Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Health Care Complaints Commission v FDE [2021] NSWCATOD 215 Hearing dates: 3 December 2021 Date of orders: 22 December 2021 Decision date: 22 December 2021 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Coleman SC ADCJ, Principal Member Decision: (1) That, until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), disclosure of the name of the Respondent is prohibited. (2) That, until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(b) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the publication or broadcasting of any report of the substantive proceedings in the Tribunal, or any evidence given in the proceedings is prohibited. (3) That, notwithstanding the terms of orders 1 and 2, any orders of the Tribunal cancelling or otherwise affecting the registration or re-registration of the Respondent pursuant to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) and the name of the Respondent may be published on any public register or roll maintained by the Medical Council of New South Wales, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, or the entity responsible for maintaining such register or roll in New Zealand. Catchwords: OCCUPATIONS — Heath practitioners — Misconduct and discipline — Disciplinary proceedings — Where interim non-publication order made to protect physical safety of practitioner in protective custody — Whether non-publication order should be discharged or continued until practitioner released from prison Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) Cases Cited: HCCC v Dr Alex Simring (Suppression Order) [2010] NSWMT 6 HCCC v Dr Gow (Suppression order) [2008] NSWMT 3 Health Care Complaints Commission v CSM [2018] NSWSC 902 Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr A [2012] NSWMT 10 Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr Annette Dao Quynh Do (No 2) [2013] NSWMT 11 Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid (Publication Application) [2019] NSWCATOD 31 Health Care Complaints Commission v Vo [2014] NSWCATOD 127 Health Care Complaints Commission v ZXY [2021] NSWCATOD 136 Walton v Momot [1997] NSWCA 334 Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Health Care complaints Commission (Applicant) FDE (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: Health Care Complaints Commission (Applicant) Respondent (Self-Represented) File Number(s): 2021/00050764 Publication restriction: Until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), disclosure of the name of the Respondent is prohibited. Until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(b) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the publication or broadcasting of any report of the substantive proceedings in the Tribunal, or any evidence given in the proceedings is prohibited. Notwithstanding the restrictions above, any orders of the Tribunal cancelling or otherwise affecting the registration or re-registration of the Respondent pursuant to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) and the name of the Respondent may be published on any public register or roll maintained by the Medical Council of New South Wales, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, or the entity responsible for maintaining such register or roll in New Zealand. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. On 27 September 2021 the Tribunal reserved its decision in proceedings commenced by the Health Care Complaints Commission (the Applicant) against the Respondent by application filed on 22 February 2021, and amended by leave on 27 September 2021. The application was pursuant to the provisions of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) (the National Law) in reliance upon the Respondent's convictions for criminal offences pursuant to s 149C(1)(c) of the National Law, and the failure to notify the Board that he had been charged with or convicted of those offences pursuant to s 139B(1)(b) and s 130 of the National Law. 2. At the conclusion of the hearing on 27 September 2021 the Respondent, who at all relevant times has represented himself, sought orders preventing the disclosure of his name. The Respondent's application was said to be based upon his fear that, if his identity was revealed, he was likely to be killed or suffer serious injury at the hands of fellow inmates of the prison in which he was then, and continues to be, serving a custodial sentence. Without conceding that a non-disclosure order was justified, Counsel for the Applicant raised little opposition to an interim order preventing the disclosure of the identity of the respondent. 3. The Tribunal decided that, having been given no notice of the Respondent's application, the Applicant was entitled to consider its position, and provide submissions in opposition to the continuation of the non-disclosure order. Subsequently, and pursuant to directions made by the Tribunal, the Applicant filed comprehensive written submissions with respect to the legal principles governing the Respondent's application, and the facts and circumstances upon which the Applicant relied in support of its contention that the non-publication orders made by the Tribunal on 27 September 2021 should be revoked. 4. At a Directions Hearing on 26 November 2021 it was properly conceded by the Applicant that the Respondent should have some further, albeit limited, time in which to consider and present any material he wished to in opposition to the Applicant's material. 