Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Al Batat & Ors (No 14) [2020] NSWSC 1165 Hearing dates: 20, 21, 24 August 2020 Date of orders: 31 August 2020 Decision date: 31 August 2020 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Hamill J Decision: The listening device recorded on 4 May 2017 at 00:52:15 under warrant SD 17/0185 is inadmissible. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – evidence - spirited and multifaceted objection - listening device recording - conversation in Mandarin - inconsistent translations - mysteries, infelicities and uncertainties - impact on probative value - carried v bring or brought - loaded expression - Urban Dictionary - leap of faith - unfair prejudice - where accused required to establish other criminal offence to explain recording - whether evidence might be confusing or misleading - evidence inadmissible Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 135 and 137 Cases Cited: IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 R v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 R v Burton [2013] NSWCCA 335; 237 A Crim R 238 R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 R v Taranto; R v Freeman [1999] NSWCCA 396 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Regina Abdallah Hassan Al Batat Ying Cheng Luo Ian Fan Jaiyu Liu Jacob Blake Bayliss Nai An Li Representation: Counsel: P Hogan (Crown) B Rigg SC (Al Batat) R Webb (Luo) T Quilter (Fan) N Carroll (Liu) A Norrie (Bayliss) D Carroll (Li) Solicitors: Solicitor for the NSW DPP (Crown) TS Law Firm (Al Batat) Voros Lawyers (Luo) Zahr & Partners (Fan) George Sten & Co (Liu) Ross Hill Lawyers (Bayliss) Younes & Espiner (Li) File Number(s): 2018/242293; 2018/214586 (Al Batat) 2017/170943; 2018/380808 (Luo) 2017/168582 (Fan) 2017/168476 (Liu) 2017/321618 (Bayliss) 2018/214894 (Li) Publication restriction: No publication until conclusion of trial Judgment 1. This is the fourteenth, and last, of a number of judgments generated in the course of a pre-trial hearing that has spanned the last five weeks. The factual circumstances of the case are set out in some of the earlier judgments. Ian Fan (also known as "Michael") is one of six men charged with a range of offences arising out of two shooting incidents that occurred, respectively, on 23 January and 1 February 2017. The target of both shootings was Jun Jia (or "Xiao Jun"). He is said to have failed to pay for some drugs and his suppliers took out a contract on his life. One of Mr Fan's co-accused, Ying Cheng Luo (sometimes known as "Johnny"), allegedly accepted the contract and recruited Mr Fan and others to carry out the killing. In the course of the incident on 1 February 2017 a friend of Mr Jia's, Mr Qin Wu, was killed. 2. On the prosecution's case, Mr Fan joined the criminal enterprise after the shooting on 23 January 2017. The prosecution alleges that the 23 January shooting was organised by Mr Luo and carried out by Abdallah Al Batat. Chronologically, the first direct evidence of Mr Fan's involvement occurred on 1 February 2017. On that date, Mr Fan, Mr Luo and Jaiyu Liu allegedly obtained two firearms from Jacob Bayliss and, at the same time, supplied him with some drugs. It was later that day that Mr Fan, Mr Luo, Mr Liu (along with a witness known as Leonard Rivers) attended a makeshift Buddhist temple in Guildford and carried out the shooting. The prosecution says that Mr Luo and Mr Liu entered the premises and shot at Mr Jia, killing Mr Wu. They then left the premises and returned a short time later with Mr Fan. All three men were armed with firearms. By this time, Mr Jia had made his escape. Apart from Mr Luo accidently discharging a handgun that was in his pocket, and shooting himself in the leg, no further shots were fired. 3. This judgment relates to the admissibility of a piece of evidence the prosecution seeks to tender against Mr Fan. The evidence consists of a recording of a conversation between Mr Fan and an unknown male on 4 May 2017 a little after midnight. The conversation was conducted in the Mandarin language and police arranged for some of it to be translated by an interpreter Mr Nelson Zhou. A statement of Xiaolei Yang (Exhibit VD11) raises the possibility that he was the unidentified male although he says he is not certain having listened to the recording. 4. Counsel for Mr Fan (Mr Quilter) raised a spirited and multifaceted objection to the admission of the evidence. While the objection is based on the provisions in ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the objection is a little more complicated and nuanced than the average. It begins with an argument over the translation. The translations 1. As I have said, Mr Zhou provided a translation of the conversation. His translation of the conversation (Exhibit VDO) was as follows: "00:52:15 FAN: Now, listen to me... UM: Might have eaten it. FAN: What has it got to do with me? UM: True. FAN: Right? What has his/her going in there got to do with me? UM: Mm. FAN: Isn't he/she a scumbag? He/She...