FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA EPF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 800 Appeal from: EPF17 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1398 File number(s): QUD 420 of 2018 Judge(s): GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 10 June 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an appeal from orders of the primary judge on the footing that the primary judge erred in failing to identify contended jurisdictional error on the part of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal having regard to contentions that the Tribunal failed to comply with obligations arising under s 424A and s 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of the observations in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at 18 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 – consideration of the question of whether the primary judge erred in failing to recognise that the Tribunal reached a contended illogical decision – consideration of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[135] and the application of those principles to the facts found by the Tribunal Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 424A, 424AA Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 236 FCR 549 Date of hearing: 22 February 2019 Date of last submissions: 20 February 2019 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 89 Solicitor for the Appellants: D Hadley, Local Legal Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Forder Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS QUD 420 of 2018 BETWEEN: EPF17 First Appellant EPE17 Second Appellant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: GREENWOOD J DATE OF ORDER: 10 JUNE 2020 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT GREENWOOD J: 1 These proceedings are concerned with an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 8 June 2018 refusing an application for the issue of the constitutional writs in relation to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the "Tribunal") affirming a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the "Minister") to refuse the grant of the appellants' application for protection visas. 2 The background facts are not in dispute between the parties subject to particular aspects of the facts directly relevant to the grounds of appeal. I will refer to those matters in due course. 3 As to the background facts, I will refer to those facts emphasised by the appellant based on the appellant's submission and I will then examine aspects of the Tribunal's decision. 4 The first appellant ("EPF17") is a Vietnamese citizen born in Ninh Binh in North Vietnam on 2 June 1969. She arrived in Australia on 29 January 2007 accompanying her husband, the second appellant ("EPE17"). The male appellant entered Australia having been issued a subclass 457 visa. The female appellant entered as a dependent family member under her husband's visa. That visa was granted on 2 January 2007 and was effective until 2 January 2011. 5 On 18 October 2013, appellant EPF17 (the female appellant) lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa. Her husband also sought a visa but only on the footing that he was part of the first appellant's family unit. He advanced no separate claim on his own behalf. 6 On 25 February 2014, the application by the appellants was refused. They then sought review of that decision before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the "RRT"). The RRT affirmed, on 27 March 2014, the decision of the then Minister's delegate. The appellants then applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review of that decision on grounds of jurisdictional error. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed that application on 24 December 2015. The appellants then filed an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia from the orders and decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Court allowed that appeal on 19 January 2016 and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration on 17 May 2016. 7 On 13 April 2017, following the remittal, the representative of the appellants provided additional written submissions and a further statutory declaration. A rescheduled hearing took place on 25 May 2017. The Tribunal (which had assumed the role in relation to migration decisions formerly conducted by the RRT), convened a further hearing attended by appellant EPF17 on 21 August 2017. EPF17's representative provided a post-hearing written submission on 28 August 2017. Appellant EPF17 attended a final hearing before the Tribunal on 8 September 2017. On 28 September 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant each of the appellants a protection visa. The appellants sought judicial review of that decision before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. On 8 June 2018, the primary judge, Judge Jarrett, dismissed the amended application of the appellants filed on 20 December 2017 with an order that the appellants pay the first respondent's costs. The appellants appeal from those orders and assert three grounds of error on the part of the primary judge. I will return to the particular grounds of appeal later in these reasons. 8 As to the background matters, the following facts emphasised on behalf of the appellants are these. Since all the material facts in support of the claims relied upon in supporting the application for the protection visa concern the female appellant, references to "the appellant" in these reasons are references to appellant EPF17. 9 The appellant is a past member of the Vietnamese Communist Party. She worked for the Communist Radio Station in her home town, Van Hai village as a presenter and broadcaster. She was a well-known member of the Communist Party and well-known to Government officials in her home town. In her claims for a protection visa, she claimed to hold a well-founded fear of persecution based on the following matters: (a) her political opinion against the Vietnamese Government; (b) her political opinion in relation to her views on Government programs; (c) non-payment of party memberships; (d) a police interrogation in relation to her alleged political activities since her arrival in Australia, which occurred when she returned to Vietnam for a brief period to visit family; (e) her raised profile as a failed asylum seeker who has been imputed with western views who departed Vietnam legally but promising to return after the expiry of her husband's visa; and (f) her activities in Australia, such as claiming asylum and participating in an anti-China protest in Brisbane. 10 The appellant feared that she would be harmed by Vietnamese authorities upon her return. She claimed that she has an adverse profile in Vietnam as an asylum seeker and an ex-community member who had been accused of having a "secret political agenda". She claimed that the reason for her departure from Vietnam was her fear of being persecuted by Communist Party officials. She claimed that the Vietnamese authorities treated her as a person with a secret political agenda due to her criticism of Government economic plans. The appellant held various positions in committees and associations of the communist regime. She was the President of the Women's Association in Van Hai village from March 2003 to January 2007, and a Member of the Women's Association of Kim Son District from August 2006 to January 2007. She was also the Secretary of the People's Committee of Van Hai village from April 2004 to January 2007. 11 At the commencement of her work at the Van Hai radio station, she was a part-time presenter and editor. She was required to obtain Communist Party membership in order to obtain permanent employment at the radio station. After she obtained Communist Party membership, she began to express her independent views more often in her radio programs. The authorities then began to scrutinise her work more carefully. The authorities did not like her expressing views on Government programs. She claimed that she was expected to engage in more "propaganda work". 