Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Winau Aust Pty Ltd v LCC Property Development Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 499 Hearing dates: 17 April 2019 Decision date: 17 April 2019 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Ward CJ in Eq Decision: 1. Notice of motion filed on 11 April 2019 dismissed. 2. Applicant to pay the costs of the motion. Catchwords: LAND LAW – Caveats – Application for extension of caveat Legislation Cited: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 126, 128, 129, 201M and 1274B Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), ss 43, 57, 58, 59 and 74K Real Property Regulation 2003 (NSW) Cases Cited: Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; [1988] HCA 16 Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248; [1998] HCA 12 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 Circuit Finance Pty Ltd v Crown & Gleeson Securities Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 997; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-143 Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Vimwise Civil Engineering Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 880; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-143 Jared v Clements [1902] Ch 399 Midland Bank Trust Co v Green [1981] AC 513 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited v Cox [2014] NSWCA 328 Sutherland v Vale [2008] NSWSC 759; (2008) 14 BPR 26,255 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Winau Aust Pty Limited (First Plaintiff) Shunjiyuan Investments Pty Limited (Second Plaintiff) 183 Eastwood Pty Limited (Applicant/named Third Plaintiff in proposed amended statement of claim) LCC Property Development Pty Ltd (First Defendant) 183 Eastwood Pty Limited as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust (named Second Defendant in original statement of claim) Scott Chan (Third Defendant) Titan Lending Group Pty Ltd (Fourth Defendant) Ippin Textiles Pty Ltd (Fifth Defendant) Jai He Family Investments Pty Ltd (Sixth Defendant) M Wang Family Pty Ltd (Seventh Defendant) Pollux Trading Pty Ltd (Eighth Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr J Foley(Rong Sheng, interested party) Solicitors: Francis Lim Barristers & Solicitors (Applicant) Bransgroves (Third to Fifth Defendants) File Number(s): 2018/00170894 Publication restriction: Nil Judgment 1. HER HONOUR: This is an application by notice of motion filed on 11 April 2019 by 183 Eastwood Pty Limited (named as the third plaintiff in the notice of motion and in the proposed amended statement of claim but as the second defendant in the original statement of claim) (183 Eastwood), for an order pursuant to s 74K of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) (Real Property Act) extending the operation of a caveat (caveat no AN865737) until the final disposal of the proceedings. The first and second plaintiffs in the proceedings are Winau Aust Pty Limited and Shunjiyuan Investments Pty Limited, respectively (collectively, with 183 Eastwood, the plaintiffs). 2. The caveat in question claims an estate or interest in three parcels of land in Eastwood. The estate or interest claimed in the land is described as follows: Estate in fee simple by virtue of transfer dated 25 February 2017 between 183 Eastwood Pty Limited and Rong Sheng Eastwood Pty Limited. 1. The details supporting the claim are set out in the caveat as follows: The Caveator was the sole registered proprietor of the Lands since 25/02/2017 until 12/11/2018. On 12/11/2018 the Registered Proprietor was registered as the registered proprietor of the Lands pursuant to a Transfer by Mortgagee Under Power of Sale. The mortgage is disputed by the Caveator. 1. A lapsing notice was issued in respect of the caveat and I understand the caveat will lapse in the very near future unless extended. 2. In support of the application for an extension of the caveat, 183 Eastwood relied upon an affidavit affirmed on 11 April 2019 of Mrs Rongjie Yuan, who has deposed that she is a director of 183 Eastwood and that she is duly authorised by 183 Eastwood to affirm the affidavit on its behalf. 3. Appearing, by leave, in order to resist the application for an extension of the caveat is the purchaser of the property, Rong Sheng Eastwood Pty Limited (Rong Sheng). Rong Sheng has been registered on the title to the property but is not joined as a party to the substantive proceedings in this Court. 4. There are also three entities who held mortgages over the properties and who transferred the properties to Rong Sheng in exercise of their power of sale. (There was no appearance for the mortgagees on this application. As I understand it, they neither consent to nor oppose the grant of the relief sought on this application.) (I have not sought to identify the mortgagees by reference to their status as defendants in the proceedings, mainly because the documents that have been filed appear inconsistently to number the various defendants, but the mortgagees in question are Ippin Textiles Pty Limited, Jia He Family Investments Pty Limited and M Wang Family Pty Limited (collectively, the mortgagees).) 