Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Ho v Berger [2019] NSWCATOD 128 Hearing dates: 15 May 2019 Date of orders: 15 May 2019 Decision date: 22 August 2019 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Hon G Mullane ADCJ, Principal Member M Riordan, Senior Member E Hayes, General Member Decision: 15 May 2019: (1) The Applicants are to file and serve a list of expenses incurred within14 Days. (2) The Respondent is to file and serve any objections within 7 days of receipt of the list. (3) The Respondent must pay the Applicant, Tessalonica Ho, within 7 days $25,000.00 by way of compensation. (4) The Respondent must pay the Applicant, Andrew Ho, within 7 days $25,000.00 by way of compensation. 22 August 2019: (5) The Respondent must pay to the Applicant, Andrew Ho, the sum of $1,180.60 towards his costs of or incidental to these proceedings; and (6) The Respondent must pay to the Applicant, Tessalonica Ho, the sum of $ 1,007.60 towards her costs of or incidental to these proceedings. Catchwords: Professions and trades, Solicitor stakeholder, unethical and fraudulent dealing with deposit, unsatisfactory professional conduct, or professional misconduct, resulting in loss to aggrieved person. Compensation order by Tribunal. Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Act, 2004; Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW); Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act (2014) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Cases Cited: None cited Texts Cited: None Cited Category: Principal judgment Parties: Andrew H Ho (First Applicant) Tessalonica Ho (Second Applicant) Victor Berger (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: First Applicant (Self Represented) Second Applicant (Self Represented) Respondent (Self Represented) File Number(s): 2018/00122174 Publication restriction: Nil REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. Disciplinary proceedings against the practitioner were heard in 2017 and Stage one findings, including a finding that the Respondent was guilty of professional misconduct, were published on 21 September 2017. 2. In these proceedings the Law Society of New South Wales raised numerous grounds against the Respondent, including an allegation that he was guilty of unethical conduct in respect of a sum of $57,500.00, which he caused to be disbursed from the trust account of the law practice sometime after 16 August 2012. 3. As at 24 July 2019, the Respondent has not repaid any part of that amount to the Applicants. The Relevant Findings in The Disciplinary Proceedings 1. In the decision dated 21 September 2017, the Tribunal found that the relevant complaint by the Law Society was proved and that the Respondent's unethical conduct constituted professional misconduct. Ground 11 of the disciplinary application alleged: Use of deposit of Mr and Mrs Ho. Unethical Conduct-applying received monies in breach of the terms of the agreement under which they were received. 1. As at 16 August 2012, the Respondent was the sole director and shareholder of a company - Storey Street Development Pty Limited ("SSD"). SSD was undertaking a residential development at 4, 6 and 8 Storey Street, Maroubra ("the development"). The property which SSD made available for purchase was lot 1, 4 Storey Street Maroubra ("Lot 1"). 2. The Law Practice acted for SSD in respect of the development and sale of lot 1. As at 16 August 2012, the development was incomplete. On that day the Applicants, as purchasers, entered into a Contract for Sale of Land with SSD as the vendor, in respect of lot 1. The contract was in the form of a standard Contract for Sale of Land 2005 Edition with 23 special conditions. The total purchase price pursuant to the contract was $1,150,000.00. 3. The deposit payable pursuant to the contract was $57,500.00. The Applicants paid that deposit on 16 August 2012, to the Law Practice, as stakeholder. The Respondent then paid the deposit into the trust account of the Law Practice. 4. SSD sought to have a special condition in the contract that would allow it to have the use of the deposit between the date of exchange of contracts and the completion of the sale. A conveyancing clerk employed by the Law Practice had the conduct of the matter and the Respondent gave evidence that he did not read the contract or its special conditions before it was submitted to the Applicant's solicitors, or before he executed it on behalf of SSD, or before the contracts were exchanged. 5. Initially the Applicants did not agree to the release of the deposit, but negotiations were then conducted between the solicitors. On 10 August, Mr Paffas (the solicitor for the Applicants) advised the Law Practice that the Applicants wanted the contract to provide for a four-month to settle and only 5% of the price to be released to the vendor. On 14 August, Mr Paffas advised the Law Practice in writing that the Applicants wanted provision that the deposit could only be released "after the plan is registered at the Land Titles Office". There was evidence that the vendor agreed to this by telephone on 14 August, but the Law Practice advised Mr Paffas that it wanted provision for the vendor to be able to make minor variations to the plan. Mr Paffas agreed to this, subject to a provision that Applicants could rescind the contract if the total area of lot 1 became less than 400m² or if the back boundary was reduced. 