High Court of Australia Dawson J Re Australian Insurance Employees Union; Ex parte Academy Insurance Pty Ltd Dawson J. In this matter an order nisi for a writ of mandamus is sought, directed to the President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to compel him to determine according to law an application that certain proceedings for the variation of an award be dealt with by a Full Bench of the Commission on the ground that it is in the public interest that they be so dealt with. The application was made under s 34(3)(b) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 Cth (the Act), in the first instance to the Commissioner hearing the proceedings who, as he was required to do, referred the application to the President. That provision was applicable by virtue of s 59(3) of the Act. Section 34(6)(b) of the Act provides: If the President, having regard to the reasons for the application is of the opinion that— (b) In the case of an application under paragraph (3)(b) or under sub-section (4) — the industrial dispute or the part of the industrial dispute, as the case may be, is of such importance that, in the public interest, it should be dealt with as provided by this section, he shall grant the application and direct accordingly. In refusing the application the President said: In my opinion, no special or extraordinary circumstances exist in this case and the application should be determined having regard to the particular circumstances of the case before the Commission, subject only to the limitations imposed by the national wage decision. It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the test applied by the President did not conform with that required by s 34(6)(b) of the Act, being narrower than is suggested by the words "is of such importance that, in the public interest, it [ie the application] should be dealt with as provided by this section". The application before me is one which the applicants were entitled to make ex parte but I allowed the unions who were the respondents to any order nisi to be represented and to oppose the application. They submitted that the President, by referring to the submissions of the employers' counsel on the application before him, took into account in reaching his decision all the matters affecting the public interest which he was required to consider. That submission does not, in my view, suggest any real answer. Where reasons are given for a decision, it would be wrong to speculate upon matters, beyond those referred to in the reasons, which may have motivated the decision: see Baldwin & Francis Ltd v Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663 at 693. The reasons given by the President are those which I must accept and do accept as being his reasons. The criterion applied by the President was clearly that of "special or extraordinary circumstances". Not only is that not the test required by s 34(6)(b), but it is plainly a narrower test, for an application may involve circumstances which are neither special nor extraordinary but which are, because of their very generality, of great importance in the public interest. It is not to the presence or absence of some special feature to which the President is required to look before he acts under s 34(6)(b), although a special or extraordinary circumstance may be of sufficient importance in the public interest to require a hearing by a Full Bench. It is the whole of the circumstances which the President is required to weigh in order to determine where the public interest lies in the future conduct of the proceedings. If he determines that the importance of the matter is such that the public interest requires it to be dealt with by a Full Bench then he should grant the application and direct accordingly. Counsel for the unions, whilst maintaining the submission that the President did not fall into error, nevertheless indicated that if an order nisi were granted, he would not oppose the making of an order absolute. The applicants before me have asked for a stay of proceedings before the Commission should I grant an order nisi. Were I to grant a stay there would inevitably be some delay which should, if possible, be avoided. On the other hand, the proceedings before the Commission have reached well into the stage of final addresses. If I were to make an order nisi but refuse a stay, it may effectively deny to the applicants the relief which they seek. The point which is raised is a short one and requires little elaboration. In view of the indication that relief by way of mandamus is not opposed and in view of the benefit which I have had by way of argument on both sides, I think that I ought, to avoid delay and in the interests of justice, to grant in the first instance an order absolute for mandamus. There is also before me an application for an order nisi for a writ of certiorari. In the circumtances, I do not think that it is necessary to deal with that application and I accordingly refuse it.