5. The proceeding in respect of the underlying dispute was commenced by way of summons filed in this Court. Orders have been made for the matter to continue on pleadings and a statement of claim has been filed. 6. There is also on the Court file an amended notice of motion filed 14 February 2018 by the plaintiffs seeking, among other relief, orders for leave to be granted to the plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim in the form set out in an exhibit to an affidavit affirmed on 19 December 2018 of Mr Dominic Lim (Exhibit B on the present application). 7. Leave is also sought in the 14 February 2019 notice of motion to join Rong Sheng as a defendant in the proceedings. The claim against Rong Sheng, as proposed to be pleaded in the proposed amended statement of claim (see [70]ff), is to the effect that Rong Sheng was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice by reason of various matters, including the allegations that when it entered into the contract for sale it had actual or constructive notice of the plaintiffs' interest in the lands and had actual or constructive notice that 183 Eastwood was holding the lands as trustee for a unit trust (the Eastwood Unit Trust), and that the plaintiffs' dispute with the mortgagees under the three mortgages was not resolved. The proposed amended statement of claim sets out various particulars of the allegations of actual or constructive notice. 8. In respect of the allegation that when Rong Sheng entered into the contract for sale it had actual or constructive notice of the plaintiffs' interest in the lands, the particulars provided "rely upon and repeat the Particulars subjoined to paragraphs 50A and 50B". It is not wholly clear what is meant by this. 9. Paragraphs 50A and 50B of the proposed amended statement of claim are not particulars as such. Rather, they are pleaded allegations, the particulars of each being no more than references to the caveats. The paragraphs themselves allege: 50A on or about 16/04/2018, Winau lodged a caveat each over the whole of each of the Lands, claiming an equitable interest in the Lands arising from its contribution of $1,050,000 towards the purchase price of the Lands by 183 Eastwood. [Particulars omitted] 50B On or about 11/05/2018, Shunjiyuan lodged a caveat each over the whole of each of the Lands, claiming an equitable interest in the Lands arising from its contribution of $600,000 towards the purchase of the Lands by 183 Eastwood. [Particulars omitted] 1. In respect of the allegation that when Rong Sheng entered into the contract for sale on or about 6 September 2018, it had actual or constructive notice that 183 Eastwood was holding the lands as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust, and that the plaintiffs' dispute with the mortgagees under the three mortgages was not resolved, the following particulars are set out: (a) Rong Sheng had notice of the Freezing Order as well as the Affidavits affirmed by Chuangwei Chen and Rongjie Yuan both affirmed on 31 May 2018 because on 01/11/2018 it lodged a Request with the NSW Land Registry to remove the registration of the Freezing Orders from the titles to the Lands. (b) These affidavits mentioned, inter alia, the following matters: (i) Mr Scott Chan [the third defendant] had removed Mr Lin and Mr Lau as directors of 183 Eastwood and appointed himself as the sole director without the knowledge and consent or Mr Lin and Mr Lau. (ii) Mr Scott Chan applied for new certificates of title and use [sic] them to borrow $4million from several companies without the knowledge of Mr Lin and Mr Lau. (iii) Scott Chan opened a new bank account in the name of 183 Eastwood to receive the loan amount. (c) Rong Sheng provided a Bank cheque for the sum of $6,037,475.06 in the name of the Supreme Court of NSW at settlement although the orders dated 11/10/2018 ordered that the proceeds of sale would be held in the joint names of the Plaintiffs' previous solicitors and Summer Lawyers. 1. The proposed amended statement of claim also alleges that the purported settlement of the sale and transfer of the lands from the mortgagees to Rong Sheng was in contempt of a freezing order made on 31 May 2018 (see the proposed amended statement of claim at [71]). I will come back to that in due course. 2. At [72] of the proposed amended statement of claim, it is alleged that the conduct of Rong Sheng, in obtaining registration of itself as the proprietor of the lands, was a fraud on the plaintiffs to deprive 183 Eastwood of the lands which it held as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust. 3. At [73] of the proposed amended statement of claim, it is proposed to be pleaded that by reason of matters pleaded in various paragraphs of the pleading, the purported sale and transfer from the mortgagees to Rong Sheng was a sale and transfer to Rong Sheng of all rights and interests of the mortgagees under the three mortgages. (The pleading actually says "the 3 Mortgagees", but I assume that is a typographical error.) 