(laughs) Therefore, on the day when we went there, on that day... UM: Mm. FAN: ...it was mainly to fix him/her up, to fix him/her up, understand? That's why all carried… 00:52:45 FAN: They said [IND] wanted to send [IND] and was hit by a gun shot. UM: Mm. FAN: Later the other party blamed/pointed at Johnny (phonetically). [00:52:50] He/She argued with Johnny, er, Johnny said to him/her, to him/her, 'Look, if you have no money, I can give it to you 500 or 1000. Right? Look, it doesn't matter if you are an elder or not, I'll lend the money to you if you run out of it. If you demand money from me this way, I won't give it to you even if I have to die. You would gamble all the money away even if you get it. You would always have no money like this. You are already at such old age now but you are still so poor. Why is that? It's because how you conduct yourself.' (laughs) 00:53:17 FAN: Someone who did business with him/her before... he/she spent their money. They came to me." 1. During the conduct of the voir dire, the Prosecutor indicated that he did not press the words that have been struck through in the above extract. [1] 2. The controversy over the translations arose after Mr Quilter received instructions that the translation provided by Mr Zhou was not a complete record of the relevant conversation. Mr Quilter approached the investigating police and a second interpreter, Ms Cathy Xie, was asked to translate the un-transcribed portion of the recording. Ms Xie translated the whole recording and presented a translation that was substantially different to that of Mr Zhou. For example, there was no reference to anybody getting hit by a gunshot. Ms Xie's translation (Ex VDP) was as follows: "00:51:27 to 00:52:14 (No conversation) 00:52:14 UKM1: Look, I say, probably, this whole thing should have been UKM2: What's that got to with me? Uhm? (IND) Can you afford to have anything to do with someone like him? He, he (laugh) That day with the welcome reception, the day we went there, didn't we? that day, right? UKM1: Mm. UKM2: That was to give, give him trouble, right? That's why they brought everything along, right? (IND) Got into business directly as soon as arriving at a place. He said to (IND, a name J..), (IND, a name J..) said to him: 'Look, if you haven't got money, I can give you (IND). If you have money, that's fine. It doesn't matter whether you want to work for it or do it in other way, I can lend it to you. (But) If you want money from me like this, I will not give it to you even if it means I need to die for it. You won't be able to get away even if you got the money. You will have no money forever. You are still so poor at your age. Why is that? That's because of the way you behave, hahahah. Someone, previously, was doing business with him. He demanded money on behalf of that someone. He approached me demanding for money. UKM1: Just like that? (IND) that, that UKM2: Who? UKM1: This, I am talking about this (IND, a name) UKM2: What about him/her? UKM1: I've never met him/her. UKM2: You have met before. (IND) UKM1: So, uhm, what about the other bit? Do I need to give you the address? UKM2: What address? UKM1: It's that address of (IND, Jonny's ?) cousin UKM2: I should have got that already. I have also paid the money too. What do you think? UKM1: That's fine. Well, I, if there is nothing else, nothing else, I will go back. (IND) will help you. Fine. So, when you (IND) in the evening, I will give you that (IND) UKM2: I, I, I, I am telling you that's no problem. Fine. UKM1: Mm. And I will ring you tomorrow morning or around lunch time, what else? I will keep that with me for the time being, and in the evening, I will UKM2: Whatever suits you. You let me know whenever you want to. I, I UKM1: I want to (IND) (The two people walked away) (IND) UKM2: Where did you leave your phone? Uh? Oh, it's here, it's here. I found it, I found it. Here UKM1: What kind of a brain... (IND. The two people walked away again) UKM2: (IND)" 1. Mr Quilter drew attention to the many variations and inconsistencies that can be identified in the two translations. The Prosecutor submitted that the critical details are more or less the same and that the conversation is capable of being construed as an admission by Mr Fan of his involvement in the shooting on 1 February 2017. Assessing the probative value of the evidence 1. Mr Quilter's first submission is that the uncertainty over the translations is such that the probative value of the evidence is diminished and that there is a risk that the jury will misuse the evidence by guessing and speculating as to words and phrases that are indecipherable ("IND"). If it is necessary to choose between the translations, the jury would not have a principled or rational way of making the choice because they are unlikely to be fluent in Mandarin. Mr Quilter relies on an example provided by the High Court in discussing the manner of assessing the "probative value" of evidence in its decision in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [50]: "It must also be understood that the basis upon which a trial judge proceeds, that the jury will accept the evidence taken at its highest, does not distort a finding as to the real probative value of the evidence. The circumstances surrounding the