12 The appellant claimed that she was secretly monitored by Government authorities in Vietnam and that she was approached by police who warned her not to broadcast her "reasons for political reform" on local radio. The appellant felt pressured in all of her activities and resigned from her job at the radio station. She claimed that she sought a work visa on behalf of her husband as an avenue to seek protection in Australia. She applied for a protection visa as soon as she learned that her husband would not be able to stay in Australia under his work visa. She claimed that whilst in Australia, she received multiple phone calls from various communist organisations requesting her to pay Communist Party membership fees. In March and April 2011, she returned to Vietnam for a six week period in order to see her sick father. She claimed that although she stayed home most of the time to avoid attention from authorities, officials identified her during the course of her visit to a local market. She claimed that she was then subjected to interrogation and was questioned about her "political activities" in Australia. She claimed that she was warned not to publish any anti-Government material in Australia. She returned to Australia soon after this experience, fearing arrest. 13 At the core of the appellant's claims is a contention that, although the contents of her programs were not anti-communist, Government officials did not tolerate her proposals for economic and social reforms in Vietnam which included the following four topics: (a) expansion of a Swedish HIV program that was operating in parts of Vietnam; (b) expansion of foreign investment in Vietnam; (c) cutting red tape by empowering local Government to approve programs giving freedom of expression; and (d) transparency in funding arrangements of the "People's Committee". 14 In the Tribunal's Statement of Decision and Reasons, the Tribunal identifies the various statutory declarations of the appellants put before the Tribunal, submissions and other documents. The primary judge observes at [18] that it was not suggested that the Tribunal's summary of the claims of the appellants was inaccurate. 15 It is now necessary to examine some particular matters. 16 Before the Tribunal, the appellant advanced claims relating to her role as a broadcaster, among other claims. As to those claims, the Tribunal notes at para 58 that having commenced her working life working on a rice farm, she moved to radio announcing. People in her village encouraged her to take up the opportunity. At para 59, the Tribunal notes that her initial radio work involved reading out the minutes of the different groups operating within the community. She was a reporter and an announcer. She was required to go out and seek information from various groups. She would put together a report and then that report would be checked by the authorities. She referred to the authorities as the "public security": Tribunal, para 59. She worked as an announcer during the period 2000 to 2005. She used to work a shift for 15 to 30 minutes although sometimes the shifts went for an hour. The program she presented was entirely "reporting". There was no music. 17 The Tribunal notes at para 64 that it discussed with her the process for approval of her material broadcast during her programs. The Tribunal notes that in response she said that she would write an article and then submit it to the content manager of the radio station. The content manager would, in turn, submit the article to the "public security" and the party leader. She gave evidence to the Tribunal that her articles were handwritten, and if they were acceptable, they would be approved by the next day for broadcast. If not approved by the next day, the article would never be approved. 18 At para 65, the Tribunal says this: The Tribunal discussed with the applicant [appellant EPF17] what stories there were that she wanted to write. She referenced an article she wrote about participating in a competition about gender equality that was sponsored by a Swedish Foundation. She said she came second in the competition, but was not able to read out her entry. Her article was about education equality. She wrote other articles about the streamlining of ID card processing, foreign investment, an eight-hour work day, transparency and AIDS. She said that she was not able to publish any of those articles. The Tribunal asked the applicant why she thought she was not allowed to broadcast those articles. The applicant stated that she believed the authorities had suspicions of the applicant having a secret agenda. She said this was particularly so when local government finances were being discussed. The applicant would argue for transparency, and the government would say that the applicant was acting against the government. 19 At para 66, the Tribunal notes that it made references to articles referred to in the decision of the Tribunal in 2014. 20 At para 67, the Tribunal notes that it mentioned to the appellant an article by Nguyen Tan Dung, Prime Minister of Vietnam, dated 23 May 2014. The article is entitled "Why foreign investment in Vietnam is booming" and was published at the World Economic Forum. The Tribunal notes that in the article, the Prime Minister stated that, "[a]ttracting foreign direct investment … has always been a key part of Vietnam's external economic affairs" and stated that, "we are working hard to become even more appealing to foreign investors". At para 67, the Tribunal observes that it indicated to the appellant that "it appeared the applicant's pro-foreign investment policies were supported by the government". 21 At para 68, the Tribunal notes that it mentioned to the appellant an article appearing in "Vietnam News", described as the "National English Language Daily". The article dated 6 June 2007 is entitled "Programme opens eyes to plight of AIDS victims". The Tribunal notes, that the article notes, local prejudice against HIV sufferers but was very positive about an HIV/AIDS awareness program launched as part of a Vietnamese and Canadian rehabilitation program. At para 68, the Tribunal notes that it indicated (to the appellant) that it appeared that foreign HIV programs were supported by the Government. 22 At paras 79 to 83, the Tribunal sets out a number of findings which are consistent with the observations earlier made in these reasons. 23 At para 84, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal accepts that after the applicant became a party member, the applicant was required to have her articles approved by the Communist Party before they were broadcast. The Tribunal accepts that censorship of her articles would have been a foreseeable consequence of her membership of the party. The Tribunal further notes that the applicant accepted this position for nearly two years after joining the party and until she resigned from the radio station. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the censorship or requirement to have her articles approved by the party would put her at risk of serious harm or significant harm if she returns to Vietnam. 24 At para 85, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal asked the applicant about some of the views she would have liked to have expressed were she not constrained by the party. She listed off stories about education equality, the streamlining of ID card processing, foreign investment, an eight-hour work day, transparency and AIDS. The Tribunal noted, as had the previous Tribunal at which she appeared, that articles by the Prime Minister appeared to support the foreign investment policies she herself was espousing. Another article suggested that the government was supportive of foreign HIV programs. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant's views on these subjects would impute her with anti-government opinion or garner her adverse attention by the Communist Party or [put] her at risk of serious harm or significant harm if she returns to Vietnam. 