MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSURANCE LID v MOTOR ACCIDENTS AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL MAHONEY, PRIESTLEY and HANDLEY JJA 7 May 1991 [1991] NSWCA 187 Mahoney JA This matter comes before the court today on appeal from a decision in the Equity Division. At the commencement of the appeal the question was raised as to whether this is a matter to which s78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 applies. Counsel wanted time to consider the matter and they have now informed the court that it is - I put the matter generally - their general opinion that s78B does apply to the present case. The court will accept that to be so and will see its duty therefore to be not to proceed in the matter unless and until steps have been taken on which it can be satisfied that the notice referred to in that section has been given. It does not appear appropriate, and has not been suggested, that the court can and should proceed with matters which are severable within subs(2)(c). ORDER The court will therefore take the course of directing each party to give notice in accordance with the terms of the Act and in particular subs(1) of that Act [Judiciary Act of 1903]. The court has given attention to the need to ensure that the notice, which is a notice "specifying the nature of the matter', given by each of the parties, is sufficiently wide to ensure that all of the matters which are apt to arise involving the interpretation of the Constitution or otherwise within the section will have been notified to all of the Attorneys General, including, as Handley JA has mentioned, the Attorney General of the Northern Territory under s78AA. The court will direct that the parties give notice in accordance with subs(1) and indicates that the terms of the notice should be sufficiently wide as to include all of the matters which are apt to arise in the circumstances. It has been suggested by Mr Staff QC, no doubt quite properly, that the matter has a degree of urgency about it. The court would ordinarily be minded to attempt to fix a date for resumption of the hearing of the appeal but in the circumstances I do not think that this is possible. It is not known when the notice can be given to the Attorneys and what the chronology of this matter may be. The appropriate course would therefore be, in my opinion, for the court, having given the direction to which I have referred, to stand the matter over to a date to be fixed by the Registrar in due course. The court indicates to the parties that they should notify the Registrar of what has been done so that the court will be in the position to know when a date for hearing can be fixed. The parties, when they are satisfied that it is appropriate to fix a date, can so indicate to the Registrar so that an appropriate date can be fixed for appeal. In my opinion, that is the manner in which the appeal should proceed. The costs today will be reserved for special consideration. Priestley JA I agree. Handley JA I also agree. 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS Mahoney JA: They are the orders of the court.