6. Contacts were executed and exchanged on 31 August 2012. Special condition 12 made provision for the release and use of the deposit by the vendor and provided: Special Condition No. 12 – Release of Deposit (a) Notwithstanding any other provision hereof and particular (sic) clause 2 hereof, should the vendor require the whole or part of the deposit paid hereunder for use as a deposit on the purchase by the vendor of another property, stamp duty in respect of such property and such other reasonable disbursements in respect of such property, and the vendor shall be entitled to apply the whole or any part of the deposit hereunder for that purpose provided that the vendor's solicitor shall advise the purchasers' solicitor prior to applying the whole or any part of the deposit the following details:- (i) address of the property to be purchased by the vendor; (ii) the amount of the deposit hereunder to be applied to the purchase; and (iii) the manner in which the monies are to be held. The purchasers shall, if so required, provide the vendor's solicitor with an authority to the agent to give effect to the provisions of this clause." 1. No other special condition provided for the early release of the deposit. Clause 19 of the contract provided: Rescission of contract 19.1 If this contract expressly gives a party a right to rescind, the party can exercise the right – 19.1.1 only by serving a notice before completion; and 19.1.2 in spite of any making of a claim or requisition, any attempt to satisfy a claim or requisition, any arbitration, litigation, mediation or negotiation or any giving or taking of possession. 19.2 Normally, if a party exercises a right to rescind expressly given by this contract or any legislation – 19.2.1 the deposit and any other money paid by the purchase under this contract must be refunded. 19.2.2 a party can claim for a reasonable adjustment if the purchaser has been in possession. 19.2.3 a party can claim for damages, costs or expenses arising out of a breach of this contract; and 19.2.4. a party will not otherwise be liable to pay the other party any damages, costs or expenses." 1. On 16 August 2012, or later, without giving notice to the Applicants and without obtaining their authority, the Respondent used the whole of the deposit in to pay debts of himself and SDD. There is no evidence that SSD purchased any other property. Neither SSD, nor the Law Practice, nor the Respondent complied with special condition 12. 2. On 4 July 2014, SSD under the hand of the Respondent as its sole director, purported to rescind the contract by way of a notice of rescission. 3. On 8 July 2014, the Applicants through their solicitor, notified the Respondent that they did not accept the notice of rescission and that: 1. if the contract was validly rescinded, they were entitled to a refund of their deposit pursuant to clause 19 of the contract; and 2. if the contract was not validly rescinded, they would give consideration to a mutual rescission of contract upon receipt of a refund of the deposit. There is no evidence that the Respondent replied to that correspondence. 1. In the disciplinary proceedings the Tribunal found to the effect that by releasing the deposit from the Law Practice's trust account to SDD in breach of the terms of the contact, the Respondent applied and received trust monies in breach of the terms of the agreement under which they were received. It found that this conduct was dishonest, fraudulent, and seriously unethical and that it constituted professional misconduct. Compensation – Relevant Law 1. The application dated 8 October 2015, indicated as follows: 140: Mr and Mrs Ho have notified the Applicant they intend to seek leave of the Tribunal to lodge a claim for compensation in relation to the matters described in pars 117 – 139 above. (i.e. the facts alleged in relation to the ground). 1. However, it was only after the publication of the Tribunal's decision dated 5 January 2018, that the Applicants were given notice of that decision and the Tribunal invited to make an Application for Compensation. 2. The evidence of the Applicants is that they unsuccessfully attempted to recover compensation against the Respondent through the Fidelity Fund and incurred substantial legal costs as a result of those proceedings. It is possible that their application failed because the Respondent was not acting as their lawyer and the Fidelity Fund was not liable to indemnify them in respect of his conduct regarding the release and use of the deposit. 