Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Health Care Complaints Commission v Schmidt (No. 2) [2017] NSWCATOD 17 Hearing dates: 23 January 2017 Date of orders: 27 January 2017 Decision date: 27 January 2017 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Marks ADCJ. Principal Member Decision: The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent in the proceedings in an amount to be assessed by a costs assessor under the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act, 2014) in default of agreement. Catchwords: Unsuccessful appeal by HCCC – costs - constitution of the Tribunal - held usual rule that costs follow the event not displaced - costs order made Legislation Cited: Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, s165B, cl 13 of Schedule 5D Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, 2013, s4 Cases Cited: Health Care Complaints Commission v Schmidt [2016] NSWCATOD 145 Health Care Complaints Commission v Philipiah [2013] NSWCA 342 Mobile Innovations Limited v Vodafone Pacific Ltd [2003] NSWSC 423 Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534 Category: Costs Parties: Health Care Complaints Commission (Appellant) Dr John Andrew Schmidt (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: M Hall SC (Respondent) Solicitors: Health Care Complaints Commission (Appellant) Avant Law (Respondent) File Number(s): 1620005 Publication restriction: Non-publication order extending to the identification of any patient of the Respondent and the mother of Patient A REASONS FOR DECISION ON COSTS Background 1. These reasons for decision arise out of a decision of the Tribunal in Health Care Complaints Commission v Schmidt [2016] NSWCATOD 145. In that decision, the Tribunal was constituted by four members, and I was the presiding member. 2. In those proceedings, the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) brought an appeal from a decision of Delegates of the Medical Council of NSW who had dismissed Complaints brought against the respondent Dr John Andrew Schmidt. The Complaints, in turn, arose out of circumstances in which the respondent had attended a dinner party whilst on call as a locum Visiting Medical Officer in a regional New South Wales city. It was alleged that whilst at the dinner party, the respondent consumed an excessive quantity of alcohol "to a degree that impaired or could have impaired his skills and judgement while on call and/or while at work." During the proceedings, which extended over seven hearing days, the Tribunal heard a great deal of evidence from persons who attended the dinner party concerning the amount of alcohol that the respondent had consumed and his behaviour, as well as evidence concerning his attendance on a patient at the hospital later that night. Evidence was also given by expert medical practitioners concerning the conduct of the respondent and concerning the likely impact upon him of the alcohol which he had consumed. 3. In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal focused attention on the Complaints brought against the respondent, and the fact that they required the Tribunal to be satisfied to the relevant standard that the respondent was, at any material time, impaired or could have been impaired by reason of the amount of alcohol consumed by him. Having evaluated all of the relevant evidentiary material, we concluded that this Complaint considered by reference to the particulars had not been made out and that it should be dismissed. On this primary basis (the proceedings also alleged other associated misconduct), the appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the appeal, we specifically made the following observations (at [138]): We conclude that Complaint 1 and the particulars thereof have not been made out and that the Complaint should be dismissed. In so finding, we should not be taken in any way to have condoned the conduct of the respondent. Whilst on call, as we have found, he had consumed 5.85 standard drinks in a period of 3.5 hours. On the basis of the expert opinions of Doctors Challis and O'Connor, such conduct was described as being significantly below the standard reasonably expected of any medical practitioner whatever his or her level of training or experience and would thereby constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct under section 139B of the National Law. His misconduct was compounded because he put himself at risk of being impaired which created a consequential risk to the safety of the public, especially as the respondent was the only specialist obstetrician available on call at the hospital at that time. Fortunately for the respondent, the Complaint and particulars were not formulated in terms that the consumption of that level of alcohol over that period of time ipso facto constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct and it was this matter alone that allowed him to avoid any finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct. 1. We reserved costs with liberty to apply which has now been exercised by the respondent who seeks a cost order in his favour. Constitution of the Tribunal to deal with costs 1. For the purpose of considering this matter it is necessary that I refer to two legislative provisions. Section 165B of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (The National Law) provides: 165B Constitution of Tribunal for complaints, applications and appeals [NSW] (1) If a complaint is referred to the Tribunal or an application or appeal is made to the Tribunal under this Law- (a) the Tribunal must inform the Council for the health profession of the referral, application or appeal; and (b) the Council for the health profession must select 3 persons (whether or not they are currently Division members) to sit as members of the Tribunal in the proceedings. Note : Schedule 5 to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 provides the President must appoint a person as an occasional member for particular proceedings entered in the Health Practitioner List if that person has been selected for participation in the