25 At para 86, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal finds that the applicant is a supporter of the Vietnamese Government. The organisations that she joined were supporters of the party and the government. She claimed that she was ridiculed for proposing ideas that were not accepted. She said that the party did not accept all ideas proposed by the Women's Association and People's Council. The Tribunal accepts that that is the nature of people's groups – ideas are proposed, some are accepted and some are rejected. The Tribunal does not accept that ridicule within a public forum puts her at risk of serious harm or significant harm if she returns to Vietnam. 26 At para 89, the Tribunal said this: For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the requirement to have her articles approved by the party, the views she held in relation to education equality, HIV/AIDS, 8 hour working day, transparency, streamlining ID card processing or foreign investment, being subjected to ridicule within a meeting for proposing different ideas, resigning from the radio station, or the requests for outstanding fees would put her at risk of serious harm or significant harm if she returns to Vietnam. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant would be at risk of serious harm for these reasons if she returns to Vietnam now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 27 As to these matters the appellants contended before the primary judge that the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to comply with the obligations required by s 424A and s 424AA of the Act. The particulars of that contention were that the Tribunal had formed the view that the appellant had not expressed anti-Government views in Vietnam in her radio programs, but failed to give the appellant "an opportunity to express the contents of her programmes and to give evidence as to how the contents of her programmes offended the government". The appellant, in this context, quotes an observation of the Tribunal at para 67 in these terms: The Tribunal indicated that it appeared the applicant's pro-foreign investment policies were supported by the government. [emphasis added] 28 The content of para 67 is more fully described at [20] of these reasons. 29 In the context of the contention at [27] of these reasons, the appellant also referred to an observation of the Tribunal at para 68 in these terms: The Tribunal indicated that it appeared that foreign HIV programs were supported by the government. [emphasis added] 30 The content of para 68 is more fully described at [21] of these reasons. 31 In the context of the ground recited at [27], the appellant also emphasised the observation of the Tribunal at para 85 that it did not accept that the appellant's views on the subjects described in para 85 would impute to her anti-Government opinion (or "garner her adverse attention by the Communist Party or [put] her at risk of serious harm or significant harm if she returns to Vietnam"). The appellant also emphasises, in the context of ground 1, the Tribunal's observation at para 86 that it found that the appellant was a supporter of the Vietnamese Government and that the Tribunal accepted that the appellant was subject to only the normal criticism one might expect within "people's groups" where ideas are proposed and some are accepted and some are rejected. Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Tribunal's reasons are set out at [24] and [25] of these reasons. 32 The primary judge at [36] records his Honour's understanding of the content of the contention put by the appellants in relation to s 424A and s 424AA by quoting paras 28, 29 and 30 of the submissions of the appellants. The following aspects of those submissions have relevance for this appeal. As to para 28, the contention was that paras 67, 68 and 85 of the Tribunal's decision record refer to two articles that the Tribunal considered "relevant and material" to its finding that the contents of the appellant's programs/writings "were not offended by the Vietnamese government". The appellant contended that that finding was "adverse", as the appellant had contended otherwise by her claims. 33 The proposition at para 28 of the submission is expressed a little awkwardly. The appellants seem to be contending that the Tribunal relied on two articles (one by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung dated 23 May 2014 concerned with foreign investment issues, and one published in the "Vietnam News" on 6 June 2007 concerned with an HIV/AIDS awareness program) in reaching a conclusion or finding at para 85 that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant's views "on these subjects" would cause her to be perceived as holding, or imputed with, anti-Government opinion. The reference to "these subjects" seems to be a reference to the subjects of "foreign investment policies" and "foreign HIV programs" (using the terms found within para 85 of the Tribunal's reasons). The Tribunal observed at para 85 that these articles suggested that the Government was supportive of greater foreign investment in Vietnam and supportive of foreign HIV programs which was consistent with the position adopted by the appellant. 34 The appellant contended before the primary judge (which has become a question challenged on appeal and I will return to the grounds of appeal later in these reasons) that s 424A and s 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the "Act") were engaged and thus she ought to have been given an opportunity to comment on the "adverse findings". The appellant contended that she was not given an opportunity "before, after or at the hearing" to comment on or respond to the adverse information. 35 Section 424A(1) provides that, subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must give the applicant, in the way the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review; and ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of the relevant information being relied on in affirming the decision under review; and invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. Section 424A(2A) provides that the Tribunal is not under an obligation under s 424A to give particulars of information if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information under s 424AA. As to subsection (3), it is in the following terms: (3) This section does not apply to information: (a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or (b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or (ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or (c) that is non-disclosable information. 36 Section 424AA provides that if an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under s 425, the Tribunal may orally give the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under the review; and if the Tribunal does so, the Tribunal must comply with the obligations at s 424AA(1)(b)(i) to (iv). 37 The term "information" is not defined in the Act. The term must be considered in, and derives its content from, the context in which it appears in those sections. The starting point is to note that the obligation is a mandatory requirement that the Tribunal must give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The phrase "the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision", marks out the boundary of the phrase "any information". The statutory purpose served by s 424A(1) and s 424AA(1) is to provide the applicant with an opportunity to comment on or respond to any such information coupled with an obligation on the part of the Tribunal to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review and the consequences of the information being relied on in affirming the decision. 38 The following observations of the majority (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [18] should be noted as to the construction of s 424A(1) of the Act: [18] Thirdly and conversely, if the reason why the tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting "information" within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute "information". Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs that the word "information": … does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc … If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly "information" be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant "information" was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself. [emphasis added] 39 The construction to be given to s 424A again arose for consideration in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 ("SZLFX") and the Court (French CJ, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) said this at [20]-[25]: 20 This Court has construed s 424A in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. There was no challenge to those authorities or the principles they contain, the emphasis in argument being on whether or not the file note in question was "the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision" under review and how that was to be assessed. Notably, it was contended by the first respondent that upon a proper review of the evidence the Federal Magistrate was correct in his conclusions. 21 In SZBYR, it was stated [at [15]] that: "Section 424A does not require notice to be given of every matter the Tribunal might think relevant to the decision under review. Rather, the Tribunal's obligation is limited to the written provision of 'particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review'." 22 Furthermore, it was emphasised that for s 424A(1)(a) to be engaged, the material in question should in its terms contain a "rejection, denial or undermining" [SZBYR at [17]] of the review applicant's claim to be a refugee. The Federal Magistrate approached the issue framed by reference to s 424A by considering whether the file note could or might undermine the credibility of the first respondent. He considered it could and also considered that no inference that the file note was not material to the decision should be drawn from the RRT's failure to mention the file note. 23 This approach was, with respect, flawed given the following observations in SZBYR [at [18]]: "[I]f the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting 'information' within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). … However broadly 'information' be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence." 24 As a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Dowsett, Bennett and Edmonds JJ) pointed out correctly, shortly after SZBYR, in SZKLG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, s 424A depends on the RRT's "consideration", that is, its opinion, that certain information would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. Here, there was no evidence or necessary inference that the RRT had "considered" or had any opinion about the file note. 25 As observed equally correctly by Heerey J in MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, s 424A speaks of information which "would", not which "could" or "might", be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. 40 It should be kept firmly in mind that the focus of the appellant's submissions to the primary judge is reflected in para 28 of the submission which develops a proposition about the two particular articles considered by the Tribunal, as identified in these reasons. 41 In addressing the appellant's submissions, the primary judge at [37] observed that "[i]t is plain that the Tribunal was not required to give the applicants the opportunity to comment on any adverse findings it proposed to make". The primary judge reached that conclusion on the appellant's submission on this point because ss 424A and 424AA are both concerned with "any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review" and, having regard to the observations of the majority in SZBYR, and the acceptance by the majority of the principle in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 236 FCR 549 at [24](iii) as quoted at [18] of SZBYR, the primary judge considered that the Tribunal's assessment of the two articles in question engaged the "subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations" of the Tribunal and was thus not "information" for the purposes of each section. 42 At [38], the primary judge observed that even if the ground of challenge reflected in paras 28 and 29 of the appellant's submission was seen as a contention that the applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on the two articles in question, the submission was not sustainable for two other reasons. First, the two articles were excluded from the operation of s 424A and s 424AA by s 424A(3)(a) because the obligation arising under each section does not apply to information that is not specifically about the appellant or another person (specifically) and is just about a class of persons of which the appellant or another person is a member. As to s 424A(3), see [35] of these reasons. Second, the primary judge observed at [38](b) that the Tribunal put each article to the appellant in the course of the hearing. The primary judge observes that the Tribunal's decision expressly states at para 67 that it mentioned the article by Nguyen Tan Dung to the appellant and indicated to the appellant that it appeared to be the position that the appellant's pro-foreign investment policies were supported by the Government. The primary judge at [38](b) also observes that at para 68, the Tribunal mentioned the "Vietnam News" article and indicated to the appellant that it seemed to be the position that foreign HIV programs were supported by the Government. At [38](b), the primary judge also observes that the Tribunal asked the appellant why she thought she was not allowed to broadcast the articles she wished to write. The primary judge observes that the appellant's representative was given the opportunity to file a post-hearing submission, and did so, dated 28 August 2017. 43 At [39], the primary judge said this: I accept the first respondent's argument that to the extent that one might see the applicants' argument that the applicant was not given an opportunity to give evidence about how the contents of her programmes offended the government, the submission is not sustainable because the Tribunal's reasons and the record more generally demonstrates that the first applicant had plenty of opportunity to include this information in her numerous statutory declarations. The Tribunal discussed with the first applicant at the hearings before it "what stories there were that she wanted to write" [para 65] and "why she thought she was not allowed to broadcast those articles" [para 65]. The first applicant expressly stated that she believed it was because "the authorities had suspicions of [her] having a secret agenda" particularly in relation to local government finances, because she would argue for transparency and the government would say that was acting against the government [also at para 65]. [emphasis added] 44 At [40], the primary judge said this: As the first respondent points out, the applicants have not contradicted this summary of the applicant's evidence, [or] explained why this opportunity was insufficient, or identified what different evidence the applicant would have given had she been given a further opportunity to do so. 45 Accordingly, the primary judge dismissed the appellants' contentions in relation to jurisdictional error on the ground of a failure to discharge obligations arising under s 424A and s 424AA of the Act. 46 That matter is the subject of ground 1 of the appeal to this Court. By ground 1, the appellants contend that the primary judge erred in law by deciding that the Tribunal had not breached s 424A and s 424AA of the Act. The particulars of the contention on appeal are put this way: Particulars (i) [A]t [39] of the FCC decision, [the primary judge] said: "First applicant had plenty of opportunity to include information about her articles in her numerous statutory declarations". At [48] d [the primary judge] said: "The [T]ribunal referred the first applicant [to] the two articles the subject of her submissions in this case and had she disagreed with the [T]ribunal's view of them, she had the opportunity to disagree with them". These findings were erroneous as the first applicant was never invited to comment on why she considered her articles offended the government. (ii) The Tribunal's finding about the content of [the] first applicant's writings was material to the Tribunal's decision in relation to her claim that she would be persecuted upon return. 