evidence may indicate that its highest level is not very high at all. The example given by J D Heydon QC was of an identification made very briefly in foggy conditions and in bad light by a witness who did not know the person identified. As he points out, on one approach it is possible to say that taken at its highest it is as high as any other identification, and then look for particular weaknesses in the evidence (which would include reliability). On another approach, it is an identification, but a weak one because it is simply unconvincing. The former is the approach undertaken by the Victorian Court of Appeal; the latter by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The point presently to be made is that it is the latter approach which the statute requires. This is the assessment undertaken by the trial judge of the probative value of the evidence." 1. The interpreters in the present case gave evidence and were cross-examined. There seemed to be two identifiable reasons for the difference in the translations. The first had nothing to do with language. In some instances, Mr Zhou said he could hear and make out Mandarin words and phrases even though the recording was of poor quality and the audio very quiet. Ms Xie was unable to do more than say that words were spoken. She could not make out the words. The second reason was linguistic, and concerned what appeared to be a somewhat different approach to the task of translating. By way of example, Mr Zhou translated the phrase just before time stamp "00:52:45" as "that's why all carried …" while Ms Xie translated the same words as "that's why they brought everything along right." Mr Zhou explained his translation in cross-examination: [2] "Q. Do you see you have written the words 'that's why all carried'? A. Yes. Q. Would a faithful translation to that sentence also be this, 'That's why they brought everything along, right'? A. Some translators might translate that way, I don't know. Q. Would you regard that as a faithful translation to what you heard? A. Would you repeat that? Q. 'That's why they brought everything along, right'? A. That's acceptable, but yeah I choose not to use this way of translation. I tried to be more verbatim. Q. When the verb 'brought' is used, can it be used equally for persons and things? A. That's correct, depending on the context. Q. So the verb is the same whether you are talking about persons or things? A. Yes, but in here, in this particular translation, it doesn't mention it all what was carried or what was brought. Q. So does that leave open the possibility that it is a reference to persons? A. It leaves the possibility to various things. Could be a person, could be an object, could be anything. 1. In re-examination, he was asked to explain this evidence: [3] "Q. Sir, you were asked about the portion of your transcription where you have the words 'that's why all carried', and an alternative translation of that was put to you of 'that's why they brought everything along, right'. You said that that second version was acceptable, but you chose not to because you try to be more verbatim? A. Yes. Q. In what way do you say that your translation 'that's why all carried' is a more verbatim transcript of what was said? A. Yes, I chose not to use that version - I am just - read out to me by the counsel because based on the context and right above there, when we went there, that means someone going from this direction, from this point to a certain point, to another point somewhere out there. Normally, you know, maybe I'm just too strict with grammar. We normally say if you take something from this point to another point, we tend to use 'take' or 'carry'. If you move something from the other point to where you are, we normally use the word 'bring'. So at the time, you know, I believed that it would be more appropriate to use the word 'carry' instead of 'bringing'. That was my, yeah, that was a discretion I exercised at the time. It was simply a technical issue." 1. The Prosecutor indicated his intention was to use Mr Zhou's translation ("that's why all carried") even when asked about the potential unfairness of such a potentially loaded expression. [4] It seemed the Prosecutor may have used the alternative translation – using a word like bring or brought – if the concern may have led to the exclusion of the evidence. [5] 2. Mr Zhou translated the conversation as including: "we went there, on that day … it was mainly to fix him/her up." It seems the same words were translated by Ms Xie as "we went there, didn't we? That day, right? That was to give, give him trouble". The Prosecutor submitted that these words essentially conveyed the same meaning and that either version betrayed "a state of mind consistent with a guilty participation in the common purpose that the Crown alleges". It was submitted the evidence was an admission concerning: "Mr Fan's purpose in going to 5 Kennedy Street, that it was mainly to fix someone up, or, in terms of the other translation, to give him trouble." [6] 1. Mr Quilter conceded (correctly) that, in terms of drawing an inference that the conversation relates to the events at the so called "temple" on 1 February 2017, the Court must not, at the admissibility stage, consider whether any other inferences are open: cf, for example, R v Burton [2013] NSWCCA 335; 237 A Crim R 238 at [159]-[160], [196]-[198]. However, Mr Quilter submitted: "[i]t is proper to recognise these limitations in the 'real probative value of the evidence' (IMM at [50]). Such limitations remain even if one disregards alternative interpretations of the recorded conversation." 