Serra-Sanfelin, Re D.H. Bankruptcy, Ex parte The Official Trustee in [1988] FCA 349
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. 2°. 7.523 onus
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY —- Sub-s.109(10) Bankruptcy Act 1966 - Application
by trustee for order conferring advantage on indemnifying
creditors with respect to distribution of recovered asset -
Asset recovered without resorting to litigation - Bankruptcy
Amendment Act 1985 - What is meant by "recovered under an
indemnity for costs of litigation" - Principles applicable to
determination of degree of advantage which should be conferred.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 sub-ss.109(10), 116(1), 152(1), 153(1),
154(1), iets, para.58(1)(b)
Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1985
RE: DAVID HAROLD SERRA~SANFELIN EX PARTE: THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY the Trustee of the property of David Harold
Serra-Santelin
NO. 171 OF 1980
LEE J.
PERTH
30 JUNE 1988
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
OF THE STATE OF
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT )
)
)
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
NO. 171 OF 1980
RE: DAVID HAROLD SERRA-SANFELIN
EX PARTE: THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY the Trustee of the
property of David Harold
Serra-Sanfelin
Applicant
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: LEE J.
DATE OF ORDER:
WHERE MADE:
30 JUNE 1988
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.
The sum of $45,000 recovered by the trustee
indemnities for costs of litigation,
under
less deductions for
relevant fees, costs and expenses, be distributed in the
following manner:
(a)
(b)
The sum of $12,000 be distributed to the
indemnifying creditors pro rata; and
the balance, after payment of costs and
expenses of administration, be distributed to
creditors of the separate estate and the
remaining surplus to creditors of the joint
estate of the bankrupt and Graeme John Jones.
action to include the joint estate of the bankrupt
Graeme John Jones.
The applicant be granted leave to amend the title of the
and
So much of the trustee's costs as do not exceed $1,000
be paid as part of the expenses of recovery of the
property the subject of this application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with
in Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
were rr
NO. 171 OF 1980
RE: DAVID HAROLD SERRA-SANFELIN
EX PARTE: THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY the Trustee of the
property of David Harold
Serra-Sanfelin
Applicant
CORAM: LEE J.
30 June 1988
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by the trustee of the property of
the bankrupt seeking orders pursuant to sub-s.109(10) of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") which will have the effect of
giving creditors who gave the trustee an indemnity for costs of
litigation an advantage over other creditors with respect to the
distribution of property of the bankrupt recovered by the trustee
consequent upon such indemnities having been provided by those
creditors.
The trustee of the bankrupt's estate 1s the Official
Trustee 1n Bankruptcy ("the trustee"). The bankrupt had carried
on business in partnership as a building contractor. The bankrupt
and his partner presented a joint debtor's petition on 15 April
1980.
The debts owing to unsecured creditors of the joant
estate were approximately $190,000. The debts due to the
unsecured creditors of the separate estate of the bankrupt
amounted to approximately $8,800.
The respective estates were duly administered by the
realization of assets and the distribution of dividends.
The joint estate of the bankrupt and his partner made a
distribution to unsecured creditors of 2.082 cents in the dollar
after payment of priority creditors. In the separate estate of
the bankrupt a dividend of 42.22 cents in the dollar was
distributed.
The bankrupt was discharged from his bankruptcy on 12
July 1983.
In November 1985 the trustee became aware that the
bankrupt had made application to become registered as the
proprietor of land of which he claimed to be entitled either as a
beneficiary of his late father's estate or through rights of
adverse possession. The trustee lodged caveats against the
property after making enquiries and forming the view that the land
in which the bankrupt claimed an interest was an asset of the
estate of the bankrupt which had vested in the trustee upon the
commencement of the bankrupt's bankruptcy.
In March 1986 a meeting of the creditors of the joint
estate of the bankrupt and his partner and of the separate estate
of the bankrupt was held to decide what action should be taken in
respect of the newly discovered item of property in the bankrupt's
estate. The meeting resolved that an opinion be obtained from the
trustee's solicitors and that the costs thereof be borne by the
creditors present in proportion to their proofs of debt.
The trustee's solicitors provided advice and recommended
that the opinion of counsel be obtained.