47 The appellants contend that the findings quoted at [39] and [48](d) of the primary judge's reasons were erroneous because there is "no evidence to suggest that the first [appellant] was invited to comment on why she considered her articles offended the government, either verbally or in writing" and that by failing to give the first appellant an opportunity to comment "on the crucial information (namely the content of her articles, relating to her persecution), verbally or in writing, the FCC has made an error in breaching its statutory duties which amount to jurisdictional error". 48 Of course, the contention must be understood as a contention that the Tribunal, by failing to give the first appellant an opportunity to comment on the content of her articles, either in writing or orally in the course of the hearing, engaged in jurisdictional error, and that the primary judge, by failing to so find, fell into error reviewable by way of rehearing. 49 In the notice of appeal, the appellants refer to [48](d) of the primary judge's reasons. That paragraph is concerned with observations in relation to ground 2 of the appeal before the primary judge. By that ground, the appellants contended that the Tribunal had reached an illogical or unreasonable decision by failing to consider country information said to have been considered by the Tribunal to be irrelevant information in relation to the claims of the appellants. The particulars of that matter were that the contents of the first appellant's programs were material to the claims; in making its findings about the claims, the Tribunal had regard to the two articles earlier mentioned in these reasons, and failed to consider the first appellant's evidence that the government was offended by the contents of her programs. The primary judge observed at [43] that there was no attempt to further explain the ground or identify the underlying error in the Tribunal's approach. The primary judge observes at [46] that although the appellants contended that the Tribunal's unreasonable fact-findings led to an erroneous conclusion, the appellants had failed to identify the facts found by the Tribunal said to be erroneous. At [47], the primary judge again notes the written submissions of the appellants and the contention that the Tribunal had made findings to the effect that the contents of the first appellant's programs/writings did not offend the Government, said to be adverse findings because they were inconsistent with the claims of the appellants. At [47], the primary judge notes the terms of para 85 of the Tribunal's decision. In this context, the primary judge then made observations at [48]. 50 At [48], the primary judge said this: However, there was no factual finding by the Tribunal that could be described as erroneous as the applicant contends. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant's views on the matters that she brought to the Tribunal's attention were anti-government because on the material before the Tribunal, they seemed to the Tribunal to be consistent with the government's approach. That reasoning was open to the Tribunal on the material before it. There is nothing illogical about the Tribunal's reasoning because: a) it is clear from the Tribunal's reasons that it discussed with the first applicant what stories she wanted to write and why she thought she was not allowed to write them; b) the decision records her evidence that she proposed publishing articles about education equality, streamlining of ID card processing, foreign investment, an eight-hour work day, transparency and AIDS but had not been allowed to publish them; c) it specifically referenced her evidence that she believed the authorities suspected that she had a secret agenda, particularly when local government finances were being discussed; d) the Tribunal referred the first applicant [to] the two articles the subject of her submissions in this case and had she disagreed with the Tribunal's view of them, she had the opportunity to disagree with them. 51 At [49], the primary judge accepted that the two articles in question were logically probative and supported the conclusion reached by the Tribunal and that it was "appropriate" for the Tribunal to have regard to the articles. 52 As to ground 1 of the appeal, the position is this. 53 Although the submissions before the primary judge focused very much on the two articles referred to by the Tribunal, ground 1 of the appeal seems to focus upon articles written by the first appellant. As to those articles, the appellant claimed that after she became a member of the Communist Party she wanted to express her personal views about particular matters in her radio broadcasts and, for that purpose, had written (apparently in her own handwriting) articles expressing her opinions. As already described in these reasons, she claimed that she was prevented from publishing her opinions by means of the broadcasts and perhaps otherwise prevented from publishing her written articles. She claimed she was prevented from doing so because the articles contained an implied criticism or anti-Government criticism of policies of the Government or the party or alternatively because party officials regarded the articles as anti-Government articles or positions taken consistent with a "hidden agenda" on the part of the first appellant. 54 As to these matters, the first appellant put a statutory declaration dated 17 October 2013 before the Tribunal and at para 25, she refers to requests made of the local authorities about broadcasting her reasons for political reform. Written submissions dated 17 September 2014 were put on, on behalf of the appellants, and in those submissions, at paras 5.1 to 5.4, the first appellant talks about raising her ideas with her supervisors and using the radio as a platform to propose reforms to Government programs. She talks about the authorities closely monitoring her programs as a result of which she lost control of her programs and her freedom of expression. The first appellant put a further statutory declaration dated 17 September 2014 before the Tribunal in which she says that she gave her proposals to her supervisors which were then considered by the "Central Propaganda Department". She says that she proposed reforms through her programs in relation to "foreign investment" and the "Swedish HIV aid program". A letter dated 11 April 2017 was put to the Tribunal on behalf of the appellants and at Item C there is reference to the contents of the first appellant's programs. The submission says that the first appellant attempted to put her ideas for reforms into writing although the authorities refused to allow her to broadcast them. The submission also talks about the proposals addressing matters of economic and administrative reform. The first appellant put a further declaration dated 10 April 2017 before the Tribunal in which she again talks about her decision to broadcast more of her personal views in her programs and the refusal of the authorities to allow her to do so. She also talks about decisions by the authorities to begin investigating her as a person with a secret political agenda. 55 The primary judge at [16] identifies these documents and other material. 