Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Bar-Mordecai v Attorney-General of NSW (No.2) [2013] NSWSC 1538 Hearing dates: 10/09/2013 Decision date: 27 September 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Garling J Decision: (1) Pursuant to s16(3) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, the Court grants leave to Mr Bar-Mordecai to commence proceedings in the District Court of NSW, by way of instituting an appeal, pursuant to s 84(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, to set aside orders made by Milledge LCM on 25 June 2013 in the Downing Centre Local Court. (2) Such grant of leave is subject to the following conditions: (a) the appeal is to be instituted within 14 days from the date of these orders, being 13 September 2013; (b) the appeal is to be instituted by the filing of an originating process which limits the grounds of the appeal to those grounds set out in the draft Notice of Appeal which is Exhibit A in these proceedings; (c) Mr Bar-Mordecai is not, without the further leave of this Court, first had and obtained, to make any application to the District Court for leave, pursuant to s 18(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, to give, or adduce fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal. (3) Reserve the question of costs. Catchwords: PROCEDURE - Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 - application for leave to appeal to the District Court from the Local Court - whether there are prima facie grounds for leave sought to appeal - whether predominant purpose of leave to appeal is to harass, annoy or cause detriment. CRIME - appeal under s 84 of Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 - application of the rights of appeal and procedure under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001. Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No.86a Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Michael Bar-Mordecai (P) Attorney-General of NSW (D1) TS (D2) Representation: Counsel: In Person (P) Mr K Oliver (D1) Mr K Ginges (D2) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor's Office (NSW) (D1) Armstrong Legal (D2) File Number(s): 2013/201207 Judgment 1Mr Michael Bar-Mordecai has applied for leave, pursuant to s 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 ("VP Act"), to commence proceedings in the District Court by way of an appeal against an order made in the Local Court of NSW by Milledge LCM on 25 June 2013. 2The application is opposed by the Attorney-General of NSW and by Mr Bar-Mordecai's daughter, TS. I shall refer to these parties as the respondents. 3The application occupied considerable Court time over the period 10 September to 13 September 2013. 4On 13 September 2013, at the conclusion of the evidence and submissions, the Court made the following orders: "1. Pursuant to s16(3) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, the Court grants leave to Mr Bar-Mordecai to commence proceedings in the District Court of NSW, by way of instituting an appeal, pursuant to s 84(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, to set aside orders made by Milledge LCM on 25 June 2013 in the Downing Centre Local Court. 2. Such grant of leave is subject to the following conditions: (a) the appeal is to be instituted within 14 days from the date of these orders; (b) the appeal is to be instituted by the filing of an originating process which limits the grounds of the appeal to those grounds set out in the draft Notice of Appeal which is Exhibit A in these proceedings; (c) Mr Bar-Mordecai is not, without the further leave of this Court, first had and obtained, to make any application to the District Court for leave, pursuant to s 18(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, to give, or adduce fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal. 3. Reserve the question of costs." 5At the time it made the orders, the Court indicated that reasons for those orders would be delivered in due course. These are those reasons. Local Court Proceedings 6On 23 October 2007, Madgwick LCM, sitting at the Waverley Local Court, made an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order ("ADVO") against Mr Bar-Mordecai who was the defendant in those proceedings. The order was as follows: "1. The defendant must not assault, molest, harass, threaten or otherwise interfere with the protected person or a person with whom the protected person has a domestic relationship, that includes the children and the husband. 2. The defendant must not engage in any conduct that intimidates the protected person or a person with whom the protected person has a domestic relationship. 3. The defendant must not stalk the protected person or the person with whom the protected person has a domestic relationship. 4. The defendant must not approach or contact the protected person by any means whatsoever except through the defendant's legal representative. 5. The defendant must not approach the school or any premises of which the protected person may from time to time attend for the purpose of education or childcare or other specified premises." 