Appeal Panel CITATION: Lloyd -v- Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee (GD) [2001] NSWADTAP 26 APPELLANT PARTIES: Ronald George Lloyd RESPONDENT Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee FILE NUMBER: 009026 HEARING DATES: 25/10/2000 SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 10/25/2000 DATE OF DECISION: 08/15/2001 Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee v Ronald George Lloyd [2000] NSWADT 98 DECISION UNDER APPEAL: BEFORE: Latham M - DCJ (Deputy President); Fleming G - Judicial Member; Mayo-Ramsay R - Member CATCHWORDS: opportunity to be heard - reconstitution of Tribunal during hearing - statutory interpretation MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL: 4004/98, 4005/98, 40015/98, 40016/98 DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL: 07/27/2000 LEGISLATION CITED : Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee v Ronald George Lloyd [2000] NSWADT 98 Chua Chee Chor v Chua Kim Yong [1962] 1 WLR 1464 Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 Seables Pty Ltd v Smith (1997) 6 Tas R 350 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1980-1981] 147 CLR 297 K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 60 ALR 509 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1995-1997] 187 CLR 384 Project Blue Sky v ABA [1998] 194 CLR 355 Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569 CASES CITED: Trade Practices Commission v Gillette Co (No 2) (1993) 118 Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49 ALR 280 R v Young [1999] NSWCCA 166 Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 409 Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd v Evans [1910] AC 444 Wills v Bowley [1983] 1 AC 57 Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139 A & B v Director of Family Services [1996] ACTSC 48 Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) 39 ALD 34 Ileris and Comcare [1999] AATA 647 Re Saverio Barbaro and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1980) 3 ALD 1 APPELLANT REPRESENTATION: N Gye, barrister RESPONDENT S Burchett, barrister ORDERS: 1 Appeal dismissed 1 The appellant appeals against three directions made by the President of the Tribunal on 27 July 2000 ( Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee v Ronald George Lloyd [2000] NSWADT 98 ), namely that :- 1. (Following the reconstitution of the Veterinary Disciplinary Panel, by the substitution of one member, hearing four sets of charges against him), the new Panel was to have regard to the record of the proceedings (including exhibits) relating to the first three of the charges already heard by the previously constituted Panel. 2. The record be referred to the new member. 3. The parties be invited to make oral submissions, on any request to the President by the new member of the Panel for the recall of any witness, and that further directions might then be made. 2 The history of the proceedings giving rise to these directions appears at paras 1 to 6 inclusive of the decision and we do not repeat them here. For reasons of convenience and to avoid confusion, we will refer to the Veterinary Disciplinary Panel throughout this decision as "the Tribunal", rather than the Panel. 3 Three broad grounds of appeal were pressed at the hearing of the appeal. They were that :- 1. On a proper construction of s 79(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (the ADT Act) the reconstituted Tribunal was required to hear the proceedings afresh. 2. There was no power vested in the President (or in any member of the Tribunal under the ADT Act) to determine the procedure to be followed on the hearing by the reconstituted Tribunal. 3. The procedure determined by the President for the hearing by the reconstituted Tribunal offended against the rules of natural justice and gave rise to procedural unfairness. The Construction of s 79(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. 4 Section 79 of the ADT Act relevantly provides :- (1) The President may replace the member, or one of the members, constituting the Tribunal after the consideration of a matter by the Tribunal has commenced if : (a) the member .... ceases to be a member before the matter is determined, and (b) the parties consent (2) The Tribunal as so reconstituted is to have regard to the evidence and decisions in relation to the matter that were given or made before the Tribunal was reconstituted. (3) If one or more of the parties do not consent to the reconstitution of the Tribunal under this section, the proceedings are to be reconsidered by the Tribunal constituted in accordance with this Act (4) If proceedings are reconsidered by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may , for the purposes of the proceedings, have regard to any record of the proceedings before the Tribunal as previously constituted including a record of any evidence taken in the proceedings. 5 The words and phrases highlighted in bold type are those upon which this appeal turns. 6 The appellant's contention is that the term "reconsidered" in subsection (3) necessarily means "to hear (the proceedings) again". According to this argument, in the absence of a party's consent to the reconstitution of the Tribunal (subsection (3)), a reconsideration necessarily involves a hearing de novo. It is submitted that this follows from the drafting of subsection (2), which clearly requires the Tribunal, reconstituted with the consent of the parties, "to have regard to the evidence and decisions" in the proceedings before the previously constituted Tribunal, whereas subsection (4) only gives rise to a discretion in the Tribunal which has been reconstituted without the consent of the parties, to "have regard to any record of the proceedings ... including a record of any evidence .. in the proceedings". In other words, a distinction is said to be implicit in the terms of subsections (1) and (2) on the one hand and subsections (3) and (4) on the other. 