56 To the extent that ground 1 is now focused upon articles written by the first appellant rather than the articles the subject of the written submissions before the primary judge, these matters should be noted. In the submission dated 17 September 2014 at para 5.1 to 5.5, the first appellant says that she decided to use the radio as a platform to propose reforms to Government programs. However, the proposed changes to Government policies in the local community, economic area and other programs were thought, by the authorities, to be against guidelines for media and press broadcasts and publications determined by the Communist Party. In the statutory declaration of 17 September 2014, the appellant makes the same point again. The same point is developed in the letter dated 11 April 2017 except that at para 19, the lawyers acting on behalf of the appellants identify that the first appellant "attempted to put her ideas for reforms into writing". However, the authorities refused to allow her to broadcast those views. The village police chief was the person who refused her proposals. This is a reference to ideas put in writing. Similar views are put in the statutory declaration of the first appellant dated 10 April 2017 although the notion about things put in writing is not developed. 57 Two things flow from these references. 58 The first is that the contentions about her views, the perception that they reflected an anti-Government position and that her views were subject to control by party officials was put by the first appellant to the Tribunal. The notion that she had reduced some of her views to writing was also put by or on her behalf to the Tribunal. Because all of this material was put in support of her position concerning the claims, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to then put the first appellant's own case to her on the footing that she ought to be given an opportunity to comment on articles or views she had put in writing which were not able to be broadcast, or otherwise published. It was a matter for the first appellant (and thus the appellants) to put before the Tribunal, in support of the various contentions in whatever material they considered would properly reflect the contentions, or would otherwise be supportive or corroborative of her contentions. It was not a matter for the Tribunal to put to the first appellant that she had made reference to views which she had at some point in time in Vietnam reduced to writing for broadcast or had otherwise written, and then provide her with "clear particulars" of those references as "information" for the purposes of s 424A and s 424AA of the Act. The source of the references was the first appellant. It was a matter for her to put forward any of the examples upon which she wished to rely in supporting her factual claims. 59 Secondly, the appellants seem to contend that they were not given a reasonable opportunity to put on evidence, give oral evidence and present arguments about any articles the first appellant had written at some point either for broadcast or otherwise. The primary judge observed at [39] that the first appellant had put on much documentation and numerous statutory declarations going to factual matters relating to her claims. It is true that in the submissions or the statutory declarations she could have taken the opportunity to refer to information about any articles or, for that matter, add or supplement her material with all of the detail she thought relevant to her claims. Moreover, it is true that the Tribunal discussed with the first appellant at the hearing the nature of the stories that she wanted to write and why she thought she was not allowed to broadcast particular material which she had reduced to writing. She explained that she believed that the authorities had suspicions about her holding a secret agenda, particularly in relation to financial matters. 60 Again, the first appellant had an opportunity to orally address the scope, content, nature and focus of any of her written material that she was unable to broadcast or any other written material she had produced. 61 To the extent that ground 1 of the appeal contends for error on the part of the primary judge in failing to find jurisdictional error in relation to the two particular articles referred to by the Tribunal in the nature of country information, it should be noted that each article was excluded from the operation of s 424A and s 424AA by operation of s 424A(3)(a). That section provides that s 424A does not apply to information that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member. The two articles in question fall within that description. 62 Ground 1 of the appeal must necessarily fail. 63 By the written submissions of the appellants, they withdraw and abandon ground 2 of the appeal. 64 Ground 3 of the appeal is in these terms: 3. The Federal Circuit Court made an error of law by failing to recognise that the Tribunal made an illogical decision. Particulars (i) the [T]ribunal did not consider country information in relation to [the] class of persons the first [appellant] belonged to, being the ex-communist members who sought asylum and were accused of criticising [the] communist government's economic policies. (ii) the [T]ribunal did not consider that being an ex-communist member who participated in anti-communist protest in Brisbane, the first [appellant] would be subjected to persecution upon return. (iii) the [T]ribunal did not make a finding about the level of surveillance [the] first [appellant] faced in Vietnam prior to her departure and during a subsequent visit which was material to its finding about the first [appellant's] fear of returning to Vietnam. 65 As to ground 3 which is described as "reasonableness and logicality", the appellants make the following submissions: a. We would respectfully submit that the [primary judge] made an error of law in failing to recognise that the findings [of] the [T]ribunal were unreasonable and illogical. b. We submit that the [T]ribunal did not consider country information in relation to class of persons the first [appellant] belonged to, being the ex-communist members who sought asylum and were accused of criticising [the] communist government's economic policies. c. We submit that the [T]ribunal did not consider that being an ex-communist member who participated in anti-communist protest in Brisbane, the first [appellant] would be subjected to persecution upon return. 66 The appellants also say this: We submit that the [T]ribunal did not make a finding about the level of surveillance the first [appellant] faced in Vietnam prior to her departure and during a subsequent visit which was material to its finding about the first [appellant's] fear of returning to Vietnam. d. In failing to consider these crucial factors, the [primary judge] could not form a judgment that was logical and reasonable. 67 The matters set out at [65] and [66] of these reasons represent the full extent of the appellants' written submissions on this ground. 68 As to findings leading to a conclusion as to whether the decision-maker can reach a state of satisfaction (or not) for the purposes of s 36(2) and s 65(1) of the Act, impugned on grounds of illogicality and irrationality, the following principles identified by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[135] should be noted: 130 In the context of the Tribunal's decision here [which equally applies to the IAA's decision in this case], "illogicality" or "irrationality" sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of the argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact [the relevant state of satisfaction], it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is "clearly unjust" or "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "unreasonable" in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. 131 … [T]he test for illogicality and irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. 132 Because illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in the context of jurisdictional fact finding as explained above, it becomes necessary to decide whether the Tribunal's conclusion about the state of satisfaction required by s 65 and its findings on the way to that conclusion revealed illogicality or irrationality amounting to jurisdictional error. … 133 … [T]he correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it. … … 135 On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. [emphasis added] 69 As to the first point at [65] of these reasons, the appellant has failed to identify particular "findings" of the Tribunal which are said to be unreasonableness and illogical. 