5. The matter was fixed for hearing on 3 December 2021. 6. The Respondent indicated at the Directions Hearing on 26 November 2021 that he sought the continuation of the interim non-disclosure order, in part to protect his own physical safety whilst incarcerated and, beyond his release on or about 9 January 2022, to protect the psychological health and safety of his children. The Respondent was advised that any of his children, all of whom are apparently adults, who wished to make statements or give evidence on 3 December would then be heard by the Tribunal. 7. On 3 December 2021 the Respondent appeared in person from prison. None of his children joined in the proceedings. Nor did Mr Neil, who holds a Power of Attorney for the Respondent and who appeared and made statements and submissions at the hearing of the substantive proceedings on 27 September 2021. The hearing on 3 December 2021 1. In the course of his submissions, the Respondent stated that one or more of his adult children had experienced, and continued to experience, psychological ill-health as a result of publicity surrounding his criminal convictions in the District Court in May 2020. The Respondent stated that, with time, he could obtain medical or psychological reports with respect to the impact of publication of details of his criminal conduct on the psychological health of his children. 2. The Applicant opposed the Respondent's request for an adjournment of the proceedings. The Tribunal rejected the Respondent's request to adjourn the proceedings. The Tribunal pointed out to the Respondent that, consistent with the indication given to him on 26 November 2021, the Respondent's children could have appeared, without fear of their identity being disclosed, and made such statements with respect to their health or otherwise as they wished to make. 3. The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may enquire into and inform itself on any matters in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice (Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 38(2)) (NCAT Act). The Tribunal received statements by the Respondent with respect to his fears and concerns for his safety if his identity became known to fellow prisoners. His adult children could have made statements with respect to their fears and concerns, any history of psychological, psychiatric or other medical intervention asserted to have resulted from publicity surrounding their father's incarceration, and any other matters which they may have suggested were relevant in that regard. 4. As is not in doubt, none of the Respondent's adult children gave evidence or made statements at the hearing on 27 September 2021. The Respondent suggested that he experienced difficulty in advising them of the proceedings. What efforts Mr Neil might have made in that regard was not indicated. None of the Respondent's adult children provided a statement at his sentencing hearing in the District Court in 2020. No document in evidence before the Tribunal identifies any of the Respondent's children by name, occupation, area of residence, or any other matter which could reasonably lead to their identity being revealed. 5. In reality, the only way in which any of the Respondent's children might be associated with him would be if the Respondent's adult children have his surname, which is not established by any material before the Tribunal, by persons known to them making that assumption. Objectively, if that were a sufficient basis for a non-disclosure order, it is difficult to imagine any case in which a person in the Respondent's position would not secure such an order. 6. As Counsel for the Applicant submitted, the Respondent's identity was not suppressed at any time during the proceedings in the District Court, which commenced with the Respondent's arrest in April 2019, and concluded with his sentencing hearing in May 2020. As submitted by Counsel for the Applicant, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it can reasonably be inferred that any psychological or other stress or harm which any child of the Respondent has suffered as a result of disclosure of his criminal conduct would date from and be referable to publicity which has occurred more than 18 months ago. 7. The evidence does not establish that publication of the Respondent's name when the Judgment is published in the substantive proceedings would expose the Respondent's adult children to the risk of psychological stress or harm. To the extent that that might be the case, objectively, that is likely to be referable to and date from publication of the Respondent's identity and criminal conduct in other proceedings which concluded more than 18 months ago. Having not made statements or given evidence in the proceedings, the Tribunal's substantive reasons will not refer to the Respondent's children in any way which might reveal their identity or association with him. 8. Nothing asserted by the Respondent provides a sufficient basis for any non-disclosure order with respect to his identity once he is again in the community. If the Tribunal cancels the Respondent's registration, and makes prohibitive or preventive orders of the kind sought by the Applicant, orders of that kind would reflect the need to protect the health and safety of the public. It would be surprising, and potentially inconsistent with the making of such orders, and the reasons for doing so, to also make orders which prevented the public, whose safety is sought to be preserved, from knowing the identity of a person from whom they have been found to require protection. 