Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Karimjee [2021] NSWCA 179 Hearing dates: On the papers Date of orders: 17 August 2021 Decision date: 17 August 2021 Before: Meagher JA, Payne JA, McCallum JA Decision: (1) Order pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) on the grounds set out in ss 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) prohibiting for a period of 80 years the disclosure by publication or otherwise anywhere in the Commonwealth of Australia of: (a) the identities of the alleged victims, or the parents or other family members of the alleged victims, in respect of proceedings 2012/280081, 2012/285455 and 2012/285639, or information tending to reveal the identity of those persons in connection with these proceedings; and (b) the name that is underlined in paragraph [25] of the confidential Agreed Statement of Facts filed contemporaneously with the Amended Summons in these proceedings; (2) Declare that Hussein Karimjee is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers maintained pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law; (3) Order that the name Hussein Karimjee be removed from the roll. Catchwords: LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – disciplinary proceedings – practitioner convicted of offence under s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) – whether probably permanently unfit to practise – order removing name from roll CIVIL PROCEDURE – hearings – suppression and non-publication orders – whether necessary to ensure consistency with extant suppression order of the District Court – where name published in publicly available judgments – no basis for order Legislation Cited: Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), ss 7, 8 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 319 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 131.1(1) Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), s 22 Cases Cited: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; [2004] HCA 1 A2 v R; Magennis v R; Vaziri v R [2018] NSWCCA 174 A2 v R; Magennis v R; Vaziri v R [2020] NSWCCA 7 Burton v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (2019) 100 NSWLR 734; [2019] NSWCA 245 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jafari [2020] NSWCA 53 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Costigan [2013] NSWCA 407 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Siggins [2021] NSWCA 40 Ex parte Lenehan (1948) 77 CLR 403 Kennedy v The Council of the Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1939) 13 ALJR 563 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v McCaffery [2004] NSWCA 470 R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106 R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 13) [2015] NSWSC 1543 R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1221 R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1306 R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 8) [2015] NSWSC 1472 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant) Hussein Karimjee (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: TL Wong and S Jeliba (Applicant) J Sutton – solicitor (Respondent) Solicitors: Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant) J Sutton Associates Pty Ltd (Respondent) File Number(s): 2021/52656 Publication restriction: See order 1 [Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.] HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] On 31 July 2013, Mr Hussein Karimjee was arrested and charged with two counts of "do act with the intent to pervert the course of justice" contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). On 15 May 2017, Mr Karimjee pleaded guilty to one count and on 25 February 2019 Mr Karimjee was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, to be served in the community by Intensive Correction Order. The conduct underlying Mr Karimjee's conviction and sentence occurred between August and October 2012, during which Mr Karimjee counselled two fellow members of the Dawoodi Bohra community to give false statements to police who were investigating allegations of female genital mutilation within the community. Shortly after pleading guilty, in June 2017 Mr Karimjee informed the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales ("the Council") that he would not renew his Practising Certificate for the following year, and agreed to surrender his then-current Practising Certificate. Mr Karimjee also volunteered to assist with the process of having his name removed from the roll of Australian lawyers maintained pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law ("the roll"). The Council commenced proceedings against Mr Karimjee, seeking a declaration that he is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll, and an order that his name be removed from the roll. Mr Karimjee does not oppose the relief sought. The Council also sought orders pursuant to s 7 Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) suppressing information revealing the identities of Mr Karimjee, and of the alleged victims of the female genital mutilation and their family members. The Court held (Meagher, Payne and McCallum JJA), granting the declaration and order for removal, and granting in part the suppression orders, sought by the Council: 1. While orders suppressing information tending to reveal the identity of any alleged victim of crime were necessary and appropriate, there is no basis for an order suppressing publication of Mr Karimjee's name. Such an order is inconsistent with the public interest in open justice, particularly in disciplinary proceedings, and would be futile in circumstances where Mr Karimjee has already been identified by name in published judgments: [12]-[15]. 2. Mr Karimjee is probably permanently unfit to practise as a solicitor and his name should be removed from the roll. By engaging in the offending conduct, Mr Karimjee deliberately placed his personal desire to assist members of his community in misleading the police above his professional obligations to the Court and to the administration of justice: [41]-[43]. Judgment 1. THE COURT: By Amended Summons filed 12 March 2021, the Council of the Law Society of NSW ("the Council") commenced proceedings against Hussein Karimjee, seeking a declaration that he is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers maintained pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law ("the roll") and an order that his name be removed from the roll. 2. On 15 May 2017, Mr Karimjee pleaded guilty in relation to one count of "do act with the intent to pervert the course of justice" contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). He was convicted and sentenced on 25 February 2019. 