CATCHWORDS Bankruptcy - generally - whether bankruptcy notice a nullity - a nullity if it could reasonably mislead a debtor or if it fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Act - effect of Acts Interpretation Act s 25C - requirement that a bankruptcy notice be in accordance with the prescribed form is itself a requirement made essential by the Act - Bankruptcy Act s 41(1)(a) - departures from prescribed form may yet be formal defects or irregularities which do not invalidate the notice. Bankruptcy - generally - whether bankruptcy notice a nullity - requirement to state address for the creditor an essential requirement - where address is not stated in the recital but is stated elsewhere the notice will only be a nullity if the misplacement is apt to mislead the debtor - notice must not be expressed to require payment at the stated address to the exclusion of other places where the judgment creditor may be found - address may be stated as care of the offices of the creditor's solicitors provided it is reasonably practicable to make payment or to secure or compound there. Bankruptcy - generally - whether bankruptcy notice a nullity - statement of the amount claimed - judgment creditor may only claim outstanding balance of the debt - notice should specify both that the amount claimed is the balance and the amounts previously paid - statement of the amount claimed could reasonably mislead the debtor - bankruptcy notice a nullity. Bankruptcy - generally - whether bankruptcy notice a nullity - whether required to bear Australian Company Number of creditor - not a public document of the company and therefore not required - Corporations Law s 88A and s 219(3). Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 41(1), s 41(2), s 306(1) Corporations Law s 88A, s 219(3) Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 25C, s 46(1)(a) Bankruptcy Rules, r 6(1), r 8, Form 2, Form 4 Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 at 79, 80 and 82 applied Re Wimborne (1979) 24 ALR 494 at 498 applied Somsak Ma v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Limited (in liquidation) 18 August 1995, unreported, applied Re St Leon; Ex parte National Australia Bank Limited (1994) 54 FCR 371 at 378 applied Re Nugent; Ex parte Nugent (1985) 5 FCR 161 applied Sub nom Nugent v Brialkim Pty Limited (1985) 61 ALR 725 applied Re Pugliese; Ex parte the Chase Manhattan Bank of Australia Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 536 James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 631 Re Manion; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 23 ALR 270 at 274 Re Walsh (1982) 47 ALR 751; affd (1983) 47 ALR 616, (1984) 53 ALR 606 PATRICK HO HANG YU v FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) NP817 of 1995 CORAM: Lehane J PLACE: Sydney DATE: 3 November 1995 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) GENERAL DIVISION ) BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES ) No NP817 of 1995 BETWEEN:PATRICK HO HANG YU Debtor AND: FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) (A.C.N. 006 125 757) Creditor CORAM: Lehane J PLACE: Sydney DATE: 3 November 1995 MINUTE OF ORDERS THE COURT ORDERS: 1. THAT the creditor's petition be dismissed. 2. THAT the creditor pay the costs of the debtor. NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) GENERAL DIVISION ) BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF NEW SOUTH WALES ) No NP817 of 1995 BETWEEN:PATRICK HO HANG YU Debtor AND: FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) (A.C.N. 006 125 757) Creditor CORAM: Lehane J PLACE: Sydney DATE: 3 November 1995 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Limited (in liquidation), to which I shall refer as the creditor, has petitioned the Court under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 for the sequestration of the estate of Patrick Ho Hang Yu, to whom I shall refer as the debtor. The act of bankruptcy alleged is failure to comply with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice issued on 18 January 1995 on the application of the creditor. By an amended notice of intention to appear at the hearing of the petition the debtor claims that the bankruptcy notice is a nullity on the grounds, first, that it is not in accordance with the prescribed form and fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Bankruptcy Act and, secondly, that it could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the bankruptcy notice. Particulars are then given, to which I shall return shortly. There are two other grounds of opposition to the petition, but I am not now concerned with them because an order was made by consent on 7 June 1995 that the following question is to be decided separately from any other question in the proceedings: Whether, as to each matter particularised in sub-paragraphs (i) - (xi) inclusive of the Particulars to paragraph 1 of the Amended Notice of Intention to Appear at