4. The background to the dispute, as set out in Mrs Yuan's 11 April 2019 affidavit, and as summarised in 183 Eastwood's submissions dated 16 April 2019, is, briefly, to the effect that 183 Eastwood, acting as the trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust, purchased the three subject pieces of land in September 2016 and that 183 Eastwood (or, perhaps more precisely, the unit holders of 183 Eastwood) "through no fault of their trustee" are at risk of losing their lands as a result of the fraudulent conduct of a fraudster (who is identified as the second defendant in the amended notice of motion filed 14 February 2019 but elsewhere as the third defendant): [w]ho may have worked together with or into the hands of a group of loan sharks comprising Ippin Textiles Pty Limited, Jia He Family Investments and M Wang Family Pty Limited. 1. It is the belief of Mrs Yuan, as deposed to in her affidavit and which I have read solely as a submission, that: 43. I believe that the Mortgagees did not exercise their purported mortgagee's power of sale in good faith and their conduct in settling the sale of the Lands to Rong Sheng and causing Rong Sheng to be registered as the proprietor of the Lands is an attempt to deprive 183 Eastwood of the Lands which it held as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust. 44. There was no valid reason for the Mortgagees and Rong Sheng to settle the purported sale of the Lands in a hurry because: (a) The balance of the purchase price of $6,037,475.36 would be held in Court and (b) Rong Sheng was aware of the fraud and forgeries perpetrated by Mr Scott Chan. (c) Rong Sheng also knew that the dispute between the Mortgagees and the Plaintiffs in relation to the alleged loan and the 3 Mortgagees was not resolved because it produced a bank cheque for $6,037,475.36 in favour of the Supreme Court of NSW at settlement although the Order dated 11/10/2018 Ordered that the proceeds of sale would be held in the joint names of our previous Solicitors and Summer Lawyers … 45. I believe that Rong Sheng may have purchased the Lands as a nominee of the Mortgagees or any one of them and the sum of $6,880,000.00 or a substantial part of it may have come from the Mortgagees or any one of them or a combination of them. I believe that when Rong Sheng and the Mortgagees make full discovery of documents in this proceeding, it will reveal the source(s) of fund which Rong Sheng used to purchase the Lands. 46. I believe that Rong Sheng did not have the financial capacity to purchase the Lands for $6,880,000.00 in cash. 1. The three mortgagees registered mortgages dated 29 January 2018 over the lands. Those mortgages were in terms to secure the repayment of all moneys which 183 Eastwood was liable to pay pursuant to the terms and conditions of the said mortgages. 2. The position of 183 Eastwood is that at all material times the lawful directors of 183 Eastwood were Mr John Tak Ching Lau and Mr Eric Naijang Lan, and that each of them held fifty ordinary shares in 183 Eastwood. In evidence on the present application were copies of statutory declarations made by Mr Lau and Mr Lan respectively, in which they declare that certain documentation must have been created and executed fraudulently without their consent or knowledge and, among other things, declare that the signatures appearing as their signatures on the various documents are not their signatures and as to their respective beliefs that the signatures have been forged. 3. Mrs Yuan deposes that 183 Eastwood did not receive any part of the principal amount allegedly advanced by the mortgagees pursuant to the three mortgages; and it is alleged that the moneys advanced were remitted into a bank account opened by Mr Chan in the name of 183 Eastwood. Mrs Yuan deposes that Mr Lau and Mr Lan did not authorise Mr Chan to open the Westpac account and deposes that 183 Eastwood did not receive any valuable consideration for the mortgages. 4. Complaint is made by Mrs Yuan in her affidavit as to the notice of default issued in respect of the $4,000,000 loan purportedly granted by the mortgagees to 183 Eastwood. It is said that the purported notices of default are defective, void and have no remedy because the mortgagees did not advance any amount of money to 183 Eastwood and 183 Eastwood was not indebted to the mortgagees. Mrs Yuan also makes complaint as to the exercise or purported exercise by the mortgagees of the powers under the mortgages or under s 58 of the Real Property Act in relation to the sale of the land. 5. 