proceedings in accordance with any applicable procedures specified by or under this Law. If a person selected under subsection (1) (b) is not already a Division member, the President will be required to appoint the person as an occasional member in relation to the proceedings. (2) Except as provided by subsections (4), (5) and (5A), the Tribunal, when conducting an inquiry or hearing an appeal under this Law, is to be constituted by- (a) 1 Division member who is an Australian lawyer of at least 7 years' standing or, in the case of medical practitioner proceedings, 1 Division member who is a senior judicial officer; and (b) 2 health practitioners selected for appointment by the Council as occasional members under subsection (1) (b) who are registered in the same health profession as the health practitioner or student the subject of the inquiry or appeal; and (c) 1 lay person (that is, a person who is not registered in the health profession) selected for appointment by the Council as an occasional member under subsection (1) (b) from among a panel of lay persons for the time being nominated by the Minister. (3) If the health profession has divisions, at least one and, if practicable, both, of the health practitioners referred to in subsection (2) (b) must be registered in the same division of the health profession as the health practitioner or student the subject of the inquiry or hearing. (4) The Tribunal, when constituted to hear appeals under this Law that are restricted to points of law, is to be constituted by- (a) in the case of medical practitioner proceedings, 1 Division member who is a senior judicial officer; or (b) in any other case, 1 Division member who is an Australian lawyer of at least 7 years' standing. (5) The Tribunal, when constituted to exercise a function under section 146D or 148G, is to be constituted by a Division member selected by the Tribunal List Manager. (5A) The Tribunal, when constituted to make an ancillary decision or an interlocutory decision within the meaning of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 , is to be constituted by the Tribunal List Manager or the member referred to in subsection (2) (a). (6) A person is not to be selected to sit on the Tribunal if the person is a member of the Council. (7) An inquiry or appeal conducted or heard by the Tribunal under this Law may relate to more than one health practitioner or student if the complaint or complaints the subject of the inquiry or appeal arise from the same conduct. 1. It will be observed that subsection (5A) refers to an ancillary decision as defined in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, 2013. By section 4 of that Act, this expression is defined as follows: "ancillary decision" of the Tribunal means a decision made by the Tribunal under legislation (other than an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal) that is preliminary to, or consequential on, a decision determining proceedings, including: (a) a decision concerning whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with a matter, and (b) a decision concerning the awarding of costs in proceedings. 1. Accordingly, when dealing with this costs application, I alone constitute the Tribunal, as being the relevant person referred to in Sec 165B(2)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. 2. Neither party contended to the contrary. General principles applying to the discretion to award costs 1. The power to order costs is found in clause 13 of Schedule 5D to the National Law. It is in the following terms: 13 Tribunal may award costs [NSW] (1) The Tribunal may order the complainant (if any), the registered health practitioner or student concerned, or any other person entitled to appear (whether as of right or because leave to appear has been granted) at an inquiry or appeal before the Tribunal to pay costs to another person as decided by the Tribunal. (2) When an order for costs has taken effect, the Tribunal is, on application by the person to whom the costs have been awarded, to issue a certificate setting out the terms of the order and stating that the order has taken effect. (3) The person in whose favour costs are awarded may file the certificate in the District Court, together with an affidavit by the person as to the amount of the costs unpaid, and the Registrar of the District Court must enter judgment for the amount unpaid together with any fees paid for filing the certificate. (3A) The Tribunal may fix the amount of costs itself or order that the amount of costs be assessed by a costs assessor under the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 ) or on any other basis. (4) This clause applies instead of section 60 (Costs) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. 1. The parties were in agreement concerning the general principles which apply when considering the making of a costs order, but in disagreement about how they should be applied to the circumstances of these proceedings. 2. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Philipiah [2013] NSWCA 342 in the NSW Court of Appeal, Emmett JA (Meagher JA and Beech-Jones J agreeing) said, at [42]-[44]: As a general rule, costs of proceedings before the Tribunal should follow the event and mere impecuniosity is not a justifiable reason for departing from that rule. However, there are factors that might militate against the recovery by the Commission of all of its costs in particular proceedings. For example, one factor might be that the Commission failed to obtain findings of professional misconduct alleged, even though it obtained findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct. Another factor might be that the Commission failed to establish all of the particulars of professional misconduct alleged. Where discrete elements of the conduct complained of are not established, that may be relevant. A third factor might be oppressive conduct by the Commission in the way in which it prosecuted the proceedings before the Tribunal, such as taking procedural steps that gave rise to unnecessary expense in preparing for the hearing (see Lucire v Health Care Complaints Commission (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 182 at [48] - [52]). It has not been suggested by the Doctor that any of those factors applied. As the Tribunal observed in its reasons, the question of costs is discretionary. However, the discretion is a judicial one and must be exercised according to proper fixed principles and rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion. While it is not easy to state the precise principles that are to guide a court in exercising the discretion over costs, the discretion is only to be exercised where there are materials upon which to exercise it (Williams v Lewer (1974) 2 NSWLR 91 at 95). It is important when exercising the discretion to bear in mind that costs are intended to compensate a successful party. Costs are not intended to penalise an unsuccessful party. It is not an appropriate basis for the exercise of the discretion that an order for costs may cause hardship to the party against whom the order is made. 1. Of course, those proceedings concerned a successful prosecution of a Complaint by the HCCC. These proceedings concern the successful defence of a Complaint. To this extent, the examples provided of those circumstances which might militate against the general rule that costs should follow the event need to be qualified accordingly. 2. In the course of his submissions Mr Shah, solicitor, who appeared for the HCCC relied on observations of Einstein J in the Supreme Court of NSW in Mobile Innovations Limited v Vodafone Pacific Ltd [2003] NSWSC423. In dealing with the question of costs in those proceedings, Einstein J in an ex tempore judgment said, as contained within [4]: • Thus, the starting point is that plaintiff, having been successful, is entitled to its costs. It is for the defendants to establish a basis for departing from that rule. • It is certainly the case that a successful party who has failed on certain issues may not only be deprived of their costs on those issues but may be ordered as well to pay the other party's costs of them Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR 40–748 at 48,136. • Notwithstanding that the Court has power to deprive a successful party of costs, or even order a successful party to pay costs, that is a course to be taken in unusual cases and with a degree of hesitancy. For example: (a) Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16 (Jacobs J): "But trials occur daily in which the party, who in the end is wholly or substantially successful, nevertheless fails along the way on particular issues of fact or law. The ultimate ends of justice may not be served if a party is dissuaded by the risk of costs from canvassing all issues, however doubtful, which might be material to the decision of the case. ... I wish merely to lend no encouragement to any suggestion that a party against whom the judgment goes ought nevertheless to anticipate a favourable exercise of the judicial discretion as to costs in respect of issues upon which he may have succeeded, based merely on his success in those particular issues." (b) Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 259; (1993) 26 IPR 261 (Gummow, French and Hill JJ): "The propositions enunciated in [Hughes] are subject to the further consideration that justice may not be served if parties are dissuaded by the risk of costs from canvassing all issues which might be material to the decision in the case: Cretazzo ... at 12. In Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 28 ALR 201, Fisher J regarded the discretion to apportion costs as one to be exercised only in the most exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless he accepted that where a considerable part of the trial is taken up in determining issues upon which a party fails, it is a proper exercise of the discretion to reduce the costs allowed to that party." (c) Waters v PC Henderson (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, CA(NSW), Kirby, Mahoney and Priestley JJA, 40678/91, 6 July 1994) (per Mahoney JA): "Where the proceedings involve multiple issues the application of the rule that costs follow the event may involve hardship where a party succeeds on some issues and yet fails on others. Particularly is this so where, for example, a defendant succeeds on issues that occupied the bulk of the time taken by the proceedings. Nevertheless unless a particular issue or group of issues is clearly dominant or separable it will ordinarily be appropriate to award the costs of the proceedings to the successful party without attempting to differentiate between those particular issues on which it was successful and those in which it failed." (d) NRMA Ltd & Ors v Morgan & Ors (No 3) [1999] NSWSC 768 (Giles J): "Principles according to which some other order may be made are fairly well established. If a party fails on some issues, the circumstances may make it reasonable that he be deprived of the costs of those issues, or even be ordered to pay the other party's costs of those issues. For this purpose, issues may be issues in a pleading sense of bases of claim, or may be disputed questions of fact or law. But it must be remembered that parties should not be dissuaded by the risk of costs from canvassing all issues which might be material to the decision in the case, and unless a particular issue or group of issues is clearly dominant or separable from the balance of the proceedings it will ordinarily be appropriate to award the costs of the proceedings to the successful party without attempting to differentiate between the issues on which he was successful and those on which he failed. It is sufficient to refer to Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 12; Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (1986) ATPR 40-748 at 48,136; Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 259; (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 271-2; and Waters v P C Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd (NSWCA, 6 July 1994, unreported). (e) Doric Products Pty Ltd v Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 