3. Mr Karimjee does not oppose the making of the orders now sought by the Council. Nor does Mr Karimjee contest the facts upon which the Council relies, although he seeks a finding that he is "indefinitely" rather than "permanently" unfit to practise. Non-publication orders 1. Before addressing the substance of this matter, it is appropriate first to deal with the application by the Council for orders pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). 2. By para 1 of its Amended Summons, the Council sought orders prohibiting, for a period of 80 years, the disclosure of: 1. the identity of the Respondent, or information tending to reveal the identity of the Respondent in connection with these proceedings; 2. the identities of the alleged victims, or the parents or other family members of the alleged victims, in respect of proceedings 2012/280081, 2012/285455 and 2018/285639, or information tending to reveal the identity of those persons in connection with these proceedings; and 3. the name that is underlined in paragraph [25] of the confidential Agreed Statement of Facts filed contemporaneously with the Summons by publication or otherwise in Australia. 1. The Court is empowered to make such orders under s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), which provides: 7 Power to make orders A court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Act, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of— (a) information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in proceedings before the court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in proceedings before the court, or (b) information that comprises evidence, or information about evidence, given in proceedings before the court. 1. The Council relied on the grounds set out at sub-ss 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) of the Act as the basis for its proposed orders: 8 Grounds for making an order (1) A court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds— … (d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature (including sexual touching or a sexual act within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900), (e) it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice. 1. Orders should be made on the grounds relied on by the Council suppressing information tending to reveal the identity of any victim of the offending that was the subject of the Supreme Court proceedings identified in sub-para 1(b) of its Amended Summons for crimes relating to female genital mutilation. The order in sub-para 1(c) relates to the name of the father of one victim and is for that reason also appropriate. The 80-year term of the proposed order is necessary and appropriate to protect the identity of the victims for the duration of their lives. We are prepared to make orders in terms of sub-paras 1(b) and 1(c) on the grounds set out in ss 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) of the Act: Burton v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (2019) 100 NSWLR 734; [2019] NSWCA 245. 2. In relation to the order proposed in sub-para 1(a), the Council submitted that the making of the order would assist to protect the identity of the victims of the offending conduct and their family members. It was also submitted that the order is consistent with an extant suppression order made in the criminal proceedings against the Respondent, Mr Karimjee. The Council submitted that a judgment which discloses the name of Mr Karimjee will not serve as a practical warning to potential clients given the lack of any real prospect that Mr Karimjee will return to practice in the future. 3. As we will explain, Mr Karimjee's name and his relevant conduct are disclosed in a number of publicly available decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal. On 6 August 2021, in response to a specific query made by the Court, Mr Karimjee's solicitor indicated that he was instructed to no longer press for an order suppressing his client's name. In response to the same question, the Council continued to press for the proposed order to suppress Mr Karimjee's name and repeated its submission that the order should be made to ensure consistency with an order of the District Court. At the time of making its original submissions, this was an order that the Council had not seen. The Council was given additional time to obtain a copy of the order from the District Court Registry. The Council's attempts to obtain a copy of the order proved unsuccessful. In their final submission, made on 13 August 2021, the Council continued to press for the making of a suppression order in relation to Mr Karimjee but advanced no additional reasons in support of making that order. 4. We reject the Council's submissions in support of an order suppressing Mr Karimjee's name. The public interest in open justice is not lightly to be discarded, especially in professional disciplinary proceedings. Admission to the roll of legal practitioners is a privilege. Removal from the roll is a very serious matter. In exercising the inherent jurisdiction to discipline legal practitioners, the public interest in open justice must be borne steadily in mind. When a member of the legal profession conducts himself or herself so as to bring disrepute to the profession, to the administration of justice and to the legal system, the reasons of the Court should be expressed as openly as reasonably possible. To do less may lead to a view, even if misguided, that the system operates in favour of members of the legal profession in a way it does not with other litigants. Open justice is an important aspect of protecting the public and fostering the public interest by maintaining the accountability of those in the legal profession involved in the administration of justice. 