District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Williams (2) [2018] NSWDC 168 Hearing dates: 25 June 2018 Date of orders: 25 June 2018 Decision date: 25 June 2018 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Berman SC DCJ Decision: Previous ruling will not be altered. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Whether offence under s 35(2) Crimes Act is an offence of "specific intent". Legislation Cited: Crimes Act Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 Cases Cited: McIlwraith v R [2017] NSWCCA 13 R v Brady [2012] NSWDC 222. R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80, R v Willliams [2018] NSWDC 163 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: The Crown Darryl Mark Williams Representation: Counsel: B Rowe (Crown) N Mikhaiel (Accused) Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Peter Murphy Criminal Law File Number(s): 2017/60992 Judgment 1. HIS HONOUR: Following the judgment I delivered on Thursday R v Willliams [2018] NSWDC 163 concerning whether an offence under s 35(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 is a crime of specific intent or not, this morning, the Crown drew my attention to a decision of his Honour Judge Blackmore, R v Brady [2012] NSWDC 222. I read this judgment and took the opportunity of drawing the attention of the parties to the decision of McIlwraith v R [2017] NSWCCA 13. I was not referred to the case by either of the parties, but became aware of it over it the weekend. 2. In the judgment I delivered last Thursday, I did note that I was aware of different judges of this Court having differing views as to whether an offence under s 35(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 was a crime of specific intent. The decision of Blackmore J is merely illustrative of that observation. 3. On the other hand, the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in McIlwraith v R is supportive of the conclusion I reached last Thursday, the Court there finding that an offence of intimidation under s 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 was an offence of specific intent. The Court held that the trial judge was wrong to regard the fact that knowledge of a likely result is a lesser requirement than an intent to cause a specific result meant that the offence her Honour was then dealing with was not a crime of specific intent. The Court adopted the reasoning in R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80, as did I in my earlier judgment. 4. The Court also referred to the practical considerations which were relied on in R v Grant, pointing to the complexity of jury directions if the charge could be based on specific intention and knowledge of likely consequences. The Court held that that in itself would be a significant reason to doubt that the legislation was intended to be understood the way the Crown would like me to understand it. 5. The result is that I will not alter the ruling I made last Thursday. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 June 2018