9. The Respondent's submissions with respect to the period between his release from custody on 9 January 2022, and his release into the community after being deported from Australia, do not provide an adequate foundation for making a non-disclosure order with respect to his identity for that period. Unlike the matters to which the Respondent referred in support of a non-disclosure order whilst he is incarcerated, the Respondent has no knowledge of the conditions in which he would be placed in immigration detention, the risks of harm which he is likely to encounter there, or the likely duration of his detention. 10. The issue is thus whether, until the date upon which the Respondent is due to be released from prison, or a date shortly thereafter in case his release does not occur on the scheduled date, his identity should continue to be suppressed. 11. The Respondent made a number of statements about the making of "non-association orders" within the prison system as a result of threats to his safety early during his incarceration. The Respondent asserted that there had been "pressure" on him to remove the non-association order, and identified two prisoners, "J" and "S", as having made particular threats to his physical safety. The Respondent stated that he has not seen or had anything to do with either of those prisoners since June 2020. The Respondent confirmed that non-association orders are still in place, that he is in protective custody, and that since June 2020 he has not been the subject of actual or threatened violence. 12. The Respondent stated that he had, whilst in custody, witnessed assaults on two inmates which had resulted in their subsequent deaths. The Respondent further stated that he was aware of two other deaths of prisoners as a result of physical violence whilst in protective custody. The Respondent appeared to be fearful as he recounted these events, frequently looking about the place of his confinement, as if apprehensive that someone there might hear what he was saying. The Respondent suggested that, although the prison inmates do not have access to the internet, they do have access to print media and television. It is accepted that, if the decision in the substantive proceedings is delivered prior to the Respondent's release from prison, which is probable, one way or another, his identity, and the nature of his criminal conduct, is likely to become known, or again become known, to other prisoners in the segregated section of the prison in which the Respondent is located. 13. The Applicant tendered documents produced on subpoena by the Department of Corrective Services (Exhibit HCCC ND1). Those records revealed the history of non-association, segregation or protective orders which have been made during the Respondent's time in custody. The Corrective Services records were not inconsistent with the Respondent's statements and, in a number of material respects, were corroborative of them. 14. In the Applicant's written submissions (at paragraphs 14-19), Counsel for the Applicant helpfully identified a number of relevant parts of the Corrective Services file, and submitted (at paragraph 19) that the Special Management Area Placement (SMAP) "is part of a correctional facility that is used to house inmates who would be at risk if not separated from other inmates". It was accurately further submitted to be not evident from the material that the Respondent's transfer, in May 2020, into SMAP "occurred because of active hostility but arose from a general concern about the respondent because of his offending". The statements of the Applicant on 3 December 2021 leave little room for doubt that, at least since June 2020, the respondent's continued placement in SMAP was referable to the latter, rather than the former concern. 15. The Applicant further, and correctly (at paragraph 20), referred to the absence of suppression of any details with respect to the Respondent in the remarks on sentence of Judge Sweeney in the District Court, to the absence of any suppression order at any time during those proceedings, to the Medical Council of New South Wales Media Statement with respect to the criminal offences with which the Respondent was charged, and a news report of 11 April 2019, identifying the Respondent and the circumstances of his arrest and charge, which were submitted to "continue to be available on the internet". With respect to each of the Medical Council Media Statement and the internet publication of 11 April 2019, Counsel for the Applicant identified each document as having been viewed electronically on 10 November 2021. 16. Ultimately, the Applicant submitted, accurately at the time of the submissions, that there was no evidence that the Respondent: "has suffered or will suffer harm consequent of [sic] the publication of his name or other matters in these proceedings. On the contrary, the public, given the gravity of [the] respondent's offending and his imminent release in January 2022 ought to be made aware of his conduct so that they are appropriately warned and protected and the reputation of the profession is appropriately preserved." 