The trustee instructed solicitors to obtain the advice
of counsel. In July 1986 counsel advised that the bankrupt had
succeeded to the property upon his father's death which had
occurred after the commencement of the bankruptcy but before the
discharge of the bankrupt. Counsel concluded that the property
was, therefore, property divisible amongst the creditors of the
bankrupt's estate pursuant to sub-s.116(1) of the Act. Counsel
advised the trustee that pursuant to para.58(1)(b) of the Act, the
property vested in the trustee upon being vested in or devolved
upon the bankrupt.
Counsel did not discuss the effect of discharge of the
bankrupt but it is clear that pursuant to sub-s.152(1) and in the
absence of any order of annulment under sub-s.154(1) with
consequent reversion of the property to the bankrupt under
4.
sub-s.154(2), the property remained vested in the trustee for the
purpose of realization and distribution to the creditors of the
bankrupt's separate and joint estates. The creditors retained
rights to receive distributions from those estates in respect of
the unsatisfied debts notwithstanding that the bankrupt personally
had been released from those debts upon discharge from his
bankruptcy pursuant to sub~-s.153(1) of the Act.
Another meeting of joint creditors of the bankrupt and
his partner and the separate creditors of the bankrupt was held on
19 December 1986 to consider the opinion the trustee had received.
The meeting was advised that 1t appeared to be necessary
for the trustee to commence legal proceedings to obtain orders
allowing him to deal with the bankrupt's property. The creditors
were advised that if such litigation were successful the creditors
of the bankrupt's separate estate would be paid in full and
creditors of the joint estate would receive a further dividend of
approximately 16 cents in the dollar.
The meeting resolved that the trustee be authorized to
institute legal proceedings to establish the interest of the
trustee in the bankrupt's properties and to realize that property.
At that meeting creditors were informed that the trustee would
require the creditors to provide indemnities in respect of his
legal costs before proceedings could be commenced. The creditors
were informed of the provisions of sub-s.109(10) of the Act which
allowed creditors who had provided such indemnities to receive an
advantage over other creditors.
In the notice of meeting forwarded to creditors, the
trustee advised creditors that he had received legal opinions
expressing the view that he had a good claim to the bankrupt's
half anterest in the property in question, He further advised
creditors that the bankrupt had offered to compromise the
trustee's claim by payment of a sumof $5,000. The trustee
informed creditors that a valuation of the property as at
September 1980 indicated that the bankrupt's half share was worth
approximately $37,000. Notice of the meeting of 19 December 1986
was forwarded to all creditors of each estate at the last
addresses notified to the trustee. In some cases notices were
returned unclaimed and the trustee made further efforts to trace
those creditors and obtain an alternative address to which another
copy of the notice could be forwarded.
After the meeting of creditors held on 19 December 1986
had resolved that the trustee be authorized to commence legal
proceedings, the trustee, 1n January 1987, forwarded a notice to
creditors that the trustee required to be indemnified for the
costs of that action. The notice specified that the costs were
anticipated to be approximately $9,000 and the notice also set out
the text of sub-s.109(10) in full. Creditors were advised that
should insufficient or unsatisfactory indemnities be received the
matter would not proceed.
6.
As a result of that notice eleven creditors of the joint
estate provided indemnities for the trustee's costs. One of those
creditors limited his liability under that indemnity to the sum of
$1,000. There were only two creditors of the separate estate and
neither creditor provided an indemnity. According to the
trustee's affidavit there were erghty-four creditors who lodged
proofs of debt in the joint estate and another ten creditors who
had been identified as creditors of that estate but had not
proved.
The eleven creditors providing indemnities represented
approximately 27% of the value of the total debts of the joint
estate and approximately 31% of the value of the proved claims
lodged in that estate.
The indemnity provided by the eleven creditors was in
the following form:
"IN CONSIDERATION of your undertaking such steps,
actions, proceedings or suits aS you may be
advised to obtain an Order from the Court claiming
the Official Receiver's half anterest in the
properties at T7 Stone Street, Bayswater,
presently registered in the name of David Harold
Serra-Sanfelin and for the realisation of that
interest.