7 Before turning to examine this ground of the appeal, it should be noted that the President's reasoning with respect to his construction of s 79 appears at paras 9 to 45 inclusive of the decision under appeal. It goes without saying that the appellant must establish error in this regard on the part of the President. 8 After setting out the terms of s 79, the President notes that the words "consideration" and "reconsidered" suggest a distinction between subsection (1) and subsection (3). He was of the view that each of them is capable of a broader connotation than the word "hearing", when one had regard to the context of the ADT Act. There followed a review of those cases in other jurisdictions where reconstitution of the bench in part-heard civil or criminal proceedings was at issue. He found the discussion of the issue in these cases of assistance. However, ultimately the issue falls to be resolved by the terms of the provision in the statute governing this particular jurisdiction : Chua Chee Chor v Chua Kim Yong [1962] 1 WLR 1464 applied in Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642. To this the President turned at paras 20 to 24 of the decision. The Oxford and Macquarie dictionary definitions of "reconsider" were referred to, but were considered unhelpful. 9 The approach adopted by the President in the construction of s 79 was to place it within its statutory context, an approach which had been endorsed by the Court in Seables Pty Ltd v Smith (1997) 6 Tas R 350 at 360. Taking into account the Tribunal's broad powers to determine its own procedure, its mandate to act "as quickly as practicable" (s 73(5)(a) of the ADT Act), its representative and tripartite character, the requirements of procedural fairness to all parties, and the public interest in the administration of justice, the President saw no justification for interpreting the term "reconsidered" in subsections (3) and (4) in the manner contended for by the appellant. In effect, the President saw nothing in the construction of s 79 which constrained the Tribunal's discretion under subsection (4) to have regard to any record of any evidence taken in the proceedings. 10 The President's approach to the construction of s 79 was correct. As was made clear by the High Court in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1980-1981] 147 CLR 297 :- "The fundamental object of statutory construction in every case is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole. But in performing that task the courts look to the operation of the statute according to its terms and to legitimate aids to construction." (at p320) 11 Despite being the dissenting voice in the outcome of the appeal in K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 60 ALR 509, Mason J's approach to statutory interpretation proved enduring. After observing that "problems of legal interpretation are not solved satisfactorily by ritual incantations which emphasise the clarity of meaning which words have when viewed in isolation, divorced from their context", he went on to confirm that "the modern approach to interpretation insists that the context be considered in the first instance, ... , and not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise." (at p514) This dicta was approved by the majority in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1995-1997] 187 CLR 384 at 408. 12 It found expression again in Project Blue Sky v ABA [1998] 194 CLR 355 at 381 :- "the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed." 13 The context of s 79, and subsection (3) in particular, is therefore crucial to the meaning to be ascribed to the expressions "consideration", "reconsidered" and "have regard to". An examination of the context of s 79 within the ADT Act is instructive. The provision appears in Part 2 of Chapter 6 of the ADT Act. Chapter 6 is headed "Procedure of Tribunal Generally", while Part 2 is headed "Other Procedural Matters". Parts 1, 3 and 4 of Chapter 6 deal with the representation and appearance of the parties before the Tribunal, the rule-making function of the Tribunal and alternative dispute resolution procedures. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of Part 2, it is pertinent to observe that, over-arching the construction of all the provisions contained in the Act is s 3. Section 3 provides that the objects of the Act are, amongst others :- (b) "to ensure that the Tribunal is accessible, its proceedings are efficient and effective and its decisions are fair (c) to enable proceedings before the Tribunal to be determined in an informal and expeditious manner" (emphasis added) 14 Thus, in construing any provision of the Act, regard must be had to the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, fairness, informality and expedition. As part of the language of the instrument, they are eloquent of the legislative intention. Of course, any one objective cannot prevail over another ; in order to ensure that, as far as possible, all the objectives of the Act are met, a balance must be struck between them. Fairness, in the sense of natural justice, cannot be sacrificed in the interests of efficiency and expedition, nor should proceedings become inefficient and unduly lengthy because of the dictates of what one party determines as "fair". Fairness cannot be determined in the abstract, nor is it the preserve of either party. Ultimately, whether proceedings are fair can only be assessed in the light of all the circumstances pertaining to them ; the course of the proceedings may change in order to meet unfairness which has arisen unexpectedly, or because anticipated unfairness does not eventuate. 