3. Section 302 (1) (k) of the Uniform Law provides that where the Tribunal has completed a disciplinary hearing and made a finding that the lawyer is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, it may make "a compensation order against the lawyer in accordance with Part 5.5". 4. Pt 5.5 of the Uniform Law comprises ss 306 – 311. Section 306 provides that the Tribunal has authority to make a compensation order for purposes of s 302. s 306(2) of the Uniform Law enables the Tribunal to make a compensation order against the practitioner in accordance with Pt 5.5 of the Act. Under s 307, a complainant can request the Tribunal to make a compensation order in respect of a loss suffered by the complainant because of the conduct the subject of the complaint. Section 307 describes the complainant as "an aggrieved person" and requires them to describe the loss suffered. Leave to request compensation 1. Under s 307(5) of the Uniform Law, the Application for Compensation by the aggrieved person cannot be made after disciplinary proceedings have been initiated in the Tribunal with respect to the complaint unless the Tribunal grants leave to make that application. 2. The Tribunal made orders in the disciplinary proceedings on 5 January 2018 and the Applicants filed their Application for Compensation on 18 April 2018. However, the Applicants, who are Indonesian immigrants with limited English language skills, applied for leave to commence the current proceedings during a directions hearing on 6 August 2018. Leave was granted at that time. 3. On 6 June 2008, the Application for Compensation was first listed for directions before Judge Boland and her Honour made the following orders: (1) Victor Berger is to give to the Tribunal and the other party the following material - a Reply - on or before 13 July 2018; (2) Victor Berger is to give to the other party the following material on or before 3 July – affidavit evidence on which that party relies; (3) The proceedings are Iisted for hearing at a date and time to be advised by the same panel that heard the proceedings in Council of the Law Society of NSW v Berger. It is noted that the parties will provide in writing a list of their available dates in August and September to the Registrar to facilitate the fixing of the hearing dates; and (4) It is noted that the Applicants for compensation seek compensation in the maximum sum payable under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); (5) The hearing date of 20 August was confirmed. 1. On 9 August, the Respondent's solicitors wrote to the Applicants and sought their agreement to the hearing date being changed to "after 18 October" because the Respondent's appeal to the Court of appeal had been listed for hearing on 18 October 2018 and "one of the matters sought to be appealed is the findings in relation to your claim". The Applicants did not agree to an adjournment of the hearing and on 14 August, the Tribunal confirmed that the matter was listed for directions on 16 August. 2. On 16 August 2018, the Respondent again sought an adjournment of the hearing (listed for 20 August) to a later date. Mr Kaalyk, counsel for the Respondent, stated that the adjournment was sought because the Court of Appeal's decision was still not available and the Tribunal's finding about the Respondent's use of the deposit was a subject of that appeal. He argued that the hearing of the Application for Compensation should be deferred until the appeal decision was available. The tribunal vacated the hearing date of 20 August and the matter was adjourned for further directions to a date after 30 October. 3. The Tribunal noted that despite the orders dated 16 June 2018, which required the Respondent to file and serve a Reply and any affidavit evidence on which he relied by 13 July 2018, he did not comply with those orders. Further, his solicitors had not filed a Notice of Address for Service. He had not repaid any of the deposit and there was a possibility that a limitation period applied in respect of the Application for Compensation. Section 36 of the Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ("the CAT Act") provides that the guiding principle of the CAT Act and the procedural rules is "to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings". Further, s 41 of the CAT Act provides: 41 Extensions of time (1) The Tribunal may, of its own motion or on application by any person, extend the period of time for the doing of anything under any legislation in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite anything to the contrary under that legislation. (2) Such an application may be made even though the relevant period of time has expired." 1. Accordingly, the Tribunal granted the Applicants leave to make their Application for Compensation by way of the application filed on 18 April 2018. 2. The Tribunal conducted a further directions hearing on 9 November 2018, at which the Respondent was represented by his Solicitor, Mr Simons and the Applicants appeared in person. Mr Simons stated that the Court of Appeal had still not published its decision and that the Respondent wanted a further adjournment. 