183 Eastwood has filed detailed submissions raising a myriad of issues in relation to their application for an extension of the operation of the caveats, including: first, that the three mortgages are all money mortgages which secured nothing (in particular, reference being made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited v Cox [2014] NSWCA 328); second, that the acts of a "corporate hijacker" are not the acts of the corporation (submitting that the mortgagees cannot rely on the assumptions contained in ss 126, 128,129, 201M and 1274B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)); third, that the mortgagees were not entitled to exercise their power of sale under s 58(1) of the Real Property Act; fourth, that the registration of Rong Sheng as proprietor of the lands under s 59 of the Real Property Act ought be set aside because the sale was not authorised by s 58, read together with s 57(2) of the Real Property Act; fifth, that the registration of Rong Sheng as proprietor of the lands may be a contempt of court; sixth, that the conduct of Rong Sheng in obtaining registration as proprietor of the lands constituted a fraud in equity against 183 Eastwood or 183 Eastwood has an in personam claim against Rong Sheng (relying, on this point, on Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; [1988] HCA 16, Jared v Clements [1902] Ch 399, Midland Bank Trust Co v Green [1981] AC 513 and Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180); lastly, it is submitted that 183 Eastwood is not guilty of any postponing conduct. 6. As to the submission that the transfer and registration of the transfers is a contempt of the freezing orders, I note the following time frame in relation to orders made in these proceedings. 7. It appears that the matter first came before Lindsay J ex parte in the duty list on 31 May 2018 and the orders made by his Honour on that occasion were the freezing orders to which reference has been made. On that occasion, on various undertakings (in particular on the undertakings referred to in Annexure 8 to the orders and on the usual undertaking as to damages), his Honour ordered that, up to and including 4 June 2018 or further order, 183 Eastwood as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust (the second defendant in those proceedings) by itself, its servants and agents be restrained from dealing with (including further encumbering) the assets of the Eastwood Unit Trust except in the ordinary course of business or with the prior written consent of the solicitor for the plaintiffs. 8. The matter subsequently came back before the Court on 4 June 2018, on which occasion a freezing order was made against LCC Property Development Pty Limited (the first defendant) and an order was made that 183 Eastwood as trustee for the Eastwood Unit Trust be restrained from dealing with, including further encumbering, the assets of the Eastwood Unit Trust except in the ordinary course of business or with the prior written consent of the solicitor acting for the plaintiffs, with such order to have effect until 6.00 pm on 18 June 2018. 9. On 2 July 2018, the matter came before me in the duty list. On that occasion, I noted that the plaintiffs had that day terminated the retainer of their solicitors and there had been no representation for the plaintiffs on the return of the matter other than by a shareholder of the plaintiffs. Amongst other things, I extended the time for compliance with the requirement for serving affidavits in accordance with order 8 of the freezing orders on 18 June 2018 to 4.00 pm on Friday 6 July 2018 and extended orders 1, 2 and 3 made on 18 June 2018 (which included the freezing orders) up to and including Monday 9 July 2018. On that occasion, the undertaking was continued by Slattery J. 10. Subsequently, and after various appearances before the registrar and/or duty judges in the matter, on 13 July 2018, the freezing order made against the first defendant was extended until further order of the Court and the freezing orders made against the second and third defendants were also extended until further order of the Court. 11. The matter then came, after various other appearances, before Hallen J on 11 October 2018. Following that appearance, his Honour made orders in chambers (upon the plaintiffs by their counsel giving the usual undertaking as to damages), which included the following: 2. Orders, until further order of the Court, or the consent of the Plaintiffs and the 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants, that the 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants will pay, or cause their agents to pay, the proceeds of sale of the properties situated at and known as 179, 181 and 183 xxxxx, Eastwood (having Folio Identifiers xxxxx, xxxxx and xxxxx) after deduction of the usual adjustments and agent's fees and commission, into the controlled monies account, held in the joint names of Aitken Lawyers Pty Ltd and Summer Lawyers Pty Ltd. 3. Notes the agreement of the parties in Paragraph 2 above, that, on or before 18 October 2018, the first and second Plaintiffs shall provide Withdrawals of Caveats over the said properties referred to in Paragraph 2, to the 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants (or to their solicitors). 