FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SZRTE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 994 Citation: SZRTE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 994 Appeal from: Application for extension of time: SZRTE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 537 Parties: SZRTE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number(s): NSD 1012 of 2013 Judge(s): GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 17 September 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an application for an extension of time for the filing of a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 36.03, 36.05 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 424A, 425 Date of hearing: 6 November 2013 Date of last submissions: 6 November 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 82 Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms A Crittenden, Clayton Utz Lawyers IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 1012 of 2013 BETWEEN: SZRTE Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION First Respondent REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: GREENWOOD J DATE OF ORDER: 17 SEPTEMBER 2014 WHERE MADE: SYDNEY THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for an extension of time filed on 11 June 2013 is dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the application fixed in the amount of $4,000. 3. The name of the first respondent be amended to "Minister for Immigration and Border Protection". Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 1012 of 2013 BETWEEN: SZRTE Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION First Respondent REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: GREENWOOD J DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 2014 PLACE: SYDNEY REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The proceeding 1 In these proceedings the applicant seeks an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. 2 Rule 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides that an appellant must file a notice of appeal within 21 days after the date on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order made. An application for an extension of time may be made under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules and the application may be made during or after the period mentioned in r 36.03. 3 The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (SZRTE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 537) records, on the coversheet, that the applicant's application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the "Tribunal") was heard on 23 April 2013 and judgment was pronounced, and orders made, on 23 April 2013. The Federal Circuit Court ordered that the application be dismissed and the applicant pay the first respondent's costs in a fixed amount. The reasons for judgment are certified as a true copy of the reasons of Judge Cameron. The reasons are dated 17 June 2013. 4 The applicant's application for an extension of time was filed on 11 June 2013 supported by an affidavit affirmed and filed by the applicant on 11 June 2013. In that affidavit, the applicant says that his application before the Federal Circuit Court was heard on 23 April 2013. He says he then received a letter from the respondent dated 28 May 2013 which caused him to contact the Registry of the Federal Circuit Court. The letter dated 28 May 2013 attached to the applicant's affidavit is a letter from the solicitors for the Minister, Clayton Utz, stating that orders had been made on 23 April 2013 dismissing the application with an order for costs in a fixed amount. The applicant says, in his affidavit, that he has no knowledge of the Court system, does not have a lawyer, is not physically and mentally very well and did not know or understand that the rules of the Federal Court required him to file an appeal from the primary judgment within 21 days of the making of the orders. He also says that he does not believe that the Court considered "all relevant issues" in relation to his "protection application" and his "review application". 5 The Federal Circuit Court pronounced judgment by making the above orders on 23 April 2013 at the conclusion of the hearing. It seems very likely that Judge Cameron pronounced ex tempore reasons that day in support of the orders, recited as having been made that day. Ms Crittenden who appeared for the Minister before this Court said that she understood that ex tempore reasons were delivered on 23 April 2013 although she did not appear in the matter before the Federal Circuit Court. It also seems likely that reasons for judgment in support of the orders were formulated from the transcript, settled in final form and then certified as correct on 17 June 2013. 6 Rule 36.03 requires the applicant to file a notice of appeal within 21 days of 23 April 2013 as that was the date upon which either the judgment was pronounced or the orders made. Thus, the applicant was required to file a notice of appeal by approximately 15 May 2013. It is, of course, necessary on this application for the applicant to explain the delay in failing to file a notice of appeal within time. In this case, having regard to the date on which the judgment was pronounced and the orders made and the later date upon which the reasons for judgment were certified as being correct, I am satisfied that the failure to file a notice of appeal within time is sufficiently explained. 