15 Part 2 of Chapter 6 gives substance to the general expression of the Act's objects. Section 73 allows the Tribunal to determine its own procedure, subject to the Act and rules. It is not bound by the rules of evidence, but its proceedings are subject to the rules of natural justice. The Tribunal is to act informally, but also according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case. Fairness to the parties requires the Tribunal to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that they are fully informed with respect to the allegations being made, the applicable law, the Tribunal's procedure, its decisions and rulings, and that the parties "have the fullest opportunity practicable to be heard". The goals of expediency and fairness are sought to be achieved by the powers vested in the Tribunal under subsection 5 of section 73. Included in those powers is the power to require evidence or argument to be presented in writing and to "decide on the matters on which it will hear oral evidence or argument", and to require the presentation of the respective cases to be limited to defined periods of time. 16 Passing over sections 73A, 74 and 75, section 76 allows the Tribunal to determine proceedings on documentary evidence alone, without holding a hearing. This is, on its face, a far-reaching provision, in that it does not fetter the Tribunal's discretion by reference to the wishes of the parties. 17 Section 78 reflects the plurality of the Tribunal's constitution and its decision-making processes, thus leading logically to s 79 and the issue of reconstitution. Sections 80, 81, 82, 82A, 85, 86, 87, 88 and 89 are concerned with post-decision making procedures. Sections 83 and 84 deal with the Tribunal's powers in relation to the calling of witnesses. The unfettered discretion in the Tribunal to call witnesses of its own motion (that is, unconstrained by the terms of section 83 itself) is allied to its inquisitorial nature, and complements the Tribunal's broad powers to determine its own procedures in pursuit of the expeditious and efficient disposition of matters before it. 18 Returning then to the construction of section 79, within the context of Part 2 of Chapter 6, its terms ought to be construed consistently with the objects of the Act, as expressed by section 3 and by the provisions of the Part in which it appears. While the search for the grammatical meaning of the words in their proper context is the starting point, should that meaning not promote the purpose or object underlying the statute, a construction that would promote the purpose or object is to be preferred ; s33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) and see Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423. 19 Moreover, each word in the Part and in s 79 must be given some meaning and effect ( see Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 ; Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569 ; Trade Practices Commission v Gillette Co (No 2) (1993) 118 ALR 280 at 290) and a term used a number of times within section 79 should bear a consistent meaning throughout the provision. 20 Bearing these principles firmly in mind, we are of the view that the word "consideration" cannot be equated with "hearing". The word "hearing" is used a number of times in Part 2 (ss 73(5), 75, 76) to denote the presentation of evidence (by the calling and examination of witnesses and/or by the tendering of affidavits and exhibits) and argument by the respective parties to the proceedings. The word "hearing" appears in the heading to s 79 but the heading to a provision is no more than a guide and does not form part of the provision for the purposes of construction. In any event, the legislature made a deliberate choice to refrain from the use of the term "hearing" within the body of the section and employed instead the term "consideration" in subsection (1). We are of the view that, for this reason and for the reasons which follow, the President was correct in ascribing to "consideration" a broader connotation than "hearing". 21 The power to replace a member of the Tribunal arises "after the consideration of a matter by the Tribunal has commenced" on the occurrence of a defined event (subsection (1)(a)). The defined event may occur after the Tribunal has concluded a substantive hearing on the merits, but before the Tribunal has conferred with a view to formulating its decision. Such a stage in the proceedings would meet the description "after the consideration of a matter by the Tribunal has commenced", even though all evidence and argument was closed and the hearing of the matter had effectively terminated. 22 How then is the term "reconsidered" to be construed ? If a "consideration" is capable of embracing more than just a hearing, is not a reconsideration capable of a similarly broad construction ? We see no reason, as a matter of construction, to conclude otherwise. The appellant's argument would confine a reconsideration to a re-hearing ; that is, the term "reconsidered" in subsections (3) and (4) cannot be construed merely as a derivative of "consideration", but bears a qualitatively different meaning which is somehow triggered by the absence of the parties' consent to the reconstitution. To accept this proposition is to accept that it was available to the legislature to use the term "re-heard" in lieu of "reconsidered", but that it did not do so, in spite of its intention to impose an obligation on the reconstituted Tribunal to hear the proceedings afresh where the consent of the parties to the reconstitution was withheld : see Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49. 23 Such an interpretation cannot be said to promote the underlying objects of the Act. If, as the appellant contends, the reconstituted Tribunal must hear all the evidence again, in every case where a party withholds its consent, it does not require much imagination to envisage the inconvenience, cost and delay which could needlessly be incurred. One example will suffice. Assume that a hearing lasting six weeks, which had all but concluded, was ultimately capable of determination on a question of law ; a member of the Tribunal dies before the last witness for the complainant is called ; a further six week hearing can hardly be said to promote efficiency and expedition in the Tribunal's decision-making processes, where there could be no suggestion that the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness were not being observed. 