1. The Prosecutor relies on the general proposition that the authorities – including IMM itself – insist that, for the purpose of determining admissibility, the evidence is to be taken at its highest and the determination is to be made on the basis that the evidence will be accepted. The Prosecutor seemed to suggest that the "foggy night identification of a stranger" referred to in IMM was essentially limited to identification evidence because such evidence has a "very particular set of concerns and drawbacks and weaknesses. This isn't identification evidence." [7] However, in the present case, due to the infelicities and uncertainties surrounding the translations, the same kinds of questions arise. Just what does the evidence – "taken at its highest" – establish that Mr Fan said to the unidentified male? What words and phrases did he actually use? Did he say he (or they) were going to "make trouble" or did he evince an intention to "fix him up"? And just what do those expressions portend in Mandarin or, once translated, in English? 2. It might be thought that there is some internal tension in the decision in IMM. It seems difficult to reconcile the result (that the evidence is inadmissible) with the principle that the assessment of probative value proceeds on an assumption that the evidence will be accepted. If it is assumed the jury will accept the evidence, how does the source of the evidence (in that case, the complainant) matter? Even so, the High Court made it clear that taking the evidence at its highest does not involve a complete abandonment of an assessment of matters that may lead to a conclusion that the highest level to which the evidence goes may "not be very high at all". 3. While the listening device evidence under consideration here has some capacity to impact on the assessment of the facts in issue – and in particular, Mr Fan's state of mind – I am satisfied that the deficiencies and complications in the translations do, in the circumstances, impact on its probative value. I can see no difference in principle between the circumstances arising here and the foggy night identification of a stranger referred to by the High Court in IMM. 4. Even so, the evidence retains a capacity to impact on an assessment of the facts in issue. It is relevant evidence. However, its probative value as an admission is not particularly high. The admissibility of the evidence turns on an assessment of the "danger of unfair prejudice" (s 137 of the Evidence Act) and the extent to which the evidence "might" be "misleading or confusing" (s 135 of the Evidence Act). The potential for the evidence to mislead or be confusing; the danger of unfair prejudice 1. The danger that the evidence might be misleading or confusing (see s 135 Evidence Act) is obvious. I need say no more about it. 2. The danger of unfair prejudice arises on two bases. First, it was submitted that there is a risk that the jury will engage in impermissible speculation given the deficiencies and inconsistencies in the translations and the number of occasions where the words used were either indecipherable or inaudible. Second, Mr Quilter took me to other statements and listening device transcripts within the prosecution brief which relate to other events and which, it was submitted, might explain the conversation subject of the objection. 3. I accept that, in spite of clear direction, the jury may speculate as to what was said in the indecipherable and inaudible parts of the conversation. At attempt on the voir dire to identify where in the original transcript particular words or phrases were used, and what those words sounded like in the original Mandarin, was unsuccessful, not to say farcical. [8] The jury will not have the resources to choose between the translations and will not be in a position to determine whether the words in Mandarin that Mr Zhou says he heard were actually used. The acceptance of translations by Courts and juries involves a leap of faith in every case; but here the perils involved in the leap have been exposed. 4. Mr Quilter took me to parts of the prosecution brief that are not admissible because they disclose or imply, otherwise irrelevantly, that Mr Fan was involved in other incidents of an unsavoury or criminal nature. This included: * A statement of Weixi Wang (Exhibit VD12). * A statement of Jun Jia (part of Exhibit VDA). * A listening device transcript recorded 25 May 2017 (part of Exhibit VDA). * A listening device transcript recorded 26 May 2017 (part of Exhibit VDA). 