TWO. ccc cece cece eee teen ee ence a
creditor...in the abovenamed estate hereby agree
that I will pay to you on demand all costs,
charges, expenses and sums of damages for which
you may become liable, pay, incur or sustain in
respect of or arising out of or in connection with
such steps, actions, proceedings or suits
(including appeals)."
Upon receipt of the indemnities the trustee authorized
solicitors to take such steps as were necessary to establish the
trustee's interest in the bankrupt's property.
The trustee's solicitors made formal demand upon the
bankrupt on behalf of the trustee as a result of which
negotiations to compromise the matter were commenced.
The bankrupt offered to pay to the trustee a sum of
$45,000 in full settlement of the rights of the trustee.
This proposal was placed before a duly convened meeting
of the creditors of the joint and separate estates of the bankrupt
on 10 July 1987. Creditors attending that meeting resolved
unanimously to authorize the trustee to accept the offer of
settlement proposed by the bankrupt.
The trustee did compromise the matter by receiving the
sum of $45,000. It is said that after payment of various fees and
disbursements the amount available for distribution to creditors
will be approximately $37,000.
In bringing this application for consideration of an
order to advantage the creditors who have provided an indemnity,
the trustee has given notice of the application to all creditors
and that notice has provided a summary of relevant facts.
On the hearing of the application no creditor sought to
oppose an order being made to advantage the creditors who had
provided indemnities.
Although the creditors of the separate estate did not
provide indemnities, it may not have been reasonable to expect
them to have done so. At the time indemnities were sought' the
amount still owing to creditors of the separate estate was only
approximately $5,000 and the bankrupt was offering to pay that sum
to the trustee without the trustee taking any further step in the
matter,
The terms of sub-s.109(10) are as follows:
"Where in any bankruptcy -—
(a) property has been recovered, realized or
preserved under an andemnity for costs of
litigation given by a creditor or creditors;
or
(b) expenses in relation to which a creditor has,
or creditors have, indemnified a trustee have
been recovered,
the Court may, upon the application of the trustee
or a creditor, make such orders as 1t thinks just
and equitable with respect to the distribution of
that property and the amount of those expenses so
recovered with a view to giving the indemnifying
creditor or creditors, as the case may be, an
advantage over others in consideration of the £15k
assumed by creditor or creditors."
9.
The indemnity provided by creditors to the trustee was
for such costs, charges and expenses which the trustee may have
incurred or sustained in respect of steps, actions, proceedings or
suits undertaken to obtain an order from the Court in respect of
the bankrupt's property.
The question that arises is whether the property
recovered in the estate, the sum of $45,000, was so recovered
under an indemnity for costs of litigation.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1985 it was
necessary to show that property had been recovered by means of an
indemnity for costs of litigation (at that time sub-s.109(6)).
After the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1985 it became necessary to
show that the property had been recovered under an indemnity for
costs of litigation.
The phrase "by means of" may have required some causal
relationship, not necessarily direct, to be demonstrated. (See
discussion of meaning of phrase "by reason of" in Vickers v.
Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1982) 43 A.L.R. 389,
407 per Morling J.)
Before the amendment it had been suggested that the
meaning of the word "recovered" was limited by the context
provided by the words "by means of an indemnity for costs of
litigation", In Re Passmore; Ex parte Official Receiver in
Bankruptcy (1984) 56 A.L.R. 181 Northrop J. said at p.184:
10.
"The court is required to construe the words
'recovered or preserved' appearing in the opening
part of s.109(6) of the Act. It is apparent that
they are to be construed in the context of
litigation. In that context the word 'recover'
signifies to recover by legal action, normally by
the judgment of a court. It is quite correct to
refer, for example, to the recovery of damages for
personal injuries even though the legal
proceedings in which damages are sought result in
a settlement being reached."
and at p.186, for the purposes of the Act, the meaning of the
words "recovered or preserved" meant:
",..recovered or preserved in some action, matter
or proceeding in a court of law."
