High Court of Australia Dawson J Re Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd; Ex parte Australian Workers Union ORDER Application refused Dawson J. This is an application for orders nisi for writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari directed to the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court. That Court, exercising a jurisdiction which it possessed by reason of the remitter to it pursuant to s 44 of the Judiciary Act 1901 Cth and s 412(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 Cth of an application to this Court for prerogative relief, issued writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus in relation to an interim award, the Aluminium Industry (Comalco Bell Bay Companies) Interim Award 1994, made by the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Commission. There are difficulties which I perceive in this Court exercising a supervisory jurisdiction by way of prerogative relief directed to a court which was itself exercising supervisory jurisdiction by way of prerogative relief. But I do not think that in this application I need enter upon those difficulties. Under s 432(2) of the Industrial Relations Act an appeal lies with leave to this Court from a decision of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court. The applicants have in fact commenced an application in this Court for leave. The writs which the applicants seek do not issue as of course, and in the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse orders nisi, the right to seek special leave to appeal to this Court is a circumstance to be taken into account, particularly where those who seek orders nisi have commenced an application for leave. An appeal is the ordinary means of remedying errors made by a court, and I quote: Apart from exceptional circumstances, the ordinary remedy of appeal rather than the extraordinary remedy of prohibition or a similar writ from this Court should be pursued. [1] Not only that, but, upon my present understanding of this matter, the complaint which the applicants make about the decision of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court would be more appropriately ventilated by way of appeal than in proceedings for prerogative relief. Moreover, if I were to grant the orders nisi, there would be an undesirable multiplicity of proceedings in this Court directed to the same matter. 1. R v Cook; Ex parte Twigg (1980) 147 CLR 15 at 30, per Murphy J. See also R v Baker and Wilkie; Ex parte Johnson (1980) 55 ALJR 191 at 192 Re Construction, Forestry and Mining Employees Union; Ex parte Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (1992) 66 ALJR 266 Mr Merkel QC for the applicants directed my attention to the remarks of Barwick CJ in R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League [2] . where he said that he: Could not regard the existence of a right of appeal and even less the possibility of the grant of special leave to appeal as a matter to be taken into consideration in the exercise of the judicial discretion. In speaking of the existence of a right of appeal, Barwick CJ was speaking of a bare right which may or may not have been exercised by those entitled to it. The situation is, in my view, different where the right to appeal with leave is vested in the very persons who are seeking prerogative relief, where the right is a right to appeal to this Court and where proceedings have been commenced to obtain leave. In those circumstances, and having regard to the views expressed in the other cases to which I have referred, I think that the appropriate course is to refuse the application. 1. (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 205 I should add that in making the remarks which I have, I have had in mind primarily the application for an order nisi for a writ of prohibition. But in this case I would regard mandamus, and if available, certiorari, as inappropriate in circumstances where prohibition ought not to lie. The application is refused. I have not said so above, but of course it is not unknown for an application to be made following an unsuccessful special leave application or leave application.