7The orders were made for a period of five years, and the protected persons were Mr Bar-Mordecai's daughter, TS, her husband, SS, and their four children. The protected persons were then, and have been since referred to by pseudonyms 8In October 2012, Senior Constable Tom Sands made an application to the Waverley Local Court on behalf of the four children of TS to vary the ADVO originally made on 23 October 2007, by extending the duration of it "... for as long as the Court sees fit". That application was joined in by TS, who was separately represented by a lawyer. 9The application form also indicated that the applicant, Senior Constable Tom Sands, was requesting the Court to vary the original order by extending it "... for a further five years until 23.10.2017 or as long as the Court deemed necessary". 10After a contested hearing in the Local Court, on 25 June 2013, the ADVO which was previously granted, was varied by Milledge LCM, so that it was extended for a further period of 10 years up to and including 23 October 2022. The terms of the ADVO otherwise remained the same. 11As well, Milledge LCM ordered Mr Bar-Mordecai to pay the legal costs of TS in the sum of $22,977.42. The order required him to pay that amount of costs by 23 July 2013. Judgment of Milledge LCM 12Milledge LCM delivered her judgment orally on 25 June 2013. Her Honour noted that there was a non-publication order in place with respect to the identity of the persons protected by the ADVO. In aid of that order, the second respondent to these proceedings has been referred to, and will in this judgment be referred to, as TS. 13The ADVO which was continued by Milledge LCM, protected TS and her four children from contact with the applicant, Mr Bar-Mordecai. 14Her Honour considered the exercise of her jurisdiction under s 73(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, which enabled her to vary, or revoke, a final apprehended violence order as being a jurisdiction which did not involve a hearing de novo on all of the issues that were considered by Madgwick LCM in 2007, when the original order was made. Her Honour said: "My view is that it is not necessary to revisit those issues because the original order was found to be well-founded, and it is only now that the Court has to consider whether the order needs to be extended or not." 15Because this was her Honour's approach, she acknowledges in her judgment, that she restricted Mr Bar-Mordecai's cross-examination of TS "... on any of the historical matters that she raised in her earlier application". She permitted cross-examination of TS about her current mental state, and any present attitude or apprehension that she may have with respect to her children. 16Her Honour permitted a clinical psychologist, Mr Borenstein, to give evidence expressing his expert opinion about the present mental state of TS, and the historical origins of it, and development of it. 17Her Honour noted that TS agreed that during the five years of the continuance of the original ADVO, there had been no contact between Mr Bar-Mordecai and her, or her children. Her Honour recorded the firm view of TS that she did not wish to have any further contact with Mr Bar-Mordecai, and she did not wish him to have any further contact with her family. 18Her Honour concluded her judgment with this paragraph: "There is no doubt that she [TS] is suffering from the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder. I accept the evidence of Mr Borenstein that it is necessary in the aiding of her recovery to have this apprehended violence order extended. I am also concerned with regards to the very serious allegations of sexual and mental abuse made against Mr Bar-Mordecai. I am satisfied on the balance that I should take that into consideration when dealing with this application, and I am satisfied that the applicants have supported the application and the need to have this order extended, and I am doing that. So, Mr Bar-Mordecai, I am against you. I think there is good reason as to why this order should be extended and I propose to extend the order. THE ORDER IS NOW EXTENDED FOR A FURTHER 10 YEARS. That's the end of the matter." 19After application by the solicitor for TS, Milledge LCM ordered Mr Bar-Mordecai to the pay the costs of TS in the amount of $22,977.42 within 28 days. 20It is against this judgment that Mr Bar-Mordecai seeks leave to appeal. Legislation 21Section 84 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act, provides for an appeal by a defendant against an ADVO. 22In relevant part, s 84 reads: "(2) An appeal may be made to the District Court: (a) by the defendant against the making of an apprehended violence order by the local court ... or ... (c) by a party to an apprehended violence order against the variation or revocation of the order by the Local Court ... ... (3) An appeal against subsection (2): (a) may be made under Part 3 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, in the same way as an application may be made under that Part by a defendant against a conviction arising from a court attendance notice dealt with under Part 2 of Chapter 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, .... (4) The Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 applies to an application or appeal arising out of this section with such modification as are made by or in accordance with the regulations under that Act." 23Accordingly, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 to understand the relevant rights of appeal and the provisions in respect of those rights. 