Hearing of Petition dated 6th June 1995, such matter is a defect: (i) which renders the bankruptcy notice a nullity; (ii) which is a formal defect or irregularity which attracts the operation of Section 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966. That is the question which I am now required to answer. Largely, but as will be seen by no means literally, the bankruptcy notice follows the form (or, more accurately, forms) prescribed by the Bankruptcy Rules. I shall set out in full the part of the notice as to which there is controversy between the parties. BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) NEW SOUTH WALES ) No NN107 1995 Re: PATRICK HO HANG YU Ex Parte: FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) To: Patrick Ho Hang Yu of Level 2 20 Burlington Street Crows Nest 2065 New South Wales WHEREAS FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ("JUDGMENT CREDITOR") has claimed that the sum of $4,165,553,58 is due by you to the judgment creditor under a final judgment obtained by the judgment creditor against you in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 23 March 1994 (less the amount received by the judgment creditor upon the sale of the secured property by Contract for Sale dated 14 April 1994), being a Judgment the execution of which has not been stayed: THEREFORE TAKE NOTICE that within 21 days after service of this notice on you, excluding the day on which this notice is served on you, you are required: (a) to pay the sum of either $4,165,553.58 so claimed by the judgment creditor to the judgment creditor of c/- Clayton Utz, Solicitors, Level 30, No. 1 O'Connell Street, Sydney, New South Wales; or (b) to secure the payment of the sum referred to in paragraph (a) to the satisfaction of the Federal Court of Australia or the judgment creditors or compound the sum so specified to the satisfaction of the judgment creditors. The judgment referred to in the notice is a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that the debtor (among others) pay to the creditor $6,848,916.63. The amount referred to in the notice as the sum claimed to be due to the creditor is a smaller sum; I am told that the difference results from an appropriation to the judgment debt of the proceeds of sale of a property over which the creditor had a mortgage securing payment of the judgment debt. The particulars given in the amended notice of intention to appear of the ways in which the debtor claims that the bankruptcy notice is deficient are as follows: 1. The Bankruptcy Notice is a nullity: (a) the Bankruptcy Notice is not in accordance with the prescribed form and fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Bankruptcy Act, 1966; (b) the Bankruptcy Notice could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the Bankruptcy Notice. Particulars (i) The address of the judgment creditor is omitted from the definition of "judgment creditor" appearing in the recital of the judgment creditor's claim. (ii) The reference to the address of the judgment creditor in the operative part of the Bankruptcy Notice is incorrect. (iii) The reference to the address of the judgment creditor in the operative part of the Bankruptcy Notice does not nominate Clayton Utz, Solicitors, as agent of the judgment creditor. (iv) The sum of $4,165,553.58 appearing in the Bankruptcy Notice does not accord with the amount of the final judgment obtained by the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 23rd March 1994 for $6,848,916.63. (v) The description of the amount claimed in the recital to the Bankruptcy Notice is not in accordance with the prescribed form. (vi) The description of the amount claimed in the recital to the Bankruptcy Notice could reasonably mislead a debtor. (vii) The description of the amount claimed in sub-paragraph (a) of the operative part of the Bankruptcy Notice is not in accordance with the prescribed form. (viii) The description of the amount claimed in sub-paragraph (a) of the operative part of the Bankruptcy Notice could reasonably mislead a debtor. (ix) The occupation of the judgment debtor is omitted from the Bankruptcy Notice. (x) The inclusion of the reference to the judgment creditor on the heading to the Bankruptcy Notice is not in accordance with the prescribed form. (xi) The reference to "judgment creditors" where appearing twice in sub-paragraph (b) of the operative part of the Bankruptcy Notice is not in accordance with the prescribed form and/or could reasonably mislead a debtor. Counsel for the debtor also drew attention to the fact that the creditor's Australian Company Number does not appear in the bankruptcy notice. I do not think, however, that it is required to be stated: the notice is not, I think, a public document of the creditor for the purposes of the Corporations Law: see Corporations Law s 219(3), s 88A. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s 41 of the Bankruptcy Act provide as follows: 41. (1) A bankruptcy notice - (a) shall be in accordance with the prescribed form; and (b) shall be issued by the Registrar. (2) The prescribed form of bankruptcy notice shall be such that the notice - (a) requires the debtor named in it, within a specified time (being the time referred to in sub-paragraph 40(1)(g)(i) or (ii), whichever is appropriate) to - (i) pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid in accordance with the judgment or order; or (ii) secure the payment of the debt or sum to the satisfaction of the Court or the creditor or his agent, if any, specified in the notice or compound the debt or sum to the satisfaction of the creditor or his agent, if any, specified in the notice; and (b) state the consequences of non-compliance with the requirements of the notice. Section 306(1) then provides: 306 (1) Proceedings under this Act are not invalidated by a formal defect or an irregularity, unless the court before which the objection on that ground is made is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by an order of that court. The form of bankruptcy notice prescribed by r 8 of the Bankruptcy Rules is Form 4; the prescribed form of title for a bankruptcy notice is Form 2. Plainly the Bankruptcy Notice was not drawn with an ideally close regard to the precise requirements of the Act and Rules. Whatever else may be said about it, it is clear that the creditor's address is not stated where the prescribed form requires it to be stated; particulars (ix) and (x) call attention to what are undoubtedly failures, even if they are to be regarded as relatively minor ones, to comply with the prescribed form. The use of the plural "judgment creditors", referred to in paragraph (xi) of the particulars, is clearly a typographical mistake. To point out that the notice was not drawn with the degree of care which the consequences of the issue and service of such a notice might indicate (see e.g. the dissenting judgment of Deane J in Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 at 82) is not, however, necessarily to say that the notice is a nullity. Although there is a failure to comply strictly with s 41 of the Act, the notice will nevertheless not be invalidated if each failure is a formal defect or irregularity to which s 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act applies. In Re Wimborne (1979) 24 ALR 494 at 498 Lockhart J held that a formal defect or irregularity "is one which could not reasonably mislead the debtor". In Klienwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl, supra at 79, 80 the majority (Mason CJ, Wilson J, Brennan J and Gaudron J) said: The authorities show that a Bankruptcy Notice is a nullity if it fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Act, or if it could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the notice: James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 631 at 644; Pillai [1970] AC 1124 at 1135. In such cases the notice is a nullity whether or not the debtor is in fact misled: in Re A Judgment Debtor, 530 of 1908 [1908] 2 KB 474 at 481. Counsel for the creditor referred also to s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. That provision applies to the Bankruptcy Rules: s 46(1)(a). Section 25C provides: Where an Act prescribes a form, then, unless the contrary intention appears, strict compliance with the form is not required and substantial compliance is sufficient. The effect of s 25C in relation to bankruptcy notices was considered by Whitlam J in Somsak Ma v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Limited (in liquidation), 18 August 1995, unreported. His Honour said: Until 1989 compliance with forms in the Rules was expressly dealt with by r 6(1), which provided: Strict compliance with the forms in Schedule 1 is not necessary and substantial compliance, or such compliance as the special circumstances of a particular case allow, is sufficient. Since that provision has been omitted, it may well be arguable that a "contrary intention" now appears in respect of the requirement that the address of the judgment creditor be inserted and that strict compliance with the form is required in that respect. I respectfully doubt that the omission of the former r 6(1) gives rise to the appearance of a contrary intention: s 25C had been inserted in the Acts Interpretation Act only in 1984 and it may well be that the former r 6(1) was omitted only on the basis that it had become unnecessary. In the end, however, I think it makes very little difference which view is right. If a document claimed to be a bankruptcy notice fails to meet a requirement made essential by the Act or is apt to mislead a debtor, then it will not have been drawn substantially in compliance with the form. If the notice, though otherwise in order, contains a formal defect or irregularity, then though the requirements of the prescribed form may not be strictly met in every detail, nevertheless the form will have been