1. The statement of Weixi Wang refers to an incident where Mr Fan, along with Mr Liu, approached him at a hotdog stand with Mr Liu and assaulted him. Mr Liu was armed with a knife. The incident seemed to be motivated by a gambling debt owed by Mr Liu to Weixi Wang. 2. The statement of Jun Jia includes reference to an incident involving Mr Liu and Yixi Wang (presumably a reference to Weixi Wang). That incident occurred about 3-4 months before the 1 February 2017 and involved Mr Fan (referred to as "Michael") and a person called "Ling Ling". The motivation is unclear but the men were fighting and a gun was produced and discharged by Ling Ling who was in company with "Michael" (Mr Fan) and Mr Liu. 3. The two listening device recordings (commencing respectively at pp 214 and 249 of Exhibit VDA) capture Mr Fan discussing those, and possibly other, similar incidents. The discussions suggest that Mr Fan was involved in at least two nefarious incidents seemingly unrelated to the events giving rise to the allegations made against him and his cohorts in the current trial. 4. The prosecution will not lead the relevant parts of the statements and listening device recordings in the trial, presumably because they are not relevant and would create unfair prejudice. 5. Mr Quilter submits that if the translated listening device recording of 4 May 2017 is admitted, Mr Fan will be forced into the position where he will be required to adduce this kind of evidence to establish the possibility that the conversation with the unknown male had nothing to do with the 1 February 2017 shooting. He says the admission of such evidence would create incurable and unfair prejudice. Some authorities 1. In R v Taranto; R v Freeman [1999] NSWCCA 396 the Court considered evidence of consciousness of guilt when the accused avoided his home after the alleged commission of an offence of malicious wounding with intent. The applicant said his conduct was explicable by the fact that he faced unrelated charges of goods in custody and possession of drugs and guns. The trial Judge admitted the evidence in spite of the fact that he was placed in a position where he may be required to adduce evidence of other criminal conduct in order to explain his behaviour. Hidden J held at [48] – [50] that it was "open" to the trial Judge to admit the evidence. The Court ordered a retrial and Hidden J said at [50] that if the same objection was taken at the re-trial "it would be a matter for the trial judge to determine [admissibility] in the light of the circumstances that he or she finds them". 2. Similarly, in R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407, evidence of flight overseas was admitted even though the accused presented a "credible explanation" for the flight, namely that they were "panicked" when advised the police were suspicious that they were involved in a series of bank robberies. The Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia upheld the trial Judge's ruling on the basis that such evidence was admissible despite there being another credible explanation for the conduct. 3. In R v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278, a trial Judge excluded evidence that an accused person absconded from bail shortly after the events giving rise to the charges. The reason was that the accused also faced the prospect of serving ten months imprisonment which constituted the balance of parole on an existing sentence and would be required to elicit prejudicial evidence to explain his flight. 4. These authorities, and others, were considered in R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52. That case also involved evidence of flight. Mr Cook was convicted of threatening to inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse. His explanation for taking flight was that he was on an apprehended domestic violence order, had been sentenced for a breach of that order and was under suspicion for a further breach. The breaches involved assaults against a female complainant. Simpson J (as her Honour then was) explained at [32]: "The prejudice to the appellant is plain. Not only would his explanation expose him as a person with a criminal record (the assault and the previous breach), it would also expose him as a person with a history of violence against women. In the context of the charge he faced, that exposure would have particular poignancy." 1. Having considered the authorities, her Honour observed at [47]. "In my opinion none of the authorities to which reference has been made support the proposition advanced on behalf of the appellant. There is no general principle that, when the explanation for flight involves revealing other offences, the evidence should be rejected. Indeed, it is part of the conventional direction in relation to evidence indicative of a consciousness of guilt (whether of lies, or flight, or otherwise), that the jury be alerted to the possibility that the accused person has undertaken that course of conduct by reason of consciousness of guilt, not of the offence charged, but of some other offence or discreditable conduct." 