24 Thus far, we have been dealing with the grammatical meaning to be attributed to the words "consideration" and "reconsidered" in the context of s 79 and the Act as a whole. The conclusions we have reached are reinforced by the terms of subsection (4), when read together with subsections (2) and (3). 25 Subsection (4) provides for a discretion in the Tribunal, which has been reconstituted in the absence of the consent of the parties, to have regard to any record of the proceedings, including a record of any evidence previously taken in the proceedings. The expression "have regard to" appears in subsection (2) and (4). It is not disputed that subsection (2) mandates the Tribunal to give attention to, or take into consideration, the transcript of any evidence given before the previous Tribunal, to avoid the necessity of calling the evidence again. The consent of the parties to the reconstitution brings with it such a guarantee. There is no reason to depart from that construction of "have regard to" in subsection (4), that is, where the parties have not consented to the reconstitution, the Tribunal may nevertheless take into consideration the record of any evidence previously given. 26 The appellant's argument on the construction of s 79(3) in effect renders subsection (4) superfluous. The purpose served by subsection (4), according to the appellant's argument before this Panel and before the President, is to allow the Tribunal to incorporate the record of the proceedings, albeit not at the expense of an obligation imposed by s 79(3) to hear the evidence again. If that is so, it is an empty purpose and one which is at odds with the objectives underlying the Part and the Act as a whole. Such an interpretation would promote cross examination of every witness on whatever subtle differences might exist between their evidence given before the previous Tribunal and the reconstituted Tribunal. Furthermore, such an interpretation would dissuade parties from consenting to a reconstitution, on the basis that a re-hearing might afford them a forensic advantage, for example, where a crucial witness for the opposing party was in declining health or about to leave the jurisdiction, never to return. It cannot have been intended by the legislature that s 79 could be an instrument of delay and inefficiency, yet this would be the result of adopting the appellant's interpretation of the section. 27 The power granted to the Tribunal under subsection (4) is not qualified in any way within the terms of the provision itself. It does not read "the Tribunal may ... have regard to any record of the proceedings before the Tribunal as previously constituted, including a record of any evidence taken in the proceedings, but only with the consent of the parties", or "the Tribunal may ... have regard to any record of the proceedings before the Tribunal as previously constituted, including a record of any evidence taken in the proceedings, notwithstanding that the evidence has been the subject of a re-hearing". There is authority of long standing which warns against reading words into a statute that are not there. Most recently, the Chief Justice of NSW in R v Young [1999] NSWCCA 166 referred to " the most frequently cited formulations" as :- "It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do". (Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 409 at 420 per Lord Mersey) ; and "...we are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself". (Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd v Evans [1910] AC 444 at 445 per Lord Loreburn LC ; and "Additional words ought not to be read into a statute unless they are required in order to make the provision intelligible". (Wills v Bowley [1983] 1 AC 57 at 78B) 28 Accordingly, the President did not err in finding the discretion vested in the Tribunal under subsection (4) "at large ... , subject always to considerations of procedural fairness and natural justice" (para 26 of the decision). 29 There is one important distinction between the terms of subsections (2) and (4), apart from the former being mandatory and the latter discretionary. Subsection (2) requires the Tribunal to have regard to any evidence and decisions previously made, whereas subsection (4) speaks only of "any record of the proceedings ... including a record of any evidence". It suggests that, in the absence of the parties consent to the reconstitution, it is not permissible for the Tribunal to have regard to any decisions made by the previous Tribunal. The reconstituted Tribunal must, in those circumstances, arrive at its own decisions, but it may do so after taking account of the record of the previous proceedings, without the need to hear the evidence afresh. This distinction is entirely consistent with the fact that the consent of one or both of the parties to the reconstitution was not forthcoming. 30 The President did not err in his construction of s 79(3). Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails. The Power to Determine the Procedure to be Followed on the Hearing by the Reconstituted Tribunal. 31 The appellant claims that there is no power available to the President, or to any member of the Tribunal, under the ADT Act to direct the procedure to be followed at the hearing before the reconstituted Tribunal. This ground of appeal may be dealt with shortly. 