does not operate to release the debtor
from any of his debts.
(2) Where a deed of arrangement provides that the
debtor is to be released from one or more of his
debts, the release is binding on the creditor or
creditors to whom that debt or those debts was or
were owing."
7.
Provision for termination of the deed is made in s.235:-
"235. A deed of arrangement is terminated by -
(b) the passing of a special resolution to that effect
by a meeting of creditors called for the purpose;
(c) an order of the Court to that effect under section
236; or
(d) the occurrence of any circumstances or event on the
occurrence of which the deed provides that it is to
terminate."
Whether the Deed is Terminated
The requirement that Robinswood obtain leave to proceed
with its counterclaim will only arise if the deed 1s still in
force and has not been terminated.
The trustee has given evidence in this case that the
total amount of ordinary unsecured creditors admitted in the
estate was $76,895.23.
He produced a print-out which showed that as at 24 March
1986, with one exception, all creditors had been paid a dividend
of 25 cents in the dollar. The exception was a firm of
solicitors, Messrs. Bryant & Owen, who had submitted a late proof
and were paid their dividend of $95.05 on 13 May 1986.
8.
It 1s, however, apparent that all contributions
necessary to enable that dividend and the preceding dividends to
be paid, had been made long before 31 March,
The trustee was cross-examined by counsel for Robinswood
and reference was made to other payments made in May 1986 in
connection with the trustee's remuneration and the administration
of the estate.
In his closing submissions, counsel contended that the
25 cent dividend on the total sum of $76,895.23 representing
admitted creditors, would require a contribution of $19,223.80 on
the part of the debtors. In fact, 1t was said, a summary of
receipts and payments showed total debtor contributions of only
$19,109.15.
This alleged discrepancy was never put to the trustee in
cross-examination, but only raised in final submissions. Whatever
the explanation for the figure that appears in the summary of
receipts and payments, it is apparent from the running list of
cash book entries that the trustee had by 31 March 1986 received
sufficient to pay out a 25 cent dividend to every creditor.
It was further contended that some of the payments shown
on the cash book summary came from sources other than the debtors
and therefore did not accord with the provisions of clause 5.
9.
Even 1f this contention had any merit in so far as the
proper construction of clause 5 is concerned, it does not affect
the operation of the termination provision, clause 12, which is
concerned only with the fact of payment and not its source.
Counsel further submitted that one payment to. the
trustee had been made after 31 March 1986 and this somehow
constituted a non-compliance with the requirements of the deed.
As to that the record of receipts showed an amount of $500.00
received on 10 May 1986.
This sum was received from Kekerwich Pty Ltd, a debtor
of the Horsmans, and was brought into the estate after the
creditors had been paid in order to cover excess costs incurred by
the trustee.
There was, under the deed, no time limit for the payment
of the trustee's costs and while the timing of that payment might
affect the date upon which the deed should be said to have
terminated, it could not defeat the operation of the termination
clause.
The termination of the deed was not affected by the fact
that a firm of solicitors submitted a late proof to receive
payment of the 25 cent dividend on 13 May 1986. The provisions of
clause 5 did not require payment of the dividend by 31 March.
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10.
Nor in its terms did the deed require payment of the
trustee's costs and costs of administration of the estate before
that date. It provided that the deed was to terminate when all
such costs had been paid and a distribution to creditors effected.
I am satisfied that that has happened and, in my opinion, the deed
has terminated.
The grounds upon which it was suggested that the deed
has not terminated were of a technical and = insubstantial
character. Had I felt obliged to accept that they defeated the
operation of the termination clause I would, in any event, have
declined to grant the leave sought and left the trustee to call a
meeting of creditors to terminate the deed by special resolution.
In that regard, I note that a meeting of creditors was
called on 24 April 1986 and passed resolutions approving the
trustee's fees and certain other costs of the estate.
The meeting also resolved that the debtors had completed
the terms of the deed of arrangement and should be released as
having complied with the terms of the deed.
These were not special resolutions and could not have
any determining effect under s.235(b).
In the result, the application for leave will be
dismissed on the basis that the deed of arrangement has been
terminated.
os
ll.
The consequence of that termination in terms of any
release binding on Robinswood will, I think, be a matter for the
District Court, as will any question of mutual debts and credits
that might arise under s.237(2) and s.86 of the Act.
I certify that this and the preceding
ten (10) pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment of his Honour
Justice French.
Associate: Delse-olh Writs
Date: ({% Nowento! 1457
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B. Wheatley
Solicitors for the Applicant: Corser & Corser
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr R. Cullen
Solicitors for the Respondents: McManus Cullen & Clements
Date of Hearing: 2 September 1987
Date of Judgment: 18 November 1987
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