1. However, Simpson J concluded at [49] that the evidence was "wrongly admitted" in Mr Cook's trial. This conclusion was explained at [48]: "The admission of the evidence put the appellant in an awkward position. His response to the evidence not only disclosed previous criminal offences, it disclosed criminal offences with a disturbingly close relationship to the offence with which he was charged. That the evidence would have a prejudicial effect is clear. The appellant's explanation, although disbelieved by the trial judge (and disbelieved in terms forcefully expressed) was not, in my view, incapable of belief by a jury. The appellant had gone to Ms Bruen's home in the early hours of the morning, while she was in bed, and joined her, uninvited, in her bed. Whatever he said to police about his state of mind with respect to the currency of the ADVO, it was then undoubtedly still current. His attendance at the house put him in breach of it, and having regard to the circumstances, in serious breach. It remains to be determined whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence was unfair. Bearing in mind the substance of the charge the appellant faced, and the nature of the evidence he would have to adduce in order to meet the flight evidence, I have come to the conclusion that the prejudicial effect was unfair, and that it outweighed the probative value of the Crown evidence. In this regard, it cannot be overlooked that the decision to admit the evidence may well have been a factor in the consideration of whether the appellant was to give evidence or not." 1. In Decision Restricted [2016] NSWCCA 92, the Court was concerned with admissions made by an accused to the complainant in "pretext" calls recorded by investigators. The accused argued that the evidence should be excluded because he was required to explain the admissions by reference to "past allegations of unspecified conduct by the complainant's sister" (at [114]). Schmidt J held at [115] that the conversations had "real probative value" and that while "their receipt would be prejudicial, as would any other evidence which tends to establish the respondent committed the offences charged, it would not be unfairly prejudicial". 2. These cases demonstrate that the admissibility of such evidence will turn on the peculiar circumstances of each individual case, an assessment of the probative value of the evidence and of the potential for the evidence to cause unfair prejudice. Two propositions are clear. First, the fact that there may be some other plausible explanation for the evidence is not sufficient to justify the exclusion of evidence that is probative of guilt. Second, the evidence may still be admissible even if the accused is forced to elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to explain the conduct in question. However, there may be cases where the prejudice is so great that the evidence must be excluded. Resolution 1. I do not accept the proposition advanced by the Prosecutor that the accused must demonstrate that the prejudice involves eliciting evidence of "offences with a disturbingly close relationship to the offence with which he is charged." [9] While that expression was used in R v Cook, and referred to in Decision Restricted (at [113]), it is not a legal test but rather a description of the evidence in question in the former case. Further, the evidence in Cook did not involve identical offending and the offence with which the accused was charged was far more serious than the incidents he was required to prove if he was to explain his flight. 2. In the present case, the evidence in the statements of Jun Jia and Weixi Wang does involve criminal conduct of a similar kind to that now charged against Mr Fan. The incidents in question involved the use of weapons (a knife in one case and a gun in the other) and a strong suspicion of gang related stand-over tactics. One of Mr Fan's current co-accused, Mr Liu, was involved in those incidents. The danger of unfair prejudice is real and substantial. 3. Further, as I have explained, the probative value of the evidence is diminished by the mysteries surrounding what words were actually spoken and what those words truly signified. 4. I am satisfied that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr Fan. The evidence "must" be excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act. 5. I am further satisfied that the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that that the evidence may be misleading or confusing. Even if s 137 was not engaged, I would exercise the "general discretion" in s 135 of the Evidence Act to reject the tender of the evidence. Ruling 1. For those reasons, the listening device recorded on 4 May 2017 at 00:52:15 under warrant SD 17/0185 is inadmissible. ********** Endnotes 1. Transcript (T) 21/08/2020 pp 566-567. 2. T 21/08/2020, pp 554 - 555. 3. T 21/08/2020, pp 557 - 558. 4. The third definition of "carried" in the Online Urban Dictionary is in the following terms: "someone is 'carrying' when they have a weapon, in most cases a gun, on their person. It is normally only applied to a weapon that has been concealed." 5. T 24/08/2020, pp 566-568. 6. T 24/08/2020, p 576. 7. T 24/08/2020, p 577. 8. T 21/08/2020, pp 562 - 564. 9. T 24/08/20, p 582. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 25 November 2020