3. The Tribunal further adjourned the matter and ordered the Respondent to file and serve any affidavit or other document on which he relied before 21 January 2019. It also ordered the Applicants file and serve any Application for leave that they wished to make, in order to allow then an opportunity to address any doubt concerning the validity of the Tribunal's grant of leave dated 16 August 2018. The matter was adjourned for a one-day hearing on a date to be fixed by the Registrar after 21 January 2019, and it was subsequently listed for hearing on 15 May 2019. Further Application for Adjournment 1. On that hearing date, all parties appeared without legal representation and informed the Tribunal that they could not afford legal representation. The Applicants were assisted by a certified interpreter. 2. The Respondent applied for an adjournment on the basis that the Court of Appeal's decision had not been published. The Tribunal noted that the Court of Appeal had, by way of courtesy, provided it with a copy of the Notice of Appeal. We further noted that contrary to the representations previously made by the Respondent and his legal representatives, the Notice of Appeal disputed on this ground only the finding of professional misconduct instead of unsatisfactory professional conduct. That was not relevant to the hearing of the Application for Compensation. The Notice of Appeal did not dispute the Tribunal's findings of fact in relation to his conduct or that his conduct regarding the release and use of the deposit was dishonest, fraudulent and unethical. 3. The Respondent then argued that the Tribunal should grant his application for an adjournment because he had come to the Tribunal "totally unprepared for a hearing because his solicitor, Mr Simons, told him to do so and advised him to ask for an adjournment on the basis that the appeal decision was not yet available and he was unqualified to appear for himself." However, the Tribunal noted that Mr Simons sent a letter to the Tribunal on 6 May 2019, stating that he had ceased to act for the Respondent in these proceedings. 4. We provided the Respondent with an opportunity to contact Mr Simons with a view to obtaining confirmation from him that he had advised the Respondent to not prepare for a hearing on 15 May 2019. However, the Respondent stated that even if an adjournment was granted, he would still not have any funds to meet the costs of legal representation. It therefore appeared that despite Mr Simons' apparent withdrawal from the proceedings some eight days previously, the Respondent made no attempt to prepare for the hearing. We further note that in the decision following the disciplinary proceedings, the Tribunal noted that the Respondent had extensive experience in litigation that was conducted in Australian Courts and his situation was considerably different to most self-represented litigants who appear in this Tribunal. 5. The Respondent and the Tribunal's Registry staff attempted to contact Mr Simons by telephone on numerous occasions. However, we were informed by the Registry staff, and verily believe, that their calls to Mr Simons' office were not answered and that they left voicemail messages asking him to return their calls urgently. The Respondent also informed the Tribunal that he had: 1. unsuccessfully attempted to call Mr Simons on his mobile telephone and had left voicemail messages asking him to return the call; 2. spoken to a member of Mr Simons' staff and asked them to locate him and request that he contact the Tribunal; and 3. sent a text message to Mr Simons asking him to call him urgently. 1. The Respondent continued to assert that Mr Simons had advised him to attend the Tribunal unprepared to participate in the hearing and to apply for a further adjournment pending the publication of the Court of Appeal's decision. He then stated that he terminated Mr Simons' retainer "because I could not pay him" and that he was unable to pay the Applicants "a cent" or for any costs that they incurred if the Tribunal granted a further adjournment. 2. The Tribunal refused the Respondent's application for a further adjournment and the hearing commenced at 11:35 am, after more than an hour was spent attempting to contact Mr Simons. The Tribunal did not accept the respondent's allegation without corroboration that Mr Simons advised him to attend without representation or preparation and ask for a further adjournment. We found, based upon Mr Simons' letter to the Tribunal, that he had ceased to act for the Respondent and that the Respondent then decided to appear for himself and apply for an adjournment without preparing for the hearing. The hearing concluded at about 1.20 pm, by which time Mr Simons had not returned any of the calls that were made to him. The Evidence 1. The Applicants signed, filed and served a statement on 18 November 2018, and on 21 January 2019, Mr Simons filed and served a Reply on behalf of the Respondent. Otherwise, the evidence in the Application for Compensation comprised: 1. The Tribunal's stage one decision dated 21 September 2017; 2. The Tribunal's Stage two decision dated 5 January 2018; 3. The Application for Compensation filed 18 April 2018; 4. The Tribunal's orders dated 6 June 2018, 14 August 2018, 16 August 2018 and 9 November 2018; 5. The lLetter from Court of Appeal to Tribunal enclosing copy of the Notice of Appeal; 6. The oral evidence of Andrew Ho; 7. The oral evidence of Tessalonica Ho; 8. The oral evidence of the Respondent 9. The Applicants' particulars and costs claims dated 20 May 2019; and 10. The Respondent's response dated 22 May 2019. 