70 As to the second point at [65], that submission takes up particular (1) of ground 3 set out at [64] of these reasons. Thus, the submission is that the Tribunal reached an illogical decision because it failed to consider country information relating to a class of persons to which the first appellant belonged, described as "ex-communist members who sought asylum and were accused of criticising [the] communist government's economic policies". As to the material findings, the Tribunal accepted and found that the first appellant had been a member of the Communist Party. It found that she had stopped paying fees for membership of supporting organisations of the Communist Party when she arrived in Australia. As the Minister observes, the Tribunal did not accept that this was because the first appellant no longer supported the views of the Communist Party. The Tribunal found that she ceased paying fees because her view was that she did not owe any fees. At para 88, the Tribunal observed that the demands for payment of outstanding fees arose because the appellant, when resigning from each organisation before moving to Australia, offered to continue paying the fees. Her complaint was that the organisations were more interested in revenue than her membership. The first appellant said that she did continue to pay the fees for two months after arriving in Australia. At para 86, the Tribunal found that the first appellant is a supporter of the Vietnamese Government. At para 131, the Tribunal observes that it had earlier found that the views held by the first appellant, and views she was interested in publishing, were, in fact, consistent with the views of the Government as expressed in articles and publicly announced and did not accept that the appellant's views on the relevant subjects would impute her with anti-Government opinion. At para 131, the Tribunal observes that it is satisfied that the reason the first appellant has not expressed anti-Government views is "because she does not have any". 71 At para 130, the Tribunal observes that it has noted its earlier findings throughout the reasons for decision that the applicant is characterised as a supporter of the Communist Party and the Government of Vietnam. Accordingly, the Tribunal assessed the first appellant's claim to suffer a real risk of serious harm for a Convention reason upon return to Vietnam against the background of the findings it had made that the first appellant was a former member of the Communist Party and a former member who continues to support the Communist Party and, a person who has not expressed anti-Government views because she does not hold such views: see also para 132 of the Tribunal's reasons. 72 As to country information, the Tribunal examined a range of country information cited throughout the reasons for decision. The Tribunal also cited country information references in the submission dated 28 August 2017. 73 In formulating this ground of appeal, the appellant, at the very least, needs to identify particular country information which she contends the Tribunal ought to have taken into account and failed to take into account. In addition, the appellant must identify the topic to which the country information is directed which ought to have been considered. None of this has been done. 74 There is no basis upon which the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by reference to the matters at Particular (i) of ground 3. 75 As to Particular (ii) of ground 3, the appellant says that the Tribunal did not consider that the first appellant would be subjected to persecution on return to Vietnam as a person who is an ex-communist member who participated in an anti-Communist protest in Brisbane. As to this ground, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant was a former member of the Communist Party. It found that she had ceased to pay fees having regard to her departure to Australia. At paras 123 to 129, the Tribunal expressly considered the factual matters and implications of the first appellant's attendance at a candlelight vigil in June 2014 and the question of her contended anti-Government views, in that context. The first appellant gave evidence to the Tribunal that the vigil was in support of the people in Vietnam and was a protest against the dispute between Vietnam and China over the occupation of the Paracel Islands. The vigil was organised by the Temple at Inala in Brisbane. 76 At paras 133 and 134, the Tribunal expressed these observations in relation to the vigil: 133. After receiving the delegate's decision in late February 2014, the applicant, notwithstanding never having attended such a vigil in the past, never having expressed any anti-government views in the past, and having been warned not to express anti-government views by the police in 2011, decided to attend a candlelight vigil in support of Free Vietnam. She positioned herself in the front row of the vigil and maintained that as the vigil was broadcast, she would have been seen and the government would have seen her, been able to identify her, and conclude that she has anti-government views. 134. The Tribunal does not accept as plausible that the government would have seen her amongst hundreds of others that attended, as it was in the dark and lit only by candles, even if they were bright candles, and even if she did appear on the broadcast, would not be able to be clearly identified. 77 In any event, the Tribunal at para 135 expressed the view that it was satisfied that the first appellant's attendance at the vigil was solely for the purpose of strengthening her protection visa application. The Tribunal did not accept as plausible that the appellant, never having attended such a vigil in the past (and having regard to the factors at para 133), would decide to attend a candlelight vigil in support of Free Vietnam and position herself in the front row of the vigil for any reason other than seeking to enhance her protection claims. 78 These findings were open to the Tribunal. 79 As to Particular (iii), the appellants contend that the decision of the Tribunal is illogical thus giving rise to jurisdictional error because the Tribunal did not make a finding about the level of surveillance the first appellant faced in Vietnam prior to her departure and during a subsequent visit which was material to its finding about the first appellant's fear of returning to Vietnam. 80 As to these matters, the Tribunal quite plainly understood the nature and content of the claims of the first appellant to fear a real risk of serious harm. The Tribunal set out a summary of the claims of the first appellant in full based on the statutory declaration dated 17 October 2013, at para 35 of the reasons. At para 36, the Tribunal refers to the first appellant's supplementary declaration and her party membership card. At para 37, the Tribunal refers to the further statutory declaration of 17 September 2014 and notes those claims in considerable detail. At paras 38 and 39, the Tribunal notes other documents going to the claims and at para 40, the Tribunal notes the further statutory declaration of 10 April 2017. Moreover, during the course of the hearing, the Tribunal asked the first appellant questions about the monitoring of her conduct by the authorities in Vietnam. At para 78, the Tribunal notes the first appellant's response in this way: The applicant stated that wherever she went, she had to report in to the party and to police. She said it started when she became a party member, and continued when she worked on the radio and [became] involved with the associations. She had to seek permission and then report in whenever she left her village. The Tribunal asked her how many times she had to do this. She said many times. She also said she was not the only one, the party had a few hundred members. The Tribunal confirmed that this requirement to report in to the authorities was not unique to her. She confirmed it was not. 81 At paras 79-83, the Tribunal makes a series of findings about the first appellant's participation as a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party and related associations. At para 84, the Tribunal accepts that after the first appellant became a party member, she was required to have her articles approved by the Communist Party before they were broadcast and the Tribunal noted that the appellant had accepted this position for nearly two years after joining the party and until she resigned from the radio station. 