1. It was thus submitted (paragraph 21) that nothing relied upon by the Respondent could properly displace "the prevailing principle of open justice" and that the non-publication order should be revoked. Jurisdiction and power 1. Section 64 of the NCAT Act and clause 7 of Schedule 5D of the National Law empower the Tribunal to make orders prohibiting the publication of the name of, inter alia, a party to proceedings. Necessarily, the Respondent seeks the relief identified earlier in reliance upon either of those powers. The jurisdiction to exercise the powers thus conferred arises pursuant to s 165B(5A) of the National Law which provides: that the Tribunal, when constituted to make an "ancillary decision or an interloctutory decision" within the meaning of the NCAT Act, may be constituted by a "senior judicial officer". A District Court judge is a senior judicial officer (National Law, s 165(b)). The current proceedings fall comfortably within the definition of "interlocutory decision" articulated in s 4 of the NCAT Act. 2. The interim order of 27 September 2021, having been made pursuant to s 64(1) of the NCAT Act, as its terms make clear, the section empowers the making of orders discharging or varying the order (Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid (Publication Application) [2019] NSWCATOD 31, at [28] ("Reid")). 3. As the terms of s 64 of the NCAT Act make clear, the power thereby conferred is discretionary, and though undoubtedly "broad", must be exercised in a principled way. The authorities confirm that each case turns on its own facts but, as discussed later in these reasons, the exercise of discretion is circumscribed by the requirement that an applicant establish "special circumstances" (see Health Care Complaints Commission v CSM [2018] NSWSC 902, [82]). The authorities 1. Counsel for the Applicant provided an accurate, helpful and balanced summary of the principles governing the present application as they emerge from the authorities. It is not in doubt, as Counsel for the Applicant submitted, that an open public sitting, such as occurred in this case (subject to the limitations imposed by the Covid protocols at the time), ordinarily means that the names of the complainant and the practitioner "may become known to interested members of the public and the media, who will be entitled to publish details of the proceedings including the name of that practitioner" (see Walton v Momot [1997] NSWCA 334 ("Walton")). 2. In support of that submission, Counsel for the Applicant referred to the Judgment of Handley JA, with whom Priestley JA and Grove AJA agreed, in Walton that "something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary, must be established" before the Tribunal could make a "suppression order" in proceedings which were heard in public, a reflection of "the general principle that the administration of justice under our system is carried on in public". 3. The "test applied" in Walton (paragraph 7) was submitted (paragraph 8) to have been "embraced" since the commencement of the National Law. A number of decisions of the Tribunal were cited in support of that contention. It was submitted that the effect of those authorities, including the recent decision in Health Care Complaints Commission v ZXY [2021] NSWCATOD 136, was to confirm that "open justice" should prevail in disciplinary proceedings under the National Law unless there were "special or out of the ordinary circumstances" displacing it. 4. The Applicant concisely summarised the "ancillary principles" which were submitted to inform the determination of an application to make a non-publication order (paragraph 9). Rather than summarise those principles, it is convenient to quote them: "a) The function of the Tribunal is a protective one and it does not, by its orders, punish the practitioner. The findings and consequential orders are: "for the protection of those who require protection"(Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186); [1] b) It is inherent in the protection of the public that information about a practitioner be available should a potential patient wish to enquire as to whether the practitioner has been the subject of an order under the Act or should a patient wish to make a complaint; [2] c) The Tribunal upholds the standards and reputation of the profession in ensuring that the public retains confidence in the medical profession. One element of deterrence is providing an assurance to the public that serious lapses in the conduct of practitioners will not be passed over or lightly put aside, but will be appropriately dealt with; [3] and d) consideration of a non-publication application requires a balancing of the open justice principle and the protective obligation on the Tribunal with the particular circumstances revealed; [4] e) It may be difficult to set a time limit on a non-publication order but it should not be assumed to be permanent and such an order is irregular; [5] f) A non-publication order may be unnecessary where the matter over which it is sought is already public. [6] " 1. The Applicant referred to the decision in Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr A [2012] NSWMT 10 to highlight the distinction between the evidence which led to the making of a non-publication order in that case and the absence of evidence in the present case. Albeit made prior to the hearing on 3 December 2021, in the light of what was indicated to the Respondent on 26 November 2021, and the absence of any material from him capable of being probative on 3 December, the Applicant's submission has particular resonance. 