1. The Application for Compensation pleaded that "Victor Berger has been found guilty of professional misconduct and dishonesty by NCAT by using our deposit contrary to special condition 12 of the Contract for Sale of property". It sought orders for "Reimbursement of $75.711 (Deposit $57,500.00, Interest $14,500.00, Legal Costs $3,700.00)." 2. The Applicants each gave sworn evidence that their statements dated 18 November 2018 were true and correct and that they each sought compensation for the losses that they suffered. They stated that they were both in paid employment and that when they entered into the contract for the purchase of lot 1, they both borrowed the whole of the deposit monies of $57,500.00 from Westpac Bank on an interest only loan. The interest at 4.5 % per annum they had paid on the loan was already $14,500.00 at the time of the Application but by 15 May 2019 they had paid interest of about $18,571.45. Therefore, they had suffered a loss totalling $76,071.45, comprising the principal and interest, which equated to a loss of $38,035.72 for each Applicant. 3. The Applicants also claimed $3,700.00 in the application for legal costs that they had incurred in relation to their unsuccessful claim against the Fidelity Fund. They particularised these costs and also provided copies of invoices totalling $11,571.45, which included fees for two barristers and three firms of solicitors However, those fees were not a loss that resulted from the Respondent's professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct regarding the release and use of the deposit monies, but resulted from poor legal advice that was provided to the Applicants. 4. During the hearing the Respondent was given opportunity to cross-examine each of the applicants, and he asked them some questions, although he maintained that he was "not equipped or qualified" to question Mrs Ho. 5. The Respondent gave oral evidence, but stated that he would do so based upon an affirmation only because he was not prepared to provide an oath without a Bible. He complained that irrelevant matters continued to be raised in the hearing and maintained that he was "not equipped or able to give evidence" and, "I have nothing to say". He said, "I have not had opportunity to have an adjournment." The Tribunal asked him whether he had instructed Mr Simons to file an affidavit by the Respondent and he replied, "Absolutely". However, he did not seek to rely upon any statement or affidavit that he had sworn or affirmed and only filed submissions on his own behalf. We asked the Respondent if he wished to say anything about delaying the hearing. He replied, "No, I'm not equipped to." However, he then said, "I would have had a barrister without a solicitor to save money". 6. The Respondent stated that he is living on "the pension" and is also driving for Uber using his car. However, the Tribunal noted that during the disciplinary proceedings he gave evidence that he was working as a mediator and that in his email to the Tribunal dated 22 May 2019, which responded to the material lodged by the Applicants regarding their costs of these proceedings, he described his occupation as "Mediator and Arbitrator". The Tribunal asked the Respondent whether he wished to say anything about whether he should pay compensation to the Applicants? He replied, "I'm not qualified". When asked whether he wanted to say anything in reply to the Applicants' evidence, he replied, "No". However, he then stated: I have tried to satisfy the Tribunal a number of circumstances to demonstrate my absolute integrity. I'm unable to do it. That troubles me seriously. He said he feels "deep contrition" for what he has suffered, although he did not express any contrition for his conduct or for the applicants. 1. Section 309 (1) of the Uniform Law provides: Unless the complainant and the respondent lawyer or law practice concerned agree, a compensation order is not to be made unless the designated local regulatory authority or designated tribunal (as the case requires) is satisfied that-- (a) the aggrieved person has suffered loss because of the conduct concerned; and (b) it is in the interests of justice that the order be made. 1. Further, s 308 (2) of the Uniform Law provides: A compensation order may include an order that the respondent lawyer or law practice pay to the aggrieved person, by way of monetary compensation for the loss, a specified amount not exceeding- (a) where the compensation order is made by the designated local regulatory authority--$25,000.00; or (b) where the compensation order is made by the designated tribunal--$25,000.00 or a greater amount agreed to with the consent of both the complainant and the respondent lawyer or law practice. 