substantially complied with. Certainly cases decided when the former r 6(1) was in force do not encourage an inquiry into whether there has been substantial compliance separate from that into whether deficiencies identified in a notice amount only to formal defects or irregularities. Finally, before turning to the alleged deficiencies in the bankruptcy notice, I should mention an argument based on a passage in the judgment of Lindgren J in Re St Leon; Ex parte National Australia Bank Limited (1994) 54 FCR 371 at 378. His Honour said this: In relation to the submission that the statement of address is not a matter made essential by the Act, there are, in my view, several difficulties. First, s 41(1)(a) provides that a bankruptcy notice "shall be in accordance with the prescribed form" and it is difficult, in the face of such plain and mandatory terms, to assume that anything which is in fact in the prescribed form though not required to be in it by s 41(2), it is not made "essential" by the Act. For example, it is difficult to accept that the note at the foot of the prescribed form could be omitted without rendering the notice invalid. A second difficulty, although it may be but another aspect of the first, is that if the submission is correct there would appear to be no sanction for non-compliance with s 41(1)(a), except perhaps in so far as the prescribed form satisfied s 41(2). I do not think that Parliament intended the mandatory terms of s 41(1)(a) to have that restricted operation. Thirdly, I do not think that their Honours in the joint judgment in Kleinwort Benson were contemplating by their reference to "a requirement made essential by the Act" a dissection of the prescribed form of bankruptcy notice into parts specifically referred to in the Act and other parts. To construe to their Honours' words in that way is to approach them as if they were the language of a statute. I think that it is consistent with the terms of the joint judgment that the statutory requirement that a bankruptcy notice be in accordance with the prescribed form is itself a requirement made essential by the Act. I respectfully agree with that passage. Certainly the particular "essential requirement" with which the High Court was concerned in Kleinwort was that specified in s 41(2)(a)(i) (see at 80); but I agree with Lindgren J that to read the majority judgment in Kleinwort as holding that only a requirement of s 41(2) is a requirement made essential by the Act is to misread the judgment. To omit altogether, for example, the address of the judgment creditor or the note at the foot of the prescribed form will invalidate a bankruptcy notice whether or not it is in the circumstances apt to mislead, because it is an omission of essential matter included in the prescribed form and thus of matter made essential by the Act. It might also be said that the omission results necessarily in a failure of substantial compliance with the prescribed form, not merely of strict compliance with it. I do not think it follows, however, that there may not be departures from the prescribed form which, because they are properly to be described as formal defects or irregularities, do not invalidate a notice. To hold that any departure from the form, however minor or inconsequential, is a failure to comply with a matter made essential by the Act is, I think, to curtail the operation of s 306 in a way which is justified neither by its terms nor by authority. The deficiencies alleged in the particulars were conveniently grouped in argument in three general categories. They were, first, alleged deficiencies relating to the way in which the address of the creditor is stated in the notice (particulars (i), (ii) and (iii)); secondly, alleged deficiencies relating to the description of the amount stated in the recital and claimed in paragraph (a) of the notice (paragraph (iv) to (viii) inclusive); and, thirdly, a miscellaneous group comprising paragraphs (ix), (x) and (xi). I shall deal with the miscellaneous category first. Counsel for the debtor submitted formally that the deficiencies referred to in paragraphs (ix) and (x) vitiated the notice, but he did not press the submission. Where the debtor is otherwise clearly identified, by name and address (and there was no suggestion that this was not so here), I think the omission of the occupation of the debtor is plainly a formal defect or irregularity and is not apt to mislead. Similarly, the inclusion of the reference to the creditor in the heading of the notice, though clearly not required by Form 2, is at most a formal defect or irregularity and one which would not mislead the debtor. Counsel pressed rather more strongly his submission that the use of the plural "judgment creditors" twice in sub‑paragraph (b) of the notice (paragraph (xi) of the particulars) was sufficient to render the notice a nullity. Certainly misprints may be a serious matter in a document of this nature. I think, however, that