2. In Health Care Complaints Commission v ZXY [2021] NSWCATOD 136 the Tribunal made a non-disclosure order with respect to the practitioner's name in reliance upon medical evidence with respect to the impact on her of publication of her proceedings given her fragile mental health (having previously attempted suicide), difficult financial circumstances and late stage of pregnancy. 3. In Health Care Complaints Commission v CSM [2018] NSWSC 902, upon which the Applicant relied, the Supreme Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in making a non-publication order over the name of a formerly registered nurse and a patient with whom the practitioner had had an intimate and sexual relationship because, according to the practitioner, the publication of those details would have had a deleterious effect upon his family and also placed their welfare, his welfare and that of the patient in jeopardy because of the threat of violent reprisal from the patient's partner. 4. The Applicant also referred to the decision in HCCC v Dr Alex Simring (Suppression Order) [2010] NSWMT 6 in which the former Medical Tribunal lifted a suppression order over the name of the respondent. The respondent had relied upon asserted embarrassment to siblings who were also medical practitioners. Significantly for present purposes, the medical practitioner in Simring had possessed and accessed child pornography. The Tribunal considered that it was vital to the maintenance of public confidence that professional colleagues and members of the public could have confidence that the Tribunal's role had been fulfilled. 5. The Applicant also relied upon the decision in HCCC v Dr Gow (Suppression order) [2008] NSWMT 3 in which a non-publication order of the name of a medical practitioner who was apparently terminally ill, and for whom it was said that attention resulting from publication of his proceedings could have an adverse impact on his health and treatment regime, was refused. The Tribunal concluded that "it would be inconsistent with the protective function of the Tribunal proceedings to make an order that suppreses the name of the respondent when publishing the reasons for determination and in making the orders that flow from that determination". 6. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Vo [2014] NSWCATOD 127, the Tribunal refused to make a non-publication order with respect to the name of a medical practitioner who, inter alia, had engaged in oral sex with one of his patients. The practitioner in that case asserted that the publicity associated with his proceedings would embarrass his family. As in the present case, there being no evidence that the practitioner's children might be embarrassed or psychologically harmed by the publication of its reasons, or as to whether the practitioner had taken steps to assist his children to deal with the consequences of his conduct, the Tribunal refused to make a non-publication order. 7. In Reid, Boland ADCJ at [29]-[36] reviewed a number of decisions in which the principles governing applications for non-publication orders of medical practitioners' names were considered. In the course of her Honour's Reasons, reference was made to the decision of Colefax SC DCJ in Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr Annette Dao Quynh Do (No 2) [2013] NSWMT 11, in which at [8]-[12] his Honour discussed the "balancing between competing considerations of open justice and individual privacy". His Honour also said, at [12], that: "Prima facie, in my view the principles of open justice militate against the imposition of restrictions on information or events occurring in courts or tribunals without there being an overwhelming competing consideration." 1. On the facts of the case before him, Colefax SC DCJ was not persuaded that there was an overwhelming competing consideration. 2. As noted earlier in these reasons with respect to the Respondent's concern for his children, nothing appearing in any document either in these proceedings or the District Court sentencing proceedings identify the Respondent's children by name, age, gender, occupation or geographical location. As the Applicant submitted, any psychological stress or harm suffered by the Respondent's children as a result of publicity surrounding his criminal conduct, and none has been established, is likely to have already occurred. Disposition 1. For the reasons earlier recorded, the Respondent does not establish circumstances, being "special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary" justifying non-disclosure of his identity on the ground of the alleged adverse impact of such disclosure on his adult children. Similarly, in the absence of any evidence, other than by impermissibly assuming that the safety of the Respondent would or could be at risk in immigration detention, no foundation for an order that his identity not be disclosed after he is released from imprisonment has been made out. 2. The remaining, and difficult issue, is whether, until the Respondent is released from custody, and taken into immigration detention, the risk of death or serious injury to him if his identity is disclosed, and the reasons for the Tribunal's decision in the substantive proceedings are published, are such that "something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary" can be found to have been established. 