5. We also reject the Council's submission addressed to the evident futility of its proposed suppression order in sub-para 1(a). As we have said, Mr Karimjee is referred to by name in a number of judgments available on the internet. The circumstances of his offending, charge and guilty plea are set out in detail in those judgments: see R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1221; R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1306; R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 8) [2015] NSWSC 1472; R v A2; R v KM; R v Vaziri (No 13) [2015] NSWSC 1543; A2 v R; Magennis v R; Vaziri v R [2018] NSWCCA 174. In the circumstances it is not apparent at all how the making of the order sought might assist in suppressing the identities of the victims. 6. Although a suppression order in relation to Mr Karimjee's name was apparently made in the District Court by Sides DCJ on 7 March 2014, all of the judgments referred to above in which Mr Karimjee was named post-date that order. The terms of the order are not published on either JusticeLink or the Register of orders made under the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). It was not suggested by either party that any extant order bound this Court not to publish Mr Karimjee's name. As we have said, Mr Karimjee did not press for the making of such an order. 7. We are not persuaded that any basis has been shown for making an order suppressing Mr Karimjee's name and decline to make proposed order 1(a) in the Amended Summons. Relevant facts 1. Mr Karimjee commenced legal practice in 1995 as a solicitor in England and Wales. He has a minor disciplinary record in England and Wales which is not relevant to the present application. He is no longer admitted to practise in England and Wales. 2. On 6 August 2002, Mr Karimjee applied for admission as an Australian legal practitioner to the Legal Profession Admission Board ("LPAB"). He disclosed to the LPAB the minor disciplinary allegations then before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in England and, when the Tribunal's findings were delivered, the result of those findings. On 4 October 2002, Mr Karimjee was admitted as an Australian legal practitioner. 3. On 31 July 2013, Mr Karimjee was arrested and charged with two counts of "do act with the intent to pervert the course of justice" contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). On 15 May 2017, he pleaded guilty to one count of doing an act with the intent to pervert the course of justice. 4. The events relevant to this plea arose in the course of investigations conducted by the NSW police into allegations of female genital mutilation amongst members of the Dawoodi Bohra, an Islamic community in Sydney. 5. Between 28 August 2012 and 10 October 2012, Mr Karimjee had a number of telephone conversations (lawfully intercepted under warrant by the police) with each of the father of the alleged victims of female genital mutilation and the local religious minister of the congregation of the Dawoodi Bohra community in Sydney. In these telephone conversations Mr Karimjee counselled them to give statements, and to counsel and influence others in the community to give statements, to the investigating police officers, which Mr Karimjee did not believe to be true. 6. To the extent it is relevant, the persons eventually charged with female genital mutilation were convicted at trial and acquitted by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in August 2018: A2 v R; Magennis v R; Vaziri v R [2018] NSWCCA 174. That decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal was set aside by the High Court: R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106. On remitter, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal set aside the convictions but ordered that there be a new trial of each of the appellants having regard to the High Court's construction of the offence provision: A2 v R; Magennis v R; Vaziri v R [2020] NSWCCA 7. 7. On 8 June 2017, Mr Karimjee informed the Council that he would not renew his Practising Certificate for the 2017/2018 year and agreed to surrender his current Practising Certificate with immediate effect. That surrender occurred on 16 June 2017. 8. On 25 February 2019, Mr Karimjee was convicted and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment, to be served in the community by Intensive Correction Order and subject to the following conditions in addition to the statutory conditions, namely: 1. he perform 400 hours of community services. 2. he obtain a mental health plan from his general practitioner and a referral to a registered psychologist and accept treatment from such psychologist for as long as he or she thinks reasonably necessary. 1. On sentencing, Mr Karimjee provided a number of character references which the sentencing judge considered "demonstrate that before his offending, he was a person of very good character". The sentencing judge found: 1. the offending was serious and fell "about half-way between the lower end of the range and the mid-range" of objective seriousness; 2. there was a low to medium risk of reoffending; 3. there was no evidence that Mr Karimjee's offending was causally contributed to in any way by any psychological or psychiatric condition; 4. Mr Karimjee did not know exactly what was involved in female genital mutilation or the practices of his community but that did not excuse the offending; and 5. Mr Karimjee actively encouraged community members to lie to the police. 1. In giving evidence on sentence, Mr Karimjee conceded that he was aware of the improper and illegal nature of his conduct in encouraging community members to lie to the police. Mr Karimjee should have appreciated that as a solicitor it was quite improper for him to encourage people to lie to the police. 2. Mr Karimjee had "no knowledge or grounding in the practice of criminal law and was simply not qualified to advise properly in relation to the police investigation". Mr Karimjee did not initiate the offending conduct but was drawn into it by his desire to assist and protect his community. 