24Section 11 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, is in the following form: "11. Appeals as of right (1) Any person who has been convicted or sentenced by the Local Court may appeal to the District Court against the conviction or sentence (or both). ... (2)An appeal must be made: (a) within 28 days after sentence is imposed, or (b) ... but (in the case of an appeal against a conviction) may not be made before sentence is imposed." 25Section 18 is of central importance. It is in the following form: "18 Appeals against conviction to be by way of rehearing on the evidence (1) An appeal against conviction is to be by way of rehearing on the basis of evidence given in the original Local Court proceedings, except as provided by section 19. (2) Fresh evidence may be given, but only by leave of the District Court which may be granted only if the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that the fresh evidence be given. ..." 26Relevant to the circumstances in which evidence may be given on an appeal, are the provisions of s 19. They are in the following form: "19 Circumstances in which evidence to be given in person (1) The District Court may direct a person to attend and give evidence in proceedings on an appeal against conviction if it is satisfied: (a) in the case of an appeal that relates to an offence involving violence against that person, that there are special reasons why, in the interests of justice, the person should attend and give evidence, or (b) in any other case, that there are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, the person should attend and give evidence. (2) An application for such a direction may be made by a party to the proceedings in relation to a particular person only if notice of the party's intention to make such an application has been served on each other party to the proceedings within such period as the District Court may direct. ..." 27Section 20 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, gives the District Court the power to set aside the order which was made, dismiss the appeal, or alternatively to set aside the order and remit the matter to the original Local Court for re-determination in accordance with any directions of the District Court. Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 28The exercise of this Court's jurisdiction to authorise the commencement of the proceedings depends upon compliance by an applicant with s 14 of the VP Act, and the Court being satisfied of the necessary conditions under s 16 of the VP Act. 29There was no submission made that Mr Bar-Mordecai had failed to comply with s 14 of the VP Act. 30Section 16 is in the following form: "16 Granting application for leave (1) Before an appropriate authorised court grants an application made under section 14 for leave to institute proceedings, it must: (a) order that the applicant serve each relevant person with a copy of the application and affidavit and a notice that the person is entitled to appear and be heard on the application, and (b) give the applicant and each relevant person an opportunity to be heard at the hearing of the application. (2) At the hearing of the application, the court may receive as evidence any record of evidence given, or affidavit filed, in any proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal in which the applicant is, or at any time was, involved either as a party or as a person acting in concert with a party. (3) The court may grant leave to institute proceedings subject to the conditions that the court considers appropriate. (4) However, the court may grant leave only if it is satisfied that: (a) the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings, and (b) there are one or more prima facie grounds for the proceedings. ..." 31In the circumstances of this case, the parties concentrated on whether or not the Court could be satisfied that the proceedings, if instituted, would not be vexatious proceedings. Evidence and Submissions 32The applicant submitted that he had satisfied the Court of all of the requisite conditions necessary to obtain a grant of leave. 33This submission involved the following propositions: (a)an order had been made against the applicant by Milledge LCM, from which the applicant had a right to appeal. This is undoubtedly correct. Neither of the respondents to the application suggested otherwise; (b)the applicant could satisfy the Court as required by s 16(4)(b) of the VP Act that there were one or more prima facie grounds for the proceedings. The applicant submitted that the length of time, namely 10 years, for which the order had been extended, when combined with the accepted evidence that there had been no breach of the previous apprehended domestic violence order, sufficiently demonstrated that there was a prima facie ground for the appeal. As well the applicant pointed to the grounds set out in his proposed Notice of Appeal. The Attorney-General submitted that it was not in issue that Mr Bar-Mordecai could show a prima facie ground for the proposed appeal. Counsel for TS made a similar concession; and (c)the Court should be satisfied that the proceedings which are to be instituted, are not vexatious proceedings. It was this issue to which a considerable amount of evidence by way of cross-examination of Mr Bar-Mordecai, and submissions were devoted by the respondents. Would the District Court Appeal be Vexatious Proceedings? 