this misprint falls within the category of formal defect or irregularity: I cannot believe that it is one which, in the context, would mislead or perplex the debtor. The complaints about the way in which the creditor's address is stated give rise to more difficult issues. The problem arises because an address for the creditor is given not in the recital after the first appearance of the creditor's name (which is where the prescribed form requires it) but after the reference to the creditor in paragraph (a) of the operative part of the notice. That is, perhaps, an unusual and rather surprising mistake to make in drawing a bankruptcy notice and it may not therefore be surprising that such a mistake does not seem to have been considered in any reported case. A number of propositions are, I think, well established. First, failure to state the creditor's address at all results in a void notice (St Leon, supra, Somsak Ma supra). Secondly, it is not necessarily an objection to a bankruptcy notice that the judgment creditor's address stated in it is care of the offices of its solicitors (Re Nugent; Ex parte Nugent (1985) 5 FCR 161; sub nom Nugent v Brialkim Pty Limited (1985) 61 ALR 725; Re Pugliese; Ex parte the Chase Manhattan Bank of Australia Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 536); that will not be a proper statement of the judgment creditor's address only if the judgment debtor establishes that it is an address at which it is not reasonably practicable to make payment or to secure or compound (Nugent v Brialkim Pty Limited, supra at 728). Thirdly, though the address stated must be one at which the judgment debtor may make payment or may offer to secure or compound, the notice must not be so expressed as to require payment at that address to the exclusion of other places where the judgment creditor may be found (James v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 631). The bankruptcy notice here does state an address of the judgment creditor. No evidence was given that it was not an address at which the debtor might pay or offer to secure or compound. Literally, at least, the notice requires payment to the judgment creditor "of" a stated address, not "at" the stated address. Ought, then, the notice be held bad simply because the address of the creditor is stated not at the beginning of the form but in the middle of it? There is, I think, no failure in this respect to meet an essential requirement of the Act (the essential requirement must be that an address be stated, not that it be stated in the recital), so that the notice will be bad only if the misplacement of the address is apt to mislead the debtor. That could be so, I think, only if the misplacement might be thought to lead to a possible inference that the notice was stating not merely an address at which the creditor might be paid, but one at which the creditor must be paid. Counsel for the debtor did not suggest that the form was misleading in that respect, and I do not think it is. What I have said is, I think, sufficient to deal with paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the particulars. It does not, however, deal with paragraph (iii). The claim in paragraph (iii) is that if the creditor's solicitors were to be mentioned at all in paragraph (a), then they could properly be mentioned only as an agent of the kind referred to in paragraph (b) of the form as one to whose satisfaction the sum claimed might be secured or compounded. As I understood it, it was not seriously disputed that if the notice had given, where the form requires the creditor's address to be stated, an address care of the creditor's solicitors, and there had been no reference to an agent in either paragraph (a) or (b), the form would (leaving aside matters other than the creditor's address) have been good. The submission was, however, as I understood it, that the mention of the solicitors in paragraph (a) necessarily imported their appointment as agent for the purposes of paragraph (b) and that, because that appointment was not expressly stated, the form was in this respect apt to mislead the debtor. I think the answer is that all paragraph (a) does, by way of departure from the form, is state an address, i.e. a place where the debtor may go for the purpose of making payment or proposing security or compounding. That is, I cannot see why the statement of an address in paragraph (a) had consequences in relation to the express nomination of an agent for the purposes of paragraph (b) any more than the statement of the same address, but in the place required by the form, would have. That brings me finally to the way in which the form describes the amount claimed. Although counsel for the debtor put the issues relating to the creditor's address at the forefront of his submissions, I have found the questions concerning the statement of the amount claimed the most difficult in this case. The notice was based on a judgment