7 The applicant appeared in person before this Court assisted by an interpreter skilled in the Bengali and English languages. The grounds of appeal the applicant would seek to agitate if an extension of time is granted 8 If an extension of time is granted, the applicant would seek to agitate an appeal from the judgment (and orders) of the Federal Circuit Court on four grounds. It is not clear whether the applicant has had any assistance from a lawyer in formulating these grounds. The grounds are set out in the applicant's draft notice of appeal in these terms: 1. [The Primary Judge] erred in not considering that the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made a mistake in rejecting the review application that the review applicant was not involve[d] in the party while he is in Australia. The Tribunal did not consider the circumstances of the review applicant and his fear for his life. 2. [The Primary Judge] erred in not finding that the Tribunal made procedural mistakes that the Tribunal failed to communicate information with the applicant. The review applicant did [not] understand what the differences he had to address are. The review applicant did not get enough time and opportunity to address the differences. The review applicant did not understand why the Tribunal was telling him all that at the hearing. 3. [The Primary Judge] did not consider that the Tribunal did not follow the rule of the part 7 of the Act. The Tribunal did not give the review applicant sufficient time to understand the difference between the Tribunal hearing and the adverse findings by the Tribunal. The review applicant also did not understand what is the impact of those adverse finding[s] and what is his obligation in regard to those findings. 4. [The Primary Judge] did not consider that the Tribunal asked many questions to the applicant at the hearing and made findings on that information and did not give opportunity to address those adverse information and rejected the applicant's case which is an unfair procedure adopted by the Tribunal and the Court did not consider that. [emphasis added] 9 Therefore, the propositions the applicant would seek to agitate on appeal (and taking account of the grounds of jurisdictional error agitated before the Federal Circuit Court to the extent the grounds of appeal seek to challenge rulings on those grounds) are these: 1. The primary Judge fell into error by failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in reaching "wrong findings" of fact that the applicant had not had any involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party ("BNP") in Australia "after being here for a year". 2. The primary Judge fell into error by failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in failing to identify to the applicant inconsistencies of concern to the Tribunal in the applicant's evidence at the Tribunal hearing and by not providing the applicant with a proper opportunity to address and respond to those inconsistencies of concern. 3. The primary Judge fell into error by failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in not complying with obligations cast on the Tribunal by Pt 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the "Act") concerning the review of protection visa decisions by the Tribunal, and in not providing the applicant with "sufficient time" to understand the role of a hearing before the Tribunal, the possibility of findings adverse to the applicant or the consequences for the applicant of adverse findings being made in the course of the Tribunal undertaking its statutory review function. 4. The primary Judge fell into error by failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in asking many questions of the applicant at the hearing and then making findings of fact (and findings as to the creditworthiness of the applicant) without giving the applicant an opportunity to address adverse information upon which the applicant's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason was rejected. 10 In substance, the contended error on the part of the primary Judge is a failure to find jurisdictional error in the terms largely put to the primary Judge by the applicant. Fact-finding by the Tribunal 11 Having regard to the proposed grounds of appeal, it is necessary to examine the way in which the Tribunal approached its review function and the findings it made. 12 The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh. 13 He arrived in Australia on 17 April 2011, and on 12 May 2011 he applied for a protection visa. 14 At para 20 of the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal notes that the applicant gave evidence at a hearing before the Tribunal on 26 April 2012. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages. 15 Before the Tribunal examined the evidence given by the applicant at the hearing, the Tribunal set out the content of the applicant's written claims. At para 21, the Tribunal notes that in his protection visa application, the applicant claimed to have been born in Sylhet in Bangladesh in 1986. He gave his religion as Islam. He claimed to have lived at particular places from 1986 until February 2011 and to have lived in Sylhet town from February to April 2011. He claimed to have received eight years of formal education in Bangladesh ending in 1998; to have been self-employed from October 2006 to April 2011; to have a wife, son and brother living in Bangladesh and a mother and a sister living in Australia: para 21. 16 He claimed to have left Bangladesh because he feared the Awami League and the government. He claimed to have been a leader of the "BNP Jubodal" (the Youth Wing of the BNP). He claimed that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be prosecuted because of his political beliefs; he might be physically hit; the police might arrest him; he might be detained; he might be placed in a "crossfire" incident; and the authorities would not protect him as they "belong to" the Awami League: para 22. 