IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR WRITS OF PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI AGAINST THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION; EX PARTE THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY AND MINING EMPLOYEES UNION | Legal Lookup
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR WRITS OF PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI AGAINST THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION; EX PARTE THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY AND MINING EMPLOYEES UNION
High Court of Australia
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7) -4- 1092
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR WRITS OF
PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI AGAINST THE
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION; EX PARTE
| THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY AND MINING EMPLOYEES UNION
JUDGMENT McHUGH J.
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR WRITS OF
PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI AGAINST THE
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION; EX PARTE
THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY AND MINING EMPLOYEES UNION
The Construction, Forestry and Mining Employees
Union, an organisation registered under the Industrial
Relations Act 1988 (Cth), ("the organisation") seeks
orders nisi for writs of prohibition, mandamus, and
certiorari against The Australian Industrial Relations
Commission in respect of the proposed amalgamation of
four organisations which are also registered under the
Act. The organisation contends that the Commission has
failed to exercise or has exceeded its jurisdiction
because it has held that, in a hearing under s.250 of
the Act for "the granting of an approval for the
submission of the amalgamation to ballot", the
organisation had no right to ask the Commission to
dismiss the proceedings pursuant to s.111(1)(g) of the
Act. That paragraph enables the Commission to dismiss
proceedings in the Commission on the ground, inter
alia, that they "are not necessary or desirable in the
public interest".
Division 7 of Pt IX of the Act provides for the
amalgamation of organisations which, by definition,
means organisations "registered under this Act".
Section 242(1), which is found in Div.7, provides:
"The existing organisations concerned in
a proposed amalgamation, and any association
proposed to be registered as an organisation
under the amalgamation, must jointly lodge in
the Industrial Registry an application for
approval for the submission of the
amalgamation to ballot."
The persons entitled to vote in the ballot are those
persons who, on the day determined in accordance with
s.253C of the Act, have the right under the rules of
the existing organisation concerned to vote at such a
ballot or, if the rules do not provide for the right to
vote at such a ballot, "have the right under the rules
of the organisation to vote at a ballot for an election
for an office in the organisation that is conducted by
a direct voting system".
Section 250 of the Act provides for the hearing of
submissions in relation to the granting of an approval
for the submission of the amalgamation to ballot. It
provides:
"Where an application is lodged under
section 242 in relation to a proposed
amalgamation, a designated Presidential
Member:
(a) must immediately fix a time and place
for hearing submissions in relation to:
(i) the granting of an approval for
the submission of the amalgamation
to ballot; and
(ii) if an application for a
declaration under section 241 was
lodged with the application - the
making of a declaration under
section 241 in relation to the
amalgamation; and
(iii) if an application was lodged under
section 244 for exemption from the
requirement that a ballot be held
in relation to the amalgamation -
the granting of the exemption; and
(iv) if an application was lodged under
section 245 for approval of a
proposal for the submission of the
amalgamation to a ballot that is
not conducted under section 2533 -
the granting of the approval; and
(b) must ensure that all organisations are
promptly notified of the time and place
of the hearing; and
(c) may inform any other person who is
likely to be interested of the time and
place of the hearing."
Although s.250 does not expressly refer to the
Matters which are to be considered by the Presidential
Member in determining whether he or she should grant
approval for the submission of the amalgamation to
ballot, the Act does not leave those matters at large.
By necessary inference, s.252 circumscribes the matters
on which submissions can be made in an application
under s.250(a)(i). Section 252(1) provides:
"If, at the conclusion of the hearing
arranged under section 250 in relation to a
proposed amalgamation, a designated
Presidential Member is satisfied:
(a) that the amalgamation does not involve
the registration of an association as an
organisation; and
(b) that a person who is not eligible for
membership of an existing organisation
concerned in the amalgamation would not
be eligible for membership of the
proposed amalgamated organisation
immediately after the amalgamation takes
effect; and
(c) that any proposed alteration of the name
of an existing organisation concerned in
the amalgamation will not result in the
organisation having a name that is the
same as the name of another organisation
or is so similar to the name of another
organisation as to be likely to cause
confusion; and
(d) that any proposed alterations of the
rules of an existing organisation comply
with, and are not contrary to, this Act
and awards and are not contrary to law;
and
(e) that any proposed de-registration of an
existing organisation complies with this
Act and is not otherwise contrary to
law;
the Presidential Member must approve the
submission of the amalgamation to ballot."
It would be an exercise in futility for the
Presidential Member to hear submissions in respect of
Matters outside the terms of s.252 because, ex
fAypothesi, they are irrelevant to the obligation to
approve the submission of the amalgamation to the
ballot. Consequently, no submission can be made in
relation to the granting of that approval unless it
falls within the terms of s.252.