3. The offending occurred over a relatively short period between 28 August and 10 October 2012. Mr Karimjee was not charged until 31 July 2013 and did nothing further during the intervening 9 1/2 months to undermine the ongoing investigation and prosecutions in any way. 4. The sentencing judge found that Mr Karimjee: 1. was a person of prior good character and had no previous convictions at the time of the offending; 2. was unlikely to reoffend and had real insight into the causes of his offending and demonstrated a record of rehabilitation; 3. had very good prospects of rehabilitation and not reoffending; and 4. was remorseful. 1. Finally, the sentencing judge found that Mr Karimjee has undertaken continuing professional development courses on ethics, has voluntarily surrendered his practising certificate and has had himself removed from the roll of solicitors, because he believed that his offending conduct did not warrant his continuing to practise in a respectable and honourable profession. Submissions 1. The Council accepted that it is required to establish that Mr Karimjee is probably permanently, or at least indefinitely, unfit to practise: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 at [115]. The ultimate question for the Court is whether, as at the time of hearing, the respondent has been shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a lawyer of the Supreme Court: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; [2004] HCA 1 at [15], [21]; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Costigan [2013] NSWCA 407 at [5]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33 at [44]-[45]. 2. The Council submitted that removal from the roll is warranted because the offending was at the high end of the range of objective seriousness in the context of professional conduct. The Council also submitted to the effect that the sentence served by Mr Karimjee has little bearing on the finding this Court should make as to his current unfitness to practise. Although Mr Karimjee has now served his sentence, the cessation of unfitness to practise does not necessarily coincide with expiry of a criminal sentence: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente at [34]. Additionally, although Mr Karimjee demonstrated insight and remorse on sentencing, this is not evidence in the present disciplinary proceedings that he has taken steps to achieve full rehabilitation in the professional context. 3. Mr Karimjee does not contest the orders sought by the Council. Mr Karimjee accepted that his name should be removed from the roll and was willing to assist with that process. The only qualification to his agreement with the submissions made by the Council was that Mr Karimjee submitted that he is indefinitely unfit, rather than permanently unfit. Consideration 1. As the Council contends, the question for the Court is whether, as at the time of hearing, the respondent has been shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a lawyer of the Supreme Court. 2. It is clear that the Court must satisfy itself that it is appropriate to make orders removing a legal practitioner's name from the roll, even if the defendant concedes that the orders should be made: Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 at [9]; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v McCaffery [2004] NSWCA 470 at [12]; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255 at [13]. 3. In a case with resonance in the present circumstances, Kennedy v The Council of the Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1939) 13 ALJR 563 at 564, McTiernan J said: "… a solicitor for a party in an action was not at liberty to employ whatever tactics he thought might contribute to his client's success. A solicitor, like anybody else, was liable to be prosecuted if with the object of winning the case he did anything which was a criminal offence. As a solicitor he had an additional and particular responsibility. His professional status, which he derived from being accredited by the court as a fit and proper person to practise, laid upon him the strict obligation not to interfere or attempt to interfere with the course of justice under any pretext. If he violated that duty he was guilty of professional misconduct." 1. In Ex parte Lenehan (1948) 77 CLR 403 at 422; [1948] HCA 45, Latham CJ and Dixon and Williams JJ said in relation to the test for removal from the roll of "probable permanent unfitness" (and the question of possible reinstatement): "The decisions cited refer to cases where a solicitor who had been on the roll was struck off the roll. When such a person applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to probable permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal. A solicitor may be restored to the roll after he has been struck off, but the power to reinstate should be exercised with the greatest caution and only upon solid and substantial grounds (Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher (1909) 9 CLR 655). The question to be decided is not one of law to be determined by reference to previous decisions. The duty of the court is to determine in what manner the court should exercise its discretion in the particular circumstances of each case. Generalizations relating to questions of character and moral fitness, such as the statement quoted from Ex parte Macaulay (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 193 should not be treated as if they were propositions of law. The two cases of Ex parte Macaulay properly emphasize the great importance of financial integrity in a solicitor, but they should not be regarded as laying down a rule of law that a solicitor who has been struck off the roll for pecuniary dishonesty cannot be reinstated and that an applicant for admission who has been guilty of a similar act cannot be allowed to proceed unless it is shown that there were some exceptional circumstances in the original offence." 