CARSON v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER (NO 1) [1997] NSWCA 61
NSW Caselaw
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CARSON v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER (NO 1)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL
SHELLER JA, STEIN JA and GILES AJA
29 August 1997
[1997] NSWCA 61
Sheller JA, Stein JA and Giles AJA. These proceedings have been brought
by Nicholas Roderick Carson against the Legal Services Commissioner (the first
opponent) and the Legal Services Tribunal (the second opponent) seeking
declarations and orders against them. The claim to the declarations sought against
the first opponent is founded on allegations about the way in which the first
opponent has dealt, both in accepting it out of time and in instituting proceedings
in the Tribunal, with a complaint by Leszek Rajski pursuant to Pt 10 the Legal
Profession Act 1987. The relief sought against the second opponent was for the
most partconsequential upon the making of these declarations. The second
opponent has filed a submitting appearance.
After the proceedings were called on for hearing on 26 August 1997, counsel
had announced their appearances and Sheller JA had made a short statement, Mr
Rajski was permitted to hand up to the Court a notice of motion seeking orders
that:
1. Rajski be added as party to these proceedings for the purpose only of
obtaining the orders sought by this motion.
2. The matter be not listed before a bench including Sheller JA for the hearing
of the First Opponent's amended notice of motion or the hearing of these
proceedings or at all.
3. The matter be not listed before a bench including Giles J for the hearing of
the First Opponent's amended notice of motion or the hearing of these
proceedings or at all.
4. Such further or other orders as may seem fit to the Court.
Presumably Mr Rajski sought to be joined as an opponent. Normally parties,
and parties alone appear in litigation; see generally Australian Railways Union v
The Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319 at 331. A person not
a party to proceedings has no standing to object to the membership of the Court
or Tribunal assigned to hear those proceedings. This may explain the unusual
nature of Mr Rajski's application. Counsel for the claimant and the first opponent
made no application that any member of the Court disqualify himself. In support
of his application to be joined as a party, Mr Rajski referred to material contained
in two handwritten affidavits left by him with theRegistry of the Court, which we
have read. He relied upon Pt 8 r 8 of the Supreme Court Rules and s 169 of the
Legal Profession Act. Section 169, which gives a limited right to a complainant
to appear at a hearing conducted by the Legal Services Tribunal, has no relevance
to these proceedings.
The claimant opposed Mr Rajski's application. The first opponent neither
supported nor opposed the application. On 26 August 1997 the Court dismissed
the application and said it would give its reasons later.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
In our opinion, no ground was shown for adding Mr Rajski as a party for the
limited purpose claimed, or at all. The claimant in the proceedings, Mr Carson,
sought no relief against Mr Rajski. The proceedings concerned alleged acts or
omissions of the first opponent. Mr Rajski demonstrated no particular right or
claim that he wished to maintain beyond his wish that two members of the Court
disqualify themselves. No doubt the other parties are aware of the material which
Mr Rajski cites in support of his claim that two members of the Court should
disqualify themselves. Accordingly, there seemed to us no purpose whatever in
adding Mr Rajski, even if a desire to object to the membership of the Court was
an appropriate ground for doing so, which it is not.
In the alternative, Mr Rajski sought to be allowed to be heard as an amicus
curiae. Mr Rajski urged that he could assist the Court in determining thematters
in issue. We are not persuaded that this is so. In our opinion, his intervention is
neither necessary nor desirable.
Orders accordingly.