34For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that, in the way contemplated by Mr Bar-Mordecai, the proceedings in the District Court, by way of an appeal against the ADVO, would not be vexatious. 35It is necessary at the outset to indicate that Mr Bar-Mordecai said in the course of cross-examination, that he intended to conduct the appeal in the District Court only by tendering, and relying upon, the record in the Local Court. He said that he would conduct the proceedings without seeking leave to adduce any further evidence, or to further cross-examine TS, or Mr Borenstein, or to give further evidence himself. 36As is apparent from the condition which I have imposed, to which condition Mr Bar-Mordecai consented, unless leave be granted by this Court, the proceedings in the District Court will be conducted solely by reference to the record in the Local Court. In other words, it will be an appeal conducted "on the papers". I do not suggest that this would preclude Mr Bar-Mordecai from putting submissions in writing or orally, as directed by the District Court. However, the condition which was imposed, and the consent to that condition by Mr Bar-Mordecai, provides the context in which the Court needs to be satisfied by the applicant that the proceedings in the District Court if permitted to be instituted, would not be vexatious proceedings. 37Section 6 of the VP Act defines vexatious proceedings in the following way: "6 Meaning of "vexatious proceedings In this Act, "vexatious proceedings" includes: (a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and (b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and (c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and (d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose." 38Both the respondents submitted that the Court could not be satisfied that the District Court proceedings were not an abuse of the process of the Court, or else were not proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment or for another wrongful purpose or else proceedings which would not be conducted in a way which harassed, annoyed or caused detriment to TS. 39Principally, it was submitted that the Court should be satisfied that the proceedings were to be instituted for the purpose of harassing, annoying, or causing detriment to TS, and that they were thereby an abuse of process. 40It was submitted that I should infer this purpose from a combination of the following matters: the past history and conduct of Mr Bar-Mordecai in the underlying proceedings in the Local Court, and in other proceedings generally; the fact that his expressed need to appeal could not be accepted; and the fact that his evidence that he had no present desire to see TS or his grandchildren meant that the continuation of the ADVO would not cause him any inconvenience or hardship. It was submitted that, therefore, it ought be inferred that the only reason why he was seeking by an appeal to the District Court to overturn the extension of the ADVO was so as to annoy, harass or cause detriment to TS. 41Mr Bar-Mordecai denied that he had anything other than a legitimate reason to seek to overturn the extension of the ADVO. 42The respondents submit, and Mr Bar-Mordecai accepts, that he bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the proceedings to be instituted in the District Court are not vexatious. 43Mr Bar-Mordecai gave evidence that there were essentially two reasons why he wished to have the extension of the ADVO set aside. 44The first was, expressed in somewhat over-dramatic words, that he did not wish to be at risk of being imprisoned for a period of up to two years because of conduct which might constitute a breach of the ADVO. The second was that the existence of the ADVO would need to be disclosed to the Medical Council of Australia, and the Medical Tribunal of NSW, with respect to any application which he brought for re-registration as a medical practitioner. 45With respect to the first of these two reasons, Mr Bar-Mordecai conceded in cross-examination that he did not intend to do anything to breach the ADVO if it remained in place. This concession gave rise to a submission from the respondents that, in the absence of any such intent, the likelihood of him being imprisoned for any breach of the ADVO was remote. 46When this was put to Mr Bar-Mordecai in evidence, he accepted that the likelihood of any intentional breach was remote, but responded that having regard to his past experience of being arrested, and confined to the police cells when an allegation was raised that he had been in breach of the existing ADVO, which allegation was dismissed, there was a sufficient reason for his desire to have the ADVO extension set aside. 