17 At para 23, the Tribunal notes that the applicant expanded upon these claims in a three page handwritten statement in Bengali with an accompanying English translation which he submitted to the Department at a departmental interview. The Tribunal notes that in the supplementary statement, the applicant made these claims: • He operated a business in the local bazaar. • He was involved with the "Bangladesh Nationalist Youth Party" as the Assistant General Secretary in the Zakigonj Upazila Branch, a position he held until coming to Australia. • Because of his political involvement he faced oppression and various obstacles. These became intolerable after the Awami League came to power in 2008 and began torturing and oppressing BNP leaders and activists. They harassed BNP leaders by using the police and RAB (Rapid Action Battalion) against them. • On 15 November 2010 Awami League activists attacked his shop and destroyed his stock. They beat him with their fists and warned him against political involvement. • On 21 January 2011, he was attacked when returning from a party meeting. His assailants told him they would teach him a lesson for ignoring their previous warning. He was beaten unconscious but was saved by bystanders who took him to a local hospital where he was detained for a week. He tried to report the matter at a police station but they refused to accept his complaint as it was directed against Awami League leaders. • This event caused him to panic. He neglected his business. He requested his sister (living in Australia) to arrange a tourist visa for him. At the time she was arranging for a visa for their mother, who was to help her with the birth of her child, and the [applicant] was included in the application. • Before the visa application was made there was a "scuffle" at the bazaar between the Awami League and the BNP. The BNP leaders and activists were forced to leave their businesses and homes. To escape torture and oppression by the Awami League activists and police he had to hide for two months. • At the end of April 2011 the Awami League leaders filed a case against several BNP leaders and activists. The police were searching for him to arrest him as a result. He remained in Sylhet, did not go to Zakigonj and then travelled to Australia with his mother. [emphasis added] 18 Apart from these supplementary written claims, the Tribunal notes that the applicant provided further information concerning his claims at a departmental interview on 17 November 2011. 19 At the interview, the applicant submitted his statement. 20 At the interview, the applicant was asked why the incidents in November 2010 and January 2011 had not been mentioned in his protection visa application initially. The applicant said that he was not aware of all of the things in the application form and thought that he should provide more details. The Tribunal notes that he said he had been told "what to write in answer to the questions" on the form and that he had received the statement tendered at the departmental interview by email from his brother. The applicant said that the statement had originally been given to the hospital where he had been treated after the January 2011 attack, and his brother had taken steps to obtain it from the hospital in English in order to save having the document being translated in Australia. 21 The Tribunal also notes that the applicant said, in the interview, that although the statement is "signed" (attributed) in an incorrect name, a mistake was made by the person who translated it into English. 22 The Tribunal sets out other matters concerning information the applicant gave at the interview. 23 The essence of those matters is this: 1. He said he had been falsely accused of involvement in fighting between the Awami League and the BNP and thus the police were looking for him. This was the reason he gave for coming to Australia. 2. He said that the fight occurred on 4 April 2011, and he came to Australia ultimately on 17 April 2011. He said that because nobody was aware that he was going to Australia, the police were not looking for him at the airport for the purpose of charging him with any particular offence. 3. He said that later he came to know that he had been charged with serious offences concerned with involvement in "party work" and being involved in "party rallies". He said that "people in power always find excuses to charge the opposition" so as to "discourage membership of the BNP". 4. He said he had been very active in the BNP as General Secretary in Zakigonj Thana in the Sylhet district from 2008 discharging a role of organising meetings and dispatching letters about the meetings to other party workers. He said that at the meetings party members would "talk about what they would do at the next meeting" and when asked to be more specific he said that they "would discuss the 'torture' inflicted by the Awami League and how the BNP could get together as a strong party". He said that whenever he was "in need", he would get instructions from senior leaders (which he called "elders") in the BNP to announce that a meeting would be held. 5. He said that his role as General Secretary of the BNP student wing gave him a high profile and he enjoyed this position up to the time he left Bangladesh. He said he had lost contact with the party and did not know who now held that position. 6. He said that if he returned to Bangladesh he would again be involved in his business which would attract the attention of the Awami League and its members who, in turn, would inform the police which, for him, meant that he "would be tortured once more, further cases would be brought against him and he could be killed in a 'crossfire' incident". 7. The applicant said that the Awami League would have an interest in him because the League's members "always target people who are actively involved in [BNP] party work" and whenever he attended meetings "everyone used to see him". 8. He also told the departmental officer that he had been in touch with his wife who had told him that there were "cases against him" and "he would be charged if he returned to Bangladesh". 