3. Accepting that the statements of the Respondent were not made on oath or affirmation, and are supported to only a limited extent by the Corrective Services documents, if inmates of the correctional facility where the Respondent is held became aware of his criminal conduct as a result of his being named in the Tribunal's reasons in the substantive proceedings, the Respondent may be at risk of death or serious physical harm. Similarly, even if the identity of the Respondent were not disclosed, if reasons in the substantive proceedings were published without restriction, it would not be difficult for prisoners in the correctional facility where the Respondent is held to "join the dots" and identify him. 4. The prospect of making orders which prevented disclosure of the Respondent's identity, or the Tribunal's reasons in the substantive proceedings, other than to the appropriate medical and regulatory bodies until the Respondent is released from custody, was traversed with Counsel for the applicant. Properly, and responsibly, Counsel for the Applicant, whilst unable to consent to orders to that effect, acknowledged that such orders would be a permissible exercise of discretion in the circumstances. 5. In the circumstances recorded earlier in these reasons, although less than a probability, the objective risk of the Respondent being killed or suffering serious injury if the relief in the terms identified is refused is sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances, or, to the extent that anything could turn on the distinction, "something out of the ordinary". The actions of Corrective Services in consistently keeping the Respondent in protective custody provide support for so finding. 6. The terms and effect of the orders to be made is that the Tribunal's decision and reasons for it in the substantive proceedings may permissibly be published to the parties, the Medical Council of New South Wales and to the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency when the decision and reasons are published, but that, until 11 January 2022, each of them is prohibited from disclosing the identity of the Respondent, or publishing the reasons of the decision in the substantive proceedings, save to the extent that, if the registration of the Respondent is cancelled, the regulatory bodies may remove his name from the register of practitioners, and record any orders prohibiting the Respondent from providing health services or preventing him from applying for re-registration, and publish that information to any relevant New Zealand regulatory body. As and from midnight on 11 January 2022, all restrictions on disclosure of the identity of the Respondent or on the publication of the Tribunal's reasons in the substantive proceedings will cease to have force and effect. 7. It is not in dispute that, until his release from imprisonment, the Respondent is not only physically unable to attempt to practice medicine, but practically unable to do anything to advance any unstated intention which he might have to attempt to practice medicine or provide other health services upon his release from imprisonment. The safety of the public would thus not be compromised if orders in the terms proposed were made. Nor, in all the circumstances, would those orders be inconsistent with the underlying basis of the principles of open justice. The need for the public to know the identity of a medical practitioner whose conduct has led to protective orders being made in the interests of the safety of the public materialises upon the Respondent's release into the community. 8. On balance, the proposed orders are not considered to offend the other ancillary objectives of protective orders as they emerge from the authorities. Making orders of the kind proposed would not be inconsistent with upholding the standards of the medical profession and "signalling" that conduct of the kind for which the respondent has been convicted is unacceptable. In the circumstances, preventing the risk of death, or of serious physical harm to the Respondent by continuing the current order for a period of approximately four weeks is considered to constitute grounds for orders in the terms articulated above. Orders 1. That, until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), disclosure of the name of the Respondent is prohibited. 2. That, until midnight on 11 January 2022, pursuant to s 64(1)(b) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the publication or broadcasting of any report of the substantive proceedings in the Tribunal, or any evidence given in the proceedings is prohibited. 3. That, notwithstanding the terms of orders 1 and 2, any orders of the Tribunal cancelling or otherwise affecting the registration or re-registration of the Respondent pursuant to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) and the name of the Respondent may be published on any public register or roll maintained by the Medical Council of New South Wales, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, or the entity responsible for maintaining such register or roll in New Zealand. ********** Endnotes 1. HCCC v Gow [2008] NSWMT 3 at [21]. 2. HCCC v Gow [2008] NSWMT 3 at [21]; HCCC v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [36]. 3. HCCC v Simring [2010] NSWCATOD 6 at [7]-[9]. 4. HCCC v Dr A [2012] NSWCATOD 10 at [23]. 5. 8 HCCC v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [37-39]; Walton v Momot & Anor [1997] NSWSC 136. 6. See the dicta in HCCC v Reid [2019] NSWCATOD 31 at [42] and HCCC v Quan [2019] NSWCATOD 160 at [19]. I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 December 2021