Moreover, the submissions which can be put by a
person who is not an applicant for approval for the
submission of the amalgamation to ballot are further
circumscribed by s.251 and reg.70. Section 251
provides:
"(1) Submissions at a hearing arranged under
subsection 241(3) or section 250 may only be
made under this section.
(2) Submissions may be made by the
applicants.
(3) Submissions may be made by another
person only with the leave of a designated
Presidential Member and may be made by the
person only in relation to a prescribed
matter."
Regulation 70 provides:
"For the purposes of subsection 251(3)
of the Act, the following matters are
prescribed:
(a) any proposed alteration in the name of
an existing organisation concerned in
the proposed amalgamation;
(b) any proposed alterations of the
eligibility rules of an existing
organisation concerned in the proposed
amalgamation."
Notwithstanding the mandatory terms of s.251(3) and
the matters prescribed by reg.70, the organisation
contended that it had the right under the Act to submit
that the proceedings should be dismissed pursuant to
the provisions of s.111(1)(g) of the Act. In
furtherance of that contention, the organisation lodged
an application to dismiss the amalgamation proceedings
on the ground that the eligibility rules of the
proposed amalgamated organisation would be contrary to
the public interest. The organisation claimed the
right to intervene and support this contention - not
under s.251(3) - but under s.43 of the Act which
empowers the Commission to give leave to an
organisation to intervene "in a matter before the
Commission". The Full Bench of the Commission rejected
the claim of the organisation to intervene under s.43
because s.251 made "clear and specific provision as to
who may appear at the hearing and in respect of what
they may make submissions". The Full Bench also
rejected the right of the organisation to contend that
the proceedings should be dismissed under s.111(1)(g).
It did so on the ground that the "invocation of the
powers under s.111(1)(g) is not a prescribed matter and
by operation of s.251(3) is not a matter that may be
raised in submissions by an organisation or person who
might otherwise have been given leave under that
section". Furthermore, the Full Bench held that,
notwithstanding the difference in language between
s.252(1)(b) and reg.70(b), "the scope of reg 70(b) is
relevantly limited to the matter required to be
considered by the Commission under s.252(1)(b)."
In this Court, the organisation did not seek to
rely on the filing of the application which it made in
purported reliance on s.111(1)(g). Nor did it contend
that it had a right to intervene under s.43. Instead,
it contended that the Full Bench had failed to
distinguish between the organisation's right to make
submissions under s.251(3) and the power of the
Commission, after hearing those submissions, to dismiss
the proceedings under s.111(1)(g). The organisation
contended that the terms of reg.70(b) go beyond the
subject matter of s.252(1)(b) of the Act. It submitted
that reg.70(b) entitles a person who is given leave
under s.251(3) to make any submission which touches or
concerns "any proposed alterations of the eligibility
rules of an existing organisation concerned in the
proposed amalgamation", irrespective of whether the
submission goes beyond discussing whether "a person who
is not eligible for membership of an existing
organisation concerned in the amalgamation would not be
eligible for membership of the proposed amalgamated
organisation" under s.252(1)(b). The organisation
contended that, if a submission concerning "any
proposed alterations of the eligibility rules" leads
the Presidential Member to conclude that the alteration
is contrary to the public interest, that Member has the
power, by reason of s.111(1)(g) and s.33 of the Act, to
dismiss the proceedings of his own motion.
Section 33(a) empowers the Commission to exercise a
power "of its own motion".
However, the contention that the organisation had a
right to address generally on the alteration of the
rules is not one which is reasonably open on the proper
construction of the Act and Regulations. This is so
even even though the Commission has power of its own
motion to dismiss proceedings under Div.7 of Pt IX ona
ground specified in s.111(1)(g) of the Act.
"Subject to this Act", s.111(1) confers a number of
specific powers on the Commission "in relation to an
industrial dispute". Unless the context otherwise
requires, the term "industrial dispute" in s.111(1) is
defined by s.111(2) to include "a reference to any
other proceeding before the Commission". It is
unnecessary to set out the terms of s.11ll. It is
enough to say that many of the powers which it confers
on the Commission are capable of being applied in
proceedings under Div.7 of Pt IX of the Act. The
powers to take evidence on oath or affirmation
(par.(a)), to sit at any place (par.(j)), to adjourn to
any time and place (par.(m)), and to correct, amend or
waive any error, defect or irregularity, whether in
substance or form (par.(q)), for example, are powers
which are capable of being applied in Div.7
proceedings. Not all the powers conferred by s.111(1),
however, are capable of being applied in Div.7
proceedings. In some cases, powers conferred by
10.