24 At paras 26 to 58 of its reasons, the Tribunal sets out the line of questioning it put to the applicant about a number of aspects of his claims said to be the basis for a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. 25 As to the information contained in the applicant's protection visa application and the version of the written statement submitted to the Department, for example, the applicant said that he sent the Bengali version to Bangladesh to be translated and returned to him. The Tribunal asked him who had translated the document and who had arranged for the translation to be obtained. The applicant told the Tribunal that he had sent the Bengali version to his younger brother in Sylhet for that purpose and "people who worked as translators" had translated the document. The Tribunal drew the applicant's attention to the lack of translator's "stamps" on the document which, it said, are usually applied to such documents by translators in Bangladesh so as to identify the translator's name. The applicant was asked whether he could explain that difference of treatment and he said that he had no idea why that process had not occurred. 26 The Tribunal asked the applicant how his brother had returned English versions of the documents to him and the applicant said that the material was sent "by mail". The Tribunal asked the applicant where "the original of the statement" was, and the Tribunal notes that the applicant "produced another photocopy" which he told the Tribunal "was what he had received from Bangladesh". The Tribunal drew the applicant's attention to the matter that the document did not appear to have been "folded" and asked the applicant how the document had been sent through the post. The Tribunal notes that the applicant said that it had been sent in a "big envelope". 27 The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he had obtained any help from anyone in Australia with his protection visa application form or the statement. The Tribunal notes that the applicant said he had received help from one of his friends. The Tribunal asked who that person was, and notes that the applicant gave the name, Ali Ahmed. The Tribunal observes that this person is the applicant's relative from his own district of Sylhet and the applicant had known him in Bangladesh. The Tribunal notes that the applicant said that he had understood everything contained in the protection visa application form and that he believed everything he had said, in the Bengali version of his statement, had been translated into English. 28 The Tribunal notes that the applicant was asked whether everything contained in those documents and in his oral statements made at the departmental interview was true and he said that it was true. The Tribunal's inquisitorial method 29 I mention these matters on these topics in some detail because it reflects the approach adopted by the Tribunal about which the applicant complains, of asking many questions (too many questions) of the applicant in an inquisitorial way about each element of his claim such as how the application form came to be completed; the relationship between the content of the claim form and the content of the statement; the translation of the documents; the assistance the applicant received in writing out the content of the documents and such matters. 30 It is not necessary to identify in these reasons the detail of each of the questions the Tribunal put to the applicant or the point of each question or the applicant's response to each question. The applicant is not entitled, should an extension of time be granted, to conduct an appeal by way of merits review. It is sufficient to note that the Tribunal indeed asked many questions of the applicant about topics such as why the applicant had left Bangladesh; the nature of his contended political activity; the basis of his contended fear; the circumstances of the various factual events he described; aspects of his biographical details; aspects of his business activities; membership of the BNP; his precise role in the BNP; the attacks he described, the false cases, police persecution and harassment of him, and many other aspects of his factual contentions. 31 Methodologically, the Tribunal in the discharge of its review function under the Act is entitled to test closely (and perhaps in a forensic way should it choose to do so) the content of each of the factual claims made by the applicant in order to determine whether it can be satisfied that the applicant holds a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and is someone to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Act. 32 The applicant was invited on 6 March 2012 to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 26 April 2012 in order to present oral evidence and submissions, and documents, to support the various factual claims made by him as the foundation facts upon which he claimed to hold a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Any inconsistency identified by the Tribunal in the applicant's factual claims set out in his protection visa application, the later statement, his oral evidence before the delegate and his oral evidence before the Tribunal, is a matter upon which the Tribunal is entitled to rely in reaching (or not) the statutory state of satisfaction required of the Tribunal in discharging its review function. In the letter, the Tribunal invites the applicant to appear "to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in your case". The Tribunal also says: "In particular, you may ask the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from another person or persons. Such a request must be given to the Tribunal within seven days of being notified of this invitation". 33 Those matters also go to questions of credit. 