1. In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jafari [2020] NSWCA 53, Mr Jafari had pleaded guilty to dishonestly appropriating property belonging to the Commonwealth with the intention of permanently depriving the Commonwealth of that property contrary to s 131.1(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The charge arose out of an unauthorised disbursement of $220,000 by Mr Jafari from a trust account for which he was responsible whilst employed as a solicitor by the Australian Government Solicitor. These funds were used to repay a "Ms M", after Mr Jafari gambled away funds Ms M had entrusted to him for investment purposes. Mr Jafari was originally sentenced to two years' imprisonment to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order (varied by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal to a sentence of imprisonment for three years). Bell P (with whom White JA and Emmett AJA agreed) held: "[31] Where an order for removal from the roll is contemplated, the ultimate issue is whether the practitioner is shown, at the time of hearing, not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; [2004] HCA 1 at [12]; Southern Law Society v Westbrook (1910) 10 CLR 609; [1910] HCA 31. [32] In Prothonotary v Gregory [2017] NSWCA 101 at [6], Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Sackville AJA noted that: '…where an order for removal from the Roll is contemplated, the ultimate issue is whether the practitioner is shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court. That question is to be determined at the time of the hearing, bearing in mind that in some cases (like the present case) the legal practitioner's misconduct may have occurred many years earlier before the application is heard by the Court'. (footnote omitted)." 1. Bell P was satisfied that the uncontested orders sought by the Council in that case should be made. The facts disclosed at least four elements of serious dishonesty: "[40] … First, the initial deception of Ms M as to the use of funds she had entrusted to Mr Jafari to invest. Second, the theft of the AGS trust account funds in an extremely large amount. Third, as part of that theft, the unauthorised countersignature on the direction to disburse funds issued to the NSW Trustee and Guardian. Fourth, the twice feigned ignorance of these matters when confronted [by another AGS solicitor] on 8 and 30 May 2014. Moreover, within the six year period between the first and fourth of these instances of deceit and dishonesty, the overall criminality was concealed from the Australian Government Solicitor, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the Law Society of New South Wales." 1. In Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Siggins [2021] NSWCA 40, Mr Siggins had, over a number of years, made knowingly false representations to the Bar Association of Queensland about his current and intended principal place of practice, and had contravened NSW law by failing to apply for a NSW practising certificate from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2017. The Court held: "[181] It should go without saying that qualities of honesty, integrity and a preparedness to comply with the law are essential requirements for being a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner. If authority were needed for that proposition, it may be found (at least) in the decisions cited in the Bar Council's written submissions, Prothonotary v Montenegro [2015] NSWCA 409 at [66] (Meagher and Leeming JJA and Emmett AJA); Prothonotary v Holt [2008] NSWCA 136 at [15] (Gzell J, with whom Tobias and McColl JJA agreed); New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 at [19] (Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P and Handley JA agreed)." 1. The Court found that Mr Siggins lacked the honesty and integrity required of a legal practitioner such that he was unfit to practise. He had never conceded any wrongdoing, maintained his denial of wrongdoing, demonstrated no remorse or contrition, and approached the proceedings in a manner which was "lacking in candour, having regard to the nature of disciplinary proceedings and Mr Siggins' status as an officer of the court": at [192]-[195]. 2. In the present case, Mr Karimjee's status as a legal practitioner laid upon him the strict obligation not to interfere, or attempt to interfere, with the course of justice. Having violated that duty, he was guilty of very serious criminal conduct warranting removal from the roll. We are unable to accept the characterisation of the conduct as demonstrating that he was "indefinitely" rather than probably permanently unfit to practise. It bears emphasis that the offence Mr Karimjee committed was one which strikes at the heart of our system of justice. 3. Mr Karimjee actively encouraged members of his community to lie to the police. Mr Karimjee conceded that he was aware of the improper and illegal nature of his conduct in encouraging his community members to maintain their "story". By engaging in the offending conduct, Mr Karimjee deliberately placed his personal desire to assist members of his community in misleading the police above his professional obligations to the Court and to the administration of justice as a legal practitioner. 4. Mr Karimjee's proved offending conduct was disgraceful. It was conduct falling far below the high standards expected of a legal practitioner. We are comfortably satisfied that the Council has demonstrated that Mr Karimjee is currently probably permanently unfit to practise as a solicitor as he lacks the essential qualities of character and trustworthiness required of a solicitor. Conclusion and orders 1. The parties agreed that each should bear their own costs and no order as to costs was sought. 2. For the foregoing reasons the Court makes the following orders: 1. Order pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) on the grounds set out in ss 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) prohibiting for a period of 80 years the disclosure by publication or otherwise anywhere in the Commonwealth of Australia of: 1. the identities of the alleged victims, or the parents or other family members of the alleged victims, in respect of proceedings 2012/280081, 2012/285455 and 2012/285639, or information tending to reveal the identity of those persons in connection with these proceedings; and 2. the name that is underlined in paragraph [25] of the confidential Agreed Statement of Facts filed contemporaneously with the Amended Summons in these proceedings; 1. Declare that Hussein Karimjee is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers maintained pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law; 2. Order that the name Hussein Karimjee be removed from the roll. ********** Amendments 26 August 2021 - [19] amended to clarify reference to persons with whom Mr Karimjee had conversations. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 August 2021