1. During the hearing, the Respondent refused to consent to any award of compensation in favour of either Applicant that exceeded $25,000.00. 2. As the Tribunal was satisfied that was is in the interests of justice to make a compensation order in favour of the Applicants, on 15 May 2019, we ordered the Respondent to pay compensation of $25,000.00 to Mr Ho and compensation of $25,000.00 to Mrs Ho. Costs 1. The Tribunal reserved the issue of costs and made orders for the parties to file and serve submissions. 2. The Applicants seek an order for costs against the Respondent and provided particulars and evidence regarding their costs on 20 May 2019. We note that they did not claim travel expenses for their attendance at the directions hearings and hearing of the Application for Compensation, but they did seek reimbursement for wages lost as a result of those attendances ($1,180.60 for Mr Ho and $1,007.60 for Mrs Ho). 3. The Respondent did not dispute the amounts claimed by the Applicants, but in his response dated 22 May 2019 Dear Registrar, Thank you for the attached. It is my intention to appeal against orders 2, 3, and 4. Consequently, I will not be complying with these orders. I so informed on 15 May at the Tribunal Mr and Mrs Ho through their interpreter of that. I would appreciate you informing Mr and Mrs Ho of this email as soon as you are able. Kindly prove (sic) me with a copy of the reasons as soon as possible. 1. Section 60 (1) of the CAT Act sets out a general rule that parties to proceedings in the Tribunal pay their own costs of or incidental to the proceedings, but s 60 (2) provides for costs to be ordered where there are "special circumstances warranting an award of costs". Section 60 (3) lists the factors that the Tribunal must have regard to in deciding whether there are special circumstances and the Tribunal has we have had regard to the following such circumstances: * The Respondent unnecessarily disadvantaged the Applicants when legally represented by delaying the hearing by making a number of adjournment applications that had no merit, while the Applicants were not legally represented and had a language disadvantage; * The Respondent's conduct during the hearing, including his further adjournment application that was without merit, unnecessarily prolonged the hearing; * The Respondent's defence of the Application for Compensation was without merit; and * The Respondent did not comply with the duty imposed by s 36 (3) of the CAT Act, which provides: (3) Each of the following persons is under a duty to co-operate with the Tribunal to give effect to the guiding principle and, for that purpose, to participate in the processes of the Tribunal and to comply with directions and orders of the Tribunal: (a) a party to proceedings in the Tribunal, (b) an Australian legal practitioner or other person who is representing a party in proceedings in the Tribunal. 1. Schedule 5 of the CAT Act applies to proceedings conducted in the Occupational Division and cl 23 (1) provides that despite s 60 of the CAT Act, the Tribunal must make a costs order against a lawyer in proceedings where it has found the lawyer guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, unless exceptional circumstances exist. 2. While we note that in relation to the Tribunal's finding concerning the Respondent's use of the deposit monies, the Notice of Appeal challenges the finding of professional misconduct but concedes that it is unsatisfactory professional conduct. 3. There is no evidence before the Tribunal us that establishes any exceptional circumstance and it is appropriate to make a costs order against the Respondent pursuant to s 60 (3) and/or cl 23 (1) of Sch 5 of the CAT Act. Orders 1. Accordingly, the Tribunal makes the following orders: 15 May 2019: 1. The Applicants are to file and serve a list of expenses incurred within14 Days. 2. The Respondent is to file and serve any objections within 7 days of receipt of the list. 3. The Respondent must pay the Applicant, Tessalonica Ho, within 7 days $25,000.00 by way of compensation. 4. The Respondent must pay the Applicant, Andrew Ho, within 7 days $25,000.00 by way of compensation. 22 August 2019: 1. The Respondent must pay to the Applicant, Andrew Ho, the sum of $1,180.60 towards his costs of or incidental to these proceedings; and 2. The Respondent must pay to the Applicant, Tessalonica Ho, the sum of $ 1,007.60 towards her costs of or incidental to these proceedings. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 August 2019