34 The hearing is the opportunity afforded to the applicant, by the Tribunal, to enable the applicant to present his claims supported by whatever material he might choose to rely upon before the Tribunal, and it is a forum in which those claims will be tested by extensive questioning by the Tribunal. The Tribunal's findings arising out of its consideration of the evidence 35 The Tribunal made these findings as to the applicant's claims to have engaged in particular political activities in Bangladesh: 62. I have significant doubts as to the credibility of the Applicant's claims to have been an active member of the branch of the [BNP] youth wing (Jubodal) in his village. 63. Although I accept it is not entirely implausible that the Applicant would have been elevated to a senior position on the executive board of the Jubodal at the same time that he joined this organisation in 2008, it is difficult to understand why there should be such uncertainty about the actual title of this position. He claims in his written statement to have been the Assistant General Secretary of the Zakigonj Upazila Branch. The letter said to be from the President of the Branch, Jamal Ahmed, describes him as the Assistant Secretary. The letter said to be from the President of the Sylhet District Branch describes him as the Assistant General Secretary. In a further variation, at the Tribunal hearing he described himself as having been the Joint Secretary. 64. Despite his claim to have been a highly active and committed member of the Jubodal and a member of its executive committee in his village, the Applicant's original statement provides no information whatsoever about his activities in this position. His responses at the Tribunal hearing offered little more enlightenment. He provided only a vague and sketchy outline of his duties, amounting to little more than suggestion that he informed people about forthcoming meetings and processions. When he was asked if he had done anything else he suggested he convinced others to join the party. When he was asked how he had done this he was able to say only that he would explain that the party did not involve itself in any fights, talk about the works of its founder and explain the directions the country should take. He made no reference to any involvement in electioneering until prompted and then offered some essentially meaningless comments about the frequency of elections in Bangladesh. 65. Even making allowance for the fact that the Applicant's involvement with the Jubodal is said to have lasted no more than about two years before leaving Bangladesh for Australia, I am not satisfied that these responses give any indication of first-hand knowledge or experience such as might reasonably be expected of a prominent local leader of a wing of the BNP. 66. In this context I also find relevant the Applicant's response at the hearing indicating that he had not had any involvement with the party in Australia after being here for a year. I note his various explanations for this – that he was suffering from a lot of tension, that he did not know anyone in the party here and that he did not have close friends – but I do not find these convincing and I am not satisfied that they reflect any genuine effort to locate and associate himself with the party here. I find that this also casts some doubt over his assertion that he would involve himself again with the party if he were to return to Bangladesh. [emphasis added] 36 Notwithstanding these observations, the Tribunal was willing to accept that it was possible that the applicant had been a supporter of the BNP and the Jubodal, and that he may also have joined the Jubodal organisation. 37 However, the Tribunal made this further observation at para 67: … I am not satisfied that he ever held a leadership position in the Jubodal as he claims to have done or that he was in any other way a political activist. Nor am I satisfied that he was ever known in his village or more widely in Sylhet District as a political activist or that he distinguished himself in any way by his political opinion. [emphasis added] 38 The Tribunal made these findings as to the applicant's claims to have suffered harm in November 2010 and January 2011: 70. Having considered these claims I am not satisfied they are credible. I note that the Applicant's evidence at the hearing about the injuries he is said to have sustained in the second of these attacks (that is, that they were only internal and were not visible) is directly inconsistent with the alleged medical certificate he submitted in which his injuries are said to include a large laceration to his scalp. When he was asked about this inconsistency his responses were notably evasive and unenlightening. 71. … I am not convinced by his explanation [of the apparent lengthy period of one year between the ascendency of the Awami League in December 2008 and attacks upon a prominent local Jubodal leader such as the applicant] that the Awami League began slowly targeting people, starting from the beginning, and I note that in his further explanations he appeared to retreat from his claims of activism by saying that at first he was largely involved in his business activities and only later began to be active in the Jubodal. 39 As to the applicant's claims to have been the subject of a false case lodged against him by the Awami League arising out of a clash in the bazaar in his village between factions supporting the Awami League and the BNP, the Tribunal observed that it was not possible to learn much about the incident from the documents submitted by the applicant, and the applicant "provided little further information beyond saying he was charged with carrying illegal arms": para 72. 