1. Relevantly, I note that those orders, which were made by consent, contemplated the payment of the proceeds of sale of the properties (after deduction of the usual adjustments and the like) into a controlled moneys account held in the names of two sets of lawyers and noted an agreement that, on or before 18 October 2018, the first and second plaintiffs would provide withdrawals of caveats over the said properties to the fifth, sixth and seventh defendants or their solicitors. 2. What next happened, relevantly, was that on 1 November 2018, when the matter was before Registrar Walton in the directions list, Registrar Walton made directions for the plaintiffs to file a statement of claim by 9 November 2018 and for the plaintiffs to file and serve by 9 November 2018 any notice of motion seeking to vary the orders that had been made. 3. A notice of motion was duly filed by the plaintiffs on 7 November 2018, seeking to vary the orders that had been made by consent by Hallen J on 11 October 2018 and seeking, among other things, restraining orders in relation to the proposed sale of the lands or exercise of any power of sale pursuant to the mortgages. 4. That notice of motion was not the subject of any contested hearing or determination because in the interim (the notice of motion having been listed for hearing on 15 November 2018) the sale of the properties was completed. 5. That is the background to the allegation that there has been some contempt by one or more of the other parties to the proceedings by reference to the sale. 6. Subsequently, the sale proceeds (or the bulk of the sale proceeds) have been paid into Court. Some of the sale proceeds, have been retained by and are held by a set of solicitors. Those orders were made on 15 November 2018 by Registrar Walton who ordered that a bank cheque provided to the solicitors for the third to sixth defendants in relation to the proceeds of sale be paid into Court. 7. The position taken by Rong Sheng in relation to the present application (it not being a party to the proceedings but having been served with the notice of motion on 11 April 2019), is that the discretion to extend the operation of the caveat pursuant to s 74K of the Real Property Act is only enlivened if the claimed interest has or may have substance. It is submitted that there is nothing in the caveat to indicate the nature of the claimed interest, nor is there anything in the evidence or supporting material filed on the present application which identifies the nature of the claimed interest in the land such as to enliven the discretion under s 74K of the Real Property Act. 8. Insofar as there is an allegation made that Rong Sheng was on constructive notice of a fraud on the part of Mr Chan or the mortgagees, reference is made to s 43 of the Real Property Act and to the decision in Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248; [1998] HCA 12. It is submitted that what is required is for there to be actual fraud and it is said that there is no allegation made of any fraud or conspiracy on the part of Rong Sheng and the mortgagees. 9. It is submitted that, in circumstances where there is no allegation that Rong Sheng has not paid the purchase price (and, therefore, there cannot be an allegation that the sale was a contrivance), there is no evidence that the sale was at less than market value other than the assertion to that effect in Mrs Yuan's affidavit; and that 183 Eastwood is here seeking to support the caveat in order to make enquiries as to whether or not Rong Sheng was acting as the nominee of the mortgagees. That, it is said, would not be sufficient to provide a basis on which the caveat should be extended. 10. It is further submitted that even if there were actual notice of Mr Chan's fraud, there would be nothing to put Rong Sheng on actual or constructive notice that the mortgagees were not exercising their legal rights as mortgagees exercising a power of sale or that that would give rise to any basis on which 183 Eastwood would have a claim to set aside the transfer of the title to Rong Sheng. 11. I should add that part of what is relied upon in the submissions by 183 Eastwood (and in the proposed amended statement of claim by the plaintiffs) as circumstances giving rise to actual or constructive notice of the fraud (and I note here that the fraud was very broadly described) was the suggestion that service of the freezing order (which made reference to an affidavit filed in the court proceedings) would of itself have put Rong Sheng on notice of the matters alleged in the affidavit. That seems to me not to take into account the fact that Rong Sheng is not a party to the proceedings and would have had no entitlement to have access to the court file in order to review the affidavit referred to in the freezing notice. 12. In response to that it was submitted by 183 Eastwood that Rong Sheng could have made enquiries through their solicitors. Suspicion is attached to the fact that Rong Sheng ,or its solicitors, made a large scale purchase only a few days after the Company's incorporation and with limited share capital, without making any such enquiries. 