Mansions of Australia P/L v. Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd [1994] FCA 772
Federal Court of Australia
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UUDGMENT No. scl ZeQual TF...
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 450 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
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BETWEEN:
MANSIONS OF AUSTRALIA
PTY LIMITED
Applicant
AND:
CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM: SACKVILLE J. RECEIV
PLACE: SYDNEY EIVED
DATE : 19 OCTOBER 1994 25 OCT 1994
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
NS FOR NT
HIS HONOUR: This is an application to amend the statement of
claim by the addition of further particulars to paragraph 5 of
the statement of claim as originally filed. Paragraph 5 contains
an allegation that the document in issue in this case, described
as "Masterpiece Coverage Comparison", was published in
circumstances that constituted conduct that was misleading or
deceptive or likely to be misleading or deceptive in
contravention of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974.
The particulars originally provided alleged that the document
contained statements concerning the applicant's insurance
products, which are either inaccurate or untrue or which are
representations that are misleading or deceptive, or likely to
mislead or deceive. The particulars go on to give nine specific
illustrations of the manner in which the document contains
statements that are said to be either inaccurate or untrue.
These are as follows:
(a)
(b)
(¢)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(9)
(h)
(i)
extended replacement cost not included;
policy requires insured to buy extra coverage for "other
structures";
"special limits/jewellery/$20,000.00 total";
limit of $5,000.00 per item for "fine arts";
extra coverages/personal computer data replacement not
included in policy;
debris removal not included/must be added to building sum
insured;
"extra living expenses" and "unoccupancy clause" as "extra
coverages";
"medical payments to others" not included;
defence coverage not included.
The application to amend is for the addition of four particulars,
(3),
(3)
(k)
(1)
(m)
(kK), (1), and (m), which are as follows:
Building: Cash Settlement Option based on Replacement Cost
- Included (Masterpiece): Not Included (Mansions) ;
Contents: Cash Settlement Available at Client's Option -
Included (Masterpiece): Not Included (Mansions) ;
Valuable Articles: Cash Settlement Client's Option -
Included (Masterpiece): Not included (Mansions);
Liability Coverage: Damage to Property of Others - Included
(Masterpiece): Not included (Mansions).
Two of the earlier particulars are proposed to be deleted. There
is of course no difficulty about that.
In relation to proposed particular (m), Mr Deakin, on behalf of
the respondent, indicates that there is nothing that he can say
to indicate substantial prejudice to the respondent if that were
to be added to the statement of claim. I propose to allow the
amendment to the extent of including particular (m). However,
particulars (j), (k) and (1) fall into a different category.
As Mr Deakin points out, those particulars, unlike others, raise
allegations based upon what is said to be a misrepresentation in
the document of the contents of the respondent's policy. The
other particulars previously provided, including proposed
particular (m), relate to alleged misrepresentations in the
document concerning the applicant's insurance coverage in its
policy. Mr Deakin submits and I think correctly that this raises
an issue different in kind from the other issues that are raised
in the statement of claim.
More particularly, however, Mr Deakin points to prejudice that
would or might be incurred by the respondent if this amendment
were permitted. He makes the point that notice of the amendment
was given in precise terms only yesterday. Furthermore, he
points out that the allegations are that the document was
disseminated within a restricted group, that is to say insurance
brokers whose knowledge, experience and expertise is such that
it is not simply a matter of assessing the effect of the document
upon ordinary readers in the general community.
Mr Deakin also points out that expert evidence has been filed on
both sides in this case, relating to the understanding that might
be obtained by the audience receiving this document. He submits
that the respondent would or might be required to adduce expert
evidence relating to these new allegations. The respondent's
expert is from Melbourne and has only arrived this morning for
the purposes of the conduct of the case.
In response Mr Coles indicates that the issue is really simply
whether or not the relevant clauses are in the respondent's
policies. I do not think that the matter can be approached this
way having regard to the lateness of the proposed amendments and
the state of the material before the Court. It is perfectly
clear that, for whatever reason, the parties have chosen to rely
upon expert evidence in order to elucidate the issues in the
case. Whether that evidence turns out to be helpful or otherwise
is not to the point. It is there and it seems to me that it is
not open to say that the respondent will not suffer prejudice as
the result of the proposed amendments. In my view prejudice may
well result. Mr Coles has also submitted that the absence from
the respondent's policy of the relevant clauses was pointed out
in an expert report that was served on 6 October 1994. That
report was itself out of time in terms of the directions given
earlier in these proceedings. More to the point, however, the
fact that something is pointed out in an expert report is not the
equivalent of proposing and framing precise amendments so that
the nature of the case to be made out is made abundantly clear
to the respondent and for that matter to the Court.
In the circumstances I propose to reject the application to amend
the statement of claim insofar as that application relates to
particulars (j), (k) and (1). I allow the amendment insofar as
it relates to paragraph (m).
HIS HONOUR: I have already ruled that paragraph 4 of the
affidavit of Mr Goodlad is not admissible upon the pleadings and
particulars as they presently stand. Faced with that ruling, Mr
Coles has sought to amend the particulars that were provided in
a letter of 29 August 1994 to the solicitors for the respondent.
His application is to amend the particulars to include a
particular that alleges the statement made in the comparison
document relating to coverage of outbuildings is misleading or
deceptive because it failed to disclose that the Chubb policy was
limited to permanent structures, whereas the Mansions policy
covered not only permanent structures but temporary or mobile
structures.
It seems to me that the proposed amendment at this stage of the
proceedings creates such difficulties for the orderly and
expeditious management of the litigation that I should not allow
it. Mr Coles submits that there would be no irremediable
prejudice to the respondent if the amendment were allowed.
However, Mr Deakin, in his submissions, indicates that it may be
necessary to adduce expert evidence in relation to the proposed
additional particular. That, of itself, is a powerful reason for
not allowing the amendment.
I appreciate that it is difficult at this stage to determine just
what, if any, additional evidence might be required. But that
is the point. It is extremely difficult to determine what effect
the amendment would have on the conduct of the litigation. In
any event, quite apart from the question of expert evidence, this
case has been brought on at relatively short notice in accordance
with pleadings and particulars provided to the respondent. The
addition of new issues by way of amendment, even though they may
appear individually not to raise particularly complex questions,
necessarily leads to an expansion in the scope of the litigation
and the time it will take to resolve the matter.
As the parties are aware, the case was listed on the basis that
it would take a day and that the issues were relatively straight
forward, involving in substantial measure a comparison of
documentation. If the issues are to be expanded at this stage
the case itself plainly will take more court time and it will not
be easy in any event to accommodate that within the Court
calendar. It seems to me that, independently of the question of
prejudice, there is a powerful case for rejecting the application
because of the need to ensure that the litigation is conducted
in the manner contemplated. For those reasons I disallow the
application for amendment of the particulars. The result will
be that paragraph 4 of the affidavit remains rejected.
Heard:
Place:
Decision:
Appearances:
I certify that this and the preceding 1 page
are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment
of the Honourable Justice Sackville.
Associate: Va Je Fer--f)
Dated: 19 October, 1994
19 October 1994
Sydney
19 October 1994
Mr B. Coles QC with Mr P Clay, instructed by
McCabe Brown, Solicitors, appeared for the
applicant.
Mr P.J. Deakin QC with Mr S. Gregory,
instructed by Curwood & Partners,
Solicitors, appeared for the respondent.