40 The Tribunal also notes at para 72: His claim that he was so frightened of being arrested or killed by police over this false charge that he decided to leave Bangladesh for Australia is, however, clearly untenable. As put to him at the hearing, the alleged FIR is shown as having been filed on 8 April 2011. On the evidence of the Applicant's passport this was three days after his Australian tourist visa was issued. The incident to which this FIR refers is said to have occurred on 4 April 2011, the day before the Applicant's visa was issued and I am satisfied that this would have been well after the date on which his visa application was lodged. [emphasis added] 41 The Tribunal made these further findings: 73. Further, as put to the Applicant at the hearing, if he had been genuinely alarmed by the lodgement of a false case against him, and believed he was about to be arrested and possibly killed, it is difficult to understand why he would have remained in Bangladesh for a further two weeks after his Australian tourist visa was issued to him. I note his explanation for this at the hearing, to the effect that he had to make arrangements to give his business to his brother and to take care of his family, and that he wanted to accompany his mother to Australia, but I am not satisfied that they account for his failure to take immediate steps to leave the country if he had genuinely feared serious harm. 74. Taking these matters together with my other findings about the general credibility of the Applicant's evidence, I am not satisfied that he was ever attacked by members or supporters of the Awami League as he claims or that a false case was ever brought against him. [emphasis added] 42 The ultimate position reached by the Tribunal is summarised in this way: 75. I have taken into account the documents submitted by the Applicant in support of his claims, namely the two supporting letters said to have been written by Jubodal leaders in Sylhet and Zakigonj, the injury certificate said to have been issued by a hospital in Zakigonj and the FIR said to have been filed on 8 April 2010. Having regard to the country information before the Tribunal indicating that false and fraudulent documents are readily available in Bangladesh and are often used in support of protection claims, together with my other concerns about the credibility of the Applicant's evidence, I am not satisfied that any evidentiary weight can be placed on this material. 76. In the light of all the information before the Tribunal I am not satisfied that the Applicant has ever been a political leader in Bangladesh or that he has any kind of profile as an activist in support of the BNP or the Jubodal. Nor am I satisfied that he has ever suffered harm for such a reason at the hands of the Awami League or anyone else in Bangladesh. Nothing has changed in this regard since he left Bangladesh to suggest there would now be a real chance that he would suffer harm for such a reason, even if he were to return to his home and resume his previous level of involvement with the Jubodal. He does not claim to fear harm in Bangladesh for any other reason and no other reason is apparent on the face of the information before the Tribunal. 77. I am not satisfied that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his real or imputed political opinion or for any other Convention reason should he return to Bangladesh, nor or in the reasonably foreseeable future and I am not satisfied that he is a refugee. [emphasis added] The reasoning of the primary Judge 43 As to the contention (Ground 1) that the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claims by making wrong findings of fact, the primary Judge held that findings of fact, open on the evidence (although minds might differ about the factual conclusions) does not constitute jurisdictional error, and in any event, the relevant finding was consistent with the applicant's own evidence. 44 As to the contention (Ground 2) that the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with a proper opportunity to address inconsistencies in his evidence at the hearing "according to the [Migration] Act", and the notion that the Tribunal had failed to comply with statutory obligations in that regard (obligations under Pt 7 of the Act), the primary Judge held that no failure to comply with s 424A(1) of the Act arose as s 424A(3)(b) was engaged and thus s 424A(1) did not apply. 45 That conclusion was reached by the primary Judge because s 424A does not apply to information that the applicant gave for the purposes of the application for review or information that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department (s 424A(3)(ba)). 46 The primary Judge observed that one possible aspect of this second ground (which may have been raised by the applicant's contention that he was "not given enough opportunity to address the inconsistency in his response at the hearing according to the Act") was that the Tribunal had failed to discharge an obligation cast upon it under s 425 of the Act (which falls within Pt 7 of the Act). Section 425(1) of the Act provides that the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before it to "give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". The primary Judge observed that the Tribunal will have failed to provide a real and meaningful hearing "implicitly promised by the invitation" required by s 425(1), if the applicant is denied an opportunity to give to the Tribunal, at the hearing, the evidence and arguments he wishes to make. 47 The primary Judge, however, described the contention in Ground 2 as "generalised allegations" which provide "no basis to conclude" that a denial of the opportunity required by s 425 occurred in the present case. The primary Judge also observed that no evidence was adduced to suggest that the applicant had been prevented from saying what he wanted to say at the Tribunal hearing. 