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SPAUTZ v KIRBY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
GLEESON CJ, MEAGHER JA, HoPE AJA
30 October 1989
[1989] NSWCA 189
Gleeson CJ There are two applications before the court. The first is for appeal
in this matter to be struck out on the ground that it is an abuse of the process of
the court. The point in issue in the appeal is a novel and important question
concerning the construction of a particular provision of the Defamation Act. As
I understand it, it is common ground that the point is free from authority. The
respondent contends that the appellant, whilst a member of the Law Reform
Commission, was one of the co-authors of a report, the terms of which are such
thatthey are either support or manifest an acceptance of an interpretation of the
section contrary to that for which the appellant would now wish to argue in the
appeal. Even assuming that assertion of fact to be correct, it is no possible basis
for concluding that the appeal constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court.
This Court will decide for itself questions that come before it as to the meaning
and effect of the provisions of the Defamation Act. Whether the Court may be
assisted to reach its own view on the true interpretation of the Act by extraneous
material is a matter that will have to be worked out in due course. It is evident,
however, that the point of construction involved is one as to which arguments can
be put both ways The first application should be dismissed.
The second application is for the appeal to be treated as a short appeal and
placed in the short appeals list. In this regard we have been given some
information by Mr McClintock of counsel and Dr Spautz as to what occurred on
the hearing of the matter at first instance. It seems to me that the point involved,
although important, is a short question of construction of the Defamation Act,
and the application that the matter be dealt with as a short appeal strikes me as
reasonable. I would propose that the application be granted and the costs of the
applications today be costs in the appeal.
Meagher JA I agree with the Chief Justice.
Hope AJA I agree.
The first application is dismissed. The second application is granted. Costs are
to be costs in the appeal.