s.111(1) are not capable of being applied in those
proceedings because they apply only to particular types
of proceedings instituted under the Act; in other
cases, powers conferred by s.111(1) are not capable of
being applied in Div.7 proceedings because the nature
of those proceedings makes it impossible to apply those
powers. Thus, some parts of s.111(1)(g) are, and some
parts are not, capable of being applied in Div.7
proceedings. Section 111(1)(g) provides:
"Subject to this Act, the Commission
may, in relation to an industrial dispute:
(g) dismiss a matter or part of a matter, or
refrain from further hearing or from
determining the industrial dispute or
part of the industrial dispute, if it
appears:
(i) that the industrial dispute or
part is trivial;
(ii) that the industrial dispute or
part has been dealt with, is being
dealt with or is proper to be
dealt with by a State industrial
authority;
(iii) that further proceedings are not
necessary or desirable in the
public interest;
(iv) that a party to the industrial
dispute is engaging in conduct
that, in the Commission's opinion,
is hindering the settlement of the
industrial dispute or another
industrial dispute; or
ll.
(v) that a party to the industrial
dispute:
(A) has breached an award or
order of the Commission; or
(B) has contravened a direction
or recommendation of the
Commission to stop industrial
action".
The nature of Div.7 proceedings makes it impossible
to. exercise the power conferred by sub-par.(g) (ii).
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a case where sub-
par.(g)(i) could be applied. But nothing in the nature
of the power conferred by sub-par.(g)(iii) makes it
inappropriate to exercise that power in Div.7
proceedings. That power, therefore, is available to
the Commission in such proceedings. It does not
follow, however, that a person who is not an applicant
for approval for the submission of the amalgamation to
the ballot can make submissions which in terms or in
effect would enliven the power conferred on the
Commission by s.111(1)(g)(iii). It is true that s.33
of the Act provides:
"Subject to this Act, the Commission may
perform a function or exercise a power:
(b) on the application of:
12.
(i) a party to an industrial dispute;
or
(ii) an organisation or person bound by
an award."
But it is a settled rule of statutory construction that
a statutory power, expressed in general terms, is not
to be construed so as to avoid a condition or
limitation placed on the exercise of a specific power
by the same statuto(!), Section 251 mandates that a
person who is not an applicant for approval can only be
heard with the leave of a designated Presidential
Member and "only in relation to a prescribed matter".
It is impossible therefore to construe s.33, or for
that matter s.43, as giving a person who is not an
applicant a right independent of s.251 to make
submissions in Div.7 proceedings. The general powers
conferred by ss.33 and 43 cannot be used to avoid the
limitations imposed by s.251. The right of the
organisation to put submissions in the present
(1) Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd. v. Amalgamated
Clothing and Allied frades Union of Australia
(1932) 47 C.L.R. 1, at pp.7, 8; R&. v. Wallis
(1949) 78 C.L.R. 529, at pp.550-551; Leon Fink
Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Film Commission
(1979) 141 C.L.R. 672, at p.678; Saraswati v. The
Queen (1991) 172 C.L.R. 1, at pp.23-24.
13.
proceedings was, therefore, limited to the matter
prescribed by s.251(3) and reg.70(b).
Moreover, the submissions which are heard pursuant
to s.251 are submissions "at a hearing arranged under
+.. section 250". For present purposes, that is a
hearing for "submissions in relation to ... the
granting of an approval for the submission of the
amalgamation to ballot"), But, as I have already
pointed out, the effect of s.252 is to confine those
submissions to the matters referred to in s.252 because
once the Presidential Member is satisfied of those
Matters he or she "must approve the submission of the
amalgamation to ballot". A serious question arises,
therefore, as to the validity of reg.70(b) because the
Act makes no provision "at a hearing arranged under ...
section 250" for the Presidential Member to consider
generally "any proposed alterations of the eligibility
rules of an existing organisation concerned in the
proposed amalgamation". If the sub-regulation is
valid, it is valid only to the extent that it is
(2) Section 250(a)(i).
14.
construed, as the Full Bench construed it, as confined
to the matter set out in s.252(1)(b).
If the sub-regulation is invalid, the organisation
had no right to make any submission. If it is valid,
it must be construed as limiting the organisation's
right to make submissions to the matter specified in
s..252(1)(b). In either event, the Full Bench was right
to reject the contentions of the organisation.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the forceful and able
submissions of counsel for the organisation, I have
reached the firm conclusion that the applications
cannot succeed and that to allow them to proceed "would
(3),
involve useless expense"
The applications are dismissed.
(3) General Steel Industries Inc. v. Commissioner for
Railways (N.S.W.) (1964) 112 C.L.R. 125, at p.138.