48 The primary Judge concluded that no failure to comply with s 425 had been made out. 49 It should also be noted that no specific allegation was made that the Tribunal had failed to comply with s 425. The primary Judge considered the operation of that section in the context of the Tribunal hearing on the footing that Ground 2 of the application before his Honour implicitly raised possible reliance on a failure by the Tribunal to comply with s 425. 50 As to the applicant's contention before the primary Judge that the applicant did not understand the Tribunal's questions, the primary Judge observed that "this allegation was not explained or clarified and the applicant did not identify why any lack of understanding on his part amounted to jurisdictional error" on the part of the Tribunal. 51 As to the contention (Ground 3), in effect, that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to appreciate that the "applicant did not know that he could have asked for additional time to answer the questions of the Tribunal", the primary Judge construed that ground of the application as implicitly suggesting that jurisdictional error had arisen on the part of the Tribunal by failing to "advise the applicant of a right to ask for additional time to respond to questions". The primary Judge held that the Act "provides no general right of this sort" and consequently "any failure to give such advice does not amount to jurisdictional error". 52 As to the contention (Ground 4) that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to give the applicant a "fair hearing opportunity to put his case and prove his case before the Tribunal", the primary Judge observed that no content was given to the contention and thus it lacked any "meaningful substance". The primary Judge also observed that the applicant did not "identify in which of many potential ways he claimed not to have been given a fair opportunity to put his case" and absent information of that kind, the allegation could not support demonstrated jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. 53 Ground 5 of the application before his Honour raised the contention that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by rejecting the applicant's claims on the basis of "wrong observations that the applicant's involvement with the Jubodal have lasted no more than about two years" and that he had not had "any involvement with the party in Australia after being here for a year". The applicant contended that these factual matters are not merely "marginal or insignificant aspects" of the applicant's account of relevant factual matters but rather "lie at the heart of his claim to fear harm in Bangladesh". 54 As to these matters, the primary Judge held that all issues raised by the ground, were "questions of fact" which "only raised disagreements with the Tribunal's factual conclusions" and disclosed no basis upon which the Court could or should set the Tribunal decision aside. 55 As earlier mentioned, aspects of the grounds the applicant would seek to agitate by way of appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court should an extension of time be granted, assert error on the part of the primary Judge in failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, largely on the footing of the contentions made before the primary Judge. Consideration of the grounds of appeal the applicant would wish to agitate should an extension of time be given 56 As to the four grounds identified at [8] and [9] of these reasons which the applicant would seek to agitate on appeal, the position is this. 57 As to Ground 1, a consideration of the Tribunal's reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal extensively considered all of the circumstances upon which the applicant contended that he held fear for his life, and upon which he asserted a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason related to engagement in political activities and the expression of political opinion. 58 By Ground 1, the applicant also contends that the Tribunal "made a mistake" in rejecting the "review application" on the footing that the applicant was "not involved in the party [BNP] while in Australia". However, the Tribunal reached a conclusion that it could not be satisfied that the applicant held a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason for a multiplicity of reasons all of which have been set out in these reasons. The factual conclusion concerning the applicant's engagement either, at all, or to a particular level, in the affairs of the BNP in the period in which he had been in Australia was a matter open to the Tribunal. In any event, however, it was not decisive of the Tribunal's inability to reach the relevant state of satisfaction in the discharge of the review function although it was an element of the Tribunal's reasoning. 59 Many other significant material considerations were weighed in the balance, on the facts, by the Tribunal. 60 As to Ground 2, the contention reflected in this ground bears a number of similarities to the grounds agitated before the primary Judge. 61 In this ground, the applicant contends that the Tribunal engaged in "procedural mistakes" in failing to "communicate information" with the applicant. 62 Another feature of the ground is the contention that the applicant did not understand the inconsistencies he might be required to address. 63 Another feature is that the applicant was not given "enough time and opportunity" to address the "differences" (which is to be taken as a reference to the inconsistencies). 64 Yet another feature of the ground is that the applicant did not "understand" why the Tribunal was "telling him all that" at the hearing. 65 To the extent that Ground 2 suggests a procedural failure on the part of the Tribunal to put clear particulars of information to the applicant which the Tribunal considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision of the delegate under review, namely, inconsistencies in the evidence of the applicant, Ground 2 might be taken as a contention (in conjunction with Ground 3) that the Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements of s 424A and s 425 and obligations arising under Pt 7 of the Act. However, no particularity is given of these matters and no specific reference is made to any particular provision of the Act casting obligations upon the Tribunal which the applicant says the Tribunal has failed to discharge. 