282 (Hely J): "The courts have cautioned against too ready a resort to apportionment according to issue based outcomes. See, eg, Australian Trade Commission v Disktravel [2000] FCA 62. Justice may not be served if the parties are dissuaded by the risks of costs from canvassing all issues which might be material to the decision in the case: Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16". • A recent application of the principle was by Barrett J in LMI v Baulderstone (No.2) [2002] NSWSC 72. In that case two plainly discrete claims were made by the plaintiff – a minor claim upon which the plaintiff was successful and the dominant claim upon which the defendant succeeded. His Honour considered the claims "were so separate and disassociated (although involving common witnesses) that I think they should be treated, for costs purposes, as if they had been the subject of separate trials". • Where the principle is applied it is generally not appropriate to order that costs be paid in respect of particular issues because "that would create a degree of artificiality, and would impose an extraordinarily difficult task upon any registrar faced with the need to tax costs, in default of agreement": Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vic) Inc (No 2) [2002] FCA 967 (Weinberg J). • Rather it is generally appropriate simply to apportion costs [SCR 52A rule 6(2)(a)] on the basis of "impression and evaluation: Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 259; (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272; LMI at paragraph 36. Mathematical precision is not required and the court will not attempt to be too technical or exacting in seeking to allocate costs: Dodds Family Investments at 272; NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 3) [1999] NSWSC 768 (Giles J) at paragraph 25; Madden as Liquidator of Aquanaut Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] NSWSC 1051 (Hamilton J) at paragraph 3; Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 22. Relevant factors include the relative time devoted to evidence and submissions on the competing issues: Hughes at 48-136; Waters at 5; Fexuto at 22-25; NRMA at paragraphs 31-47 and the relative success of the party in terms of its original claim: Abigroup v Peninsula (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016 (13 November 2001) at paragraphs 36-40; LMI at paragraphs 41-47. 1. I shall return to a consideration of some of the matters referred to in the above extract shortly. However, I observe that Einstein J was at pains to describe the various matters to which he referred as constituting exceptions to the general rule and as representing a departure from that rule, the basis for which must be established in these proceedings by the HCCC, and which departure is to be taken "in unusual cases and with a degree of hesitancy." The circumstances of these proceedings 1. In essence, there were a number of primary matters which were dealt with in the proceedings. These included: 1. The conduct of the respondent during the course of the dinner party 2. The conduct of the respondent whilst at the hospital later that night 3. Whether, and to what extent, the respondent was impaired at any stage because of the quantity of alcohol which he had consumed 4. The meaning of the expression "could have been impaired" contained within the Complaint and particulars 5. Whether the Tribunal could and should have determined whether the respondent was impaired or could have been impaired on the basis of "common knowledge", involving also a consideration of any necessary factual basis of a decision of the Tribunal 1. As will be seen from a reading of the reasons for decision, in the absence of any blood alcohol readings it was essential that the appellant adduce evidence concerning the conduct of the respondent during the course of the dinner party, including such evidence as was available as to the amount of alcohol which he consumed, as well as evidence concerning the conduct of the respondent later that evening at the hospital when he interacted with the patient, her mother and attending staff. 2. In the same way, it was essential that the appellant demonstrate to the relevant standard that the respondent was, or could have been, impaired. Accordingly, it was necessary that the appellant adduce expert opinion evidence concerning these matters and entirely appropriate that the respondent adduce expert opinion evidence in reply. Furthermore, it was the appellant who asserted that it was sufficient that the Tribunal apply "common knowledge" to the findings made by it concerning the quantum of alcohol consumed and the period over which this consumption occurred. These matters inevitably lead to a consideration of the appropriate factual basis for the decision. They also lead to a consideration of the manner in which some of the particulars had been framed. Is the general principle displaced? 1. In written submissions, the appellant noted that the respondent denied that he had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol and that he was unduly affected by alcohol. It was said that the findings made by the Tribunal that the respondent had consumed 5.85 standard drinks over a 3.5 hour period ipso facto constituted a rejection of the respondent's position. Accordingly, it was said that the appellant was justified in pursuing the Complaint by reference to this factual matter. The appellant further submitted that this Tribunal has a "role in upholding public confidence in the standards in the medical profession" and cited a number of cases in support. It was said that the overall findings of the Tribunal were clearly adverse to the conduct of the respondent who was, in effect, lucky to have escaped a finding of misconduct because of the manner in which the Complaint had been formulated. Furthermore, the appellant submitted that the condemnation of the conduct of the respondent by reference to the amount of alcohol consumed by him provided "guidance to the profession" and that this was "a relevant factor for the Tribunal to consider in its order as to costs." 