against the debtor, among others, of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The amount of the judgment was $6,848,916.63. Clearly, what the creditor was seeking to claim by the bankruptcy notice was the balance of that judgment debt remaining after the appropriation to it of the proceeds of sale of property over which the creditor had a mortgage or other security of some kind. It is clear that where payments have been received by a judgment creditor in reduction of the judgment debt the balance only of the judgment debt may be claimed in a bankruptcy notice based on it: Re Manion; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 23 ALR 270; Re Walsh (1982) 47 ALR 751 (affd (1983) 47 ALR 616; (1984) 53 ALR 606). In Manion Lockhart J said, at 274: If it is the balance of the judgment that is claimed, that fact should be stated and the amounts paid or credited after judgment was signed should be specified. The bankruptcy notice with which His Honour was concerned made it clear that the principal sum claimed was the balance of the judgment debt but did not specify the amounts which had been paid or credited after judgment was signed. Lockhart J held that the notice was not, on that account, to be regarded "as perplexing a debtor to the point where he could not readily understand it". The bankruptcy notice in this case is, of course, somewhat different. There is at least a rudimentary attempt (and it is not much more than that) to specify the amounts credited since judgment. At least as a matter of grammar, however, this notice is less than clear in stating that it is indeed the outstanding balance of the judgment debt which is claimed. It recites that the creditor "has claimed that the sum of $4,165,553.58 is due by you to the judgment creditor under a final judgment obtained ... (less the amount received by the judgment creditor on the sale of the secured property by Contract for Sale dated 14 April 1994) ...". If a creditor claims that a debtor owes a particular sum less another sum, that ordinarily means that the amount actually owed (and therefore to be claimed) is the difference between the two. What the creditor presumably intended here, rather than "less", was "after taking into account". If, however, the recital is read in isolation it is impossible, I think, to say that it is unambiguous or incapable of misleading a debtor. Counsel for the creditor relied on Klienwort Benson, supra, for the propositions, first, that no uncertainty arises if it is clear that payment of the amount specified in the notice will constitute compliance with the requirements of the notice and, secondly, that any suggested uncertainty in the recital portion of the notice will not invalidate the notice where the body of the notice makes it clear what sum is required to be paid, secured or compromised. That, no doubt, is so where, as in Klienwort, an amount claimed is clearly and unambiguously stated in the recital and is an amount which, at the time when the bankruptcy notice was issued, was in fact due. The present case is rather different. The recital is open to the construction that a sum less than $4,165,553.58 is due. If that were the correct construction, then clearly a requirement, under paragraph (a) of the notice, to pay the sum of $4,165,553.58 would be invalid. If one looks at it in that way, one might fairly conclude that what the creditor is asserting is that the ambiguity in the recital is to be resolved on the basis of a presumption that no more is claimed by the operative part of the notice than is in fact due. The problem is, of course, compounded by the rather less than definite command in paragraph (a) resulting from the interpolation of the word "either" before the amount. Clearly the matters to which I have referred are deficiencies in the form of the notice. They are deficiencies which introduce at least an element of ambiguity into it. I think they are of a kind which could reasonably mislead the debtor and that they are not, therefore, formal defects or irregularities saved by s 306. The question for separate determination should therefore be answered: (i) as to the matters particularised in sub-paragraphs (iv) to (viii) inclusive of the Particulars, they are; as to the matter particularised in each other sub‑paragraph, it is not; (ii) as to the matters particularised in sub‑paragraphs (iv) to (viii) inclusive of the Particulars, they are not; as to the matter specified in each other sub‑paragraph, it is. The creditor's petition should, accordingly, be dismissed with costs. I certify that this and the preceding 16 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lehane. Associate: Dated: 3 November 1995 Heard: 20 October 1995 Place: Sydney Decision: 3 November 1995 Appearances: Mr B J Skinner of counsel instructed by Kemp Strang & Chippindall appeared for the debtor. Mr B A J Coles QC with Mr C R C Newlinds of counsel instructed by Clayton Utz appeared for the creditor.