66 Nevertheless, a consideration of the Tribunal's reasons makes plain that the Tribunal analysed extensively information put before it through documents, oral evidence and statements made by the applicant for the purposes of the application for review. In the Tribunal's assessment, this material gave rise to material inconsistencies which it relied upon in the way earlier described. The Tribunal was entitled to take that course. 67 It may be that in some respects, this Court, as a tribunal of fact in the exercise of its original jurisdiction might not have reached the same findings. Nevertheless, the findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence. 68 There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal reaching those findings. 69 There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal failing to put a schedule of inconsistencies to the applicant arising out of information that the applicant gave to the Tribunal for the purposes of the review application, for a response. 70 There is no obligation upon the Tribunal to do so. 71 Nor is there any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in the discharge of its review function by reason of a circumstance (even if it be the circumstance), that the applicant did not understand the reason or reasons for the Tribunal asking the applicant an extensive range of questions about the factual matters said to be the basis for the applicant's well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. 72 As to Ground 3, the applicant contends that the primary Judge fell into error by failing to find jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part by not complying with the requirements of Pt 7 of the Act. Another feature of Ground 3 is the contention that the Tribunal did not give the applicant "sufficient time to understand the difference between the Tribunal hearing and the adverse findings by the Tribunal". A further feature of the ground is that the applicant did not "understand" what the impact of adverse findings by the Tribunal might be. 73 It is not clear whether these additional features of Ground 3 are said to be the expression of a failure by the Tribunal to comply with the requirements of Pt 7 of the Act or whether they represent contended procedural failings on the part of the Tribunal independently of the operation of Pt 7. 74 There is no content to Ground 3. 75 To the extent that the failure to comply with the requirements of Pt 7 of the Act is to be found in a failure to comply with s 424A or s 425, no such error is demonstrated on the part of the primary Judge. Moreover, the applicant was given the opportunity to attend the hearing to present any material upon which he wished to rely in seeking to demonstrate (and thus satisfy the Tribunal of) the basis upon which he contended he held a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. There is no content to the contention that the Tribunal did not give the applicant sufficient time to understand what he describes as the difference between a Tribunal hearing on the one hand and the possibility of adverse findings arising out of such a hearing on the other hand. 76 The applicant was given an opportunity to attend a hearing and present his facts, submissions and contentions orally expressly for the purpose of enabling the Tribunal to test and question any of those matters. No jurisdictional error is demonstrated on the basis of the contended lack of "sufficient time" to appreciate the nature of the hearing and the consequences of an assessment by the Tribunal of the applicant's answers to questions. Moreover, there is no jurisdictional error in the notion that the applicant did not understand what the consequences might be for him, in the discharge of the Tribunal's review function, should the Tribunal reach findings adverse to the applicant. 77 As to Ground 4, there is no jurisdictional error in the notion that the Tribunal asked too many questions of the applicant at the hearing. 78 Nor is there jurisdictional error in the Tribunal failing to provide the applicant with a further opportunity, after the hearing, to address findings that might be made, adversely to the applicant, based upon the Tribunal's view that there were material inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, and that the Tribunal could not be satisfied as to aspects of the version of events put to the Tribunal by the applicant. 79 The opportunity afforded to the applicant was one of attending an oral hearing. The information the Tribunal took into account, apart from country information, was information both written and oral provided by the applicant for the purposes of the review. 80 Although there is no suggestion of a failure on the part of the Tribunal to comply with s 424AA, there is nothing in the material which would suggest a failure on the part of the Tribunal to comply with that section. I mention that matter simply because the applicant is appearing in person before the Court. 81 It follows that none of the grounds of appeal which the applicant would seek to agitate have any prospect of success and thus there is no utility in granting an extension of time for the filing of a notice of appeal reflecting those grounds. 82 Accordingly, the application must be dismissed with costs fixed in an amount of $4,000. In fixing the amount, I have had regard to the affidavit of Reuben Reyes Ray, affirmed on 6 November 2013. I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Greenwood. Associate: Dated: 17 September 2014