82 As to the question of being monitored while in Australia, the Tribunal notes aspects of the interaction between the first appellant and the Women's Association. At para 88, the Tribunal says that it has reservations about the appellant's account of when she received seven calls from the Women's Association and radio station to pay her outstanding fees. The Tribunal observes that it gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt in accepting that these calls were received. The demands for payment of outstanding fees arose because the appellant, when resigning from each body before moving to Australia, offered to continue paying the fees. The Tribunal notes the appellant's claim that upon her return to Vietnam the payment of fees was again pressed and requested by police officers, and upon her saying that she would pay the fees, she was released without arrest or detention. At para 88, the Tribunal observes that it is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the appellant would be at risk of serious harm or significant harm for the reason of the requests to pay outstanding membership fees or not having paid the fees in the past. At para 89, the Tribunal observes that it is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the appellant would be at risk of serious harm for the collection of reasons mentioned in that paragraph should she return to Vietnam now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As to para 89, see [26] of these reasons. 83 Having regard to these considerations, the Tribunal expressly dealt with the question of the level of surveillance faced by the first appellant in Vietnam prior to her departure. The findings it made in relation to its state of satisfaction address and deal with those matters. 84 As to the question of the first appellant's temporary return to Vietnam in 2011, the Tribunal also made findings about these factual matters. Thus, it is not correct to say that the Tribunal did not address the question and make findings. The truth of the matter is that the appellant simply emphatically disagrees with the conclusions the Tribunal reached. At paras 90-112, the Tribunal expressly addresses in some considerable detail the circumstances relating to the visa applications, departure from Vietnam and the return to Vietnam in 2011. At para 107, the Tribunal notes that after resuming the hearing on 8 September 2017, it restated its concerns with the first appellant's account of her return to Vietnam in 2011 as set out in the reasons prior to para 107. From para 113, the Tribunal sets out its findings in relation to the topics there under debate, and at paras 113-116 the Tribunal: accepted that the first appellant travelled to Australia with her family pursuant to her husband's work visa; accepted that she returned to Vietnam lawfully in 2011 and returned to Australia six weeks later; did not accept that the first appellant returned to Vietnam secretly; did not accept as plausible that she had any reason to keep her visit a secret as she had been living in Australia lawfully and without incident for four years; noted that she had received seven phone calls chasing outstanding fees in the first year she was in Australia, but those calls had stopped; and did not accept that she had said things in the past that the party did not like. At para 116, the Tribunal observes that it confirmed (with the first appellant) "that the party had not hurt her, had not tried to terminate her membership, and had not tried to have her arrested or incarcerated". At para 116, the Tribunal notes that "[a]t worst, she had written articles that the party may not have approved and they weren't broadcast". 85 At para 117, the Tribunal expresses concerns about the plausibility of the first appellant's account of the circumstances surrounding how and when and why she was intercepted by police at a market about three weeks after she returned to Vietnam in 2011. Nevertheless, the Tribunal gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt and accepted that she had been intercepted by police. At para 118, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant may have decided to return home earlier than planned. At para 119, the Tribunal observed that it had concerns about the plausibility of the appellant's account of a second visit to the police station the day before she left to return to Australia. Nevertheless, the Tribunal gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt and accepted that the police may have again asked her about outstanding fees; may have again reminded her not to express or publish anti-Government views; and may even have discussed with her, her presence in Vietnam. However, at para 119, the Tribunal observes that "the police again allowed her to leave without arrest, threat or attempt to detain her". At para 119, the Tribunal makes this observation: The Tribunal again does not accept that as a consequence of such second visit to the police that such an additional request not to publish anti-government views would result in her being imputed with being anti-government or anti-communist or acquiring a profile as a political dissident. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant would be at risk of serious harm or significant harm for [the] reason of the additional request not to publish anti-government views. 86 At para 120, the Tribunal accepts that he police may have visited the appellant's father after she returned to Australia. The Tribunal observes that on each of the two occasions that the police made inquiry, they were told that the appellant was in Australia and the police left quietly making no threat to the appellant's parents. The Tribunal observed that it did not accept that such visits indicated any heightened level of interest in her or any adverse interest in her beyond the payment of outstanding fees and ensuring that she does not publish any anti-government views. 87 When this section of the Tribunal's reasons are read, it is clear that the Tribunal did consider the factual content of the claim regarding the extent to which the first appellant was or was not being monitored in Vietnam before she left, and also upon her short term return to Vietnam in 2011. Although it is true that the Tribunal did not make a finding about the degree of monitoring faced by the first appellant, it did make findings about aspects of the content of the claims touching upon that matter. In any event, any failure to make a specific or express finding does not render the decision of the Tribunal on the fundamental question of whether it could reach a state of satisfaction about the integers of the protection claim, irrational, illogical or unreasonable. It is clear that the Tribunal did make specific findings on aspects of the monitoring of the first appellant such as questions of censorship of broadcasts and written material, questioning by police upon return in 2011, questioning of the first appellant's parents and such matters. The Tribunal formed the view having regard to all of the evidence that it could not reach a state of satisfaction that the first appellant departed Vietnam for Australia for any of the reasons claimed or that she held a fear of a real risk of serious harm for the reasons claimed. The cumulative findings on these matters are set out at para 151. 88 Accordingly, no aspect of ground 3 is established. 89 Having regard to all of these considerations, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Greenwood. Associate: Dated: 10 June 2020