13. I should also note that Rong Sheng has submitted that if I were to be satisfied that the discretion to extend the operation of the caveat has been enlivened (because the caveat discloses an interest that has or may have substance), then it would seek to adduce evidence going to the prejudice that it will suffer if the caveat remains on title. I was informed from the bar table that Rong Sheng is a property development company intending to develop the land and at an advanced stage in relation to its application for finance in that regard and is seeking to market the properties off the plan and, in that regard, will suffer prejudice if the caveat remains on title. I do not take that into account circumstances where there is no evidence of any of those matters before me and I do not frankly understand why in the period from the time of service of the notice of motion there would not have been an opportunity for Rong Sheng to put on evidence of that kind. 14. In any event, I am not satisfied that the caveat in its present form has or may have substance. The caveatable interest claimed, as I have already set out, is "an estate in fee simple". In submissions, it appears that in effect that that is not the caveatable interest that is maintained (or sought to be maintained); rather, that what is asserted or sought to be maintained is some form of entitlement or equity to have the transfer set aside and the register rectified to have 183 Eastwood restored on the title as the legal owner of the property. 15. In Sutherland v Vale [2008] NSWSC 759; (2008) 14 BPR 26,255, Brereton J made clear (at [12]) that: The characterisation and description of the nature of the estate, interest or right claimed by a caveator is more than a mere formal requirement of the provisions of the Act, but goes to the heart and substance of their operation, because without a description of the estate, interest or right claimed, neither the Registrar-General nor a person reading the caveat can know whether a dealing would adversely affect the estate claimed, nor can the Court tell whether the caveator's interest has or may have substance. 1. There, the caveat in question simply identified the interest as "an equitable interest". Justice Brereton referred to the decision in Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Vimwise Civil Engineering Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 880; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-143, where Campbell J (as his Honour then was) had explained why a caveat which claimed merely an equitable interest was insufficient to specify the interest claimed by the caveator as required by the relevant provisions of the Real Property Act and the Real Property Regulation 2003 (NSW), and also referred to Circuit Finance Pty Ltd v Crown & Gleeson Securities Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 997; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-143 in that regard. 2. The difficulty I have with the description of the caveat in the present case is not dissimilar. It does not seem to me that the caveat properly records a claimed interest in the land that, on the material before me, can be said has or may have substance; and in those circumstances I accept the submission made for Rong Sheng that the discretion under s 74K of the Real Property Act is not enlivened and the application for an extension of the caveat should be dismissed. 3. I should add that, were I to have been otherwise of the view, that the jurisdiction was enlivened, then there would have been the issue to determine as to the prejudice that would be suffered by the respective parties if the caveat were to be extended, or not extended, as the case may be. This is a situation where the proceeds of sale are in large part held in Court and/or in the hands of solicitors and, therefore, to that extent quarantined. There will be an underlying (and no doubt ongoing) dispute in relation to various matters the subject of the allegations contained in the amended statement of claim and the proposed amended statement of claim but, at the end of the day, if 183 Eastwood's allegations are correct then there are funds available out of which it may be in a position to have a remedy in respect of the loss it has suffered as a result of the fraud. I accept that land is treated as being unique and that a monetary order may not fully compensate for any loss sustained as a result of the fraud, but in the circumstances I am not persuaded that it is open to me to (nor that I should), make an order extending the operation of the caveat. 4. Accordingly, I dismiss the notice of motion filed on 11 April 2019. I order the applicant, 183 Eastwood, to pay the costs of this motion, including the costs of Rong Sheng who has intervened to be heard on the motion. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 May 2019