2. In his submissions, the respondent relied on the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534. Those proceedings considered whether a successful defendant in summary proceedings before a magistrate should be entitled to a costs order against the informant. McHugh J, part of the majority, said (within [8]): Likewise, a successful defendant in summary proceedings has a reasonable expectation of obtaining an order for the payment of his or her costs because it is just and reasonable that the informant should reimburse him or her for liability for costs which have been incurred in defending the prosecution. Consequently, a magistrate ought not to exercise his or her discretion against a successful defendant on grounds unconnected with the charge or the conduct of the litigation. The fact that the informant has acted in good faith in the public interest or may have to meet the costs out of his or her own pocket is not a ground for depriving the defendant of his or her costs. Speaking generally, before a court deprives a successful defendant in summary proceedings of his or her costs, it will be necessary for the informant to establish that the defendant unreasonably induced the informant to think that a charge could be successfully brought against the defendant or that the conduct of the defendant occasioned unnecessary expense in the institution or conduct of the proceedings: cf. Ritter v. Godfrey (1920) 2 KB 47, at pp 53, 54-60, 66; Sunday Times Newspaper Co. Ltd. v. McIntosh [1933] NSWStRp 37; (1933) 33 SR(NSW) 371, at p 377; Redden v. Chapman [1949] NSWStRp 28; (1949) 50 SR(NSW) 24, at p 25; Schaftenaar, at pp 274-275; see also McEwen v. Siely (1972) 21 FLR 131, at p 136. Thus, non-disclosure to investigatory police of a tape recording later successfully used in cross-examination of the informant's witnesses may be a relevant matter to be taken into account in determining whether the defendant should be awarded costs: cf. Reg. v. Dainer; Ex parte Milevich (1988) 91 FLR 33. A successful defendant cannot be deprived of his or her costs, however, because the charge is brought in the public interest or by a public official, because the charge is serious or because the informant acted reasonably in instituting the proceedings or might be deterred from laying charges in the future if he or she was ordered to pay costs. Nor can the successful defendant be deprived of his or her costs because the conduct of the defendant gave rise to a suspicion or probability that he or she was guilty of the offence the subject of the prosecution. Hence, in most cases, the successful defendant in summary proceedings, like the successful party in civil proceedings, should obtain an order for costs in respect of those issues on which the defendant succeeds. 1. I accept the submissions of the appellant that, by analogy, it is appropriate to adopt the same approach to the exercise of discretion as to whether to order costs in these proceedings as was applied to summary proceedings before a magistrate in Latoudis. Accordingly, the public interest in the prosecution of the proceedings, the bona fides of the HCCC in bringing the proceedings, and the obiter observations of the Tribunal concerning the inappropriate consumption of alcohol by a medical practitioner whilst on duty do not, per se, detract from the application of the general principle that in normal circumstances costs should follow the event. 2. There can be no allegation brought against the respondent concerning his conduct in and about the defence of the proceedings as described by McHugh J in the extract above which would disentitle him to a costs order in his favour, and no such conduct was contended for by the appellant. 3. This leaves for examination the disentitling factors summarised by Einstein J in Mobile Innovations set out above. I am unable to discern that there was any "considerable part of the trial ... taken up in determining issues upon which (the respondent)" failed. The appellant relied upon the finding made by the Tribunal that contrary to the assertion of the respondent, he had consumed an inappropriate amount of alcohol. However, the amount of alcohol consumed was an element which had to be pursued by the appellant in prosecuting the proceedings. As it transpired, the factual finding made assumed no significance for the determination of the proceedings in the absence of expert or other evidence that would enable the Tribunal to be comfortably satisfied that the respondent was impaired or could have been impaired as alleged. In any event, this was but one of a number of overall issues which needed to be determined for the disposition of the proceedings. Accordingly, I reject the submissions of the appellant in this regard. 4. The primary position of the appellant was that the respondent should pay his own costs. The secondary position in the event that I concluded otherwise, as I do, was that the respondent should be entitled to an order of 50% of his costs only, based on the same considerations. Once I have concluded, as I do, that there is no good reason why the general principle should not be applied, it follows that there can be no good reason why a costs order should be restricted to 50%. This alternative submission is also rejected. 5. The overall result in these proceedings is that the respondent has successfully defended the Complaint brought against him as made and particularised. There is no reason why the general principle that he should be entitled to a costs order in his favour should not be applied, because there is no identifiable disentitling factor. Conclusion and Order 1. For the reasons set out above, I conclude that the appellant should pay the costs of the respondent in the proceedings 2. I order that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent in the proceedings in an amount to be assessed by a costs assessor under the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act, 2014) in default of agreement. I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 27 January 2017