47There is no doubt that an incident occurred, some years ago, in which an allegation was made that Mr Bar-Mordecai had been in breach of the ADVO. Proceedings were taken by police with respect to that breach. The proceedings were dismissed. However, Mr Bar-Mordecai had been initially arrested and detained by police with respect to the alleged breach. 48Mr Bar-Mordecai is not a young man. I have no doubt that it would have been an unpleasant experience for Mr Bar-Mordecai to have been arrested and taken into custody. I am equally satisfied that he has no desire to be again placed in such a position. So much is entirely natural, and is to be expected. It is in my assessment a sufficient basis for Mr Bar-Mordecai to seek to lodge an appeal to the District Court. 49I am also satisfied that the requirement for an applicant for re-registration as a medical practitioner to be "... a suitable person ...", or else a "fit and proper person" would oblige an applicant for re-registration to disclose at the time of making that application, that he or she was the subject of an ADVO, and that, if it be the fact, the ADVO remained in place. It would be necessary to disclose the length of time for which the order existed. These requirements are to be found in s 52(1)(c) and s 55(1)(h)(i) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No.86a. 50Mr Bar-Mordecai gave evidence, and submitted, that the existence of an ADVO may affect his capacity, or entitlement to treat children if re-registered as a medical practitioner. I am not satisfied that this is so. The ADVO was not brought about by any conduct on his part which affected children broadly, nor does the evidence sustain any submission that children generally are at any risk from his conduct. I am not persuaded that such consideration ought be given any weight in the determination of this question. 51However, I have been satisfied on the evidence that Mr Bar-Mordecai has good reason to want the ADVO extension set aside. 52Accordingly, in the following circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Bar-Mordecai's principal motive in bringing the proceedings is to have the ADVO extension set aside and not to annoy, harass or cause detriment to his daughter, TS. I am satisfied that this is so from, at least, the following matters: (a)the ADVO was taken out in circumstances in which he did not consent to it, but rather opposed it being imposed in the first place, and, then subsequently opposed the extension of it; (b)the relevant statutes give a person against whom an ADVO has been ordered a right to appeal to the District Court against the imposition (or extension of the order); (c)Mr Bar-Mordecai has one or more prima facie grounds for seeking to have the judgment of the Local Court set aside; (d)Mr Bar-Mordecai has a legitimate and well-founded concern that the continued existence of the ADVO may give rise to a risk that he may be arrested and detained in custody, notwithstanding his best efforts to avoid breaching the ADVO, and that the existence of the ADVO will be required to be disclosed to re-registration authorities. 53Notwithstanding the attacks mounted on Mr Bar-Mordecai in the course of giving his evidence, I accept the substance of his evidence that his concern to have the ADVO extension set aside is a legitimate one, and that this is his principal purpose. 54The respondents, submitted that nevertheless I should not be satisfied that, even if there was a legitimate purpose for Mr Bar-Mordecai to bring the proceedings, his predominant purpose was not to harass or annoy or cause detriment to TS. 55The substance of these submissions was that Mr Bar-Mordecai's past conduct as a vexatious litigant, and in particular, his conduct in bringing proceedings in the Family Court with respect to gaining and exercising access rights to his grandchildren, and foreshadowed proceedings being brought by his parents, with his assistance, for access to their great-grandchildren, combined to suggest that his true predominant purpose was to harass, annoy or cause detriment to TS. 56There was no evidence from TS adduced directly in this application that she would be in any way annoyed, harassed or otherwise suffer any detriment by the anticipated proceedings in the District Court. The evidence which she gave in the Local Court was put before this Court. 57However, it was submitted that I ought accept that, necessarily, the existence of District Court proceedings in which TS was a respondent, would cause her annoyance, and also financial cost by way of the need to have legal representation in those proceedings. 58I accept that if TS chooses to be represented in the District Court, then she will incur a financial cost for the employment of her lawyers. 