However, in several earlier cases where the trustee had
relied upon an indemnity for the costs of litigation in taking any
step to assert his right to a bankrupt's property, it had been
held that assets recovered by those steps without resort to
litigation were assets recovered by means of the indemnity. In Re
A. and M. Myerson (1908) 25 W.N. (N.S.W.) 136 Street J. stated at
p.137:
"I am not going to attempt to put an exhaustive
interpretation upon the words 'by means of'. Each
case must depend upon its own circumstances, but I
think that in every case the Court must see, not
merely that the assets in question were recovered
after the giving of the indemnity, but that were
it not for the indemnity they would probably not
have been recovered at all, or at least that the
protection and assurance afforded to the official
assignee by the indemnity have been material
factors in rendering possible and helping towards
and facilitating the recovery of the assets
claimed to have been recovered by means of such
indemnity."
11.
and at p.138:
"Nearly the whole of this amount was recovered
without hostile litigation being resorted to, but
if the indemnity comes within the terms of the
section I do not think that it is necessary that
in every case hostile litigation should have been
embarked upon before the provisions of the section
can be brought into operation."
In that case the Official Assignee had recovered monies
from various sources by letters of request and demand without
resort to litigation but had made demand only after receiving the
indemnities in respect of his costs of litigation.
In Re Farrow (1956) 18 A.B.C. 225 the Official Receiver
demanded repayment of monies the Official Receiver claimed to have
been preferential payments. The demand was refused. The Official
Receiver obtained counsel's opinion and thereafter an indemnity
from creditors for the costs of litigation. The Court then
granted leave to the Official Receiver to institute proceedings
and to recover the disputed payments. However, the creditor paid
the amounts previously demanded upon becoming aware that leave to
institute proceedings had been granted without any formal litigous
step having been taken. In that case Jeffriess J. said at p.229:
"By the indemnity, it appears to me that the
creditors who signed have subjected themselves' to
the risk of having to pay the costs of adverse
litigation. According to the affidavit of the
official receiver, he would not have taken any
further action or made any further demand against
12.
Burns Philp and Co. Limited had those creditors
not given the indemnity...Therefore I conclude
that the protection and assurance afforded to the
official receiver by the indemnities have been the
material factor in bringing about the recovery of
these moneys and that the official receiver would
not have incurred the expense and risk which he
did and take the action which he did, unless he
had been secured against personal loss by the
indemnity, especially as Burns Philp and Co. Ltd
had made it clear from the outset that the claim
would be resisted. For these reasons I hold that
the assets have been recovered by means of an
indemnity for the costs of litigation within the
meaning of s.84(2) of the Bankruptcy Act."
The effect of the 1985 amendments to s.109 have been
considered by Pincus J. in Re Webb; Ex parte Taylor (1987) 75
A.L.R. 139. At pp.141-142 his Honour said:
"The expression 'recovered under an indemnity for
costs of litigation' is a little elliptical. It
seems to mean ''recovered by reason of steps taken
under an indemnity for costs of litigation'; an
indemnity cannot itself directly bring about
recovery. Counsel argued that there is no
intention in the section to give a creditor an
advantage by reason of having given an indemnity
for the costs of any investigation with a view to
possible litigation and referred to in Re A
Shadler Ltd (1905) 5 SR(NSW) 33. In that case
Walker J. held that s.77 of the Bankruptcy Act
1899 (NSW) applied in a winding up under the
Companies Act but that, giving that section (which
was similar in terms so far as_ relevant to
s109(10)) a strict interpretation, the costs of
inquiry into whether or not litigation should be
instituted were not covered by the section. It
follows from Shadler's case that here, if there
had been an indemnity only for the costs of
investigation, the section would not have applied;
but the indemnity in the end covered both
investigation and litigation, as it did not in
Shadler''s case.
The question whether the property was recovered
'under' the indemnity is one of some difficulty.
Giving the provision the construction mentioned in
13.
the preceding paragraph, however, I find that the
property was so recovered. It seems a reasonable
inference that it was the threat of immediate
litigation which induced Mr. Webb to offer to
transfer the properties, and that threat was made
in the course of the solicitors pursuing their
retainer covered by the indemnity for the costs of
litigation. In my view, that indemnity covered
the preliminary steps such as preparing the court
papers and writing a letter of demand."
In the present case the indemnity is not an indemnity
limited to the costs of litigation. It extends to costs or
charges incurred in respect of such steps as the trustee may be
advised to take to obtain an order from the Court. Furthermore,
the trustee made it plain that he would take no steps to proceed
to obtain a court order in respect of the property unless' such
indemnities were received.