32 The proceedings on 21 July 2000, which gave rise to the President's directions of 27 July 2000, was a directions hearing held under s 73(6) of the Act. As paras 4 and 5 of the reasons make clear, the Tribunal had been reconstituted and had begun to hear evidence in relation to the fourth notice of inquiry as and from 8 June 2000. The parties were given the opportunity to make written and oral submissions on the procedure to be followed in relation to the first three notices of inquiry. 33 There is nothing in s 79, in Part 2 of Chapter 6, or in the Act, which precludes the application of the procedural provisions to hearings by a reconstituted Tribunal. Given the specific power to hold directions hearings, coupled with the broad powers in Part 2 of Chapter 6 referred to above, in particular section 73(1), (2) and (5), s 76 and s 83, this ground of appeal must also fail. The Procedure Determined by the President for the Hearing by the Reconstituted Tribunal Offended against the Rules of Natural Justice and Gave Rise to Procedural Unfairness. 34 The nub of the appellant's submission on this ground rests upon paras 42, 43 and 44 of the President's reasons, which find expression in the third of the directions set out at the beginning of this decision. Paragraphs 42- 44 read :- "42. In my view, again the appropriate course is to invite the new member to identify those witnesses who she would like to have recalled to assist her understanding, either for clarification or to re-hear part or whole of their evidence. 43. In this instance in my view the appropriate course to adopt is to incorporate the record of the previous proceedings into these proceedings, and to invite the new member, Mrs Clark, to review the record with a view to advising me, as the presiding member, as to whether there are any witnesses she would like to have recalled. 44. I would then proceed by conveying Ms Clark's views to the parties, and inviting oral submissions on them. I would then proceed to rule as to the extent to which previous evidence ought to be revisited." 35 The appellant contends that para 44 in particular suggests that the parties may not have any influence on the Tribunal's decision to re-hear evidence which was previously given. The appellant's argument suggests that, unless the parties themselves determine the evidence to be re-called, the Tribunal will be in breach of the rules of natural justice. Such a result appears to negate the broad discretion vested in the reconstituted Tribunal to determine how it will proceed. Some consideration of the principles relating to natural justice are necessary in order to deal with this ground. 36 The rules of natural justice oblige the Tribunal to give a fair opportunity to a party to meet material, adverse to that party's interests, which has been admitted into evidence, by testing that evidence in cross-examination and/or by calling evidence to contradict it and/or being heard in respect of it by way of submissions : Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 ; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139 ; A & B v Director of Family Services [1996] ACTSC 48 ; Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) 39 ALD 34 ; Ileris and Comcare [1999] AATA 647. 37 An extensive statement of the requirements of procedural fairness in the context of a Tribunal not bound by the rules of evidence appears in Re Saverio Barbaro and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1980) 3 ALD 1 at 4. "In informing itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate, the Tribunal endeavours to be fair to the parties. It endeavours not to put the parties to unnecessary expense and may admit into evidence evidentiary material of a logically probative nature notwithstanding that that material is not the best evidence of the matter which it tends to prove. But the Tribunal does not lightly receive into evidence challenged evidentiary material concerning a matter of importance of which there is or should be better evidence. And the requirement of a hearing and the provision of a right to appear and be represented carries with it an implication that, so far as is possible and consistent with the function of the Tribunal, a party should be given the opportunity of testing prejudicial evidentiary material tendered against him. It is generally appropriate that a party should have an opportunity to do more than give evidence to the contrary of the evidence adduced on behalf of the other party. He should be given an opportunity to test the evidence tendered against him provided that the testing of the evidence seems appropriate in the circumstances and does not conflict with the obligation laid upon the Tribunal to proceed with as little formality and technicality and with as much expedition as the matter before the Tribunal permits." (emphasis added) 38 It should be observed at the outset that, whatever evidence the new member of the Tribunal wishes to hear de novo, the appellant will have an opportunity to test the evidence in the relevant sense. In respect of any record of the evidence taken into account by the reconstituted Tribunal, the appellant has already had the opportunity to test that evidence in the relevant sense. As the dicta from Barbaro (above) makes clear, there is no denial of procedural fairness where the testing of the evidence is appropriate in all the circumstances. 39 In any event, we do not accept the appellant's contention that the President's reasons at para 44 necessarily give rise to procedural unfairness. The President expressly invites submissions from the parties on the views of the new member. It is difficult, if not impossible, in these circumstances to assert procedural unfairness or a breach of the rules of natural justice in future proceedings. If and when it arises, the appellant will no doubt bring it to the attention of the Tribunal, and measures may be adopted to address the appellant's concerns. This ground of appeal also fails. 40 The orders of the Panel are :- 1. Appeal dismissed 2. Directions of the President of 27 July 2000 are confirmed DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.