59However, there would be two respondents to the proceedings in the District Court. One would be TS. The other is Senior Constable Sands, who, by legislation, was the applicant in the Local Court in respect to the four children of TS. Senior Constable Sands did not appear separately in the proceedings in this Court. He filed an appearance submitting to the orders of the Court, except any order for costs. There is no reason to believe that Senior Constable Sands would not appear in the District Court and fulfil the role, fully, of a contradictor of the appeal. This would be without cost to TS. 60It is also necessary to keep in mind that, to the extent that an appeal causes any annoyance or financial detriment to TS, then those are the consequences, permitted by statute, in circumstances where TS has instituted proceedings for the extension of the ADVO, and has successfully achieved the result which she desired. It must necessarily have been within TS's contemplation that, by joining in as an applicant for an extension of the ADVO, any costs to be incurred either on that application, by her retaining independent lawyers, or else on an appeal, were part of the process which she initiated. Whether she would obtain an order for costs in her favour was quite uncertain at the time she commenced the proceedings. 61In those circumstances I do not regard any financial detriment as being of sufficient significance to allow a conclusion that the predominant purpose of Mr Bar-Mordecai is to harass, annoy or cause TS detriment. 62It then remains to consider previous conduct in which Mr Bar-Mordecai has engaged, including the commencement of proceedings in the Family Court of Australia with respect to obtaining access to his grandchildren. 63For the purposes of considering this issue, it can be accepted that the proceedings commenced by Mr Bar-Mordecai in the Family Court of Australia, in his attempt to obtain access to his grandchildren, which were wholly unsuccessful, caused annoyance and were harassing for TS. No doubt she did not wish to be exposed to them. No doubt she was anxious that he might succeed in obtaining the orders which he sought. 64However, the proposed proceedings in the District Court, are in a different category, and are of a different type. These proceedings concern directly an order against Mr Bar-Mordecai which has beneficial consequences for TS and her children. He has agreed, and the Court has imposed a condition, that the proceedings be conducted in a particular way. That is, by reference only to the Local Court record. In those circumstances, it seems to me that very little weight can be given to the past conduct of Mr Bar-Mordecai in the way in which he went about the conduct of other proceedings, which required to be proved by evidence adduced in those proceedings. 65I am not satisfied that his predominant purpose of conducting these proceedings in the way he offered, which is now controlled by a condition of the Court, is to harass, annoy or cause detriment to TS. 66Even if Mr Bar-Mordecai does not have a purpose sufficient to permit a conclusion that the proceedings, if instituted, would be vexatious proceedings, the Court must consider whether the proceedings would be conducted in a way which amounted to harassing, annoying or causing detriment to TS: see s 6(d) VP Act. 67Whilst I accept that there is a potential for that to occur, I am satisfied that the condition imposed will ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, that the proceedings will be conducted in a way which does not fall within s 6(d) of the VP Act. 68Accordingly, I am satisfied that the proceedings which are to be conducted in the District Court, by way of an appeal against the imposition of the ADVO, which proceedings are to be conducted by reference only to the Local Court record, are not vexatious proceedings. Summary 69For the reasons which I have expressed, I am satisfied that the proceedings to be instituted in the District Court are not vexatious, and that Mr Bar-Mordecai has one or more prima facie grounds for the proceedings. 70The proposed Notice of Appeal contains grounds which are not inappropriate, and in all of the circumstances, it is appropriate that leave be granted to commence the proceedings by the filing of a Notice of Appeal. 71It was for these reasons that I made the orders, which I did on 13 September 2013. Orders (1)Pursuant to s16(3) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, the Court grants leave to Mr Bar-Mordecai to commence proceedings in the District Court of NSW, by way of instituting an appeal, pursuant to s 84(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, to set aside orders made by Milledge LCM on 25 June 2013 in the Downing Centre Local Court. (2)Such grant of leave is subject to the following conditions: (a)the appeal is to be instituted within 14 days from the date of these orders, being 13 September 2012; (b)the appeal is to be instituted by the filing of an originating process which limits the grounds of the appeal to those grounds set out in the draft Notice of Appeal which is Exhibit A in these proceedings; (c)Mr Bar-Mordecai is not, without the further leave of this Court, first had and obtained, to make any application to the District Court for leave, pursuant to s 18(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, to give, or adduce fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal. (3)Reserve the question of costs. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 October 2013