Whatever the meaning of the expression "recovered under
an indemnity" may be, it is apparent that replacement of the
phrase "by means of" with the word "under" does not display any
intention to contract the scope of operation of the section, and,
to the contrary, may show an intention to loosen the nexus of a
causal relationship.
Ifa trustee or creditor is able to show that an
indemnity for costs of litigation has been provided and that the
trustee relied upon that indemnity in taking steps preparatory to
litigation as a result of which property was recovered for the
estate, such circumstances will come within the meaning of the
words ""property...recovered...under an indemnity for costs of
litigation."
14.
I am satisfied that the provisions of sub-s.109(10)
apply to the facts of the present case.
Accordingly the Court 18 empowered to make such order as
it considers to be just and equitable with regard to the
distribution of the property recovered with a view to giving
indemnifying creditors an advantage over others in consideration
of the risk assumed.
The risk assumed by the indemnifying creditors must
therefore be assessed.
Before the indemnity was requested and given, the
trustee had already obtained advice from solicitors and counsel's
opinion which expressed the view that the trustee had a good claim
to the bankrupt's property. Furthermore, before the trustee
sought an indemnity in respect of his costs of litigation
estimated to be approximately $9,000, the bankrupt had already
offered, without prejudice, to settle the trustee's claim by
payment of a sum of $5,000.
It would not be appropriate to conclude that the
indemnifying creditors had exposed themselves to a_ substantial
risk. The costs of litigation would have been shared by eleven
creditors and an individual creditor's liability may have been
comparatively modest. (See Re M.L. Ried (1946) 13 A.B.C. 287.)
15.
At worst no indemnifying creditor would have been likely to have
been called upon to pay more than the $1,000 to which one of their
number limited his exposure under the indemnity.
As is stated in Re Manson; Ex Parte the Official
Assignee [1897] 18 L.R.(N.S.W.) B & P 45, each case must stand on
its own facts and it is for the Court to weigh up all the
circumstances including the amount of risk run by the indemnifying
creditors, the amount recovered, the proportion between the debts
of indemnifying creditors and non-indemnifying creditors and any
other matters considered to be relevant. In assessing the degree
of risk, of course, the Court must be careful not to rely too
strongly on the benefit of hindsight.
I am of the opinion that the indemnifying creditors did
undertake a risk, although not major, and they are entitled to
some advantage. It would not be proper to disturb the anticipated
distribution in full to the creditors of the separate estate and
it must be remembered that the indemnifying creditors represent
less than one-third of the total proved debts of the joint estate.
The proceeds of the property recovered in respect of
which an order may be made under sub-s.109(10) are the net
proceeds after deduction of relevant remuneration, legal costs and
expenses which deductions will not include the cost of work done
prior to the receipt of indemnity. Some of the outstanding fees
and disbursements recited by the trustee in his affidavit appear
16.
to relate to costs incurred prior to the receipt of indemnity and
if so they should be charged against the general administration
and not deducted from the proceeds received. (See Re Ehrat and
Danglmaier (1976) 12 A.L.R. 566.)
Accordingly, the appropriate order would be that the sum
of $45,000 recovered by the trustee under indemnities for costs of
litigation, less deductions for relevant fees, costs and expenses,
be distributed in the following manner:
(a) The sum of $12,000 be distributed to the
indemnifying creditors pro rata; and
(b) the balance, after payment of costs and
expenses of administration, be distributed to
creditors of the separate estate and the
remaining surplus to creditors of the joint
estate of the bankrupt and Graeme John Jones.
Leave will be granted to amend the title of the
application to include the joint estate of the bankrupt and Graeme
John Jones, the trustee having given appropriate notice of the
application to all creditors of the joint estate.
I will receive submissions from counsel on the question
of costs of the application.
17.
I certify that the preceding
sixteen (16) pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment of his Honour
Justice Lee.
Associate: fetnaa Calull
Date: 4ot Gere, (98s.
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. R. Harrison
Solicitors for the Applicant: Messrs. Warren Harrison
The following indemnifying creditors appeared on their own behalf:
Mr. D. Campbell
Allied Glass Pty. Ltd. through its representative Miss F. Grey
Date of Hearing: 22 February, 8 March 1988
Date of Judgment: 30 June 1988